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Summary 
 
This thesis explores whether or not it is possible to positively inflect – via digital means – 
people’s orientations toward nature through connecting their duration to the time of animals. 
The thesis opens with an overview of the contemporary environmental crisis, mapping related 
significant discourses, events and responses from the early 1960s onward. In this regard, after 
thematizing the relatively ineffective global institutional response to the environmental crisis 
to date – in spite of both consistent criticisms proffered by a range of stakeholders and widely 
available information on the scope of current environmental degradation – the lack of any 
concerted effort to deal with this issue is accounted for in terms of the dimensions of what 
Kilbourne, Beckmann and Thelen refer to as the ‘Dominant Social Paradigm’ (DSP). 
However, it is argued that of these dimensions, the technological dimension is most amenable 
to pro-environmental inflection, particularly through recent developments within information 
technology. That is, despite the latter being the privileged technology of neoliberalism, and 
despite the environmental cost of its current material infrastructure, it is also highly unlikely 
that societies will abandon their dependence on information technology in the near future. 
Given this, the importance of considering how such technology can be harnessed to positively 
re-orientate users’ perceptions of the natural world, in a way that also avoids the pitfall of 
technophilia, is advanced. In terms of this, both positive and negative appraisals of 
information technology by prominent new media theorists are discussed, and information 
technology is put forward as a tool that remains indeterminate in terms of its use. After this, 
and with a view to exploring how the technological dimension of the DSP might possibly be 
inflected in a pro-environmental manner, the thesis draws on the works of Gilles Deleuze and 
Félix Guattari who promote desire and difference outside the ambit of capitalism, particularly 
through desubjectivation in relation to their concept of ‘becoming-animal.’ Finally, after 
dealing in addition with some potential theoretical challenges to the application of Deleuze’s 
ideas within the digital realm, focus shifts to three contemporary digital artefacts which have 
the capacity, albeit to varying degrees, to facilitate a becoming-animal. In this regard, a 
distinction is made between those artefacts that precipitate first-, second- and third-order 
hybrid durationality, and it is argued that the latter category presents the greatest promise of 
interfacing the time of humans with the time of animals. 
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Introduction 
Just over four years ago, my wife showed me a curious application on her smartphone. I was 
admittedly only vaguely interested at the time, and watched somewhat impatiently as the 
phone struggled to load the new app. What appeared once it had loaded was a confusing set 
of points mapped out along the southern coastline of South Africa. We zoomed in toward the 
digitally-represented shores of the Eastern Cape, and zeroed in on the waters of Port 
Elizabeth. And as we did so, the points – or rather, dots – appeared less frequently along the 
map. This did not trouble me at first, and I remained only marginally focused on the visuals 
in front of us, and asked the question I should perhaps have asked up front: “So, what are 
these dots?” My wife grinned in anticipation of delivering a surprising revelation, and then 
replied: “Sharks active, right now, right here in PE.” We zoomed in as close as we could, and 
sure enough, there was one coasting along in Algoa Bay, but none lurking around Pollock 
Beach and Sardinia Bay. Another, though, seemed to be getting really close to the shore at 
Jeffrey’s Bay. The tagged sharks had names, and you could track them exclusively – if an 
individual shark passed a receptor beacon, a signal would be sent to the user’s phone. We 
picked one whose name I don’t remember, and waited for a ping from the netherworld; it did 
not come, and after a few minutes it struck me as incredibly strange that we had been sitting 
at a phone, waiting for a message from a shark. But late that night, as I was reading, her 
phone pinged, and I experienced a strange sense of wonder at the thought that out there in the 
cold darkness of the ocean, slowly and silently, a great white leviathan was moving forward 
through space and time – and into my time and space through the message it had just sent to 
us. Probably on account of the many uncomplimentary images of sharks spread through 
popular culture and the mass media, I had up until that point regarded them as rather 
loathsome creatures, who chiefly comprised a threat to the health and wellbeing of humans. 
But in that moment I encountered one differently, as a creature in its own world, quietly 
pursuing its own ends, without compassion, without remorse, without hatred; a perfect 
predator who beneath the bioluminescent surface of the water appeared to me for the first 
time beautiful.  
 At the time I was preparing for doctoral study, and reading up on environmentalism 
and the current ecological crisis, and I was profoundly dismayed by the many shocking 
statistics and descriptions of the immense degradation around us. But I was also struck by the 
fact that, despite all the information available and easily disseminated via the internet, 
environmental degradation continues to increase exponentially. Moreover, despite new media 
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being heralded by so many as the medium that could precipitate the requisite change, and 
correlatively – on a more immediate level – despite the plethora of ‘likes’ generated 
whenever someone posted an environmentally-themed message or picture on Facebook, no 
significant positive re-orientation toward nature seemed to be underway. It was as if a 
disjuncture prevailed between how we virtually live today, through our information 
technology, and the actual world around us. But remembering my poignant late night 
encounter with a shark, my thoughts turned to the possibility that certain digital artefacts 
might possibly have the potential to more powerfully inflect attitudes toward environmental 
care, not simply through providing information on nature, but through connecting human and 
animal time, in a way that renders conspicuous how our lives are inextricably intertwined 
within the same great duration. However, this begged a number of theoretical questions and 
posed a number of correlative problems, and in the following thesis I have sought to answer 
and address them, respectively.  
Firstly, the question of what force or dynamic was so powerfully inflecting attitudes 
against nature, emerged. And with a view to answering this, in Chapter One, the 
environmental crisis is discussed at length. The idea of the environmental crisis first found 
articulation in the Western world in the 1960s, and its entry into the realm of public concern 
can arguably be tied to Rachel Carson’s evocative text Silent Spring, which reported on the 
destructive effects of the pesticide DDT on the natural environment, and relatedly, on human 
beings. In addition, a number of environmental disasters in the latter part of this decade, in 
conjunction with the emergence of the first photos of the earth from space – all of which were 
chronicled extensively by the mass media of the time – saw pro-environmental discourse 
become a major talking point across society. In turn, this expansion of environmental 
awareness prompted the demand for institutional responses, and from the 1970s onward, 
national and international policy-makers began to explicitly acknowledge the severity of the 
environmental degradation around them, and to thematize the need to address the matter 
through institutional change. However, despite at least one major multi-national conference 
per decade from the 1970s onward, such efforts were severely undermined each time; 
initially, by era-specific geopolitical quandaries related to the Cold War, and later, by the 
emergence and rise to dominance of the economic discourse of neoliberalism, the principles 
of which remain largely incongruent with concerns over environmental degradation. And 
current statistics continue to saliently demonstrate the disastrous effects of this incongruence; 
indeed, the degradation of nature today is both greater than ever before, and rapidly 
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increasing in its parameters. Thus, ironically, despite the publicity and legitimacy afforded to 
the environmental crisis by the mass media, both then and today, the situation is now worse 
than ever. And even though we are all aware of it, simultaneously, most continue to act as if 
it does not exist. As will be advanced toward the end of the chapter, this problematic partial 
amnesia can be accounted for in terms of Kilbourne, Beckmann and Thelen’s idea of the 
Dominant Social Paradigm or DSP, which discursively informs contemporary subjectivity in 
a way that prejudices it against the natural environment. Furthermore, due to the rise to 
hegemonic status of neoliberalism since the 1990s, this paradigm is now effectively 
ubiquitous; a fact which has rendered everyone – from those in unequivocal support of free-
market economics to the most vehement social greens and bioenvironmentalists – complicit 
in at least some or other way with the DSP, not least because of the latter’s technological 
dimension which all rely on for communication.    
Secondly, in relation to the above, the question emerged of whether or not one can 
make use of such technological means – in particular, information technology – to engage 
with and alter destructive orientations toward the environment. And Chapter Two is a 
reflection on some of the more immediate challenges to heralding information technology as 
an agent of remedial change within the context of the environmental crisis. In this regard, as 
will be discussed, firstly, information technology is inextricably linked with the spread of 
neoliberal economic discourse and practice, and secondly, it is intertwined with both 
environmental and social degradation on account of the resources and infrastructure required 
to keep it operative. However, while the above two issues remain problematic, it is also 
highly unlikely that contemporary society will abandon its reliance on information 
technology in the near future. As such, it will be argued that rather than trying to operate 
against or without reliance on information technology, we should instead attempt to find 
ways to employ it in a more environmentally benign or positive way. Admittedly, immense 
caution must be taken here, because as Kilbourne, Beckmann and Thelen rightfully warn in 
relation to their conception of the DSP, the technological dimension that exists within it is 
both predicated upon and promotes the idea of, a technofix. In short, a belief that technology 
can always be relied on to save us – albeit from ourselves – at some point, even as we 
continue to destroy the planet. Accordingly, to avoid falling into the trap of the technofix, it 
will be argued that a serious philosophical meditation on information technology is crucial. 
As a first step in this reflection, the chapter will turn to writers such as Dave Toke, Manuel 
Poitras, Frederick Buell and Vincent Mosco, who place into critical question some of the 
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more entrenched ideas concerning information technology. Following on from this, the focus 
will shift to, among others, Martin Lister et al., who problematize the standard Western 
conception of technology as being separate from, and in opposition to, both culture and 
nature. And in terms of their argument, the location of human agency as operating within a 
spectrum that includes technology, nature and culture – which are in themselves in constant 
interplay with one another – will be thematized. Accordingly, the adoption of a related 
circumspect approach which acknowledges the complexities involved in any such exchange, 
and which simultaneously avoids being either too pessimistic, or conversely, too optimistic 
over technological development, will inform the exploration of the succeeding chapters.   
 Thirdly, if nature and a concern for it do not automatically exclude technology, and if 
technology can be considered an indeterminate tool that may be employed either to endorse 
the status quo or to transform it, then the next question that emerges concerns the direction in 
which to inflect the technological dimension of the DSP, so that it might precipitate a more 
positive orientation toward nature. To respond to this a philosophical framework is required, 
both to guide any new interventions and to recognize resonant existing interventions, and in 
this regard Chapter Three turns to the writings of the post-structural philosopher Gilles 
Deleuze and to his collaborative work with the radical psychoanalyst, Félix Guattari, for two 
reasons. Firstly, Deleuze was a philosopher of difference and desire outside of the ambit of 
capitalism, which remains a cornerstone of the DSP, and his ideas accordingly allow for a 
consideration of options beyond the entrenched interests which the DSP endorses. Secondly, 
Deleuze and Guattari, in their concept of desubjectivation via ‘becoming-animal,’ provide an 
alternative perspective on the anthropocentrism propagated by the cosmological dimension of 
the DSP as something limited and limiting, but by no means cast in stone. And it is in the 
interests of elaborating on the potential of their work in the above two respects that key 
features and concepts of their philosophy will be elaborated upon at this stage.  
  However, fourthly, the question that next emerges concerns the validity of using 
Deleuzoguattarian concepts in relation to information technology, to establish a conduit for 
transformative experience. This is because, while Deleuze promoted heterogeneity against 
ossified, dogmatic modes of thought, at the end of his career in his “Postscript on Control 
Societies,” he also advanced digitality as synonymous with and indissociable from new 
societies of control – which he saw as far more constraining than the disciplinary societies 
identified earlier by Michel Foucault. Chapter Four accordingly thinks through this obstacle. 
Firstly, the contemporary theorists who lend support to Deleuze’s relatively pessimistic 
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assessment of the capacity of the digital to negate the generation of difference, will be 
considered. Secondly, two valid counterweights – one from Deleuze himself, and one from 
his long-time collaborator Guattari – will be thematized. That is, although Deleuze never 
developed the idea significantly, when asked about how the hegemony of a digital society of 
control could be resisted, he responded by advancing the idea of counter-information. And he 
furthermore suggested that viral contamination and piracy constituted two forms of such 
counter-information. With a view to exploring this, the ideas of a number of contemporary 
theorists who make use of Deleuze’s idea of viral contamination to argue that digital control 
is not all-encompassing, will be thematized, along with their elaboration on the counter-
information of error within digital code and in institutional response to new digital practices. 
After this, and because of Deleuze’s admittedly laconic discussion of counter-information, 
the individual works of Deleuze’s long-time co-author, Guattari, will be turned to for further 
elaboration on the concept, particularly via his concept of post-media, which moreover entails 
a more optimistic elaboration on the capacity of digital artefacts and practices to precipitate 
difference. That is, drawing on their extensive co-authored body of work, Guattari provides a 
careful and compelling case as to why we should not dismiss the potential of the digital to 
produce new connections, and both his related ideas, and how they have been supported – 
both explicitly and implicitly – by a number of contemporary theorists, will be discussed at 
this point.   
 Yet, fifthly, a further and deeper question that emerges concerns the capacity of 
counter-information to generate difference in the absence of the durationality so important for 
Deleuze in this regard. That is, despite elaboration within the writings of contemporary 
theorists, and through the insights of Guattari, on what Deleuze meant when he spoke of 
counter-information, to ignore Deleuze’s insistence that duration is inextricably linked with 
difference, is a problematic oversight. This is because it displaces a key point of his reflection 
on digital technology, namely that counter-information can be identified by its efficacy, but 
that this efficacy is relative to its advancement of a different time; the reflective time of 
duration incompatible with the hyper-rapid time of information. And in the absence of such 
durationality only a superficial – and ineffective – application of Deleuzoguattarian concepts 
to the realm of the digital is possible.  In the interest of responding to this issue, in Chapter 
Five, the initial focus falls on the durational component of Deleuze’s idea of difference. And 
it will be argued that this component is built up by Deleuze through his writings on 
Nietzsche, Bergson and Proust, and furthermore, explicitly dealt with in his own Difference 
6 
 
and Repetition in relation to Nietzsche. Thereafter, the focus shifts to two instances where 
Deleuze applied his consideration of durational difference to the technological phylum of 
analog cinema, namely Cinema 1: The Movement-Image and Cinema 2: The Time-Image. In 
this regard, how Deleuze sees in the movement- and time-images of cinema an ability to 
engender difference via technology, through related reflection of and upon duration, will be 
discussed. Next, the argument thematized by the prominent Deleuzian scholar, David 
Rodowick, that because the digital involves a different informational ontology, digital cinema 
– and by extension, other digital artefacts from games to mobile applications – cannot 
communicate duration, will be engaged with. And after this, the counter arguments of the 
equally prominent Deleuzian thinkers, Brian Massumi and Ronald Bogue, will be discussed. 
That is, while Massumi argues that the digital cannot be extricated from its analog context, 
Bogue points out that the production of non-dogmatic thought and new connections is 
dependent on aesthetic dynamics, before any dependency on technological means through 
which the aesthetic is produced. 
 In light of all the previous discussions and arguments, the final questions that emerge 
concern whether any digital artefacts currently exist that do indeed engender durational 
intuition, or whether they still only exemplify the limiting machinations of control society. 
And, if any such artefacts exist, how do they engender durational intuition, and is there 
conceivable room for improvement in this regard, given the pressing needs of the 
environmental crisis to which such improvements might constitute a partial response. In the 
interest of responding to these issues, in Chapter Six, three such digital artefacts will be 
examined. In order, these are the iconic device of the 1990s, the Tamagotchi, the free-to-play 
multi-platform adventure game Botanicula, and the shark tracking applications Shark Net, in 
conjunction with the more recently launched Ocearch. As will be argued, each of these 
represent a different type of encounter with duration on the part of the user. To begin with, 
the Tamagotchi effectively wastes its young users’ time, using their sincere and innocent 
affections for their virtual pets as a means by which to coerce them – by threat of its ‘death’ 
(or permanent shut down) – to continuously take care of it. To be sure, in this regard the 
Tamagotchi comprised a seminal moment in terms of digital durational exchange, insofar as 
its young users saw it as being ‘alive.’ And it is moreover precisely the generation who grew 
up with the Tamagotchi who were quick, as adults, to adapt to the various information 
technology-based phenomena of the twenty-first century – the social media networks, the 
smart phones, etc. –many of which exemplify and, indeed, make possible and extend, the 
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dynamics of control society. It is accordingly possible that the little device functioned as a 
means of facilitating an intuitive encounter with the digital on the part of this (and 
subsequent) generations. But while the Tamagotchi served as a testament to the validity of 
Deleuze’s fears over the capacity of the digital to infiltrate our desires and sensibilities, under 
the auspices of control society, digital technologies also became far more sophisticated a 
decade after the birth of this device. And with this, the developers of digital artefacts were 
increasingly able to express their concerns through this medium – including environmentally-
orientated concerns. In this regard, the second digital artefact that will be examined is the 
2012-released point-and-click adventure game, Botanicula. The most crucial aspect of the 
game that distinguishes it markedly from the Tamagotchi, with its relentless drive toward 
keeping itself alive through its demands for attention, is that Botanicula is a slow, exploratory 
progression through a baffling and staggeringly vague natural environment. A world within 
which the user not only encounters even smaller worlds and creatures, all of whom exist 
within the main represented natural environment – namely a tree – but also shifts in-between 
these inter-connected animal life-worlds. Indeed, in many ways, the game resembles a 2012 
version of one of the works of a key influence on Deleuze, namely, the biological picture 
book of the Estonian biosemiotician, Jakob von Uexküll, through which he similarly 
promoted a proto-becoming-animal, as it were, via his evocative invitation to readers to enter 
the imaginary Umwelt of the myriad creatures who surround them daily, particularly in terms 
of the experience of difference this entailed. However, while a beautiful – and as will be 
discussed, a hauntingly nomadic – representation of the complexity of nature, and while also 
crucially very popular with children as noted in the mass media, the game remains an 
enclosed system. And this too has a number of limiting ramifications that while be explored. 
Accordingly, the third digital artefact that will be examined is Shark Net, in conjunction with 
the more recently launched Ocearch, and the extent to which they exceed the parameters of 
Botanicula in their generation of durational intuition will be explored. And it will be argued 
that, through the combined power of a range of technologies, including the digital which 
serves as the main conduit, digital artefacts no longer need to remain enclosed systems. 
Rather, individual animals can become an open variable within a digitized schema, in a way 
that can precipitate the kind of strange durational exchange alluded to in the opening 
paragraph of this Introduction. But as always, there is conceivable room for improvement in 
this regard, and after engaging with both the successes and deficits of Shark Net and Ocearch, 
related recommendations will be advanced in the Conclusion of this thesis.  
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In terms of methodology, generally-speaking, a qualitative approach will be employed 
in this study. The qualitative approach is defined by Creswell as “an inquiry process of 
understanding based on distinct methodological traditions of inquiry that explore a social or 
human problem” (Creswell 1998: 01). Thus, in-depth analysis of data is preferred over the 
collection of data through quantifiable means (interviews, surveys, etc.). As Trappes-Lomax 
writes, “qualitative research methods…,designed as they are to deal with the complexities of 
meaning in social context, are naturalistic (not controlled), observational (not experimental), 
and more focused on problems of validity than on those of reliability and generalizability.” 
Accordingly, the data produced tends to be “‘rich [and] deep’ rather than ‘hard and 
replicable’” (cited in Davies and Elder 2008:141). That is, this study will involve a critical 
reading of various texts with a view to reflecting upon the discourses operative within them; 
as such, the method employed in this study will be discourse analysis. This type of approach 
seeks to “show systematic links between texts, discourse practices, and socio-cultural 
practices” (cited in Deacon et al. 2008:152).  In this regard, “the analysis of discourse is, 
necessarily, the analysis of language in use. As such, it cannot be restricted to the description 
of linguistic forms independent of the purposes or functions which these forms are designed 
to serve in human affairs” (Brown and Yule, 1983: 01). In relation to this, Alba-Juez explains 
that, “when analysing discourse, researchers are not only concerned with ‘purely’ linguistic 
facts; they pay equal or more attention to language use in relation to social, political and 
cultural aspects.” And it is for this reason that “discourse is not only within the interests of 
linguists,” but also “a field that is…studied by communication scientists, literary critics, 
philosophers, sociologists, [etc.] and many others” (2009:10). Understandably, because of the 
qualitative nature of the study, no use will be made of any questionnaires, surveys, focus 
groups, etc. in terms of data collection, and because no interviews were held, no ethics 
clearance was necessary for the study. 
More specifically, the methodology employed in this study falls under the auspices of 
“critical hermeneutics.” As Hurst explains when discussing this methodological approach, 
such research “is committed to identifying the biases, prejudices and distortions which 
prevent healthy personal and social growth.” Accordingly, this will involve “the use of 
specific strategies such as ‘discourse analysis’ and ‘critical ethnography’ in an effort to 
unmask ideologies at work,” and in relation to these findings, to adopt an open-ended and 
flexible attitude, “which is directed by new developments arising out of the research process 
itself” (2004:53). In this regard, in particular, the work of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari 
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will inform this study. That is, through employing Deleuze and Guattari as the major theorists 
in this project, to a large extent, the trajectory of the study became influenced by the method 
they used in their own works, which is known as nomadology. Albert Refiti in “A 
Psychedelic Method: Spatial Exposition, Perspectivism and Bricklaying” – in Engels-
Schwarzpaul and Peters’s Of Other Thoughts: Non-Traditional Ways to the Doctorate – 
maintains that, in terms of their nomadological approach, Deleuze and Guattari, “rather than 
bringing things together under an existing concept, were interested in relating variables 
according to new concepts to create productive connections” (2013: 30).  
  The above is of great importance to this study, due to the amorphous and changing 
nature of information technology. Accordingly, this study explores information technology 
not by strict delineation, but rather moves inter-changeably between terms such as the 
internet, network technologies, social media platforms, mobile devices/smartphones, and the 
digital, among others. This is because, on the one hand, one can try to provide a strict 
definition for the term ‘information technology,’ as Pelin Aksoy and Laura DeNardis in 
Information Technology in Theory do when they describe “information technologies [as] 
systems of hardware and/or software that capture, process, exchange, store, and/or present 
information, using electric, magnetic, and/or electromagnetic energy.” However, on the other 
hand, as they immediately point out, such a “restrictive definition of IT” already “cuts a wide 
swath across technical topics ranging from digital cameras to internet radio to corporate 
computer networks” (2008: 8). Accordingly, in the study of new media, many theorists do not 
operate in terms of strict delineation in this regard, and a similar flexibility informs this study. 
However, for the sake of clarity, the most crucial terms will nonetheless be briefly defined. 
To begin with, digital communication is understood in terms of Robert Heath and Atul 
Salvekar’s definition in The Internet Encyclopaedia Volume 1 A-F, as “the process of 
conveying digital information from a transmitter to a receiver across an analog channel,” and 
they furthermore advance that “all aspects of the internet are enabled by digital 
communication technology” (in Bigdoli 2004: 457). In effect, for the purposes of this study, 
then, information technology and the digital are construed as inextricably intertwined, 
because while they may be separated by technical definition, for all practical purposes, they 
form part of the same development. As such, all related terms, such as those listed above, will 
fall under the umbrella term information technology, because their existence is only possible 
through digital communication technology. And related to this are network technologies, 
which connect the many devices (computers, smartphones, etc.) to IT/digital developments, 
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such as the internet and the many social media platforms which have become a feature of 
cyber-space in recent years.  
 To return specifically to nomadology as a method through which to engage with 
information technology, as David Cole notes in his “Lost in Data Space: Using Nomadic 
Analysis to Perform Social Science,” in Deleuze and Research Methodologies, nomadology 
rejects “stable identities, fixed categories and divisions” (in Coleman and Ringrose 2013: 
224). And this rejection of the fixity of anything means, as Griet Roets and Rosa Braidotti 
write in “Nomadology and Subjectivity,” that “nomadology is a political project in which a 
new subjectivity is created which blurs boundaries and consists in erasing and recomposing 
the former boundaries between self and others” (in Goodley et al. 2012: 168). This is 
especially important for this study on account of its exploration of how humans can connect 
with nature via technology. Indeed, as Craig Lundy writes in History and Becoming: 
Deleuze's Philosophy of Creativity, nomadology, instead of insisting on separation, is about 
“the following of flows,” or alternatively, “placing oneself within various lines of movement” 
(2012: n.p.). And through the employment of such a method, two dispositifs, namely 
neoliberalism and information technology, will be critically engaged with. Andreas Fickers 
and Catherine Johnson in Transnational Television History: A Comparative Approach, 
provide an excellent example both of what the term dispositif means, and of how it can be 
challenged. They write – citing Michel Foucault as a major influence in popularizing the term 
– that it “has its roots in the French language, where it means a ‘system’ or ‘device,’” and that 
any such system or device can be approached in one of two ways. That is, and in relation to 
media studies, “generally speaking, two main lines of interpretation can be seen.” On the one 
hand, one can “emphasiz[e] the normative power of media systems,” or, on the other hand, 
one can have recourse to “interpretation inspired more by film theory, analysing the 
triangular communicative relationship between the television set, the channel…and the 
recipient…against a background of media-specific perception horizons” (2012: 15). In effect, 
though, it is the latter option which allows for an interpretation that is far more open-ended 
and resonant with Deleuze’s description of a dispositif, which he calls – as noted by Maria 
Tamboukou in “Ordinary/Extraordinary: narratives, politics, history” – “a tangle, a 
multilinear ensemble” (2016: 192). Accordingly, in the following study, the above two 
dispositifs will be engaged with in the interests of finding within them assemblages not yet 
enunciated. That is, instead of taking on an oppositional stance to the deeply problematic but 
also highly productive dispositif of neoliberalism, and rather than veering toward either 
11 
 
technophobia or technophilia in relation to the environmental crisis, the following study will 
approach both dispositifs as complex phenomena, and in a way that is sensitive to their 
respective perils and merits. 
The study is potentially relevant at both local and global levels, not only because in an 
increasingly globalized society, information technology has become the primary means 
through which we access and distribute information of any kind, but also because the 
environmental crisis is a global phenomenon.   
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Chapter One – The environmental crisis through the lens of legacy mass 
media within the context of economic globalization  
Introduction 
This chapter deals with how the environmental crisis – despite being an issue still disputed by 
some fringe interest groups – is now ubiquitous in public discourse, where it is ironically 
advanced as the most pressing and defining issue of the twenty-first century, while at the 
same time being met with ineffective international responses that often amount to mere 
symbolic gestures. And such lack of efficacy will, in turn, be accounted for with reference to 
what Kilbourne, Beckmann and Thelen call the Dominant Social Paradigm, or DSP. In this 
regard, the paradoxical status of legacy mass media,1 as a technology that both facilitated 
popular awareness of environmental problems, while at the same time remaining an 
indissociable part of the nexus of economic globalization and development that exacerbated 
such environmental degradation in the first place, will also be thematized.     
To begin with, the focus of the chapter will fall on the the work of Rachel Carson, 
who through her 1962 book, Silent Spring, arguably brought environmental concern into the 
public limelight. But as will be discussed, the success of the book in this regard was because 
it was coterminous with major instances of environmental degradation that threatened human 
security; concern over which grew rapidly because of their coverage in the mass media of the 
time. That is, following Carson’s seminal work, a number of large-scale and visceral 
environmental disasters received widespread media coverage. Moreover, these were 
increasingly considered in conjunction with a new perspective of the earth as finite and 
fragile, facilitated by the famous Earthrise photograph taken by the Apollo space mission, 
and also made available through the mass media. And the related sympathetic public 
orientation toward the environment, in turn, culminated not only in the best-seller status of a 
host of books expressing concern over the environment, but also in the creation and 
celebration of the first Earth Day in 1970.  
                                                          
1 Legacy mass media, or legacy media, refers to the old media before the advent of the internet. This would 
include traditional mediums such as print, radio, and television (Biagi 2012: 266). It is important to note that 
new media, or the various digital distribution networks associated with the internet, have not replaced the older 
mediums, but have rather problematized them. As Andrea Castellet notes in Emerging Perspectives on the 
Mobile Content Evolution, “most of legacy media have regarded [the] internet…with a mixed-feelings 
approach,” ranging from seeing these “new habits of media consumption” as “new, abundant sources of 
wealth,” through to “mistrust[ing] the way the full digitalization of content leads to a loss of their former control 
on distribution via copyright regulations” (2016: 66).  
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After this, focus will shift to how, on the one hand, this concern continued to gain 
momentum in the early 1970s, when a broader institutional global response was demanded. 
And the related efforts of global policymakers to address issues of significant environmental 
degradation will be thematized. However, on the other hand, although this discussion will 
cover the major institutional efforts spanning the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, as well as 
institutional responses in the new millennium, what clearly emerges is the failure of such 
responses to effect meaningful change. That is, during each of these time periods, the 
response by those with institutional power was consistently undermined both by specific 
problems, and by a common malaise. A malaise that can be significantly attributed to the rise 
of a neoliberal economic discourse, which began to be established in the early 1970s, and 
which by the late 1980s had gained such status that it proved impermeable to even the 
strongest criticism in the mass media. 
Next, and against the backdrop of the above tepid institutional response, the continued 
availability of overwhelming statistical and qualitative evidence that the degradation of the 
environment has sped up at a dizzying rate, will be thematized. In the interest of exploring 
this, the chapter will turn to research conducted by a number of well-established and credible 
international bodies, undertaken in relation to those categories employed by the Environment 
Statistics Section of the United Nations Statistics Division (UNSD). 
Finally, the chapter will conclude by accounting for the failure of such information to 
catalyse society into a paradigm shift, with reference to Kilbourne, Beckmann and Thelen’s 
concept of the Dominant Social Paradigm or DSP. That is, despite the continuation of 
overwhelmingly massive environmental degradation, for the most part a distinct lack of 
urgency – both at global institutional levels and for much of the public at large – continues to 
characterize responses to the environmental crisis. Indeed, despite becoming a fixture in 
terms of media coverage, a concerted effort at change has yet to emerge. And this tepid 
response is arguably best understood in relation to the various aspects of the DSP which have 
become internalized and ubiquitous.  
The mass media and growing popular awareness of the environmental crisis 
A term often associated with hyperbole by its critics, and one that correlatively generates 
fierce passions among its supporters, the ‘environmental crisis,’ is perhaps better understood 
as a constellation of potentially serious problems facing the environment as a result of human 
activity. Although the spectrum of arguments involves a range of often opposing positions 
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taken in relation to the environment, it is clear today that the crisis has become a mainstream 
issue, insofar as it is well represented in public discourse – at international institutional levels, 
in national and local policy, and in the pledges made by various businesses. It is also both 
extensively covered in the mass media, and reflected in the anxieties put forward by ordinary 
people across a multiplicity of platforms. However, with a view to understanding the 
dynamics at play, it is helpful to consider at what point the idea of an environmental crisis 
entered into mainstream discussion and consideration.  
  The beginning of the modern environmental movement has been traced back to 
Rachel Carson’s 1962 work, Silent Spring (Garrard 2004: 1).2 In short, “this book focused 
international attention on the deadly effects of DDT and other chemical pesticides” and “had 
a profound influence on the public’s attitude toward chemical pollution and environmental 
protection” (Des Jardins 2006: 3). However, despite the specific focus of Carson’s work, it 
seemed that a more general nerve had been touched by the evocative case made by the 
impassioned author. As Frederick Buell explains in From Apocalypse to Way of Life: 
Environmental Crisis in the American Century, although Carson’s work was “not the first to 
raise the spectre of imminent human-made environmental crisis,” it “had a decisive effect” on 
account of its evocative articulation of the problem (2003: viii). Similarly, in his account of 
why Silent Spring garnered such immediate and wide-spread response – as opposed to other 
texts that pursued similar concerns – Greg Garrard in Ecocriticism points to Carson’s use of 
“poetic parable” and her reliance “on the literary genres of pastoral and apocalypse, pre-
existing ways of imaging the place of humans in nature that may be traced back to sources 
such as Genesis and Revelations” (2004: 2). Thus, in its recourse to pre-industrial and 
Christian tropes, Carson’s book struck an intuitive and emotive chord among many of its 
American readers, and the success of the book led to it “making concern about [the] 
environmental crisis a national issue” with strong spiritual undertones (Buell 2003: viii).3 To 
                                                          
2 This consensus is reflected in, among others texts, William Reiner and Jeffrey Lockwood’s Philosophical 
Foundations for the Practices of Ecology (2010: 111), Nicholas Hildyard’s “Foxes in Charge of the Chickens” 
in Wolfgang Sachs’s Global Ecology: A New Arena of Political Conflict (1993: 25), and Jennifer Clapp and 
Peter Dauvergne’s Paths to a Green World: The Political Economy of the Global Environment (2005: 48-49).  
3 Admittedly, while Carson’s book certainly generated wide public interest, theorists such as Roger Scruton take 
a longer view of the environmental movement. In How to Think Seriously About the Planet: The Case for an 
Environmental Conservatism, Scruton argues that such concern has been long expressed, regardless of political 
affiliation. He writes that in Britain, “the environmental movement has its roots in the Enlightenment cult of 
natural beauty and in the nineteenth-century reaction to the Industrial Revolution.” He also suggests that across 
the Atlantic, “American environmentalism incorporates the nature worship of John Muir, the radical 
individualism of Thoreau, the transcendentalism of Emerson, the ‘ecocentrism’ of Aldo Leopold and the social 
conservatism of the Southern Agrarians.” Scruton moreover identifies the writings of Allen Tate as an example 
from the past, and the work of Wendell Berry as a present example (2012: 5-6). Yet, while Scruton’s argument 
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be sure, despite the public interest and support generated by her book, “the scientific 
community lost no time in attacking Carson in the media, accusing her…of overstating the 
case against DDT (dichlorodiphenyl-trichloroethane) and other chemicals” (Clapp and 
Dauvergne 2005: 49). Yet this criticism notwithstanding, Carson’s argument maintained its 
public legitimacy, and as Des Jardins argues, “after Carson’s work, the long-term 
consequences to both humans and the natural world, as well as the political and ethical 
implications of pesticide use, came to the forefront” of popular awareness where they have 
remained ever since (2006: 4). As such, although addressing a very specific environmental 
issue, Carson’s work served to catalyse public sentiment, and it is from this point on that a 
multitude of specific but related environmental issues began to find articulation within the 
public domain. 
To contextualize this achievement further, one needs to bear in mind that the global – 
and specifically the American – economy following the Second World War experienced a 
significant boom. That is, fuelled by rapid industrialization coupled with technological 
advance (particularly in communication and transportation technologies), it grew 
exponentially, and accordingly, in the global North at least, people’s standard of living 
measured in consumer terms improved significantly. In relation to such prosperity, at first 
glance it seems strange that the public took such attention of Carson’s text, which poetically 
spoke of “a future spring without the songs of birds” (Clapp and Dauvergne 2005: 49). 
However, this makes sense when one remembers that, as market liberals point out,4 when 
“wealth brings education,” it is often accompanied by “higher expectations” and growing 
“societal concern over environmental issues” for aesthetic reasons (Clapp and Dauvergne 
2006: 93). Moreover, elaborating on the context of the 1960s, Robert Gottlieb recalls how a 
number of environmental disasters in the United States readily affirmed the warning bells 
rung by Carson. According to Gottlieb, 
 
environmental crisis seemed to be written for all to see in such disparate events of 
the late 1960s as the burning of the Cuyahoga River in the center of Cleveland, the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
has merit, Carson’s text nevertheless remains exemplary on account of its focused blend of poetics and techno-
scientific acumen.  
4 Denise DeGarmo in International Environmental Treaties and State Behaviour: Factors Influencing Co-
operation, sums up the market-liberal perspective as relying “heavily on the idea that the best way to protect the 
global commons is to privatize it.” In this regard, market “liberalism believes there must be an effective 
equilibrium between the demand of economic development and environmental protection by bringing market 
forces to bear upon both interests.” As such, market “liberals are wary of environmental regulations that curb 
market forces or stress the role of the state” (2005:114). 
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eutrophication of Lake Erie, and the dying birds washed up on the oil-slicked shores 
of Santa Barbara. (in Buell 2003: viii) 
 
In this regard, Alan Dutka in Cleveland Calamities: A History of Storm, Fire and Pestilence, 
explains that the Cuyahoga River had long been a source of great industrialization and 
subsequent pollution, because its natural bends and curves provided ideal spots for industry to 
set up. Furthermore, it had caught fire on a number of occasions due to the high levels of 
toxic waste it contained (2014: 65-68). Specifically “on June 22, 1969, a patch of the 
Cuyahoga River below a railroad bridge burst into flames,” dramatically “reaching a height 
of five stories” and lasting “twenty-six minutes” (2014: 64). Dutka writes that although the 
story attracted little initial interest in Cleveland, a Time magazine story published two months 
later and accompanied by sensational pictures of a blaze (ironically, not the actual blaze, but 
one from the same river in 1952), sparked the attention of the nation (2014: 64).  In terms of 
the eutrophication of Lake Erie, the release of pollutants – primarily phosphorous – by 
industry and mechanized agricultural practice into this relatively shallow lake promoted the 
rapid proliferation of algae, which subsequently sucked up the available oxygen, killing off 
other existing life in the water. As a consequence, the stagnant water gave off a putrid smell, 
which repelled tourists and affected residents, not least because the lake was an important 
source of water to households in the region and beyond. As such, its “rapid eutrophication” 
(Sea Wind 1991: 8) was cause for serious and immediate concern, and by the late 1960s, the 
phrase “Lake Erie is dead” started to appear frequently “in national publications” (Rotman 
2016: 1). Finally, the case of the dying birds washing up on the beaches of Santa Barbara 
refers to the 1969 oil spill off that coast, which killed off a significant amount of birdlife there 
– all of which was captured by television stations and broadcast to shocked viewers (Farmer 
2006: 108). Erik Loomis, in Out of Sight: The Long and Disturbing Story of Corporations 
Outsourcing Catastrophe, further notes that this particular incident was met with a massive 
grassroots fury, and “united citizens of all political persuasions in a truly non-partisan cause” 
(2015: 30). What is also important to note in relation to these disasters is the role of the 
communication technologies of the day in spreading the imagery of the impact of 
environmental negligence.  Indeed, as Gary Haq and Alistair Paul point out in their 
Environmentalism Since 1945, “coverage of the 1969 oil slick fire on the Cuyahoga River 
and the Santa Barbara Channel oil spill were key moments in the growing media coverage of 
the human impact on the environment” (2012: 77).  
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Clapp and Dauvergne similarly argue that in conjunction with this growing media 
focus on the environment, it was only in the 1960s that people began to see “the planet as 
fragile and interconnected;” a perception “reinforced as pictures of earth from space became 
more common” (2005: 49). Specifically, the photograph they refer to is the famous Earthrise 
photo taken from lunar orbit by Apollo 8 mission astronaut William Anders on 24 December  
1968, which depicts a shot of the earth rising – the first high quality, colour photograph of its 
kind (Ignatow 2007: 26).5 Haq and Paul explain that, “in particular, the view of the Earth for 
the very first time from space transformed people’s understanding of our place in the 
universe.” Indeed, “the images of a desolate and lifeless moon contrasted with the blue and 
white, fertile Earth,” and served as “a stark reminder of humankind’s fragility” that 
galvanized the nascent environmental movement (2012: 77-78). Robert Poole in Earthrise: 
How Man First Saw the Earth concurs with the above, arguing that the Apollo years, between 
1968 and 1972, were responsible for an “eco-renaissance” (2008: 13).  
While the above global environmental consciousness was emerging, a number of 
other developments also had a significant influence on the range of responses to 
environmental issues. That is, “the early 1960s saw rapid economic growth and greater global 
integration of trade and investment,” and in this period, global growth rates rose “as high as 
5-6 percent” – although this growth was certainly not equally distributed across all regions. 
Nevertheless, the related emerging global economic infrastructure, “codified by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT),” was seen as the key to growth and success for countries the world over. 
And it was at this time too that “the wave of decolonization in Asia and Africa” reached its 
height, with the newly independent countries born of this process entering this codified global 
arena. But after initial optimism, their belief in the potential benefits of this global system of 
exchange progressively diminished, not only because their participation did not yield the 
enormous success that was promised, but also because in many cases it led to a new type of 
imperialism or colonialism.6 In terms of this, the developing countries of the global South 
became increasingly mired in a cycle in which they served as cheap suppliers of raw material, 
                                                          
5 The other equally famous photograph of the earth was taken on 7 December 1972, by members of the Apollo 
17 mission and is entitled The Blue Marble (Ignatow 2007: 27).  
6 As Anthony Payne and Paul Sutton in Dependency Under Challenge: The Political Economy of the 
Commonwealth Caribbean argue, “dependency thinking has come to dominate the study of society, politics, and 
economics in the modern Third World.” Furthermore, they describe dependency theory as “an eclectic body of 
thought” produced by a “theoretical mingling” of “the structuralist approach developed most prominently by 
Latin American scholars,” and “the neo-Marxist view of under-development popularised most successfully by 
Andre Gunder Frank” (1984: 1). Dependency theory has as its core idea the argument that, after independence, 
the countries of the so-called Third World continue to be exploited by wealthy First World countries. 
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dictated to by governments and corporate interests housed in the developed countries of the 
global North (Clapp and Dauvergne 2005: 49).7 Although the situation of the countries of the 
global South undoubtedly allowed the economic interests of the global North to flourish, 
critical voices capitalizing on an emerging global consciousness – enabled in part by the 
aforementioned advances in communication and transportation – also pointed out that such an 
unequal system of exchange could lead to catastrophic environmental consequences. Paul 
Ehrlich’s bestseller The Population Bomb (1968) is an example of one such critical voice. 
Ehrlich pointed out that it was rapid population growth in “underdeveloped countries 
(UDCs)” that would begin to affect countries that were far more developed, as the world’s 
resource base struggled to cater for an exponentially increasing human population (1975: 7-
8). And as “40% of the population of the underdeveloped world” was made up of “people 
under fifteen years” and, as such, not yet in their “reproductive years” (1975: 12), Ehrlich 
predicted a “population explosion” by the year 2000 – the effects which could not be 
confined to the underdeveloped countries in question. Clapp and Dauvergne, in their 
assessment of this iconic work focus on its likening of the Earth to a ship; accordingly, once 
more utilizing the idea of global inter-connectedness that had gained traction in the 1960s, it 
was suggested that if one end of the ship were to sink, all on board would be affected to some 
degree (2005: 49-52). Judging by its bestseller status, environmental concern was at this point 
not confined to the academy or to fringe interest groups. Rather, the educated middle classes 
in the global North were making the connections between social injustice and environmental 
degradation. Indeed, in this regard, Clapp and Dauvergne cite a 1969 New York Times article, 
in which the author discusses how “concern with the environmental crisis [was] sweeping the 
nation’s campuses, with an intensity that [almost eclipsed] student discontent over the war in 
Vietnam” (2005: 52).  
 Accordingly, by the 1970s, and through other popular texts such as The Limits of 
Growth by Meadows et al. in 1972, and E.F. Schumacher’s 1973 work Small is Beautiful: 
Economics as if People Mattered, the environmental question had become firmly established 
as a key issue that could no longer be marginalized.  Buell concurs with this assessment, and 
                                                          
7 The terms “developed” and “developing” form part of a highly problematic framework in themselves, and are 
rooted in the modernization theory contested vigorously by the aforementioned dependency theorists. Very 
briefly, modernization theory held that, if Third World countries received technological assistance from the 
West, they would then be able to mimic the successes of these more advanced societies. Besides this already 
dubious idea, one must also consider that the theory was produced within the shadow of the Cold War, and thus 
was as much an attempt at legitimating Western involvement in Third World spaces as it was a theoretical 
position (Berberoglu 1992: 7-9).  
 
19 
 
advances moreover “that by the 1970s…the…environmental crisis seemed more and more 
overwhelming.” In this regard, he cites Senator Gaylord Nelson – the originator of the “first 
Earth Day (1970)” – who claimed that “the environmental crisis ‘was the most critical issue 
facing mankind,’ making ‘Vietnam, nuclear war, hunger, decaying cities, and all the other 
major problems one could name…relatively insignificant by comparison.’” However, such 
explicit concern, although widespread during this period, did not result in co-ordinated pro-
environmental strategies and remedial actions. Rather, Buell describes the concern over the 
environmental crisis exhibited by the likes of Nelson, as simply “part of the post-war 
environmental movement that Carson helped inaugurate and [which] the 1970 Earth Day 
helped celebrate and consolidate.”  And he lists a number of analogous examples of “utopian 
enthusiasm and optimistic reformism [that] overshadowed [the] environmental 
apocalypticism” exhibited above. In terms of this, “people committed themselves to a wide 
variety of causes, such as ‘ecology,’ green lifestyles, back-to-the-land movements, and 
wilderness appreciation and protection” initiatives. To be sure, these practices did not “nullify 
concern about [the] crisis; in fact, the two motives intensified each other” in that “new 
perceptions of nature’s potentially irreversible deformation intensified people’s impulses to 
experience, protect, and cherish nature and work to ensure a viable future for human society” 
(2003: viii). But, as will be discussed next, the scale of the problem required a global 
response in the form of a paradigm shift which was simply not forthcoming, despite 
consistent criticism of the related malaise in the mass media.  
Institutional responses to the environmental crisis  
After it became an issue of popular debate, the problem of environmental degradation began 
to gain significant attention within the ambit of domestic and international governance, 
particularly in the 1970s. This was not least because, from the 1970s onward, the modern 
environmental movement – having brought attention to various environmental crises – began 
to operate in relation to decisions taken by national and/or international leaders which 
affected the environment. Correlatively, from the 1970s onward, global policy-makers began 
to meet on various occasions in an attempt to tackle matters of environmental concern. In 
many respects, the main periods of institutional response can be identified as corresponding 
to the Stockholm Conference of the 1970s, the Brundtland Report of the 1980s, the Earth 
Summit of the 1990s, the Johannesburg Summit of 2002, the UNCSD conference of 2012, 
and the related global meetings held recently in Paris in 2015.  
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However, the first global-level conference on the environment, namely the United 
Nations Conference on the Human Environment held in Stockholm in 1972, set the sombre 
tone for future institutional attempts to address, in a meaningful manner, issues relating to the 
environment. This was because the incremental improvements penned were offset by 
conflicting politico-economic contextual factors. That is, while economic reform as a crucial 
aspect of addressing environmental degradation became part of the debate, commitment to 
such change was in short supply (Carroll: 1988: 4), and thus this global-level discussion – 
like many others in the decades to come – became little more than an exercise in artifice and 
superficial commitment (Varfis 2009: 110). Indeed, even at this stage it was apparent that the 
underlying principles of neoliberal capitalism clearly clashed with responsible earth 
stewardship, specifically because of this economic paradigm’s demand for constant growth. 
This particular form of capitalism, which began to gain momentum in the late 1970s and 
1980s (Klein 2007: 253), differed from applications of capitalist economic thought in 
previous decades. In this regard, according to Campbell and Pederson, neoliberalism can be 
defined as a 
 
heterogeneous set of institutions consisting of various ideas, social and economic 
policies, and ways of organizing political and economic activity. Ideally, it includes 
formal institutions, such as minimalist welfare state, taxation and business 
regulation programs; flexible labour markets and decentralized capital-labour 
relations unencumbered by strong unions and collective bargaining…[and 
characterized by] international capital mobility. It includes institutionalized 
normative principles favouring free-market solutions to economic problems, rather 
than bargaining or indicative planning, and [entails] a dedication to controlling 
inflation even at the expense of full employment. (2001: 5)
8
 
 
David Harvey, in his 2004 Hettner-Lecture entitled “Spaces of neoliberalization: towards a 
theory of uneven geographical development,” provides a succinct historical account of its 
emergence. He writes that in the 1950s and 1960s, “the social democratic state in Europe and 
the Keynesian compromise that grounded the social contract between capital and labour in 
                                                          
8 For their part, Clapp and Dauvergne define neoliberal economic policy during the 1970s and beyond as one 
which “called for deregulation, stressing the need for free and open markets as the best way to organize an 
economy.” It moreover “advocated liberalization of trade, investment, and financial policies as a way of 
integrating the global economy,” in the interest of “stimulating economic growth” (2005: 59).  
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the US,”9 continued to work well and resulted in decades of growth. However, by the end of 
the 1960s, this situation “began to break down, both internationally and within domestic 
economies.” Indeed, Harvey argues that by 1973, “even before events such as the “OPEC oil 
embargo[,] signs of a serious crisis of capital accumulation were everywhere apparent, 
ushering in a global phase of stagflation, [and the] fiscal crises of various states” (2004: 10). 
And while the left sought to deepen state control in order to combat such crises, the right 
argued for better and more open conditions for active capital accumulation. Harvey argues 
that it was the inefficiency of the left’s proposals, as well as the near-simultaneous awarding 
of Nobel prizes for two proponents of neoliberal economics – namely Friedrich Hayek (1974) 
and Milton Friedman (1976) – which led to neoliberal economic thought being turned to as a 
potential saviour (2004: 11). In addition, the 1980s also saw the beginning of the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, along with its economic system of organization. Accordingly, after “the 
end of the Cold War” in 1991, “free-market capitalism as an economic ideology triumphed in 
much of the world, including China, Russia, and the less-developed regions.” And this 
triumph saw the “expansion of TNCs,10 the rapid movement of investments, the shifting of 
jobs and industries ‘off shore,’ the proliferation of global networks of production and 
distribution,” and “the emergence of ‘world cities,’ all underpinned by subscription to the 
‘mass consumerism’ required to power constant trade and consumption” (Mansbach and 
Rafferty 2008: 744-745). 
 The conference in Stockholm took place in the early years of the above historical 
sequence, and a first point of concern was its lack of inclusiveness, as Russia and its Eastern 
Bloc satellite states boycotted the discussions because East Germany – at that point not a UN 
member – was not allowed to participate. Consequently, the nascent neoliberal stance 
detailed above wielded immense influence. Admittedly, 113 countries sent delegates to the 
conference, with developing countries calling for “economic reforms as part of efforts to 
solve global environmental problems.” In fact, the organizers of the conference were at pains 
to present at least a veneer of inclusiveness in relation to the developing countries, with the 
conference being preceded by a 1971 meeting in Founex, Switzerland, in which development 
                                                          
9 Based on the 1930’s ideas of British economist John Maynard Keynes (Mansbach and Rafferty 2008: 519), 
Keynesianism, in principle, advocates a mixed economy in which the private sector is promoted, but with the 
State having a key role to play, particularly in times of economic difficulty (Clarke 1988: 151, Togati 2006: 85). 
In the 1950s and 1960s, both the US economy and the social democratic states of Europe, operated under 
principles that, to different degrees, could be considered Keynesian. Of course, as Togati points out, Keynesian 
principles greatly complexified and became issues of fierce debate after 1960 (2006: 202).  
10 In Introduction to Global Politics, Mansbach and Rafferty define TNCs (or transnational corporations) as 
“economic enterprises with operations in two or more countries” (2008: 499). Significantly, they are often 
named as key agents in the degradation of the environment. 
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experts and scientists from the developing world met to discuss links between environmental 
degradation and development. Yet, despite these gestures, “no real remedies were offered” 
beyond the creation of “soft international law” that did not “legally bind the signatory states” 
(Clapp and Dauvergne 2005: 55-56). While the conference did signal major concern over the 
global environment, the lack of adequate response, and furthermore, the economic turmoil 
generated by the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) crisis in 1973-
4,11 meant that such turbulence relegated the environmental crisis to a secondary issue. For 
example, Roy Nersesian in Energy for the 21st Century: A Comprehensive Guide to 
Conventional and Alternative Sources, writes that in the United States, “congress set an 
interesting precedent by overriding environmental concerns in the wake of the 1973 oil 
crisis,” when they “authorized the construction of a 800-miles long pipeline,” from “Alaska 
to Valdez,” with the result that “Alaskan oil began flowing in 1977” (2010: 161).   
In turn, this turmoil was exacerbated in the 1980s when a number of developing 
countries, beginning with Mexico, began to default on their international debts – a knock-on 
effect of rising interest rates stemming from the above mentioned OPEC oil crisis. This also 
coincided with relatively strong economic performance by the countries of the global North, 
whose recovery was accounted for in terms of their adoption of neoliberal economic 
practices; an idea which further endorsed the legitimacy of related economic policy. The 
1980s thus became, as Ulrike Schuerkens notes in Globalization and Transformations of 
Social Inequality, the decade when “market accomplishment came to dominate socio-
economic thought” (2010: 11). Thus, the acceptance of neoliberal economic principles 
formed the context within which the 1984 Brundtland Commission took place.  In relation to 
this, Wolfgang Sachs in his “Global Ecology and the Shadow of Development,” argues that 
the commission changed the discourse surrounding global environmentalism significantly. 
Referencing Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring as a starting point, Sachs points out that at the 
time of Carson’s writing, “development was understood to inflict injuries on people and 
nature.” In contrast, and as evinced by the Brundtland Report’s ironic theme of sustainable 
development, by the 1980s “development [had] come to be seen as a therapy for the injuries 
caused by development” (1993: 9). Clapp and Dauvergne reiterate this point, arguing that the 
                                                          
11 The OPEC crisis began when the members of the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries, as 
well as Egypt and Syria, declared an embargo on the export of oil to the West as a protest against American 
support of Israel in the Yom Kippur War (Yergin 2008: 597; Lenczowski 1990: 130). The result of this was that 
“oil prices rocketed,” leading to “long lines at US gas pumps and economic downturn.” On a more implicit 
level, the OPEC oil embargo “underscore[d] US and western European oil dependence” (Hixson 2016: 322), 
which led to the search for alternative sources of oil in Alaska and in the increased extraction of “North Sea 
crude” (Skeet 1988: 140).  
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Brundtland definition of sustainable development effectively saw the creation of “a concept 
that secure[d] the hegemony of a coalition of the moderate market liberal and 
institutionalists’ views of environmental management within the global community” (2005: 
61).12 Thus, while commitment to a globally acknowledged environmental crisis may have 
been weakened by economic instability in the 1970s, by the 1980s a concerted effort to 
subordinate environmental concerns to neoliberal economic dictates was evident.  
The next major event to be held concerning the environment was the UN Conference 
on the Environment and Development (UNCED), held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, and 
popularly known as the Earth Summit. But again, by the early 1990s, a series of political and 
economic developments had occurred which scuppered the chance of a wide-ranging and 
effective outcome of the conference. Firstly, it must be noted that the Eastern Bloc had by 
then collapsed so that it no longer comprised a powerful alternative voice to neoliberalism. 
Accordingly, the North-South divide became further entrenched because the East-West axis 
ceased to function as a politico-economic reality that determined how global politics was 
understood (Bowker and Brown 1993:76). Secondly, economic globalization was 
accelerating rapidly due to technological advances (particularly in information technologies), 
and thirdly, despite the ensuing greater economic inter-connectedness, the Third World 
countries of the global South remained in the throes of a debt crisis – unable to repay loans 
taken from Northern institutions partly on account of fast-increasing interest (Jackson 
1990:124). Understandably, within such a turbulent climate, the Earth Summit failed to yield 
any significant consensus on tackling issues of global environmental concern. Yet the above 
notwithstanding, several encouraging trends did emerge during the Rio de Janeiro 
proceedings (Cass 2006:93), and Carolyn Merchant in Radical Ecology: The Search for a 
Liveable World, discusses some of these more positive developments – which happened in 
spite of, rather than as a result of, the conference. Merchant writes that “a major effort to 
coordinate Greens worldwide began…at the Earth Summit” (2005: 180), enabling the 
movement to grow and thus provide – despite theoretical divisions – a counter-weight to the 
neoliberal view represented by the major institutional players involved. A crucial part of this 
effort, and one of the more encouraging developments in relation to the conference, was the 
                                                          
12 Unlike the market liberal perspective on the environment, the institutionalists argue for, as Richard Scott 
explains in “Organizations and the Natural Environment: Evolving Models,” inter-governmental organizations 
to be involved in regulating destructive environmental practices through a “broad array of control mechanisms.” 
Importantly, though, these “regulators do not enjoy a monopoly over influence and control” (Scott 2002: 457) 
and as will be further demonstrated, their reliance on co-operation, as well as their balancing of competing 
interests, often renders them incapable of producing meaningful change.  
24 
 
emergence of a strong women’s movement in support of the environment. In this regard, 
Merchant explains that “the…Earth Summit” comprised “a watershed in which women’s 
roles in environment and development moved from peripheral add-ins to centre stage” (2005: 
219). Nicholas Hildyard in “Foxes in Charge of Chickens,” articulates these successes in 
analogous terms, when he writes that 
 
for many environmental groups…the Summit was a success: careers [had] been 
made, credibility achieved (some even having seats on government delegations) and 
their concerns [were] no longer marginalized. They [were] now regarded as major 
players themselves. (1993: 22)   
 
But this success did not significantly undermine the neoliberal discourse espoused by 
corporate and governmental representatives. As Hildyard advances, “for the major players, 
the Earth Summit was a phenomenal success;” for instance, “the World Bank [not only] 
emerged with its development policies intact but [also] with control of an expanded Global 
Environmental Facility (GEF),” while “the corporate sector, which throughout the UNCED 
process enjoyed special access to the Secretariat, also got what it wanted: the final documents 
not only treated TNCs with kid gloves but extolled them as key actors in the ‘battle to save 
the planet’” (1993: 22).13 Clapp and Dauvergne confirm Hildyard’s viewpoint, arguing that, 
like in previous conferences, very few pro-environment assertions were legally binding, such 
that many pledges to reform remained disingenuous. Moreover, in relation to the adoption of 
soft law, they also explain that although “Agenda 21, a 300-page action program to promote 
sustainable development, was…adopted,” the financial commitment to facilitate its 
implementation was less forthcoming. That is, the implementation of the program was 
estimated to cost US$ 625 billion, and besides a very small percentage of this total being 
pledged at the Rio de Janeiro conference itself, “developed countries were asked to cover just 
US$ 125 billion” (2005: 65), or 20 percent of the total cost of implementation. Thus, the 
conference’s commitment to “Brundtland-style solutions,” as well as its half-hearted 
application of even these solutions, suggest that the pattern of environmental concern being 
subordinate to economic interest remained, despite a more cogent and better co-ordinated 
                                                          
13 Ironically, as Saidul  Islam in Development, Power, and The Environment: Neoliberal Paradox in the Age of 
Vulnerability notes,  “TNCs are driven by profit motives, and their growth imperative results in increased 
demands on the extraction of resources, often contributing directly or indirectly to environmental degradation” 
(2013: 15). 
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pro-environmental opposition having formed. Indeed, while “UNCED did achieve some 
notable successes, especially in terms of raising environmental awareness among the general 
public in both the North and South” (Clapp and Dauvergne 2005:66), this success could also 
be considered negligible in relation to the lack of sincere financial commitment involved.  
 Considering the results of the above three global conferences on the environment, 
little more was expected from the first major conference in the new millennium, namely the 
2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development held in Johannesburg, and accordingly 
little more was delivered. As with previous global meetings, official documents were created, 
and in particular a far less ambitious environmental program called “The Plan of Action, a 
sixty-five page document,” was adopted. Yet, with the focus remaining on sustainable 
development, at the same time new instruments were developed through which this concept 
could be better implemented. These instruments – referred to as “Type II – Type I” 
agreements – proposed more co-operation between the public and private sectors, or in other 
words, between “governments, NGOs, and business.” As “voluntary agreements,” 
commitment to such co-operation was not enforced, but the aim was “to encourage the 
transfer of funds and technology to areas of critical need” (Clapp and Dauvergne 2005: 69). 
In her explanation of the Johannesburg summit, Karin Mickelson in “The Stockholm 
Conference and the Creation of the South-North Divide in International Environmental Law 
and Policy,” demonstrates that the pragmatic (and correspondingly less ambitious) focus of 
the conference came under fierce criticism from various environmental and social groups. 
And she writes that many “lamented the missed opportunity to strengthen or deepen existing 
[environmental] commitments.” As an example, she cites the reaction of Friends of the Earth 
International, who reacted by proclaiming that the Johannesburg Summit “barely begins to 
deal with the scale of the problems the worlds faces,” and accusing the delegates of the 
“betrayal of hundreds of millions” of people. Indeed, they damningly concluded that 
“governments [had] failed to set the necessary social and ecological limits to economic 
globalisation” (2015: 65). However, although opposition voices were able to present effective 
cases against the manner in which the environmental crisis was being tackled, “the overall 
dominance of the views of market liberals and institutionalists in the official proceedings” 
ensured that such arguments became marginalized as “talk,” which was not allowed to 
percolate into the official resolutions taken (Clapp and Dauvergne 2005: 69).14 Des Jardins, 
                                                          
14 Gill Seyfang in Citizenship, Environment, Economy, further adds that “this perspective on sustainable 
consumption has become widely adopted by governments” the world over (in Dobson and Saiz 2005:140). In 
many respects, the institutionalist perspective does not radically differ from that of the market liberals, apart 
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writing on Mark Sagoff’s The Economy of the Earth,15 argues that, for Sagoff, such 
marginalization is the result of a fundamental error in thinking, whereby “economic analysis 
[is used as] the dominant tool of environmental policymakers” (2006: 62). He sums up 
Sagoff’s position as follows: 
 
Sagoff reminds us that when environmentalists argue that we ought to preserve a 
national forest for its aesthetic or symbolic meaning, they are not merely expressing 
a personal want. They are stating a conviction about a public good that should be 
accepted or rejected by others on the basis of reasons, not on the basis of who is 
willing to pay for that public good. Because economics has no way to factor them 
into its analysis, beliefs and convictions are either ignored or treated as though they 
were mere wants. (Des Jardins 2006: 63) 
 
Clapp and Dauvergne report that because the summit in “Johannesburg disappointed so 
many,” the UN subsequently proposed to focus more on “implementation and yearly reviews 
of progress” instead of large environmental summits (2005: 70). But, despite this proposal, in 
2009 the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution “to hold the United Nations Conference 
on Sustainable Development (UNCSD) in 2012.” This mega-conference, held again in Brazil 
and more commonly referred to as Rio+20 or Rio 20 (UNCSD, 2011), was preceded by 
meetings such as the Copenhagen climate change conference in 2009, the Cancun climate 
change conference in 2010, and the Durban climate change conference of 2011 (COP 15 to 
COP 17).  Yet, notwithstanding the allusion to climate change and the environment in the 
names of the conferences, an analogous pattern of weak environmental resolutions continued, 
perpetuating the institutional failure of earlier conferences to contend seriously with the 
environmental crisis. That is, on the one hand, Ong Suan Ee in The Diplomat describes this 
meeting as “world leaders, government officials, and civil society and private sector 
representatives seeking the best ways of working toward achieving a global green economy, 
poverty eradication, and sustainable development.” However, on the other hand, she both 
notes the initial “considerable pessimism that Rio+20 would amount to anything other than 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
from its allowance for governmental – but more often global institutional – interference when necessary. In this 
regard, Martin-Schramm, Spencer and Stivers in Earth Ethics: A Case Method Approach, write that 
“institutionalist…positions share with the free market positions confidence in capitalism,” but “their emphasis 
on conserving and using resources for the common good tempers a focus solely on individual property rights 
and freedom from government constraints” (2015: 33).  
15 Sagoff’s Economy of the Earth was originally published in 1988, and “is a book about social regulation” in 
relation to the environment. The specific focus for Sagoff is U.S. environmental policy from the 1960s onward 
(1990: 1-2).  
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another elite talking shop,” and concludes that “the outcome of this massive multilateral 
effort appears to have vindicated these gloomy forecasts” (The Diplomat, 2012). Similarly, 
Jonathan Watts in The Guardian neatly sums up the now familiar list of criticisms against the 
summit. Firstly, he observes that while “50 000 participants from civil society and business 
groups” were expected to attend, certain economically influential countries such as the US, 
the UK, and Germany did not send their national leaders to the event – which indicated their 
limited commitment to addressing the crisis. Secondly, he points out that while “Rio+20 
[was] much bigger than its predecessor,…it [was] also… criticised for being vaguer and less 
ambitious,” opting for “shared principles” as opposed to “any legally binding treaties.” 
Thirdly, as with previous conferences, Watts suggests that a number of deep political 
divisions, “particularly between developed and developing countries,” scuppered any major 
chance of a concerted universal response to the severe environmental problems facing us all. 
And he specifically emphasizes that, despite the same pattern playing itself out – namely that 
of a non-committal and non-universal response to the crisis – the world’s environment has 
not held constant, but has rather “continued to deteriorate.” Some of his citations in this 
regard include the Living Planet report of the time, which indicates that global demand for 
natural resources had doubled from the period 1996 to 2012, and that in relation to this, such 
demand was 50% higher than the regenerative capacity of the planet. Beyond this, Watts also 
points to a 40% increase in carbon emissions over a twenty year period (1992-2012), as well 
as rapid biodiversity loss and undernourishment for one in six people on the planet (The 
Guardian, 2012).   
 Subsequent institutional response to the crisis, however, remained limited, as evinced 
by the UN climate change conference in Paris, which commenced on 30 November 2015. 
Once more, despite the exponential degradation of the natural world underway, the theme of 
these multi-lateral meetings was consistent with its predecessors. Although it is not within the 
ambit of this chapter to chronicle it exhaustively, the sentiments of French President Francois 
Hollande perhaps best sum up the under-whelming response to the environmental crisis, 
which has moreover been recognised since the 1960s. In short, Hollande “ruefully 
acknowledged the difficulty of coming up with…an agreement…on limiting greenhouse 
gases that would involve both developed and developing countries,” pointing out that “a 
miracle” would be needed in order to achieve consensus among the 196 countries represented 
at the conference (The Guardian, 2015). It should also be noted that the 13 November 2015 
terror attacks on Paris by Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) militants, which killed 130 
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people, shifted the focus of the meeting from the chronic issue of climate change to 
immediate security concerns. And this despite the appeals of world leaders, most notably 
U.S. president Barack Obama, not to lose sight of the importance of climate-related 
discussions in the wake of the horrific terrorist attack (The Telegraph 2015, France 24 2015). 
Consequently, the media continued to question the ability of global leaders to come up with a 
legally binding solution, as the Paris conference effectively continued the trend of weak 
resolutions passed in previous conferences. For instance, Ivo Vegter, writing for South 
Africa’s Daily Maverick, contends that what the Paris talk participants “have in mind this 
time is a non-binding agreement among member countries to try to meet a set of self-
established emissions targets,” and that “if that sounds like weak tea, it is” (Daily Maverick, 
2015).16 While such criticism is validated by a history of ineffective and muddled responses, 
continued inertia with regard to combatting environmental degradation is not an option as 
Naomi Klein reminds us in This Changes Everything. She writes, “We know that if we 
continue on our current path…climate change will change everything about our world.” And 
part of this change, in her view, includes “a very high chance that our children will spend a 
great deal of their lives fleeing and recovering from vicious storms and extreme droughts” 
(2014: 4).   
The parameters of environmental degradation today  
Although calculations vary according to the source consulted, there appears to be a broad 
agreement in terms of data sets published that the degradation of the environment is a 
consistent, significant and irrefutable occurrence. The Environment Statistics Section of the 
United Nations Statistics Division (UNSD) defines its work as disseminating “global 
environment statistics on ten indicator themes compiled from a wide range of data sources.” 
And the ten themes it advances are, in order: (1) air and climate, (2) biodiversity, (3) energy 
and minerals, (4) forests, (5) governance, (6) inland water resources, (7) land and agriculture, 
(8) marine and coastal areas, (9) natural disasters, and (10) waste. According to the UNSD, 
the various “indicator tables, charts, and maps” are of “relatively good quality and coverage 
across countries,” and furthermore, the information they provide is linked to “other 
international sources.” Admittedly, it is acknowledged by the UN that because 
“environmental statistics is still at an early stage of development in many countries,” the data 
                                                          
16 Although Vegter is well known for his contrarian style of writing and often provocative claims (such as his 
acute scepticism regarding climate change), he was certainly correct in this instance when he tapped into the 
general feeling that the Paris talks, like all those that came before it, comprised an exercise in preening and, 
ultimately, futility.   
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may at times be “sparse,” and that accordingly, the “UNSD is not responsible for the quality, 
completeness/availability, and validity of the data” (UNSD, 2015). Consequently, while the 
discussion that follows draws on the ten categories through which this particular set of 
information is presented, it also makes use of, among others, data published by the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), which was established by the United 
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the World Meteorological Organization 
(WMO) in 1988 (IPPC, 2015). Additionally it makes use of information sourced from the 
International Environmental Data Rescue Organization (IEDRO), Greenpeace International, 
and the WWF (IEDRO, 2015; Greenpeace, 2015; WWF, 2015).17 Also, for the purpose of 
narrowing down a vast set of numbers, the following discussion includes recourse to The 
World Counts,18 which sources its information from the organizations listed above – as well 
as others – and compiles visual algorithmic representations of the issues at hand. 
Additionally, information presented by The World Resources Institute (WRI) website,19 
which sources its information from similar data sources, will also be referred to. 
                                                          
17 Dave Toke in Green Politics and Neo-Liberalism, makes an important point that should be strongly 
emphasized when considering the data from organizations such as the UNSD and the IPCC. He argues that often 
the collection of scientific information on matters of the environment has problematic dynamics attached to it. 
This is because, “even within the scientific community itself there are examples of how centralised expert, ‘hi-
tech’ knowledge is given widespread credence over that derived by scientists through their own experience.” 
And the example he provides in support of such an assertion relates to the time just before the 1997 Kyoto 
Conference, in which “international agreements to limit greenhouse gases” were being debated. In this particular 
instance, it was NASA who “announced that its satellites had detected no significant global warming since it 
started measuring at the end of the 1970s.” This was in direct contradiction to “ground and sea-based 
measurements garnered from instruments which had been used consistently for many years.” In the battle 
between the two conflicting sets of data, it was the latter which lost, after being derided “for their inferiority as 
low tech, and [construed as] unreliable…compared to the satellites.” However, due to “unforeseen orbital 
degradations and [other] inconsistencies,” the work of the satellites later became invalidated on scientific 
grounds. For policy-makers, especially those who opposed “international agreements to cut carbon dioxide 
emissions,” the satellite failure proved that no such cuts should be made based on the unreliability of the satellite 
data. Completely ignored in this decision was the very consistent and compelling information provided by the 
aforementioned ground and sea-based measurements. Toke explains this “over-reliance on ‘hi-tech’ methods as 
an example of “what Marglin…calls the deference (inherent in the practices of modernity) given to what is 
called ‘episteme’ – knowledge of the expert – over ‘techne,’ the technical knowledge of the labourer” (2000: 
169-170). Indeed, first-hand knowledge and experience, backed up by proven scientific method, is often 
sacrificed on the altar of supposedly improved, yet distant or entirely removed, technology. Therefore, when 
looking at the various figures quoted in this section, we should consider that the details could easily fall into 
question. What is undisputable, however, regardless of method or technological orientation, is that a consistent 
message emerges from the data set accessed – and that is one of consistent environmental degradation.  
18 The World Counts website source their data from “a large number of respected organisations, research 
institutions, news services, etc.” This information is then “made ‘live’ through different algorithms, depending 
on the type of counter and the projections made.” Their website further notes that they use data “selectively” 
instead of “exhaustively” and apply “the precautionary principle” in the creation of their constantly updated 
projections. In other words, their recourse to this principle implies that they take “a prudent stance” in their 
projection of numbers. They are not a research institute, but rather a collator of environmentally-orientated data, 
and are based in Copenhagen, Denmark (The World Counts, 2015).  
19 The World Resources Institute, or WRI, describes itself as “a global research organization that spans more 
than 50 countries, with offices in Brazil, China, Europe, India, Indonesia, and the United States” (WRI, 2015). It 
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 In terms of the first UNSD category, namely air and climate information, the WRI 
states that “stabilizing the global climate is the greatest challenge of the 21st century,” but 
that this is difficult because due to our energy consumption, “temperatures have exceeded 
global annual averages for 38 consecutive years” (WRI, 2015). With regard to this, The World 
Counts calculates that the world uses “over 500 million terajoules of energy in one year,” 
with the current figure for 2015 standing at just over “481 million terajoules.” 
Problematically, “81%” of this energy comes from “the burning of fossil fuels (oil, coal, and 
gas),” with the demand for energy projected to rise by “35% between 2011 and 2035.” And 
as a result of the burning of these fuels for ever-increasing energy needs, harmful emissions 
have increased in volume. For instance, it is estimated that “the world emits 33 billion tons of 
CO2 per year,” and that other, even more dangerous emissions are estimated to increase by 
up to 34% by 2030, which would “correspond to a total of 57 billion tons of CO2” released 
per year. One of the effects of this high level of energy use and subsequent emission is the 
changing of climates, and this, as well as other factors such as over-consumption, 
deforestation, the destruction of coral reefs, etc., has led to a major loss in terms of species on 
the planet. Indeed, considered under the second UNSD category, The World Counts estimates 
that in 2015 alone, just under 121, 000 species became extinct – this translates to “1 [unique 
species] every 5 minutes.” While historically, species have always come and gone, “the 
current rate of extinction is up to 10,000 times higher than the average historical extinction 
rates.” In terms of the third UNSD category outlined, namely energy and minerals, The World 
Counts section on the environmental effects of mining calculates that, as of December 2015, 
almost 36.6 billion tons of resources were mined from the earth, and that apart from the vast 
energy consumption required to power this industry, a vast amount of waste has also been 
generated – 6.9 trillion tons of waste from gold mining alone, and 83.7 billion tons of waste 
water produced in the steel mining sector. Additionally, the “production of mined metal 
commodities is expected to increase by 250 percent by 2030.” Relatedly, the fourth UNSD 
category, forests, are also in jeopardy, with the WRI reporting that “despite decreased 
deforestation rates in some regions, forest ecosystems are still under great threat.” According 
to their research, “30 percent of global forest cover has been cleared, while another 20 
percent has been degraded. Most of the rest has been fragmented, leaving only about 15 
percent intact” (WRI, 2015). The World Counts, for its part, estimates that “130,000 square 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
was chosen specifically because of its corporate orientation, in order to ensure as broad a spectrum of voices as 
possible. In this regard, it is most telling that an institute such as the WRI identifies similar worries to those 
posed by, for instance, environmental thinkers such as Dave Toke, albeit with different interests at stake.  
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kilometres of forests are cut down or burned every year,” which is equivalent to 3 times the 
area of Denmark, a football field every 1.4 seconds, or 100 large harvesters working non-
stop.” And in turn, this loss of forest – the 33% of global wild forest left – leads to 
“desertification, loss of species, and contributes to global warming.” In terms of the fifth 
UNSD category, governance, the WRI point out that the legal rights of people affected 
directly or indirectly by developments such as those discussed above, are often difficult to 
defend, especially when they entail conflict with governments and multinational corporations 
whose interests clash with those of the locals and their claims to self-determination. The WRI 
notes in particular that “fair and effective governance is critical to ensuring that development 
projects benefit people and the planet.” However, “in many regions around the world, 
communities are regularly subjected to environmental and social injustices,” and they 
attribute such injustice to “inadequate or non-existent Freedom of Information laws” in many 
countries, especially poorer ones. Accordingly, these “leave communities without a say in the 
development decisions that directly impact them – such as [the] approval of dams, highways, 
and oil and gas exploration.” Additionally, “weak property rights can result in impoverished 
people losing access to the land and natural resources they rely on for their livelihoods.” A 
situation which is compounded by the way in which “the impacts of climate change 
disproportionately affect the world’s impoverished communities” (WRI, 2015). The Global 
Policy Forum concurs with such appraisal of the situation,20 noting that resources such as 
diamonds, oil and natural gas, water, timber, and other minerals such as cobalt, coltan, 
copper, and uranium, all tend to fuel the destabilization of local communities, particularly 
within less developed regions (GPF, 2015). With regard to the sixth UNSD category, inland 
water resources, The World Counts has a number of distressing statistics collated on the 
matter. They state that, as a first point, it should be considered that “freshwater on the planet 
amounts to only 3 percent of all water” available, and that of this, “less than 1 percent…is 
ready for human use.” Accordingly, water is becoming a scarce resource, and with an ever-
growing population, its scarcity will become an even more problematic issue in the future – 
especially if one considers that “1.4 billion people already live in areas that are simply 
running out of water.” The World Resources Institute further estimates that by 2025, as many 
as 3.5 billion people could experience the impacts of water scarcity (WRI, 2015). The seventh 
UNSD category, land and agriculture, has already been discussed to some extent in terms of 
                                                          
20 The Global Policy Forum describes itself as “an independent policy watchdog that monitors the work of the 
United Nations and scrutinizes global policymaking.” It was founded in 1993 “by a group of fourteen 
progressive scholars and activists” whose work is orientated around an “holistic approach, linking peace and 
security with economic justice and human development” (GPF, 2015).  
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forest loss, desertification, governance, and so on. Yet what must also be considered is the 
ethical use of land in response to a burgeoning world population, not least because, as The 
World Resources Institute estimates, the world “is projected to hold 9.6 billion people by 
2050.” And on account of this, “the world will have to close a gap of nearly 70 percent 
between the amount of food available today and that required by 2050.” But to do so, “it must 
reduce agriculture’s impact on climate, ecosystems, and water. And it needs to ensure that 
agriculture supports inclusive economic and social development;” a trajectory which at 
present is far from being followed. In terms of the eighth UNSD category, marine and coastal 
areas, the statistics collected by The World Counts are grim. For instance, it is estimated that 
in approximately 32 years from December 2015, there may be no sea life left for us to fish 
due to current rates of massive over-consumption. That is, although “oceans cover 71% of the 
planet and are home to 80% of life on Earth…they are also fragile ecosystems threatened by 
massive overfishing and pollution.” And the most damning statistic in terms of the ecological 
destruction of marine areas points to the fact that “since the onset of industrial fishing in the 
1960s, the total biomass of large commercially targeted marine fish species has declined by a 
staggering 90 percent.” Category nine of the UNSD’s environmental indicators relates to 
natural disasters, and this is divided into four further sub-categories, namely climatological, 
geophysical, hydrological, and meteorological disasters. Each of these is tracked in terms of 
the number of events recorded per country per decade (starting in the 1980s), and across each 
sub-category there appears to be an increase in such incidents from the 1980s onward. For 
example, in terms of climatological disasters, a significant number of countries have seen an 
increase in incidence rate. Indeed, South Africa itself experienced 4 such incidents in the 
1980s, 6 in the following decade, and 8 between 2000 and 2009 (UNSTATS, 2010). The 
tenth and final UNSD category relates to waste. While this has already been covered above in 
relation to sections such as mining, a few other overall data sets are worth considering. The 
World Counts estimates that “we throw out 50 tons of household waste every second,” which 
amounts to 37 million tons of electronic waste discarded in 2015 alone. Furthermore, it is 
calculated that “by 2030 the amount of household waste will almost double to 3000 million 
tons annually.” Beyond this, “every bag of household waste has produced approximately 70 
bags of waste upstream during extraction and production processes” (The World Counts, 
2015).21   
                                                          
21 In terms of the information taken from The World Counts website, in each instance the following sources are 
cited. For ‘air and climate,’ the sources used were The European Commission’s EDGAR database, the 
Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, UNSD, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
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According to Avner de Shalit, two problematic developments constitute important 
features of the current market-orientated discursive landscape which remains immune to such 
terrifying facts and figures, and correlatively dead set on pursuing business as usual. That is, 
in Why Posterity Matters: Environmental Politics and Future Generations, he describes the 
first as the tendency for “the environment” to be “treated by most people as a free 
commodity,” even though “it is becoming clear (even to politicians) that in the near future we 
will not be able to use the environment without incurring economic cost.” And secondly, de 
Shalit points out that “the demand for natural resources, clean air and clean water has been 
increasing, and will continue to do so,” and he cites a study by the Hudson Institute which 
estimates that “world energy consumption in 2025 will be 3.4 times greater than it was in the 
1980s, and will double itself by 2075” (2005: 3). While the economic cost of using the 
environment is now acknowledged as a matter of serious concern, the environmental editor of 
The Guardian, George Monbiot, shows clearly how the constant economic growth 
encouraged by free-market capitalism simply cannot be reconciled with any notion of 
sustainability. And he thereby accounts for the lack of efficacy of global forums such as the 
COP 21 talks in Paris, mentioned in the previous section, in terms of the seemingly 
irreconcilable differences among countries with dissimilar positions and interests. In 
“Consume More, Conserve More: Sorry, but we can’t just do both,” Monbiot discusses the 
exalted yet flawed economic principle of decoupling, and subsequently shows that 
environmental cost is judged through faulty means. As he explains, 
 
We can have it all: that is the promise of our age. We can own every gadget we are 
capable of imagining – and quite a few that we are not. We can live like monarchs 
without compromising Earth’s capacity to sustain us. That promise that makes all 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Change (UNFCCC), World Energy Outlook, Greenpeace, IEA. For ‘biodiversity,’ the sources used were the 
World Wildlife Fund (WWF) and the Whole Systems Foundation. For ‘energy and minerals,’ the sources used 
were the OECD Environmental Outlook to 2030 Report (Page 240), the United States Geological Survey 
(USGS), and the US National Mining Association. For ‘forests,’ the sources used were the Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations’ ‘Deforestation and Net Forest Change Area Report,’ the CDP Forests 
Program, the FAO’s ‘State of the World’s Forests, 2009’ Report (Page 77), the UNEP Yearbook 2009 (Page 55) 
and the Forest Stewardship Council. For ‘inland water sources,’ the sources used were the World Water 
Council’s ‘Virtual Water Trade – Conscious Choices’ Report (Page 7), the IFPRI’s ‘World Water and Food to 
2025’ Report (Page 62), the UN’s ‘Human Development Report 2006’ (Pages vi and 14), and the UNEP 
Yearbook 2009 (Page 50). For ‘marine and coastal areas,’ the sources used were The State of World Fisheries 
and Aquaculture 2012, the OECD’s ‘Environmental Outlook to 2030’ (Page 329), the UNEP Yearbook 2009 
(Page 2), the UN’s ‘Millennium Assessment Report: Ecosystems and Human Well-Being: Biodiversity’ (Page 
64) and the Marine Stewardship Council. And finally, for waste, the sources used were Greenpeace’s 
‘Incineration Campaign,’ the MBDC (Cradle to cradle framework) and the OECD’s ‘Environmental Outlook to 
2030’ report.   
34 
 
this possible is that as economies develop, they become more efficient in their use 
of resources. In other words, they decouple. (The Guardian, 2015) 
 
In particular, he points to two types of decoupling, namely the relative and the absolute, tied 
to which is the notion of sustainable development that first gained currency as a principle de 
jour in the 1970s and 1980s. According to him, if “relative decoupling means using less stuff 
with every unit of economic growth,” then “absolute decoupling means a total reduction in 
the use of resources, even though the economy continues to grow.” Furthermore, Monbiot 
argues, “almost all economists see decoupling – relative or absolute – [as] an inexorable 
feature of economic growth.” Yet, while this notion, tied to sustainable development and 
sitting “at the heart of the climate talks in Paris…and of every other summit on 
environmental issues,” is dominant, for him it is a thoroughly unfounded one. And by way of 
substantiation he points to a paper published by the Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences,22 which disputes the manner in which decoupling is accounted for. In fact, for the 
authors, “even the relative decoupling” – by far the more realistic and immediate type – “is 
an artefact of false accounting.” As Monbiot explains, “governments and economists have 
measured our impacts in a way that seems irrational,” because if one “takes the raw materials 
we extract in our own countries, adds them to our imports of stuff from other countries, then 
subtracts our exports,” one ends up with something called “domestic material consumption” 
(The Guardian, 2015). And such accounting practice is highly problematic because, “by 
measuring only the products shifted from one nation to another, rather than the raw materials 
needed to create those products, it greatly underestimates the total use of resources by the rich 
nations.” And he provides an example of this practice when he discusses the effects of the 
mining sector. He notes: 
 
If ores are mined and processed at home, these raw materials, as well as the 
machinery and infrastructure used to make finished metal, are included in the 
domestic material consumption accounts. But if we buy a metal product from 
abroad, only the weight of the metal is counted. So as mining and manufacturing 
shift from countries such as the UK and the US to countries like China and India, 
the rich nations appear to be using fewer resources. (The Guardian, 2015)  
                                                          
22 The report cited by Monbiot is entitled “The material footprint of nations,” written by Thomas O. Wiedmann, 
Heinz Schandlb, Manfred Lenzen, Daniel Moranc, Sangwon Suhf, James West, and Keiichiro Kanemotoc. It is 
edited by Joan Martínez Alier, from the Autonomous University of Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain, and was 
accepted by the Editorial Board on August 1, 2013.  
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In contrast to this, he advances the need for “a more rational measure,” which he calls the 
“material footprint,” and which “includes all the raw materials an economy uses, wherever 
they happen to be extracted.” Not only is this a more transparent method of counting for 
resource use, insofar as it takes account of all raw materials used – both domestic and 
imported – so that “the apparent improvements in efficiency disappear” (The Guardian, 
2015). In addition, it facilitates an approximation of the scope of the problem, as outlined by 
The World Counts, WRI, UNSD, and GPF, elaborated upon above. Yet, as much as the 
ensuing cognisance would be salutary, it remains questionable whether it would be sufficient 
to effect change, to the point of ushering in a paradigm shift. And more clarity concerning the 
obstacles emerges when what Kilbourne, Beckmann and Thelen call the Dominant Social 
Paradigm (DSP) is taken into account.  
The Dominant Social Paradigm  
While writers such as Sagoff and Monbiot all point to various aspects and practices of 
neoliberal economic rationality as the major contributors to ever-worsening environmental 
degradation, Kilbourne, Beckmann and Thelen in their “The Role of the Dominant Social 
Paradigm in Environmental Attitudes: A Multinational Examination,” offer an expanded 
view on the issue. And through their discussion what emerges is how Western industrial 
societies – as well as Westernized/Westernizing and rapidly industrializing societies – remain 
conceptually distant from the increasing environmental degradation occurring around them, 
because of how they are informed by the discursive dimensions of the DSP, to the point 
where their subjectivity is constituted around frames of reference inimical to paradigm 
change.23 Tied to this is their assertion that the vast majority of people living within such 
societies thus continue to be complicit in the ruin of their natural surroundings. Accordingly, 
Kilbourne et al. argue that people living within the context of capitalist systems, and in 
relation to the governments and corporations that operate within that framework, remain 
generally unconcerned with environmental issues for reasons associated with the DSP’s three 
inter-linked discursive dimensions. These dimensions are the political, the economic, and the 
                                                          
23 Kilbourne, Beckmann, and Thelen’s short text was originally published in 1997, but this chapter makes 
reference to the 2002 version. For the purposes of a more in-depth and updated discussion, reference is also 
made to Kilbourne, Beckmann, Dam and Pardo’s “Anthropocentrism, Value Systems and Environmental 
Attitudes: A Multi-National Comparison” (1997), and Kilbourne and Polonsky’s “Environmental Attitudes and 
their Relation to the Dominant Social Paradigm Among University Students in New Zealand and Australia” 
(2005).  
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technological, and together they constitute what is termed the Dominant Social Paradigm 
(DSP).  
That is, in “Anthropocentrism, Value Systems and Environmental Attitudes: A Multi-
National Comparison,” Kilbourne et al. begin with a curious thought, noting that “while high 
levels of environmental concern appear to have developed over the past twenty years, 
environmental degradation advances at relatively high rates.” And they argue that this is 
“because individuals who express concern seldom engage in environmentally responsible 
behaviours.” Indeed, for them, one can identify an “alarming…gap” between “attitudes and 
behaviour in the environmental arena.” In effect, it is in the matter of trying to explain this 
gap that Kilbourne et al. turn to the idea of a Dominant Social Paradigm that is prejudiced 
against nature, and which underpins the activities of Western and Westernized/Westernizing 
societies; that is, a DSP which operates as “the cultural context within which society’s 
members construct their world view” (1997: 1-2). William Shafer in “Social Paradigms and 
Attitudes Toward Environmental Accountability” provides a brief historical backdrop for the 
development of this concept. He writes that “the concept of a DSP was developed by 
sociology researchers in the late 1970s,” and “although variously operationalized,” its 
“socioeconomic dimensions…in modern Western societies are generally theorized to include 
political, economic, and technological dimensions.” It has as its precursor, of course, Thomas 
Kuhn’s concept of “scientific paradigms” (2006: 121-122),24 but has been expanded and 
developed upon by empirical research completed in the 1980s (Kilbourne et al. 2002: 195, 
Kilbourne and Polonsky 2005:37). For his part, Shafer defines the DSP as a combination of 
elements that “may be thought of as socially constructed traditions that legitimate prevailing 
social, economic, and political institutions, and express a common sense reality regarding the 
way society works” (2006: 122). In “The Role of the Dominant Social Paradigm in 
Environmental Attitudes: A Multinational Examination,” Kilbourne et al. provide more detail 
on each of the aforementioned dimensions. 
 With regard to the political dimension, they posit that “liberal democracy is the 
prevailing mode of political organization within the DSP.” This entails a “focus on the free 
individual, private property, and a limited government whose primary function is the 
                                                          
24 It is important to note that this study– in the spirit of a Deleuzoguattarian approach – does not endorse the 
rigid conceptual structures upon which the theorization of the DSP is based. Rather, such structures are 
referenced here for the useful insights into dominant attitudes which they provide. However, the emphasis 
remains on the pursuit of change, something which the DSP, rooted as it is in the work of Thomas Kuhn, cannot 
readily account for; a deficit which has been remarked upon by a range of scholars (Restivo 2011: 30, Moorstein 
2004: 31).  
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protection of property and enforcement of contracts.” As such, Kilbourne et al. point out that 
“in this Lockean framework,25 possessive individualism…is the ontological supposition and 
characterizes each individual as in possession of her/himself.” Within this prevailing mode of 
political organization, the unlimited accumulation of property is validated and given 
legitimacy (at the expense of the environment), and the individual is only given the freedom 
to participate within the realm of the market. Indeed, there is no real freedom other than the 
freedom to be able to consume, and to attempt to consume exponentially at that, and this 
comes at the expense of the individual who seeks alternative forms of autonomy and a more 
profound experience of freedom. However, it is difficult to problematize this political mode 
as it simply uses market-related structures and reformist policies to endorse the current 
political mode and capital. In relation to this, to enact a “radical ‘green’ politics” would be to 
“call into question the very foundations of liberal democracies,” and, as such, related politics 
is almost always ultimately marginalized (2002: 197).  
 For its part, the economic dimension feeds neatly into a mode of thought that diffuses 
any legitimate concern regarding the environment and its destruction. According to Kilbourne 
et al., the “essential elements of the economic dimension are free markets, self-interest as the 
sole motivator of behaviour, prices as the mediator of exchange, and efficiency as the primary 
criterion for the effective functioning of markets.”26 Accordingly, within this dimension, any 
environmental problems are simply dismissed as market failures, or even annotated as rare 
failures of the market. In such cases, markets are simply accused of not pricing resources 
appropriately, leading to inefficient allocations, and accordingly “economic policy 
instruments such as pollution taxes” are offered as a solution to any environmental problem 
that may occur. In short, everything tangible is related to an abstract notion of ‘the market,’ to 
the point where this virtual market becomes all encompassing. Through such means, an 
abstract, virtual formulation becomes a pseudo-religious conception that both accounts for 
                                                          
25 The Lockean framework referred to by Kilbourne et al. relates to Locke’s thinking on property rights. John 
Simmons, in The Lockean Theory of Rights, explains these as a crucial part of “Lockean moral and political 
philosophy” (1992: 3). Richard Spinello and Herman Tavani provide further explanation in Intellectual Property 
Rights in a Networked World when they write that, “essentially, Locke’s property theory is based on the notion 
of ‘just desserts’ for one’s physical labour.” However, the most immediate criticisms that can be attached to 
Locke’s thinking is his “claim that a property right is a natural right” (2005: 188), and it is this claim that 
Kilbourne et al. see as permeating contemporary thought in relation to the environment.    
26 Thomas Princen in his The Logic of Sufficiency, neatly demonstrates how the term ‘efficiency’ came into 
being at a specific point in history and how it has since, due to a number of circumstances and developments, 
gained a fetishized and unwarrantedly hegemonic status. In sum, he argues that the construct of efficiency 
accompanies power and that it mutated from effectiveness and suitability to efficiency as a result of the new 
needs of industrial society. Within this industrial sphere, the ratio of a desired result was no longer assessed in 
qualitative terms, but in quantitative ones. Against this, he advances instead a logic of sufficiency (2005: 66 -71).  
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and regulates every activity. In effect, a faith in “free markets,” as well as a fundamental 
belief in the capacity of the market and its growth to solve both short-term inefficiencies and 
long-term problems, prevails. And this faith tends to reduce the discursive momentum built 
up by those protesting the degradation and the exploitation of the environment, and the 
potential disastrous implications of this – protestors whose everyday actions also often 
contradict their avowed aspirations for a different way of living, because of the influence of 
the DSP (2002: 197-198).  
Finally, within the technological dimension, Kilbourne et al. argue that with the 
hugely successful development and application of Enlightenment science, the conditions 
under which human beings lived improved at an enormous rate. And the successful 
application of technology to industry and the exponential benefits which accompanied this, 
succeeded in silencing even the harshest of critics. In this regard, they cite Ehrenfeld (1978), 
who argues that this success brought about a profound arrogance within humanity, which he 
termed “humanism”. This refers to humanity being so impressed by its technological 
advances, that it no longer questions the implications of that technology. As Kilbourne et al. 
point out, “within the framework of technological optimism, it is assumed that technology 
can and will come to the aid of society whenever and wherever it is called upon” and they 
refer to this as the “technofix.” Besides this, Kilbourne et al. also point out that politics are 
immanent within technology itself. That is, while small-scale, decentralized technologies are 
conducive to democratic institution formation due to the individual control they afford, large-
scale, centralized technology is inherently authoritarian insofar as it demands strict control of 
its use, ownership and deployment, in the interest of efficacy (2002: 196-197).  
While the above three dimensions are the most commonly referred to components of 
the DSP, Kilbourne and Polonsky complicate the model by conceptualizing it, in addition, as 
a “two dimensional construct” with “three components in each dimension.” While the first, or 
the socio-economic dimension (with its political, economic and technological dimensional 
components) has received significant popular attention, their assertions concerning the 
cosmological dimension – containing the dimensional components of “structure (atomism-
holism), function (cooperation-competition) [and] organization (human position in nature)” – 
have received less thematization. However, the latter is no less important because, to a great 
extent, it underpins much of the thinking housed in the socio-economic dimension.  
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With regard to its structural dimension, Kilbourne and Polonsky argue that this “refers 
to beliefs about the composition of the world in which we live,” and they specifically refer to 
our adoption of a mechanical view of nature at the expense of an organic view. In terms of 
this, “the prevailing belief is still that the universe can be benignly deconstructed in an effort 
to reduce it to [fundamental] building blocks so that it can be understood and manipulated in 
the service of humanity.” And although this type of thinking has been “subject to question in 
quantum mechanics for decades,”27 it is still “the dominant view and pervades human thought 
and action.” Accordingly, for the authors, such thought thoroughly informs “political and 
economic liberalism,” within which not only nature but also people become reduced to 
atomized components, operating within “impersonal competitive relations” (2005:39). 
Moreover, the functional dimension in many respects reinforces the idea of such 
competitiveness, and thus ultimately endorses the quest for domination over others and 
nature. In this regard, Kilbourne and Polonsky trace the idea of competitiveness back to 
Charles Darwin’s Origin of the Species, in which they argue, “nature was reduced to the 
competitive struggle for existence.” In terms of human relations, they also argue that it was 
Herbert Spencer’s “concept, later known as Social Darwinism,” which “firmly established the 
role of interpersonal competition among independent individuals as the sine qua non of social 
progress.”28 The clear difference between Darwin and Spencer, however, was that while the 
former established “no universally desirable goal and was therefore non-teleological,” the 
latter “clearly defined competition as the only means through which progress could be 
consistently insured.” And Kilbourne and Polonsky argue that this concept of “social 
competitiveness” passed from one established Western economic philosopher to the next, 
“from Hobbes to Adam Smith through Locke,”29 and “has since become the standard in 
assessing the ability of markets to best serve the march of material progress.” Indeed, the 
                                                          
27 Quantum mechanics, in its study of the very small, destabilizes and opens up further avenues of question 
(Vermaas 1999: 4) as opposed to the type of thinking discussed by Kilbourne and Polonsky.  
28 Here, Kilbourne and Polonsky make reference to the famous Darwinian notion of ‘natural selection,’ often 
mistakenly read as a ‘survival of the fittest.’ As James T. Costa, in his accompanying notes to On The Organic 
Law of Change: A Facsimile Edition and Annotated Transcription of Alfred Russel Wallace’s Species Notebook 
of 1855-1859, explains, it was actually Spencer’s idea of “survival of the fittest” which Darwin reluctantly – 
under the “exhortations” of Wallace – adopted, despite not being “much of a Spencer fan himself.” As such, the 
fifth edition of the Origin of Species included a definition of “natural selection” as equatable to “the expression 
often used by Mr. Herbert Spencer of the Survival of the Fittest” (2013: 385).  
29 In his discussion on the social contract between States and those who live within them, Thomas Hobbes, in 
Leviathan, first published in 1651, sees competition as unavoidable as people of “rough equality of strength and 
mental ability” are not ready “to acknowledge another’s superior right to [any] object” (in Hampton 1986: 59).   
Similarly, in his iconic text, The Wealth of Nations, first published in 1776, Adam Smith argues for competition 
as the key practice in securing a fairer life for all, insofar as it comprises a bastion against governmental 
interference and monopoly (Haakkonssen 2006: 3-4).  
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DSP today is intertwined with both the idea of “individual competitiveness” and “human 
competition with nature,” both of which serve as its “fundamental beliefs” (2005: 39-40).  
In turn, human competition with nature is better understood with reference to the final 
component within the cosmological dimension, namely the human position in nature. In this 
regard, Kilbourne and Polonsky posit that “the essential feature…is the belief that humans are 
separate from and morally superior to the rest of nature.” And the result of this type of 
anthropocentric thinking is that “humans consider themselves to be the masters of nature[,] 
subduing it for their own instrumental purposes.” On the opposite end of what can be 
considered a continuum, is an ecocentric mode of thinking, which does not privilege humans 
as inherently superior to other life forms. And although this viewpoint has gained some 
traction – even being argued forcefully at times, such as by “Peter Singer (2004) in his 
extensive work on animal rights”30 – the anthropocentric view, enforced by the structural and 
functional dimensions, as well as by the previously discussed socio-economic dimensions, 
remains dominant (2005: 40-41).  
While the the two broad oppositional theoretical positions of the bioenvironmentalists 
and social greens perspectives on the matter are in no way invalid ,31 because of the 
                                                          
30 Singer is known particularly for his book Animal Liberation (1975), which is considered a canonical work in 
terms of animal rights discourse (Bekoff and Meaney 1998: 2).  
31 The bioenvironmentalist perspective stresses “the biological limits of the earth to support life.” While there 
are a number of variations on this theme, the agreed upon idea is that “the planet is fragile” and “an ecosystem 
like any other,” and in relation to this, it is human activity that is considered to be the problematic factor that 
upsets the fragile balance of the earth. Indeed, “many bioenvironmentalists see humans as anthropocentric and 
selfish (or at least self-interested) animals,” while some – such as “the academic William Rees – even see 
humans as having “a genetic predisposition for unsustainability.’” Accordingly, for the bioenvironmentalists, the 
key factors of concern with regard to our impact on the earth’s capacity to sustain us are rapid population 
growth, the neoclassical economic assumption of infinite growth and thus our associated consumption patterns, 
and the negative impacts of globalization, such as the spreading of Western patterns of consumption globally. 
The solutions proposed to these problems are relatively simple, in that, they advance that “we need to curb 
economic and population growth” (Clapp and Dauvergne 2005: 9-11). For its part, the various viewpoints that 
can be classified under the social green perspective, draw “primarily on radical social and economic theories, 
[and] see social and environmental problems as inseparable.” For them, “inequality and domination, exacerbated 
by economic globalization, are seen as leading to unequal access to resources as well as unequal exposure to 
environmental harms.” The term social green is a broad umbrella term, and includes contributions from a 
number of theoretical perspectives. For instance, “more academic social greens draw on Marxist thought, 
pointing specifically to capitalism as the primary driver of social and environmental injustice in a globalized 
world.” Equally inspired by Marxist thought, but taking on a specifically neo-Gramscian perspective, other 
academic social greens focus “on the way those in power frame and influence ecological problems,” and their 
targets in this regard are the “hegemonic blocs consisting of large corporations and industrial country 
governments.” A further related and influential strand of thought is the feminist theory of Vandana Shiva, who 
argues that “patriarchal relationships in the global economy are intricately tied to ecological destruction.” While 
the various theoretical contributions housed under the umbrella term ‘social green’ are sympathetic to the 
concerns put forward by the bioenvironmentalists (they match on criticizing the ills of economic globalization 
for instance), there is disagreement to be found on some key points. Specifically, “few social greens accept 
bioenvironmentalist arguments regarding population growth.” On this point of difference, they maintain that it is 
“overconsumption, particularly among the rich in the First World” that poses “a far greater problem.” In terms 
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dominance of the current political and economic schema under which we all operate, their 
endeavours to elicit change through their critique has to date been largely unsuccessful. 
Indeed, despite the best efforts of the modern environmental movement to contest the 
thinking behind our current predisposition to nature, the status quo remains. And this is 
because the DSP not only informs the subjectivity of the public at large, but also informs – to 
a greater or lesser extent – the subjectivity of even the strongest environmentalists. After all, 
we all operate within, and are informed by the DSP to some extent, even as we take on the 
challenge of communicating the need for environmental protection through the new media 
means at our disposal.  
Conclusion 
Having thus elaborated on the environmental crisis within the context of the DSP, it needs to 
be considered if there is room to manoeuvre, or if an inflection of attitudes is possible within 
this paradigm. In short, how does one begin to take on the various assumptions and well-
entrenched beliefs within its cosmological dimension, that moreover spill over into the 
political and economic practices that we adopt in relation to nature? As a first tactic of 
contestation, one could adopt an oppositional stance to the thinking and practices that 
characterize the DSP. And this stance has been adopted by many academics, activists and 
citizens under the auspices of social green and the bioenvironmentalist critique.32 However, 
the key issues with such an oppositional approach are twofold: Firstly, although crucially 
important, such opposition has not (yet) succeeded in replacing the destructive thought and 
practices of a world operating in terms of the DSP. Secondly, the various critics of the DSP 
who employ such an oppositional approach do not always readily acknowledge that they are 
complicit with it, insofar as academics, activists and concerned citizens alike are all afforded 
the means of critique by the very system of relations they criticize. We write about 
environmental degradation on our laptops, and access related information through our 
smartphones, which are made ever-more powerful by the capacity and malleability of conflict 
minerals such as coltan, and connected to vast and immensely polluting telecommunications 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
of solutions proposed, the social greens advocate “a dismantling of current global economic structures and 
institutions,” and in terms of replacement, call for “a return to local community autonomy to rejuvenate social 
relations and restore the natural environment” (Clapp and Dauvergne 2005: 11-16). 
32 With regard to a more radical bioenvironmentalist perspective, Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess introduced 
the term ‘deep ecology’ in 1972, in order to define a more extreme form of bioenvironmentalism that advocated 
an almost mystical union with nature; one that required significant personal transformation in the adoption of 
sustainable modes of being. As he writes in “The shallow and the deep, long-range ecology movement: A 
summary,” deep ecology constitutes a “rejection of the man-in-environment image in favour of the relational, 
total-field image” (Naess 2010: 95), in which humanity reassess its values by encountering nature through an 
alternative more egalitarian framework.  
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networks. Accordingly, unless one is willing to step outside of such a system of relations in 
some radical way – and most are certainly not – one must admit to at least partial complicity 
with the DSP. And this is the point of departure for the next chapter.  
That is, rather than taking on such an oppositional stance, the following chapter will 
explore which dimension of the DSP is most susceptible to alteration in relation to the 
cosmological assumptions described above, and in this regard, focus will fall in particular on 
the technological dimension. That is, as evinced throughout this chapter, the weak political 
response to the environmental crisis over the previous decades, along with the rise to near-
hegemonic status of the neoliberal economic discourse since the mid-1970s, all bear 
testimony to how difficult it is to effect change within the political and economic dimensions. 
Yet, it will be argued that the technological dimension, although also highly problematic, 
offers the possibility of incremental transformation – specifically the sphere of information 
technology. Of course, great care must be taken here to avoid the illusion of the ‘technofix’ 
identified by Kilbourne et al. As such, rather than simplistically exalting information 
technology as an innocent conduit through which we can dislodge destructive environmental 
attitudes and behaviours, in the following chapter – and after due consideration of both its 
link to neoliberalism and its material cost to the environment – information technology will 
carefully be examined for its potential to alter – albeit only incrementally –its users 
orientations toward nature, and with this the parameters of their cosmology.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
43 
 
Chapter Two – Rethinking the technological dimension of the DSP: 
Information technology and the environment 
Introduction  
As demonstrated in the first chapter, despite the proliferation of voices addressing the 
environmental crisis since 1962, significant remedial change has not been forthcoming. In 
this regard, legacy mass media, and for that matter, information technology which functions 
in an analogously top-down manner (such as the informational websites on various aspects of 
environmental degradation run by organizations such as Greenpeace), have failed to 
precipitate a transformation of the DSP. And it was argued that this is largely because of the 
competing discursive parameters of the DSP, which are far more powerful and pervasive. 
However, information technology in the wake of Web 2.0 that allows for interactivity and 
mutual/reciprocal exchanges has admittedly gone some way toward addressing this. Yet, 
before valorizing it for its pro-environmental achievements in this regard, firstly, its 
relationship to neoliberalism must be considered, and secondly, the material burden its 
infrastructure places on the environment must be appraised. Accordingly, in what follows, 
firstly, the link between information technology and the hegemonic economic discourse of 
neoliberalism will be discussed, because the intersection between the two has had a 
significant impact on promoting an economic ideology that focuses on growth, often at the 
expense of the environment. Secondly, the material cost of our digital infrastructure on the 
natural environment will be explored. This is an important related issue because the virtual 
worlds constructed by our information age are often mistakenly construed in only virtual 
terms. That is, in the excitement of exploring the possibilities offered by an ever more 
ubiquitous digital world, what is forgotten is that all our virtual interactions are only made 
possible through an actual, material network of infrastructure that stores, sends and receives 
our information exchanges. And when one closely examines these digital infrastructures, it 
becomes evident that the vast arrangement that makes our new virtual world possible comes 
at a major material cost to the environment. 
Yet while the fact that digital infrastructure is not ‘clean’ technology is indisputable, 
what will be argued in this chapter is that an abandonment of a digitally-orientated society is 
also highly unlikely in the near future. As such, it is important to ask if the digital spaces and 
applications enabled by this digital infrastructure have any qualities to them that could offer a 
positive contribution to the reorientation of how we, as human beings, relate to nature. And 
this requires very careful consideration because, as will be discussed, too often work on 
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technology – and information technology in particular –is undertaken from an extreme 
position. That is, either techno-pessimism heralds technological advance as the enemy of 
nature, or technophilia ascribes immense remedial power to information technology. In what 
follows, though, a middle ground between the two extreme positions will be adopted, and in 
this regard, a number of theoretical contributions on the relationship between technology and 
nature will be considered. In particular, the respective works of Dave Toke, Manuel Poitras, 
Frederick Buell and Vincent Mosco, will be engaged with because of how they place into 
critical question some of our otherwise entrenched ideas concerning information technology. 
Following this, the focus will shift to the ideas of Martin Lister, Jon Dovey, Seth Giddings, 
Iain Grant and Kieran Kelly, which open up such discussion even further, specifically via 
“Cyberculture: Technology, Nature and Culture,” in which Lister et al. argue that when 
studying new media, we need to reconsider our tendency to place human agency in 
opposition to all sorts of determinisms – specifically in relation to our exchanges with 
emerging technologies. Instead, they locate human agency as operating within a spectrum 
that includes technology, nature and culture, which are in themselves in constant interplay 
with one another. And the importance of adopting such a route will be emphasized because of 
how it facilitates consideration of the complexities involved in any such exchange, but 
without falling prey either to technological pessimism, or conversely, to over-enthusiasm in 
this regard.33  
Information technology and neoliberalism: Connectivity and commerce  
During the 1980s, and exponentially more so during the 1990s, there occurred “the 
proliferation of powerful computers and microelectronic technologies that [helped] 
individuals and groups to communicate virtually instantaneously,” and which allowed them 
“to move vast amounts of money and [related] information via these technologies” 
(Mansbach and Rafferty 2008: 745). In this regard, Lister et al. point out that it was “the 
displacement of the military ARPANET” – or the Advanced Research Projects Agency 
Network – “into the Internet” (2009: 95) that marked the genetic point of the development of 
this medium. In effect, as David Bell states in “On the Net: Navigating the World Wide 
Web,” ARPANET was “an initially small network established by the US Department of 
                                                          
33As stated in the methodology section in the Introduction, due to the nebulous nature of information 
technology, this study explores information technology not by strict delineation, but rather moves inter-
changeably between terms such as the internet, network technologies, social media platforms, mobile 
devices/smartphones, and digitality, among others. This is in keeping with the approach of many theorists who 
adopt similar flexibility in their engagement with new media on account of its protean dimensions.  
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Defense, connecting a number of what were then considered supercomputers.” Accordingly, 
the initial purpose of establishing these connections was to build “a network of distributed 
nodes able to evade or withstand nuclear attack.” Thus, designed and built within the shadow 
of the perceived threats associated with the Cold War,34 the origin of the Internet was to a 
certain extent bound to the specific interests of its developers. However, as Bell warns, “it is 
important not to overstate this part of the Internet’s origin,” because although the Internet’s 
development was initially linked to the American military complex, it was also “part of a 
number of other political, economic and technological projects, some more or less driven by 
the state, some by the computer industries,” and “some by countercultures emerging from 
hobbyist and hacker groups interested in computing as a tool for democracy or revolution.” 
Consequently, input into the development of this medium was highly varied, and informed by 
anything from cynical exploitation of emergent technologies for military or commercial 
advantage, to highly creative endeavours espousing an altogether different politico-discursive 
aim. But regardless of how the above strands were “often divergent in their aim,” they all 
appeared to “share at root a belief in networked computers as a tool for progress” (2009: 30-
31). 
While these sources offered unique contributions to the development of the Internet, 
the space that they collectively created remained for quite some time inaccessible to the 
public at large. That is, while personal computers (or microcomputers) first emerged in 
1977/8 with the launch of the Apple II, and while the market for this technology expanded 
dramatically throughout the 1980s, the Internet in its initial phase almost exclusively 
remained the domain of more specialized users. As David Gauntlett in Web. Studies points 
out, it was only with the World Wide Web, “a user-friendly interface onto the Internet” 
(2004: 5), that the Internet was first able to reach a mass audience beyond its initial limited 
scope. And although Bell maintains that “the birth date of the World Wide Web is often cited 
as 6 August 1991,” in reality it really only gained momentum a couple of years later, when 
the World Wide Web programme “developed by Tim Berners-Lee…was joined to a widely 
and freely available browser called Mosaic” (2009: 31). In effect, the programme and 
browser – working in tandem – allowed for non-specialized users to access the network 
through a simple interface. Hassan and Thomas, in their introduction to the New Media 
                                                          
34 The Cold War refers to the period of animosity and proxy conflict that characterized the years 1945 to 1991, 
as the two new superpowers of the post-World War Two era, namely the USA and the Soviet Union, vied for 
dominance over world affairs according to their individual ideological outlooks (Walker 1995: 1). Part of this 
conflict, as Aaron Friedberg notes in “The United States and the Cold War Arms Race,” was an arms race 
between the two which precipitated technological advance in order to try to establish an upper hand (2000: 220).  
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Theory Reader,35 confirm this development as crucial to “the growth to behemoth status of 
corporations such as Microsoft, Intel and Apple,” which they attribute to “the growth of the 
NASDAQ bubble” in the “1990s” (2006: xxiii).36 In many respects, with the launch of 
Microsoft’s Windows 95 in August of 1995, the updated versions of which included the 
browser Internet Explorer – launched as a rival to Netscape Navigator and NCSA Mosaic 
(Gibbs, 2014) – the Internet became a public space that was thereafter constantly subject to 
enhancement through commercial competition.  
Although networked computers started to become a norm around 1995, the 
capabilities of this early interface were limited. Web 1.0 is a retronym used to describe the 
early ‘web,’ or the Internet pre 2003/4, after which period Web 2.0 became a buzzword 
“commonly used to encompass various novel phenomena on the World Wide Web.” That is, 
although Web 2.0 was predominantly a marketing term, “some of the key attributes 
associated with Web 2.0 include[d] the growth of social networks, bi-directional 
communication, various ‘glue’ technologies, and significant diversity in content types” 
(Cormode and Krishnamurthy 2008: 1). In effect, the essential distinction between the two 
periods derives from the manner in which the user experienced the interface. Whereas in its 
previous form, or Web 1.0, “the vast majority of users simply [acted] as consumers of 
content,” the Web 2.0 interface “allow[ed] for any participant [to] be a content creator…and 
numerous technological aids” were subsequently “created to maximize the potential for 
content creation” (2008: 2). One of the major developments spurred on by this change in 
interface capability has been the rapid growth of social networking sites (SNSs), most notably 
Facebook.37 Lister et al., quoting Boyd and Ellison, argue that these sites “are structured as 
                                                          
35 For the most part, new media theory “only formalized itself since the 1990s” as a result of “the accelerated 
diffusion of digital media from [the] telecommunications and information technology sectors” in this period, 
which led to “media and communication studies [being] defined by new objects of investigation.” Indeed, “new 
forms of media demand exploration in their own right at the same time as the remediation of traditional media 
becomes open to investigation.” And accordingly, new media studies has earned a place as a branch of 
communication theory precisely because “traditional media environments” have not simply been altered by 
technological innovation – in particular the rapid emergence of the digital – but have also been significantly 
challenged (Holmes, 2012: 685-689).  
36 Larry Harris in Trading and Exchanges: Market Microstructure for Practitioners, explains the NASDAQ 
bubble as one in which “traders…excessively optimistic about prospects for new technology companies” 
convinced people to invest heavily in those companies operating in “the Internet, telecommunications, 
computer, and biotechnology sectors” (2003: 569). Donald Rapp in Bubbles, Booms, and Busts: The Rise and 
Fall of Financial Assets, relatedly indicates that this aforementioned boom in investment in technology 
companies, also known as the “dot.com stock market bubble,” occurred mainly “from about 1997 to early 2000” 
(2015: 305).  
37 Facebook, founded in 2004 by Mark Zuckerberg (Carlson 2010), is widely regarded as the world’s most 
popular social networking site, with Internetlivestats.com estimating that the site currently has approximately 
1.32 billion users (Internetlivestats 2014). The site offers a number of features including the opportunity for 
users to post their personal thoughts on any matter whatsoever, upload pictures, ‘like’ (support) companies and 
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personal (or ‘egocentric’) networks, with the individual at the centre of their own 
community” (2009: 216), and ostensibly in full control of who they connect with, and what 
information they expose themselves to. But the debate over the extent of their agency in this 
regard notwithstanding, in effect Web 2.0 offers the user a far more dynamic experience of 
the Internet, in which content can be consumed through multimedia, rather than in a 
“primarily textual” form (Bell 2009: 31), and in which users can construct their own 
messages through a variety of forms (text, image, video, etc.).  
In terms of worldwide access to the Internet, statistics are difficult to pin down 
precisely as a result of the rapid and constant growth of the medium. However, it is possible 
to offer a fairly accurate snapshot at a given point in time by taking into account a number of 
statistics relating to the number of ‘users’ in various geographical regions. According to the 
site Internetworldstats.com,38 as of 31 December 2013, there were just over 2.8 billion 
Internet users. Of these people accessing the Internet, North America had the best penetration 
percentage, with 84.9% of the population classified as users, while Africa, with its 
approximately 240 million users, had a penetration percentage of only 21.3%. While this is 
certainly the lowest percentage compared to Asia, Europe, the Middle East, Latin 
America/Caribbean, Oceania/Australia, and indeed North America, it is worth noting that 
internet use has grown in Africa, from approximately 4.5 million users in 2000 to over 240 
million in 2013. Statista.com estimates that 2.92 billion people accessed the Internet in 2014 
(based on information collated by June 2014), and that the people of the Middle East and 
Africa (whom they categorize together) comprise 19% of that number. Internetlivestats.com, 
which collects information in real time, also estimates that there are – as of 6 October, 2014 – 
2.98 billion internet users, with South Africa in particular registering 24.9 million users, 
indicating a penetration percentage of 46.88%.39 Undoubtedly, one of the major contributors 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
ideas, chat in real time with other people they are connected to as ‘friends,’ and even update these connections 
on their whereabouts via geolocation services that are supported by Facebook’s digital infrastructure. The site 
has certainly reached a ubiquity of sorts, with its presence easily located in popular discourse. 
38 The compilers of the information at Internetworldstats.com are highly cognisant of the disputes over who 
precisely can be classified as an Internet user. In this regard, they state that “the ITU subscribes to the definition 
of an Internet user as someone aged 2 years old and above, who went online in the past 30 days. The US 
Department of Commerce, in contrast, defines Internet users as those 3 years or older who ‘currently use’ the 
Internet.” Against this, “the CNNIC” for instance “defines the Internet user as a Chinese citizen, aged 6 or 
above, who uses the Internet at least one hour per week” (Internetworldstats, 2014). The compilers of the 
statistics at Internetworldstats.com, however, label an Internet user as needing only to meet two requirements to 
be considered as acceptable for inclusion in their statistics, namely, “available access to an Internet connection 
point [and] the basic knowledge required to use web technology” (Internetworldstats, 2014). 
39 Internetworldstats.com obtains its numbers from the Nielsen Group, which is described “as a global standard 
for Internet audience measurement and analysis and is the industry’s premier source for online advertising 
intelligence,” as well as from the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), which is an affiliate of the 
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to the increase in internet use, and the correlative narrowing of the digital divide,40 is the 
growing use of mobile devices – specifically sophisticated cell phone technologies 
(smartphones) – to connect to the World Wide Web. Indeed, at the end of 2013, Business 
Insider reported that “22% [of the world’s population] will own smartphones” (Heggestuen, 
2013), and six months later, the wireless technology site Fierce Wireless reported that this 
figure had grown to 25%, with “1.76 billion people” owning smartphones (Goldstein, 2014). 
Yet, while one thus no longer needs a fixed connection and expensive hardware (such as a 
PC, a modem, etc.) to connect to the internet, and while this has certainly made the medium 
far more accessible to larger sections of the world’s population, one should also be cognisant 
of the implications of such pervasive reach within the neoliberal context discussed in the 
previous chapter. And related to this point, one must also consider how ever-larger segments 
of the world population now operate under the auspices of the DSP, through more robust 
incorporation into its modes of thinking via their new access to its (information) 
technological dimension.  
In this regard, in The Network Society: From Knowledge to Policy, Manuel Castells 
(with Gustavo Cardoso) argues that “our world has been in a process of structural 
transformation for over two decades.”41 He locates the beginning of this process as having 
taken shape in the 1970s, arguing that while “this process is multidimensional,…it is 
associated with the emergence of a new technological paradigm, based in information and 
communication technologies…diffused unevenly around the world” (2005: 3). In relation to 
this profound structural change, in The Rise of the Network Society, Castells employs two key 
concepts which explain how such a radically altered society operates, namely the idea of 
society operating as a network, and the dominant mode of organization related to such a 
networked society, namely the space of flows. In his exploration of these concepts, Castells 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
United Nations (Internet World Stats 2014). Statista.com describes itself as “the world’s biggest statistics 
portal,” and claims to have “statistics, studies, and reports from over 18 000 sources,” all of which have 
“adherence to academic sources” (Statista 2014). Lastly, Internetlivestats.com is described as “an international 
team of developers, researchers, and analysts with the goal of making statistics available in a dynamic and time 
relevant format to a wide audience around the world.” The site claims to be contracted to provide information 
for, among others, “BBC News, United Nations Conference Rio+20 and Wired [magazine]” (Internet Live Stats 
2014).  
40 Benjamin Compalne in The Digital Divide: Facing a Crisis or Creating a Myth? defines the digital divide as 
“the perceived gap between those who have access to the latest information technologies and those who do not,” 
in terms of which “not having access to this information [is] considered a handicap” (2001: xi). 
41 Castells’ Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture trilogy, comprising of The Rise of the Network 
Society (1996), The Power of Identity (1997), and End of Millennium (1998), offer a thorough overview of the 
multi-faceted socio-cultural and politico-economic features and consequences of the internet. This has led to 
him becoming one of the most cited scholars on the issue of how information technology is affecting and 
framing human relations.  
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discusses the impact of this structural transformation on economic activity itself, and the 
impact of the resultant new economic organization on individuals and groups.  
In terms of the economic sphere itself, or more specifically, the rise of neoliberal 
capitalism, Castells argues that it was as a result of the aforementioned technological 
advances that “capitalism itself [underwent]…a process of profound restructuring, 
characterized by greater flexibility in management [and] decentralization and networking of 
firms both internally and in their relationships to other firms.” And these changes had 
manifold consequences, including the “considerable empowering of capital,” and with this, 
“the concomitant decline of the labour movement,” as well as the “intervention of the state to 
deregulate markets selectively, and to undo the welfare state, with different intensity and 
orientations depending upon the nature of political forces and institutions in each society” – 
all of which occurred within “a context of stepped-up global economic competition” (2010: 
1-2).42 
Such swift structural changes to an economic context that had previously operated 
under the guise of relative stability, Castells argues, led to a disorientation on the part of the 
individual, who was obliged to make sense of their newfound position within a vortex of 
social change, informed by economic restructurings, and enabled by technological advance.43 
Indeed, when “global networks of instrumental exchanges selectively switch on and off 
individuals, groups, regions, and even countries, according to their relevance in fulfilling the 
goals processed in the network, in a relentless flow of strategic decisions,” there can only be 
“structural schizophrenia.” And Castells discusses a number of possible reactions to such 
flux, ranging from “people regroup[ing] around primary identities: religious, ethnic, 
territorial, [or] national,” to a search for meaning, “ascribed or constructed” (2010: 3) via 
technological means.    
In terms of individual interaction with information technology, Castells concentrates 
his exploration on the concept of time, and specifically, the impact of a networked society on 
                                                          
42 Castells also lists further important implications, such as “increasing individualization and diversification of 
working relationships [and] massive incorporation of women into the paid labour force, usually under 
discriminatory conditions” (2010: 1-2).  
43 When referring to “an economic context,” it is acknowledged that, although neoliberal capitalism is today the 
dominant economic philosophy informing most economic contexts and participation in the global economy, 
each country’s unique social and historical conditions, and any economic modes of organization stemming from 
such conditions, always entail an element of differentiation in their respective relation to the principles of 
neoliberalism. For instance, although both subscribe to neoliberalism, the Russian Casino Capitalism associated 
with the collapse of the Soviet Union (Brzezinski 2002: 13) is different to the gradual privatization of Britain’s 
public services under the Conservatives and New Labour (van Zon 2016: 60).  
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time. According to him, “linear, irreversible, measurable, predictable time is being shattered 
in the network society, in a movement of extraordinary historical significance” (2010: 463). 
This is because the virtual space enabled by information society comprises “a forever 
universe, not self-expanding but self-maintaining, not cyclical but random,” that produces a 
“timeless time;” one which not only uses “technology to escape the contexts of its existence,” 
but which also “appropriate[s] selectively any value each context could offer to the ever-
present” (2010: 464).44 But if, as Castells claims, an informational networked society has 
allowed “capitalism freedom from time,” and “culture an escape from the clock” (2010: 464), 
what consequences does this have for the individual?  
In terms of the individual’s relation to work, and with a view to understanding their 
societal orientation as a space of flows, Castells explores terms such as future time, flex-time, 
and life working time (2010: 466- 468). By future time, Castells refers to the financial 
speculation enabled by the time-space compression engendered through advances in 
information technology, in which capital “is shuttled back and forth between economies in a 
matter of hours, minutes, and sometimes [even] seconds,” by “powerful computer programs 
and skilful financial analysts/computer wizards, sitting at the global nodes of a selective 
telecommunications network,” who “play games, literally, with billions of dollars” (2010: 
465). However, understandably, these movements are not without immense and manifold 
consequences, with Castells arguing that they are “increasingly felt in economies and daily 
lives around the world,” particularly in terms of “recurrent monetary crises” that have 
“usher[ed] in an era of structural economic instability” (2010: 466). Flex and life working 
time refer to the manner in which work has changed over the last few decades, with 
technology – particularly the emergence of the mobile phone – ensuring that the separation 
between work and time away from it becomes increasingly blurred. Together, these two 
technology-enabled developments have profoundly altered the way in which the 
contemporary person finds him/herself operating within time. In this regard, as Kanouse and 
Schultz explain in “Notes on Affective Practice: an exchange,” today “our time, bodies and 
minds are inscribed with capitalist competitiveness (we hustle to live, if some more than 
                                                          
44 Castells attributes his notion of ‘timeless time’ to the work of Leibniz (2010: 494), which constitutes an 
interesting theoretical overlap between him and Deleuze, whose work will be discussed in the next chapter.  In 
his The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque (1988), Deleuze similarly maintained that Leibniz’s concepts of “the 
monad” and “the fold” allowed for a conception of time that was not structured and ordered like Descartes 
“rather sober concepts,” but instead embraced a conception of time that sees it as both “singular [and] 
universal,” and in “continuous variation” (in Marks 1998: 75-76).   
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others), rhythms (cybertime, or hyper-speed) and productivity (more + more + more)” (2013: 
11).45 
In sum, it is clear that information technology has allowed for the proliferation of the 
neoliberal economic practices that were embraced globally in the 1970s and 1980s. As David 
Harvey notes in A Brief History of Neoliberalism, “information technology is the privileged 
technology of neoliberalism” (2007: 159).  
The material infrastructure underpinning our digital world  
Besides the deep connections between information technology and neoliberalism – an 
economic ideology and practice which remains largely responsible for the lack of effective 
action against environmental degradation – the next point of consideration must be the 
material cost of the ubiquitous information technology we employ continuously for our work 
and leisure. In this regard, in what follows, such material cost is considered in terms of firstly, 
the type and amount of energy used to power our digital infrastructure, secondly, the 
pollution that this causes in a number of different ways, as well as the pollution caused by the 
devices (end user equipment) themselves, thirdly, the unseen human cost of digital 
production and disposal, as well as, fourthly, the philosophical implications of all of the 
above, particularly in terms of the loss of time experienced within a world infatuated by 
information technology.  
As an entry point into the topic of the environmental impact of digitality, Marcus 
Hurst’s “How Polluting is the Internet?” published by CCCB Lab,46 offers a comprehensive 
overview of the material requirements and correlative consequences in this regard. Hurst 
begins his piece by arguing that, while it should be noted that digital technology may allow 
for a lowering of individual carbon footprints due to its efficiency – citing Skype as an 
example of a development that may offset unnecessary travel, particularly in terms of 
                                                          
45 As an interesting aside, beyond work, or functioning in relation to capital, individuals often try to cope with 
this situation through accessing culture, often via technological means. In The Power of Identity, Castells 
elaborates on the primary identities people attach to in response to such flux, citing examples such as Islamic 
fundamentalism, American Christian fundamentalism and Nationalism (2010: 13-35). Accordingly, despite its 
presumed backwardness, such involvement often entails sophisticated use of available information technology 
to reach out to the disorientated.  As Castells points out, “When networks dissolve time and space, people 
anchor themselves in places, and recall their historic memory” (2010: 69). 
46 The CCCB Lab blog is the online publication of the CCCB, or the Centre du Cultura Contemporania de 
Barcelona, which describes itself as aiming “to take on board the complexity, intensity and creativity of a 
historic point in time where old certainties are dissolving and new paradigms require imagination and maximum 
openness.” It is affiliated to a number of European universities and research institutes, placing a high emphasis 
on digital and robotic technologies as a field of study (CCCB, 2015).  
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business – it should also be remembered “that [just because] its footprint is lower than that of 
traditional activities does not mean it is totally innocuous” (Hurst, 2014). Indeed, as Simon 
Marvin in Global City Regions: Their Emerging Forms notes, “relations between 
telecommunications and the…environment are much more complex and contradictory than is 
often assumed” (in Hack and Simmonds 2000: 247). Measuring the precise energy 
consumption of the internet has admittedly proved a difficult task. As Hurst writes, “the first 
thing that emerges after surveying various sources is that nobody knows [what it is] for sure,” 
and he provides a number of differing figures on the matter. For instance, he refers to a 2010 
report published by The Guardian which puts the figure at “300 million tonnes of CO2 per 
year,” which is put into context when one considers that this is “as much as all the coal, oil 
and gas burned in Turkey or Poland in one year.” Alternatively, the New York Times claimed 
a figure of “30 billion watts of electricity in 2011,” which contextualized is “roughly 
equivalent to the output of 30 nuclear power plants.” Additionally, in another report 
commissioned by Gartner consultants,47 it was stated that “the internet was responsible for 
2% of global emissions in 2007,” thus “outstripping the carbon footprint of the aviation 
industry.” In turn, the Melbourne-based research centre CEET,48 in 2013, “estimated that the 
telecommunications industry as a whole [emitted] 830 million tonnes of carbon dioxide a 
year,” furthermore stating that the “energy demands of the internet could double by 2020.” 
Frighteningly, they advanced that the current energy consumption related to the internet 
“accounts for 1.5% to 2% of the world’s energy consumption,” which means that if it were 
classified as a country, it would “rank as the fifth largest for energy consumption.” While the 
statistics do admittedly vary, what remains clear is that the telecommunications which allow 
for our digitally-orientated societies certainly do have a substantially negative environmental 
impact.49 That is, while we may experience digital space as an abstract one, the carbon 
footprint produced in keeping this virtual space constantly active is less oblique, because the 
power required to keep this space of commerce, information, and interpersonal exchange 
                                                          
47 Gartner consultants, or Gartner, Inc. (NYSE: IT), is a prominent US-based research firm, which describes 
itself as “the world’s leading information technology research and advisory company.” It provides information 
to a broad selection of clients, “from CIOs and senior IT leaders in corporations and government agencies, to 
business leaders in high-tech and telecom enterprises and professional services firms, to technology investors,” 
and has “clients in approximately 10,000 distinct enterprises worldwide” (Gartner, 2015).  
48 The CEET, or the Centre for Energy-Efficient Telecommunications, describes itself as an “academic-industry 
collaboration located within the Department of Electrical and Electronic Engineering at the University of 
Melbourne.” The CEET “was launched in March 2011 by Alcatel-Lucent, the Victorian State Government and 
the University of Melbourne, to address the massive projected growth in energy consumption linked to surging 
Internet demand” (Bell Labs and University of Melbourne, 2015). 
49 In this regard, even those such as Barney Warf in Cities in The Telecommunications Age: The Fracturing of 
Geographies, who are positive in their appraisal of telecommunications infrastructures – lauding them as clean 
technology – have reservations over their potential “negative impact” (2000: 109).  
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going has a major material effect on our natural world. In a nutshell, the constellation of 
receptors for mobile phones, our laptops, tablets and smartphones, and storage centres for all 
the data generated, all require electricity – and this electricity is often produced through 
traditional, highly polluting means. As a shocking example of the crude material used to 
power a technology perceived as cleaner than the typical polluting industries and systems, 
David Whiteley in An Introduction to Information Systems, notes that “diesel-powered 
generators” are often used to make up for any inadequate power supplies (2013: 348).  
Besides remembering the power required by the devices that are used to access digital 
space, one must also consider the data centres required to store the various sets of information 
exchanged on a daily basis. For instance, something as seemingly innocuous as a personal 
Facebook profile houses a fair amount of information, and this data must be stored 
somewhere physically. And if this is multiplied by the hundreds of millions of users a social 
networking site like Facebook caters to, the space required to house all the information 
generated becomes considerable. Hurst provides a clearer picture of the size of the data 
centres in which details of every kind are stored; he explains that, “to get an idea of the 
energy needs of data centres, Facebook is building one in Prineville, Oregon, that will 
consume around 78 megawatts of electricity,” which is equivalent to the energy consumed by 
“around 64, 000 homes” (Hurst, 2014). And this high level of electricity consumption, 
sourced from typical and polluting energy sources such as coal, is found across the spectrum 
of the tech giants. For instance, citing the Greenpeace-commissioned report How Clean is 
your Cloud?, Robert Bryce in Smaller, Faster, Lighter, Denser, Cheaper: How Innovation 
keeps proving the Catastrophists wrong, demonstrates that “55.1% of the electricity used by 
Apple servers is generated by coal plants, as is 49.7% of the energy used by IBM servers, and 
39.4% in the case of Facebook servers (2014: 118).50 To be fair, however, the big companies 
of the tech industry have taken a number of steps to reduce their carbon footprint. For 
example, Vinnie Mirchandani in The New Technology Elite: How Great Companies Optimize 
Both Technology Consumption and Production, explains that in light of the aforementioned 
Greenpeace report, “Facebook promised a preference for access to clean and renewable 
energy in picking future sites for data centres,” and furthermore “recruited Bill Weihl, 
formerly Google’s ‘Energy Czar’” to help them achieve such aims (2012: 137). And in this 
regard, Vincent Mosco in To the Cloud: Big Data in a Turbulent World notes that, although 
                                                          
50 Bryce, notes – with some apparent glee – that the commissioner of the report, Greenpeace, “of course has a 
Facebook page” (2014: 118), which once more demonstrates the immense difficulty of operating outside of the 
parameters of the DSP.  
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“Facebook was short on specifics…Greenpeace took this as a step in the right direction” 
(2014: 134), which demonstrates that the new-age tech companies have indeed shown some 
level of commitment to addressing their selection of energy sources.51  
 In this debate between economic imperative and environmental concern, Hurst offers, 
in closing, a recommendation that focuses on individual responsibility. While this is 
potentially problematic in that it displaces difficult questions that should be posed to the tech 
industry onto ordinary people, it nevertheless offers a poignant reminder of how our 
subscription to the cyber-world is underpinned by a vast material infrastructure with very real 
environmental effects. He explains that, “every visit to a website has a carbon footprint,” and 
cites the Harvard University physicist Alex Wissner-Gross who “calculates that viewing a 
web page generates about 0.02g of C02 per second, which goes up to about 0.03g when 
viewing a website with complex images, animations or videos.” Evocatively, Wissner-Gross 
points out the scale of effect of every individual action online, when he claims: “So when you 
are sitting in London viewing a website hosted in California, there are power plants on at 
least two continents actively pumping carbon dioxide into the atmosphere in order for you to 
watch that video or read that online newspaper.” The recommended action in relation to this 
from Hurst’s perspective, is the optimization of a website’s programming and design, because 
“a page with clean code and a balanced design will load more quickly than a site full of 
banners, pop-ups, large photos and external programmes that slow it down.” While this is 
certainly a noble endeavour to pursue, when one considers the immense scale of 
communication and information exchange maintained by digital infrastructure,52 such a 
strategy is hardly viable as a long-term solution, especially if one considers that websites 
actively attempt to offer users as many features as possible (interactive elements, video, etc.). 
Beyond the above considerations of the energy resources required to power the 
internet – which in themselves are issues of concern – the material cost of our digital 
infrastructure is also immense. Indeed, some thinkers are thoroughly damning in their 
                                                          
51 For his part, Hurst concurs with the above two assessments on the topic of Facebook and alternative sources 
of power, writing that the company has committed itself to “solar, hydroelectric, wind and geothermic energy,” 
setting itself a target of “powering its data centres on 25% renewable energy by 2015.” However, he also notes 
that, according to Gary Cook, an IT analyst at Greenpeace, while “Greenpeace acknowledges the commitments 
of companies like Facebook and Google…there is still a long way to go.” And this is because renewable energy 
is perceived as an expensive alternative, with the consequence that “most Internet companies are choosing the 
quick and dirty path.” In effect, “they are powering the 21st century data centres that are the engine of the 
Internet economy with 19th and 20th century coal and nuclear power” (Hurst, 2014).  
52 As an example, “Google’s servers refresh 20 billion pages a day, process over 100 billion search queries a 
month, provide email for 425 million Gmail users and process 72 hours of video uploaded per minute to 
YouTube” (Hurst 2014: 2-9). 
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indictment of the digital as a huge contributor to environmental degradation. For instance, the 
ecofeminist philosopher Ariel Salleh, maintains that “reliance on computerization to manage 
every conceivable aspect of daily life actually multiplies environmental damage to an 
extreme degree (2014: 1). Similarly, Eric Williams in “Environmental effects of information 
and communications technologies,” argues that “digital revolution affects the environment on 
several levels.” Firstly, on a direct level, “information and communications technology (ICT) 
has environmental impacts through the manufacturing, operation and disposal of devices and 
network equipment,” even when this can be offset “through smart buildings and 
teleworking.” Indeed, as noted previously, the big tech companies have exhibited a 
willingness and at times commitment to more energy-efficient operations, as well as 
renewable sources of energy. But although “ICTs influence economic growth and bring about 
technological and societal change” (2011: 354), part of this change is also pollution. In this 
regard, Williams references some troubling studies that pose serious questions about the 
broader implications of our subscription to digitality. Using Yu, Williams, Ju and Yang’s 
“Forecasting global generation of obsolete personal computers,” which offers a frightening 
assessment of the waste generated by discarded computing parts, Williams writes that “this 
global forecast predicts that the developing world will dispose of more computers than the 
developed world from 2016-18 onward.” And if one considers that the developing world is 
already often used as a dumping ground for unwanted old computer components, old 
cellphones, and other similar such devices,53 then such an assessment points to even further, 
rapid degradation of dump-hosting countries. Moreover, adding to the exponential 
proliferation of electronic waste, is the issue of wasteful manufacture. Citing his own 
previous work, “Energy intensity of computer manufacturing: hybrid analysis combing 
process and economic input-output methods,” Williams argues that “the energy used during 
manufacturing a home desktop computer exceeds its lifetime operating energy” (2011: 359). 
                                                          
53 African countries appear to be the biggest – but by no means only – recipients of electronic waste from other 
parts of the world; specifically, Ghana, the Ivory Coast, and Nigeria. In this regard, Greenpeace International 
reports that “E-waste is routinely exported by developed countries to developing ones, often in violation of the 
international law” (Greenpeace, 2009). John Vidal of the Guardian, reports that according to Interpol, “although 
it is legal to export discarded goods to poor countries if they can be reused or refurbished, much is being sent to 
Africa or Asia under false pretences,” because a substantial number of the technological goods are “falsely 
classified as ‘used goods’ although in reality [they are] non-functional” (The Guardian, 2013). And PBS, in a 
story on the matter, shows the devastating effects of such dumping. Their journalists describe an area in Ghana 
named Agbogloshie, referred to by the locals as “Sodom and Gomorrah,” which “has become one of the world's 
digital dumping grounds, where the West’s electronic waste, or e-waste, piles up -- hundreds of millions of tons 
of it each year.” The journalists’ contact on the ground tells them that when he was a boy, the area was “pristine 
wetland,” and in an evocative display picks up an old computer with the label School District of Philadelphia” 
on it, and laments the negative health effects on the local population of this environmental catastrophe (PBS, 
2009). And although the above examples are from a few years back, Tony Carnie of IOL News, has recently 
reported that the situation remains largely the same at present (IOL, 2015).  
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Whether or not this is a wilful economic strategy in order to generate constant sales is a 
debate beyond the ambit of this research; however, it is evident that beyond the incremental 
efforts of tech companies like Google and Facebook to use cleaner energy, the substantial 
material cost of the digital world resides at the linked levels of manufacture and disposal. 
It is also important, at this point, to discuss the high demand for devices that can 
access the digital world, as it is this demand that drives both high manufacturing output, as 
well as high levels of subsequent replacement and consequent disposal. Arne Johann 
Vetlesen in The Denial of Nature: Environmental Philosophy in the Era of Global 
Capitalism, notes the negative effects of technological consumption for both consumers of 
such artefacts, and for those – mostly in poorer countries – who are tied to the manufacture of 
these artefacts. He writes that “technology in our era has liberated us from (meaning us 
privileged Westerners, not the factory workers in Asian or African low-cost, non-unionized, 
tax-free business havens)…the toil and monotony of manual labour,” but this has been 
accompanied by “a diminishing of the fullness of our repertoire as human subjects in the 
world.” That is, for him, “there is a close and mutually reinforcing correspondence between 
the shrinking of the outside world (or nature as a whole) into so many items for consumption 
here and now, and the shrinking of my repertoire as a human subject” (2015: 157). Indeed, 
Vetlesen argues that “the illusion is fed that the entire world is at the feet of any individual 
equipped with a keyboard and a screen [or an] iPhone, iPad, and multi-functional cell 
phones.” Moreover, in relation to these commodities and the services they offer, “we want 
[everything] now, and we want it to come to us,” and because we have invented technologies 
that “at a moment’s notice bring to us whatever it is we want, regardless of time and 
geographical location – bringing us practically everything, everywhere, and at any time – we 
are abolishing time.” Correlatively, “the ubiquitous market offers commodities that satisfy 
the fantasy of instant gratification, causing anxiety or rage whenever the ‘instant’ of the 
gratification fails to obtain,” the consequence of which is childishness. As Vetlesen explains, 
the alternative is “the possibility to experience the frustration following from 
wanting…something without getting it,” which he advances as “an experience crucial to 
growth and maturation” (2015: 41). Yet, while the above narcissistic dynamic may impact 
negatively on the millions of users who have the resources to access digital space, on the 
other side, for those involved in the extraction of resources and manufacture of digital 
infrastructures and devices, the material effects of a digital society are even more grim. Here 
we should consider the specific materials without which our portable and multi-functional 
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devices – such as laptops and the now ubiquitous smartphones – would not be able to operate; 
in particular, coltan, or more precisely columbite-tantalite. This “black tar-like mineral [is] 
found in large quantities in the Congo,” which currently produces 80% of the world’s supply, 
and is exported from here through Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda to major processors in the 
West, who once they have refined the material, sell it on to companies such as Nokia, Sony, 
Hewlett-Packard and Compaq, among many others (Conflictminerals.org, 2015). Imtiyaz 
Delawala writing for ABC News, notes that the value of coltan is in its refined form as 
“metallic tantalum, a heat-resistant powder that can hold a high electrical charge.” It is this 
property that “make[s] it a vital element in creating capacitors, the electronic elements that 
control current flow inside miniature circuit boards.” Indeed, “tantalum capacitors are used in 
almost all cell phones, laptops, pagers and many other electronics,” with the consequence that 
the price for coltan even “skyrocketed to as much as $400 a kilogram at one point” (ABC, 
2015). The International Consortium of Investigative Journalists notes, though, some of the 
many problems with the extraction of this particular substance. According to them, “most 
Central African coltan is considered a conflict mineral because mining areas are controlled by 
armed factions and organized crime.” Furthermore, “there is no simple way to keep conflict 
coltan out of the stream of legitimate minerals used by manufacturers,” because it doesn’t 
have “geo-fingerprints” like “conflict diamonds.” Moreover, they note that, although attempts 
at certification have been made, China and India – who import the bulk of the world’s supply 
– do not require such papers. And in any event, Western attempts at certification would 
require “comprehensive action by industry, governments, and activists,” and this has been 
difficult to achieve (ICIJ, 2012). Closer to the source of the tech bubble, Lori Gruen in 
“Technology,” discusses the polluting qualities of what she labels “so-called ‘clean 
technologies,’” with her specific focus falling on the production of microchips which are 
central to the operation of all computing technologies. She argues that their manufacture 
“involves the use of many highly toxic chemicals, such as arsine, acetone, ethylene glycol, 
and xylene.” And the use of these chemicals by the high-tech industry has caused “massive 
ground water contamination in the last thirty years.” Furthermore, in the event of unforeseen 
spillage or leakage “at the site of a high-tech company, the pollution often spreads many 
miles from its origin and can affect vital sources of drinking water and precious wetlands.” 
As a surprising example of the ill-effects associated with the manufacture of ‘clean’ 
technology, Gruen points to the problems faced by the much-lauded Silicon Valley.54 In this 
                                                          
54 The reason I suggest that this may be surprising is that Silicon Valley is often seen as a Mecca of creativity 
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regard, she writes that in Silicon Valley, the “centre of high-tech production, there are now 
more polluted sites prioritized for clean-up by the federal government than in any other 
county in the United States” (2001: 439-440). 
 On a final, and somewhat more philosophical note, Greg Kennedy’s An Ontology of 
Trash: The Disposable and its Problematic Nature explores the meaning of disposable 
objects in general, also focusing on the proliferation of the quickly-outdated (and thus 
consistently updated and discarded) devices used to access digital space – and why we are so 
immensely receptive to such a system of relations. According to Kennedy, there are a number 
of factors at play in our acceptance of disposability, from the quasi-religious through to the 
alienation pervasive in societies defined by patterns of consumption (2007: 47, 142). 
Specifically with regard to the disposability of technology, its effects, and our lack of regard 
for those consequences, he narrows popular sentiment on the topic down to two main ideas. 
Drawing on the thought of Heidegger, he argues that “much of the appeal of new 
technologies stems from their promise to diversify our experience, by freeing us up from a 
limited set of physical tasks.” And in this regard, Kennedy turns to the philosopher Albert 
Borgmann,55 who sees such an exchange as “a promise to bring the forces of nature and 
culture under control, to liberate us from misery and toil, and to enrich our lives.” 
Problematically, though, this promised liberty “is often purchased at the expense of bodily 
activity and participation with the tangible world” (2007: 46-47). Indeed, “the danger of 
technology lies in the cloud of intoxication that descends on technological humanity; for this 
cloud obscures the fact of human receptivity,” in that “within this cloud, we are too ready to 
believe that our existence is self-secured, invulnerable, and without debt, when in truth we 
exist always and essentially as helpless beneficiaries” (2007: 49-50). For Kennedy, it is this 
sense of invulnerability and dislocation from the material world that allows for a collective 
inertia over, or amnesia concerning, the environmental impacts of our consumption, and he 
provides a good example of the damage of having adopted such a sensibility. He writes, 
“every time we eat we consume not only the entire transportation network but also the whole 
inter-connected industrial web of production that created and maintains the former.” For 
instance, discarding a banana peel means the throwing away of “tires, asphalt, spark plugs, 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
and, indeed, “a high-tech gold rush” (IMDB, 2014) in which fortunes are made. As such, off hand, most people 
would hardly associate it with the severe levels of pollution pointed out by Gruen.  
55 Albert Borgmann is a German-born American philosopher, who in relation to the thought of Heidegger, wrote 
a number of works on technology, including Technology and the Character of Contemporary Life: A 
Philosophical Inquiry, published in 1984, in which he called for urgent reform in terms of how people think 
about technology.  
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work boots, fuels, pipelines, paper invoices, boxes, computer chips, television screens, 
newspaper flyers,” etc. that are used” to produce, deliver, and market the commodity.” And 
he – perhaps a little dramatically – accordingly describes every such instance of consumption 
as “the excrement of the technologically externalized body” (2007: 52), which despite being 
part of this consumption cycle, is a “bulk of this waste” that never comes into our view, 
because it instead simply disappears “into black plastic bags, out-of-the-way landfills, 
incinerators, into the depths of the Ocean and Third-World processing plants.”56 In effect, for 
him, “technology disposes of the world by effacing its physical earthly counterpart: the 
body,” and it is here that an interesting concept is first mentioned. When discussing this issue, 
and the disposable products that are a feature of our contemporary societies, Kennedy 
suggests that “they seem to lack all temporal integrity.” Indeed, “out of nowhere they 
magically materialize on the retailers’ shelves and just as suddenly dematerialize after the 
brief act of consumption. That is, their being is concentrated into the serial ‘now’ of repeated 
consumption” (2007: 53-54). Similarly, “even the slightest delays in loading or processing 
data strikes us as tedious, if not unbearable,” even though “perfect availability…exists 
outside of time and space” (2007: 72).   
Yet, while information technology is inextricably linked to neoliberal economic 
practice, and while its material infrastructure undoubtedly impacts negatively on the 
environment, it would nevertheless be myopic to label it entirely incapable of facilitating a 
positive response to the environmental crisis, without due consideration.  
Questioning the relationship between technology and nature  
While the environmental cost of a digitally-orientated society, discussed above, should not be 
ignored, it is also highly unlikely that contemporary societies will move away from their 
reliance on digital exchange (and the infrastructure that makes it possible) in the near future. 
It is therefore imperative to seek aspects and features of this technology that may engender a 
different orientation toward nature on the part of the individual who uses them. In this regard, 
it is important to consider the relationship between technology and nature carefully, and to 
                                                          
56 Here, Kennedy argues that this exchange is highly negative for both the consumers and producers involved in 
such a system of relations. On the one hand, for the consumer who exists in the “so-called post-industrialized 
sectors of the Western world,” alienation is the effect, because “sitting confined to a computer for a day of data-
entry can severely exhaust and tax the body such that it numbly craves commodities.” In turn, “the high-tech 
proletariat, which now includes most of the middle class, has lost even the remotest physical connection to the 
production of the commodities they consume.” On the other hand, while such “mystification surrounding 
commodities deepens” in the First World, “work is exported overseas to countries still caught in the growing 
pains of rapid industrialization” (2007: 95).  
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explore whether these two are mutually exclusive, or whether the exchanges between 
technology, the self, and nature are far more complex and entangled than is often assumed. 
In this regard, Dave Toke in Green Politics and Neo-Liberalism, offers an important 
first point. He argues that the environmental movement is often unfairly labelled as being 
against progress because of their supposed aversion to technology, but that such conceptions 
of those who are concerned with the environment are misguided. And he attributes the 
pervasiveness of this prejudice to the work of Francis Fukuyama, who in his influential The 
End of History and The Last Man – published in 199257 – attacked “the green movement as 
being infected with Rousseau-like romanticism,” and advanced that they “are against 
progress and technology.” Indeed, Toke quotes Fukuyama, who argued that Rousseau’s 
 
criticism of the Economic Man envisioned by John Locke and Adam Smith remains 
the basis of most present-day attacks on unlimited economic growth, and is the 
(oftentimes unconscious) intellectual basis for most contemporary 
environmentalism…Is it possible to imagine the emergence of a highly radicalised 
environmentalism that would seek to reject, on the basis of an updated 
Rousseauism, the entire modern project of the conquest of nature, as well as the 
technological civilisation that rests on it? The answer, for a variety of reasons, 
would appear to be no. (Fukuyama in Toke: 2000: 159).  
 
 
Toke also points out how Fukuyama maintains that “people will not return to nature and they 
will not freeze technology,” and in this he is undoubtedly correct. However, it is in his 
assertion that this is the desire of the environmental movement at large that Fukuyama is 
mistaken. Against this, Toke argues that “the issue is not whether greens are Rousseau-ites 
any more than whether some right-wingers support General Pinochet’s fascist methods 
because they support the introduction of market economics into Chile.” Rather, he argues, the 
issue “is whether unlimited economic growth is the main priority of social development, 
whether the current deployment of industrial and social technology is healthy and whether the 
conquest of nature is a desirable philosophical goal.” As such, rather than being “against 
progress,” those concerned with the environment are for “a different sort of progress,” one 
which is at variance with “the blind industrialism and extreme competition which seems to be 
                                                          
57 Toke argues that Fukuyama’s “writings have been widely accepted as emblematic in describing the alleged 
historic victory of capitalist liberal democracy” in the late twentieth century, and that Fukuyama “expresses the 
dominant view of neo-liberalism when he attacks the green movement” (2000: 159) after the fall of the Soviet 
Union. 
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favoured by Fukuyama” (Toke 2000: 159-160). And Toke outlines the position taken by the 
environmentally-orientated activists further, writing that “this green vanguard of progress 
may promote different technologies to the industrial mainstream, but it chooses those 
technologies, including social technologies, which uphold the most fundamental of human 
truths concerned with the advancement of health and survival.”58 In this regard, and by way 
of a summation of his argument, Toke quotes Barry Commoner, whom he labels “one of the 
gurus of the new environmentalism that sprang up…in the 1960s,” and for whom “the real 
question is not whether we should use our new (scientific) knowledge, but how to use it” 
(2000: 175).  
 Against the backdrop of Toke’s argument that a concern for nature does not 
automatically exclude consideration of technology as a means through which one could affect 
a positive change in terms of our relationship with the environment, the discussion can be 
opened up further by considering the relationship between culture, technology, nature, and 
the self. As Manuel Poitras advances in “Social Movements and Techno-Democracy: 
Reclaiming the Genetic Commons,” there are three possible positions one could take on the 
issue of technology as a societal variable. Firstly, the idea of technology as a panacea for all 
ills, secondly, the idea of technology as the source of all ills, and thirdly, the idea of 
technology as indeterminate.  
To begin with, Poitras argues that it is surprising that, although technology “occupies 
a central place in the dynamics of societies,” it is seldom “a topic of political debate or 
struggle.” And he explains that the reason for this is reflected in the first broad position taken 
on technology, which for him is rooted in “enlightenment thinking on social progress still 
common in Western societies.” Such thought “views technology as a gift of modernity and as 
necessarily beneficial, inevitably leading to the greater benefit of all,” such that it does not 
require “explanation or debate.” Poitras also reflects further that in such a conception, 
technology is seen as socially neutral, apolitical, and only belonging to the realm of 
specialists and scientists, with the consequence that it is not readily taken on by politicians or 
social movements (2008: 268). Specifically for his study, he notes that this is the thinking 
that underlies the US government’s attitude toward genetically modified food, in its 
insistence that “GMOs should be regulated on the basis of ‘science’ only, [and] not ideology 
                                                          
58 Toke also argues that even those environmental movements often associated with an extreme aversion to 
technology are mislabelled as technophobic, because “despite their professed anti-technological leanings, even 
the most radical deep ecologists tend to suggest a path of alternative, not zero, technology” (2000: 175).  
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or politics.” With regard to information technologies, of course, this template doesn’t apply 
quite so neatly. Certainly, new developments within this realm are greeted with enthusiasm, 
and are heralded as progress, but the political and ideological dimension of, for instance, the 
proliferation of social media sites and applications enabled by the features of Web 2.0, are 
also seen by many parties – including government – as a realm of political and ideological 
contest. What does apply to any technology, in terms of Poitras’ argument, is the 
consequence of this view of technology, namely “that resistance to new technologies is 
considered necessarily regressive and against the progress of human societies.”  
Yet, correlative technophilliac proclamations are both abundant and no less 
obfuscating. An extreme example of a text which unequivocally reifies the power of 
information technology, is the tech magazine Wired, which welcomed the new millennium 
through a series of articles that Frederick Buell labels as exhibiting “the culture of hyper 
exuberance” often associated with information technology. The article Buell focuses on in 
particular “was a tale of New York City in the new millennium, a story that began right in the 
midst of environmental meltdown.” In short, the article imagines a city which has embraced 
information technology to the extent that it has liberated itself from an environmental crisis 
foisted upon it through a subscription to the supposedly far more destructive technologies of 
the past. As Buell notes, the conception of such a city is one “in which nature ha[s] become 
thoroughly technologized and technology ha[s] put nature everywhere to work.” And he 
quotes a passage from the article which saliently demonstrates such thought, in its suggestion 
that “in the past, it had always been the cost of time and attention that was the quiet hell of 
the wannabe-Green lifestyle. The laudable goal was to live an ecologically sane life, close to 
the good green earth, reading your Emerson essays on the shore of Walden Pond.” However, 
“in harsh reality, your daily life meant endless hours of butter to churn, pigs to slop, beans to 
hoe, trash to sort and recycle.” Yet today, instead, through a subscription to technology, one 
can make the “conceptual breakthrough” to understanding that “the Web could manage that.” 
And in a self-parodying style, it is advanced that if one “can’t hire a gardener” then one 
should “wire the garden and hire a gardening site to maintain it for you.” But as Buell notes, 
despite the “mock-breathy, self-parodic tone – a tone typical of Wired” – the message was 
clear, namely that the environmental crisis is a “cool” realm of creative possibility.  Indeed, 
he notes that the writer and readers of the magazine would have “doubtless felt [that the] 
environmental crisis was truly good for us. It was truly bad, but then it was good too,” 
because it generated “urgency and excitement” and provided the “breeding ground of out-of-
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the-box contrarian thinking” (2003: 195-196). Thinking which was nevertheless 
fundamentalist in its embrace of information technology as best placed to respond to the 
crisis. Fundamentalism is perhaps the most apposite descriptor for such utopian, ahistorical 
and decontextualized claims, because of the reflections at times of spiritual beliefs within 
such positive appraisals of digitality. Vincent Mosco, through his examination of the various 
metaphors and myths that surround our digitally-orientated world in The Digital Sublime: 
Myth, Power, and Cyberspace, provides further explanation of how such “hyper-exuberance” 
over the potential of information technology has emerged. He argues that popular language 
on cyberspace is laced with grandiose claims that seem to find in cyberspace “what amounts 
to the fundamental metaphor for understanding the universe.” And he lists some of these as 
the internet being perceived as digital library, information highway, electronic commerce, 
virtual community, digital ecology, and the narrative stream (2004: 51-52). While he does not 
dispute the capacity of the internet to, in part, play such a role and facilitate such practices, he 
questions the holism of its capacity in this regard. Beyond metaphor, Mosco looks at myth in 
relation to the digital. On this matter, he divides his discussion into two strands of 
exploration; firstly, the idea of the digital as magical, and secondly, declarations of its ends in 
a thoroughly positive sense – such as those of Fukuyama or of those expressed in the article 
analysed by Buell. That is, firstly, Mosco addresses in great detail the idea that information 
technology seems to house within it some sort of spiritual, abstract quality that cannot quite 
be touched, but that – were one to just push it a little further – would be able to offer us 
endless possibilities. In this regard, he references the work of the polarizing transhumanist 
Ray Kurzweil,59 whose work The Age of Spiritual Machines he lambasts. He writes that 
through his book, “with its promise of immortality, spiritual fulfilment, perfect community, 
and practically every other mythic utopian vision, all based on the power of...[the micro] 
chip,” Kurzweil has done nothing more than turn a “technical forecast” into “a larger quest 
that amounts to turning [technology] into a spiritual principle and its object” – namely the 
microchip – “into a magical talisman.” While the optimism exhibited by the likes of Kurzweil 
might be excessive, it is nevertheless ideologically powerful insofar as it operates in relation 
to frustrating human limitations. Limitations we have always tried to overcome, whether 
through perception or through practical means. As Mosco elaborates, “the thorny question 
arising from all the limitations that make us human were once addressed by myths that 
                                                          
59 On the subject of this author, Peter Diamandis and Steven Kotler in Abundance: The Future is Better Than 
You Think, credit Kurzweil with being the best example of a person able to predict technological trends – and 
that this has earned him as much praise as criticisms (2012: 51).  
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featured gods, goddesses, and the variety of beings and rituals that for many provided 
satisfactory answers.” Yet, in the contemporary era, this dynamic has become secularised in 
Western/Westernized/Westernizing societies because “today, it is the spiritual machines and 
their world of cyberspace that hold out the hope of overcoming life’s limitations.” In effect, 
these machines facilitate access to “what Dibbell calls ‘the pre-Enlightenment principle of the 
magic world,’ in that “commands entered into a computer do not just communicate; they 
make things happen. As a result, a cyberspace version of ‘the logic of the incantation’ is 
rapidly permeating the fabric of our lives,” and that, accordingly, for many “our high-
technology world is essentially a magical one” in which “the boundary between reality and 
fantasy is constantly being transgressed” (2004: 78). Secondly, besides this perception of 
digitality as a mystical exchange, declarations of the immensely transformative capabilities of 
information technology also abound. Of course, “almost every wave of new technology, 
including information and communication media, has brought with it declarations of the 
end,” but in doing so, they represent “the ideology of redemption through networks.” The 
power of this myth is that such proclamations “take place with no reference to similar 
proclamations in the previous wave,” and so “one cannot help but conclude that the rhetoric 
of technology…is powerful enough to create a widespread historical amnesia.” To be sure, 
Mosco advances a simple way to discredit proclamations of the redemptive end, by arguing 
that “one of the more useful ways to understand technological myths, including myths of 
cyberspace, is to excavate the tales that accompanied the rise of earlier ‘history-ending’ 
technologies” (2004: 117). And he proceeds to do exactly this, tracing the many exuberant 
declarations that greeted, respectively, the telegraph, electrification, the telephone, radio, and 
television (2004: 118-130), because for him “looking at the history of technology literally 
puts us in our place.” Indeed, “rather than ending time, space, and social relations as we have 
known them, the rise of cyberspace amounts to just another in a series of 
interesting…exercises in the extension of human tools,” which is certainly not enough to 
“warrant claims about the [salvific] end of anything” (2004: 119).  
The second general position taken on technology reflects a “mirror view” of the 
above, in that it “sees it as the root of all problems in modern society, and calls for a return to 
traditional ways” (Mosco 2004: 120). Donald Norman in The Design of Everyday Things, 
gets to the heart of the matter when he explains that, increasingly today, “people are 
frustrated with everyday things. From the ever-increasing complexity of the automobile 
dashboard, to the increasing automation in the home with its internal networks,” which 
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comprise of “complex music, video, and game systems for entertainment and 
communication,” we face “continued errors, frustration, and a continual cycle of updating 
and maintaining our belongings” (2013: 10). And Mark Brosnan in Technophobia: The 
Psychological Impact of Information Technology, explains that such breakdowns in the 
exchange between human beings and ever-proliferating technologies results in what he calls 
the “emergent phenomena of technophobia.” Indeed, for Brosnan “it affects up to one third of 
the entire population,” and he rejects the notion that “technophobia is a passing phenomenon 
affecting [only] older individuals” (1998: 2). After all, if one considers also the earlier 
discussed contributions of Castells, Kanouse and Schultz, who speak of a schizophrenic 
world operating in terms of the hyper-speed engendered by information technology, then 
such aversions to technology can be easily understood.  
Both of the above positions are thus marked by a certain fundamentalism, which is 
problematic in a situation characterised by immense dynamism and change, where what is 
required is an exploratory attitude. And in light of this, the third position emerges as 
particularly valuable, because in terms of it “technology is considered ‘undetermined,’” 
because “there are [always] a number of alternative developments that can arise from [any] 
one technological advance.” Therefore, when we think about technology, we should be 
careful to neither accept nor reject it based solely on technical and economic considerations, 
but instead, should philosophically and ethically consider “the fit between devices and the 
interests and beliefs of the various social groups that influence the design process.” Indeed, 
“what singles out an artefact is its relationship to the social environment” and “not some 
intrinsic property” – a relationship which can also always change or be changed (2008: 268-
269).  
With this in mind, the aim, as ever, is to get to a pragmatic consideration of the role of 
information technology in our present day, particularly in terms of its potential contribution 
to facilitating a positive re-orientation toward nature on the part of individual users. In this 
regard, to adopt the third position of seeing technology as undetermined, as advanced by 
Poitras, emerges as the most sensible approach in the interest of gauging what kind of 
connections have emerged and can be developed between users of information technologies 
and the environment. Accordingly, a deeper critical reflection must be pursued with regard to 
the complex exchange between human agency, and technology, nature and culture. In terms 
of this, Martin Lister, Jon Dovey, Seth Giddings, Iain Grant and Kieran Kelly, offer a rich 
vein of reflection on this matter in their book New Media: A Critical Introduction (Second 
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Edition). In particular, in “Cyberculture: Technology, Nature and Culture,” Lister et al. argue 
that when studying new media, we should reconsider our tendency to place human agency in 
opposition to all sorts of determinisms – specifically in relation to our exchanges with 
emerging technologies. Rather, they argue, one should see human agency as located within a 
spectrum in which technology, nature and culture are in constant interplay with one another. 
This is because, if we adopt such a perspective, a far more productive encounter with 
technology can potentially occur, insofar as, rather than seeing technology as a substitute – 
the Western perspective that everything digital is simply substitution – we see it as something 
in itself; a series of developments that have capacity, potential, and in a sense, agency. 
Indeed, rather than taking on the somewhat paranoid perspective that digital technology is 
only about control, restriction, and a poor replica of human agency, their argument is that 
digitality should rather be approached from the perspective of its uniqueness, and the 
capacities and potentials that such a haecceity can generate.60  
 As a starting point, Lister et al. posit that new media form a part of “cyberculture,” 
and they define this cultural orientation where “machines play a particularly important role,” 
as one in which a number of constituents are present, namely “communications networks, 
programming, and software, [as well as] artificial intelligence, virtual reality, artificial life, 
and the human-computer interface.” In relation to this relatively new mix of constituent 
developments and practices, they point out that “cyberculture…marks a threshold at which 
concepts, theories and practices stemming from cultural and media studies confront concepts, 
theories and practices stemming from the sciences” – most specifically, from “biotechnology, 
robotics and genomics.” These tentative and not yet certain exchanges suggest a terrain that is 
in no way yet fixed and stable; indeed, further complicating the matter “is, of course, the 
extraordinary pace of contemporary technological change” (2009: 317).61 And it is their 
assertion that the many uncertainties and questions that have come to light in relation to the 
emergence of new media, “are actually versions of larger and more fundamental questions 
about the relationship of culture to technology and technology to nature.” With regard to this, 
they argue that at the heart of questions about “advanced technological societies,” that are 
                                                          
60 Gary Rosenkrantz in Haecceity: An Ontological Essay, defines a haecceity as something exhibiting a 
“thisness” – or something unique to itself, although Rosenkrantz does point out that such readings of it are in 
themselves highly contested (1993: 5).  
61 And Lister et al. provide a number of practical examples of how we have entered unchartered waters, as it 
were, in our embrace of digital technology. For instance, “our newspapers now routinely announce some new 
marriage of biology and technology in the form of intelligent prosthetics, implant technologies, cloning, and so 
on, while we are suffering new physical (repetitive strain injury) and psychological disorders (in-tray anxiety, 
information sickness) as a consequence of the ubiquity of computation” (2009: 317). 
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organized under the name of cyberculture, lies “the shifting relations between…culture, 
technology and nature.” As such, while  
 
we may be used to dividing ‘nature’ from ‘culture,’ and…routinely bas[ing] our 
academic investigations on attending to one or other realm,…the advent of 
technology troubles this simple distribution of academic labour, and compels us to 
ask the question of how to approach ‘the question of technology’ at all. (2009: 318) 
 
However, while we do know that technology has an impact, both in a material sense, and in 
terms of its effects on leisure, work, social relations, and so forth, Lister et al. argue that the 
response is, in a sense, limited. This is because, on the one hand, “most media theorists are 
highly sceptical of…[the claim that] technology, both in its forms and its capacities, 
profoundly affects human culture.” On the other hand, and perhaps in response to such 
scepticism, certain other theorists participate in “sudden outbursts of techno-enthusiasm and 
the making of over-inflated claims” that involve an “undisciplined euphoria and ideological 
overstatement.” And both positions, in attempting to combat each other’s entrenched 
perspectives, have “largely failed to develop a means of addressing technology as a real and 
material phenomenon” (2009: 319-320). Accordingly, a way out of this impasse would be to 
perceive a more amorphous, fluid relation between technology, nature, culture, and within 
this mix, human agency.  
 In their endeavour to map this set of relations, Lister et al. begin by exploring the 
relationship between technology and nature. They state that although this relationship, off 
hand, seems like a logical opposition, in that “technology is by definition artificial, and 
biology, by definition, investigates the natural,” if we consider concepts – and indeed realities 
– such as “cyborgs, clones, and prosthetics,” then such developments “call into question the 
settled edge between the biological and the technological in the contemporary world.” And to 
support their assertion, they point to a “long history of doubting the distinction” between the 
two, arguing that trying to separate technology and nature only leads to more questions posed 
than stable distinctions made. They then similarly consider the ostensible opposition of 
“technology to another big idea or category of things: culture,” through asking the key 
question: “while it may seem self-evidently true that humans put machines together, does it 
automatically follow that humans and their cultures remain in control of them?” By way of 
response, they suggest that, certainly, human beings (or human cultures and societies) are in 
easy control over “simple machines or tools,” but that this position cannot be as easily 
replicated when it comes to “complex machines or systems of machinery.” Accordingly, 
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within the context of societies in which embedded digital technologies act swiftly and, in a 
sense, invisibly, via a range of actions (from the interpersonal, such as texting, to the global, 
such as automated stock-markets), it makes “increasingly less sense to distinguish technology 
from culture as cultures becomes increasingly technologized.” Thus, much like the attempt to 
make the distinction between technology and nature, the attempt to separate technology from 
culture is fraught with problems and contradictions. Indeed, Lister et al. posit that “the now 
commonplace division of things into the realms of ‘nature’ and ‘culture’” is nothing more 
than a “fundamental intellectual habit,” which they attribute to the nineteenth-century 
German philosopher, Wilhelm Dilthey, who “carved up knowledge into the natural or 
physical sciences (Naturwissenschaften) and the cultural or human sciences 
(Geisteswissenschaften)” (2009: 323-324). What is at stake is rather neatly summed up by 
Lori Gruen, who asks us to consider the “not unrealistic situation in which an individual has 
no chance at all of experiencing genuine nature.” Her hypothetical individual “is poor and 
lives in an overpopulated urban centre” and “most of her time is spent trying to survive and 
keep her children alive.” Yet, “on rare occasions, she and others like her are invited to view a 
nature video or experience nature in a ‘virtual’ way.” While this provides her with “genuine 
pleasure...she knows her experience is mediated through technology,” but this does not 
diminish her recognizing the “value of nature” within her mediated experience (2001: 447-
448). Certainly, Gruen’s scenario is by no means an isolated or decontextualized one – to a 
great extent, many of us know what we know of the natural environment through mediated 
means. Thus, although technology – including information technology – is destructive of the 
environment, it could also be used to offer us an experience that is profoundly unsettling and 
evocative, and which could ultimately catalyse us into considering nature in a different way. 
And from this, various interesting possibilities could emerge.62 
Conclusion 
On a concluding note, if nature does not automatically exclude technology, and if technology 
can be considered indeterminate and a tool that can be employed for its transformative 
capabilities, perhaps then it is possible to shift or inflect aspects of the DSP through digital 
                                                          
62 Although it is not within the scope of this study to consider at length Bernard Stiegler’s three-volume 
Technics and Time, this is not to discount the further reflections offered by him in his trilogy concerning how 
we have related to, and currently relate to, technology in general. In this regard, Anna Kouppanou, in “Bernard 
Stiegler’s Philosophy of Technology: Invention, decision, and education in times of digitization,” points 
specifically to his evocative “concept of individuation [that] suggests that the human being is co-constituted 
with technology” (2015: 41). Indeed, this issue is very much explored in this thesis, but via a Deleuzoguattarian 
framework.  
69 
 
means. Of course, great care must be taken here to avoid what Kilbourne et al. call the trap of 
the “technofix,” and what Mosco terms the “digital myth.” But against the backdrop of this 
caveat, the following chapter will begin to explore what kind of new connections between 
ourselves and nature might be possible and beneficial in this regard, in relation to the 
theoretical contributions of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, along with the potential 
technological obstacles to the establishment of such connections.   
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Chapter Three – Deleuze and Guattari, becoming-animal, and the digital 
wall  
Introduction 
As discussed in the previous chapters, the DSP is operative in the marginalization of pro-
environmental discourse, and although it has been opposed by a number of environmental 
theorists and activists, on account of this, it was also argued that everyone is to some extent 
complicit with the DSP – even the very environmental theorists and activists who write and 
speak out against it. But the very idea that technology, nature and culture exist as separate 
and mutually exclusive domains or realms was also called into question, and correlatively the 
need to approach them in the contemporary era with more circumspection as complex 
phenomena, characterized by entanglement and imbrication, was advanced. In this regard, it 
was argued that we should look beyond the oppositional stances of the past and instead 
explore how individual attitudes and behaviours toward continuing environmental 
degradation might be re-orientated through technological, and particularly, digital means. 
That is, despite its negative effects – which were extensively detailed – it was advanced that 
digitality nevertheless may have the capacity to shift aspects of the DSP toward a more 
environmentally benign orientation. Yet for this, a philosophical framework is required, both 
to guide any new interventions, and to recognize resonant interventions. In the interest of 
establishing this, in what follows, the work of Gilles Deleuze – both his individual works and 
his collaborations with Félix Guattari – will be focused upon. And this is done not only 
because they were philosophers of difference and desire outside of the ambit of capitalism, a 
cornerstone of the DSP. In addition, it is also because their idea of becoming-animal, with its 
corollary of desubjectivation – which emerged alongside the environmental movement 
discussed in Chapter One – comports with a critical assessment of the anthropocentrism 
propagated by the cosmological dimension of the DSP. Yet in this regard, Deleuze’s concerns 
over the negative impact of digitality on thought will also, of necessity, have to be engaged 
with.      
Accordingly, in what follows, firstly, Deleuze’s socio-political and academic 
environment, to which he responded through his various theoretical works, will be explored. 
In particular, the decade of the 1960s will be discussed in terms of its great changes and 
instability, and particular attention will be paid to the May/June protests of 1968, so 
important for Deleuze and his colleagues. Secondly, after such historical contextualization, 
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the focus of the chapter will shift to an exploration of the philosophical context Deleuze 
formed part of; that is, the legacy of Hegelian dialecticism which Deleuze found 
tremendously stifling, the immense influence of structuralism precipitated by the work of 
Claude Levi-Strauss, and the emergence of Nietzschean-inspired French post-structuralism. 
Thirdly, attention will be drawn to Deleuze’s own contribution to post-structural thought and 
his exploration of difference, as evinced in his book Nietzsche and Philosophy (1962). This 
text, along with other key theoretical contributions, will be considered in relation to 
Deleuze’s commitment to the production of difference and the correlative eschewal of 
adherence to dogmatic thought, before the dynamics of his collaborative work with Guattari 
are elaborated upon. In the latter regard, by the 1970s, Deleuze had begun an immensely 
productive series of collaborations with the radical psychoanalyst Félix Guattari, and from 
1972 onward, with the publication of their book Capitalism and Schizophrenia: Anti-
Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari produced a myriad concepts designed to precipitate 
affirmative experiences of difference. In this regard, specific focus will fall on the 
Deleuzoguattarian concepts of ‘desire and machines/desiring machines,’ ‘Bodies without 
Organs,’ ‘nomadism,’ ‘nomadic war machines,’ and ‘rhizomes.’ After this, the discussion 
will turn to Deleuze and Guattari’s 1980 work, Capitalism and Schizophrenia: A Thousand 
Plateaus, in which they discuss the generation of difference in relation to interactions 
between humankind and the natural world, involving desubjectivation through the process of 
becoming-animal. Finally, the extent to which Deleuze, despite a provocative career and 
prodigious theoretical output spanning decades, by the 1990s evinced an increasingly sombre 
perspective on the rapid advance of information technology, will be examined. In particular, 
his 1990 work “Postscript on Control Societies” will be engaged with, and Deleuze’s concern 
that digitally-orientated societies would ultimately rob people even further of their agency, 
will be discussed.  
Deleuze’s historical context: The 1960s as a decade of change  
The 1960s, and in particular 1968, are widely regarded as years of great socio-political and 
cultural change; a revolutionary period in which Western capitalist societies encountered a 
time of great destabilization, insofar as enclaves of established authority to various degrees 
became obliged to yield to the desires and critical demands of their citizens. Peter Taaffe in 
“1968: Year of Revolution,” explains that “some years stand out as historic turning points: 
1789, 1848, 1871, 1917, 1989,” and he goes on to equate the period of the 1960s, specifically 
the climactic moment of May 1968, with some of the most profoundly unsettling and 
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transformative flashpoints in modern history. In this regard, he writes that although some of 
the above years can be seen as “signifying a turning back of the wheel of history,” others – 
such as 1968 – must be “clearly identified with revolution.” Citing the ideas of Karl Marx 
and Friedrich Engels, and relating them to the events of the 1960s, Taaffe argues that there 
are “periods in history when decades appear like ‘one day’ in their apparent tranquillity.” 
However, alternatively, “there can be days in which the events of 20 years can be 
compressed” (2008: 1), and the events of May-June 1968 in France comprise a case in point.  
 For the sake of clarity, it is helpful to consider the immediate historical context 
preceding and informing this explosion of dissatisfaction, protest and popular desire for a 
different future. Jeff Kisseloff in his Generation On Fire: Voices of Protest from the 1960s, 
provides a useful frame of reference from an American perspective. He begins by reflecting 
on the generation of people who had survived the Great Depression and gone on to fight in 
the Second World War, arguing that although this “greatest generation” – as they were later 
termed in Tom Brokaw’s best-selling book on the subject63– were indisputably resilient and 
courageous, in the years following the war, “many settled into lives of conformity and 
comfort, paying little heed to the spectres of poverty, racism, and McCarthyism that haunted 
the country” (Kisseloff 2006: 1). That is, while the decade following the catastrophic global 
conflict of the 1940s was a period of great economic boom, which accordingly allowed many 
people access to living standards never thought possible before, as Richard Brownell in 
Counter-Culture of the 1960s demonstrates, this economic prosperity did not reach everyone. 
Specifically, while many “women…lived with the advantages that the culture afforded 
them,…they were never expected to want more than the traditional role that prevented them 
from living independently” (Brownell 2011: 6) similarly, many minority groups faced open 
discrimination.64 Yet in contrast to their parents, or those of the ‘greatest generation,’ “the so-
called baby boomers who came of age in the 1960s were less content with such limitations 
and inequality,” and it was they “who fought and sacrificed to compel a reluctant nation to 
make good on its promise of ‘life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.’” Even though this 
was often at great personal cost to themselves in terms of their own family relations, societal 
ostracism and marginalization (Kisseloff 2006: 1).65 That is, while some of them were either 
                                                          
63 The book is entitled The Greatest Generation, and after its publication in 2001, it achieved both critical 
acclaim and commercial success.  
64 The assassination of civil rights leader Martin Luther King, on 4April 1964, was just one event that indicated 
the severity of this discrimination (Brownell 2011: 6-8).  
65 Ironically, the criticisms levelled by the so-called baby-boomers against their parents are being replicated 
today, insofar as baby-boomers are often criticized by their children for their lapse into conservatism and 
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implicitly or forcibly pushed to the margins of society, others opted out of mainstream 
society by choice. This adversarial group, although undoubtedly in many individual cases 
well placed to access the material benefits of belonging to mainstream society, rejected it, 
claiming “that most Americans had become prisoners to the lifestyles they maintained,” and 
that “they wanted no part of the affluence and materialism of the 1950s” (Brownell 2011: 8). 
The radical nature of this gesture begs the question as to why any group would choose 
potential exclusion over the lure of comfort and stability, especially in a country which had 
moreover risen to dominance following the events of the Second World War. By way of 
answer, Brownell points out that for many Americans, the 1960s had “opened with a promise 
of change” through the election of John F. Kennedy as President in 1961. As the youngest 
ever incumbent of the presidency, Kennedy’s replacing of “the oldest man ever to serve in the 
White House,” namely Dwight D. Eisenhower, served as a symbolic moment for many. And 
coupled with his progressive views and alignment with the civil rights movement, Kennedy 
“created a climate of high idealism,” which he pursued – at least rhetorically – with 
evangelical zeal.66 However, the events of the decade, both domestically and internationally, 
soon diminished the public’s belief that history was moving toward a less cynical and 
exploitative system of relations. Although a full description of all such events is beyond the 
scope of the present work, among some of the most important were the 1961 Bay of Pigs 
invasion, and the related Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 (Lynch 2009:1-7; Roberts 2012: xi-
xix), which demonstrated that the Cold War – characterized by severe political tension and 
proxy military conflict with an ever-present threat of global nuclear obliteration – was 
escalating dangerously. Adding to this existential angst was Kennedy’s assassination in 1963, 
which was followed by the assassination of the civil rights leader Martin Luther King the 
next year, which seemed to constitute the death knell for idealists who desired change. 
Something which was compounded by the fact that, toward the end of December, American 
military involvement in Vietnam increased significantly (Farber and Bailey 2001:38), so that 
the distant localized conflict grew into an increasingly bloody quagmire, involving hundreds 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
comfortable lifestyles, at the expense of a more affirmative engagement with life. See, for instance, Greg 
Jericho’s “Generation Y have every right to be angry at baby boomers’ share of wealth” (Guardian, 2014), Will 
Hutton’s “The Baby Boomers and the price of personal freedom” (Guardian, 2010), and Jim Tankersley’s “Who 
Destroyed the Economy? The Case against Baby Boomers” (The Atlantic, 2012).   
66 Of course, Kennedy was a multi-faceted individual, operating within a specific and complex political, 
economic and socio-cultural context, and therefore should not be characterized in hagiographical terms. Texts 
such as Giglio and Rabe’s Debating the Kennedy Presidency (Debating Twentieth Century America) (2003), and 
Robert Dallek’s An Unfinished Life: John F. Kennedy, 1917-1963 (2004), offer deeper insight into this political 
figure and his ambiguous stance on many of the key issues that he was popularly perceived to support 
unequivocally. Yet, such issues notwithstanding, it is generally considered that Kennedy remains one of 
America’s more progressive presidents.  
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of thousands of American soldiers. Consequently, when the Republican candidate Richard 
Nixon became President in 1969, for many it seemed that while order had been restored, an 
opportunity for radical change through institutional means had also been lost. The cultural 
backlash to this growing uncertainty took many forms, but in effect, “many young people 
began to question whether they should make an effort to liberalize a society that seemed 
closed to their ideas,” and then instead “simply walked away and developed their own 
society” (Brownell 2011: 42). Of course, in addition to groups such as the so-called Hippies, 
who opted out of ‘the system’ as best they could, the vast majority instead loosened their 
attachment to the establishment through more incremental means, like exploring alternative 
viewpoints, embracing adversarial social practices, and – as noted by Leroy Ashby in With 
Amusement for All: A History of American Popular Culture since 1830 – through 
involvement in politics at a grassroots level, challenging notions of gender and race, and 
expression in art and music (2006: 348 - 360). And all of these were construed as a challenge 
to “the mainstream of American culture” (Brownell 2011: 44). What this evinced was a 
desperate attempt to generate difference against the backdrop of a society perceived to be 
static, ossified and conformist. A society which, moreover, through its commitment to repeat 
the errors and prejudices of the past – domestically and in terms of international relations – 
appeared to be moving rapidly toward a catastrophic endpoint.  
Such uncertainty and discontent, along with the attendant desire for a different state of 
affairs, was simultaneously reflected in European society. In this regard, Taaffe points to a 
number of key events in Europe during the 1960s, singling out revolt in Stalinist 
Czechoslovakia and the Prague Spring in terms of Eastern Europe,67 and in terms of Western 
Europe, enormous strife within the Labour Party in the United Kingdom, the “sophisticated 
industrial struggle” that became known as Italy’s Hot Autumn, and the mass protests of May-
                                                          
67 Kieran Williams in The Prague Spring and its Aftermath: Czechoslovak Politics 1968-1970 (1997), explains 
the conditions that led to revolt against the Stalinist regime in Czechoslovakia. Accordingly, the Prague Spring 
should be seen, firstly, as “a liberalization of a Leninist regime,” rather than a revolution. Secondly, it was the 
result of the way in which the post-war communist seizure of power had “demolished the urban and rural middle 
classes,” so that by 1967, “around 60 per cent of the working population was aged between fifteen and thirty-
seven,” and “had been shaped almost exclusively by wartime and the communist era, and had at most only a 
fuzzy memory of the pre-war republic.” Consequently, the intelligentsia – sourced from this aforementioned 
group – was a new one, and did not remember the values of the old Republic. Thus, rather than willingly 
adhering to a Stalinist framework, they were upset by its orthodoxy. In turn, the Stalinist regime, instead of 
seeing this grouping as enemies, saw the situation as rather something akin to “one big feuding family” 
(Williams 1997: 3-5). However, as Bischof et al. explain in The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact Invasion 
of Czechoslovakia in 1968 (2010), “the invasion by the Warsaw Pact” army stopped “the liberalization and 
democratization of this Soviet puppet state,” thus demonstrating that any challenge to Soviet power would not 
be tolerated, no matter how true to Marxism that revolt may be (2010: 4).  
75 
 
June 1968 in France (2008: 1- 8).68 In short, in an ideologically-divided continent, regardless 
of whether people lived under Communist rule, or whether they lived within a capitalist 
context, a deep dissatisfaction with the status quo emerged. That is, while the brutal might of 
Stalinism crushed any popular uprising in Czechoslovakia with a Warsaw-Pact assembled 
army, dissent not only remained but also became even more pronounced in the Eastern Bloc 
following such heavy-handed action. Indeed, it is plausible to suggest that the Prague Spring 
was a critical moment in which “the basis for the mass disillusionment with Stalinism” was 
laid (Taaffe 2008: 7). Similarly, within Western Europe, the unrest of the 1960s which began 
in England, resonated toward the end of the decade in the May 1968 student revolts in 
France, which were succeeded in turn by crippling strikes in Italy – inspired by the mass 
action in France the year before. In many ways then, France emerged as the focal point of a 
challenge to the capitalist establishment, and to the conservative socio-cultural status quo 
associated with it. 
While the initial student unrest may have sparked the mass unrest, it is essential to 
note the context that led to such enflamed emotions in the first place. By 1968, the 
government of Charles de Gaulle had been in power for a decade, with de Gaulle having 
secured a first term in 1958, and a second in 1965 (Martin 2013: 5, 12-13). And although the 
French economy had improved significantly since the immediate post-war years through the 
reforms and projects of the de Gaulle government, which were based on a unique policy 
named dirigisme – in effect, a combination of capitalism and state-direction of the economy 
(Godin and Chafer 2005:106; Knapp and Wright 2006:18) – many felt isolated by the 
associated rigidity of the system. By way of response, De Gaulle, whose popularity had 
declined sharply from the mass support he had enjoyed in his first term, resorted to heavy-
handedness and orthodoxy in relation to the politico-economic and socio-cultural affairs of 
France, and this led to a craving – particularly among the youth – for a different, less rigid 
                                                          
68 The events of May-June 1968 will be explained in detail in what follows; however, a brief explanation of 
events in England and Italy is helpful to understanding the greater context in which it occurred. In terms of the 
strife in England, Eric Shaw in Discipline and Discord in the Labour Party (1988), demonstrates the existential 
crisis faced by Labour when in the midst of its rule, massive strikes rocked the country, forcing Labour into 
severe intra-party conflict, with the party stretched between a commitment to its post-war plan of re-
nationalization and a less left-wing economic approach. With regard to Italy, William Keach, in his article 
“What do we want? Everything! Italy’s Hot Autumn 1969,” explains the struggle in the country as one in which 
working-class and militant student movements were inextricably linked (Keach 2009: 1). He further elaborates 
on the scope of the mass strikes, writing that, “in the course of 1969, millions of workers went on strike – 
primarily in the industrialized north of Italy but eventually in other areas, including the severely underdeveloped 
south” (2009: 1). 
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milieu.69 As the Independent noted in an article commemorating the 50th anniversary of the 
strikes, “May 1968 was, in its origins, a revolt against the stifling papa-knows-best 
conservatism, and dullness, of General Charles de Gaulle’s economically booming 1960s 
France” (Independent, 2008). Similarly, International Viewpoint describes the reasons for the 
general unrest as a consequence of how “Gaullism had allowed capitalism to accelerate the 
restructuring of the productive apparatus,” which produced great results in terms of 
combatting unemployment and so forth, but only at a high price. That is, “to achieve all this, 
workers had to accept the fragmentation of tasks, shift work and stepped up rhythms,” and 
face both “an average of 46 hours’ work per week and an armada of little bosses to sweat out 
the profits.” Within this context, “work was more tiring, [and]…more dangerous also: there 
were 2.5 million work accidents per year for 16.5 million employees” (Paz, Cabral 2008). 
Indeed, much like in the post-war American economy, while the French economy was 
flourishing, the everyday experiences of ordinary people in France had deteriorated in the 
accompanying atmosphere of pressure and bureaucracy – to which the strikes were a 
response. 
Eric Drott in Music and the Elusive Revolution: Cultural Politics and Political 
Culture in France: 1968-1981, points to 3 May 1968 as the beginning of the civil unrest that, 
as the Situtationalist International put it in 1969, “stopped the economy of an advanced 
industrial country” (Situtationalist International Online 1969: 1) – or at least brought it to a 
“virtual standstill” (2011: 22).70 Drott explains that on this date, a relatively small group of 
students arrived at the “courtyard of the Sorbonne in Paris” to protest against the closure of 
“the Nanterre campus of the Universite de Paris following a series of disturbances.” In 
addition to this complaint, the protesting students were incensed by the threatened expulsion 
of those accused of being ring-leaders in the above opposition. Drott emphasizes, though, that 
this was also not an isolated gathering, but rather “followed a well-rehearsed pattern…in the 
                                                          
69 For more historical information on French affairs during this period, see also Christian Nuenlist’s Globalizing 
de Gaulle: International Perspectives on French Foreign Policies, 1958-1969 (2010), and Jean K. Chalaby’s 
The de Gaulle Presidency and the Media: Statism and Public Communications (2002).  While Nuenlist’s text 
provides a comprehensive overview of de Gaulle’s particular approach to international relations, Chalaby’s text 
is useful in that, through its exploration of how Gaullism affected the media, it provides a helpful overview of 
some key dynamics of his domestic policy. 
70 The Situtationalist International was a loose collective of thinkers that was formed in 1957, around a strand of 
libertarian Marxism. That is, while the ideas of the group were rooted in Marxism, insofar as they rejected 
capitalism as an affirmative and legitimate means of societal organization, they also rejected the orthodox, 
authoritarian interpretations of Marx, favouring instead the adoption of a more open approach. Some of their 
tactics included “attempting to create ‘situations’ where humans would interact together as people,” without 
being “mediated by commodities,” seeing in these “moments of true community the possibility of a future, 
joyful and un-alienated society” (Lib com, 2014). Guy Debord’s Society of the Spectacle (1967) and Raoul 
Vaneigem’s The Revolution of Everyday Life (1967) are cited as key texts of this movement.  
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series of political rallies staged by student militants,” who were “protesting everything from 
American involvement in Vietnam to the government’s planned restructuring of the French 
university system.” While the crowd dispersed following the protest, it quickly reassembled, 
“spurred by rumours that [a] neo-fascist youth group Occident was planning to confront 
students as they left.” And with student groups of sharply different political stances “milling 
about,” the university administration panicked, cancelling classes for the day, and called in 
security forces. With the police’s arrival and their subsequent “shepherd[ing] of students] into 
police vans,” an ever-growing number of bystanders grew agitated and violent confrontations 
began to occur. By the evening, a further “two thousand students flooded the boulevard Saint 
Michel to protest the police’s occupation,” and such participation grew steadily, so that the 
subsequent weeks saw an escalation of both the size of the protests and the severity of the 
state’s response. Drott writes that by 7 May, twenty thousand people had taken to the streets, 
and that by 10 May, the fifth arrondissement had been barricaded off by protestors,71 after 
which it became the site for bitter and violent confrontations between protestors and the 
police. Soon the protest movement generated sympathy among other groups, and when trade 
unions called for a general one day strike, “one million people were alleged to have 
participated in the march through Paris that took place on the 13th of May.” Initially confined 
to Paris, by the second week of the unrest, “wildcat strikes” had spread across the country as 
workers “inspired by the students’ occupation of the Sorbonne…seized control of factories 
throughout the country,” causing the output of the state to grind to a halt (Drott 2011: 21-24). 
However, their immense impact notwithstanding, the strikes did eventually come to an end. 
As Peter Steinfels explains in “Paris, May 1968: The Revolution That Never Was,” on 30 
May “de Gaulle put his foot down,” announcing new elections and hinting that he would use 
“military means to restore order.” Additionally, Steinfels suggests that “few people over 30 
really had any stomach” for the revolution, so that as “May passed into June,” although 
“workers and students won some changes…the elections swept de Gaulle and his supporters 
back into power” (New York Times, 2008).72 However, while the politico-economic success 
of May 1968 is still highly contested today, what is far less an issue of debate is that it 
successfully heralded a socio-cultural refusal on the part of many groups within French 
                                                          
71 The fifth arrondissement is an administrative district located in one of the central areas in Paris, on the left 
bank of the River Seine. It houses a large concentration of prestigious research and educational establishments.  
72 For further elaboration on the final phase of the unrest, see Angelo Quattrocchi and Tom Nairn’s The 
Beginning of the End: France, May 1968 (1998).  
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society to acquiesce to a life confined within what they experienced as a stiflingly rigid 
conceptual/discursive framework.73  
Deleuze’s academic context:  Nietzsche, Hegelianism and micro-narratives 
As Gary Gutting in French Philosophy in the Twentieth Century points out, by the early 
1960s in France, structuralism was the dominant philosophical approach, and he emphasizes 
in particular the contribution of Claude Levi Strauss. Specifically, he recalls the long 
theoretical shadow initially cast by his famous work Tristes Tropiques (1955), which was 
followed up by his Structural Anthropology (1958), both of which left an indelible mark on 
French thought in the 1960s (2001: 221-224).74 In terms of this, Edith Kurzwell in The Age of 
Structuralism: From Levi-Strauss to Foucault, explains Levi-Strauss’ work as “the 
systematic attempt to uncover deep universal mental structures,” which “manifest themselves 
in kinship and larger social structures…and in the unconscious psychological patterns that 
motivate human behaviour” (1996: 1). And Francois Dosse in his History of Structuralism: 
The Rising Sign 1945-1966, further suggests that such attempts reflected both a “rejection of 
traditional Western culture, and…a desire for modernism in search of new models.” 
Accordingly, he defines the emergent structuralism as “an instrument of de-ideologization for 
many politically committed intellectuals,” who embraced it at “a specific political moment 
characterized by disenchantment” with the established “configuration of knowledge” (1998: 
xx). To a certain extent, this dovetailed with the historical and socio-cultural issues discussed 
in the preceding section. That is, although Western capitalist societies were experiencing 
unprecedented economic growth, both popular and academic enthusiasm for this success was 
in short supply, and the prevailing view instead was that such a society was morally bankrupt 
and culturally stagnant. 
However, while structuralism resonated with this disillusionment with the status quo, 
the thinkers associated with the ensuing post-structural thought saw a flaw in the structuralist 
approach to societal relations. As John Lechte points out in Fifty Key Contemporary 
                                                          
73 Of course, the United States and France were not the only areas affected by this groundswell desire for 
difference. That is, while the focus here has fallen on these countries in order to outline the context within which 
Deleuze and his fellow post-structuralists found themselves, it must be remembered that the 1960s were a 
turbulent decade for virtually all parts of the globe. In Africa, for instance, 30 countries won their independence 
in this decade, including Cameroon, Senegal, Nigeria, Cote d’Ivoire, Uganda and Zambia. Additionally, the 
decade also saw great turmoil in other countries such as China, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Mexico (Christiansen 
and Scarlett 2012: 3-16).   
74 Patrick Wilcken in Claude Levi-Strauss: The Poet in the Laboratory explains that while Levi-Strauss’s 
“memoir of his fieldwork in Brazil,” namely Tristes Tropiques –his only “non-academic book” – “brought him 
fame in the 1950s” (2010: 7), it was his academic work Structural Anthropology, which remains the canonical 
work of Structuralism, as it brought together all his writings “in one place for the first time” (2010: 228). 
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Thinkers: From Structuralism to Post-Humanism, they faulted Saussure – whose contribution 
constituted the basis for structuralism – for leaving “intact certain (metaphysical) pre-
suppositions about subjectivity and language” (2008: 128). In this regard, while structuralists 
argued their case under the assumption of fixed meaning, post-structuralists emphasized that 
meaning itself was unstable and protean. And as Madan Sarup suggests in An Introductory 
Guide to Post-structuralism and Postmodernism, the change from structural thought to this 
new mode of interpretation can be attributed significantly to the events of 1968. That is, for 
him, “post-structuralism is largely a product of 1968,” because, “unable to break the 
structures of state power, [it] found it possible to subvert the structures of language.” In terms 
of this, when “the student movement was flushed off the streets and driven underground into 
discourse,” it took as its “enemies…coherent belief systems of any kind… [and] all total, 
systematic thought [became] suspect” (1993: 105-106). 
Yet importantly, this new approach to thought was not a rejection of its predecessor, 
but rather a more sophisticated mode of analysis, based partially on the disappointment with 
the failed revolution. Consequently, although the events of May 1968 may not have yielded 
the politico-economic sea-change envisioned by its participants, the events did stimulate 
many creative responses to totalizing systems of power, which remain important socio-
cultural concerns even today. In this regard, Sarup identifies three key features of post-
structural thought. Firstly, “if one looks at the work of…post-structuralists…such as Deleuze 
and Guattari, Derrida, Foucault, Lyotard, and others, one can see the influence of [Friedrich] 
Nietzsche’s philosophy,” which entailed an analogous “antipathy” toward any system. In 
relation to this, the second feature associated with post-structural thought is a rejection of 
Hegelianism, with its systematic view of history (1993: 105). According to Vincent 
Descombes, a suffocatingly ‘progressive’ Hegelianism had permeated Western thinking in 
general, and French thought in particular, since the nineteenth century, to the point where 
many experienced aspects of twentieth century French academia as ossified (1980: 9, 168). 
As John Marks explains in Gilles Deleuze: Vitalism and Multiplicity, according to the French 
version of Hegelianism taught by Kojeve and prevalent at the Sorbonne in the 1940s75 – 
where Deleuze studied – “Hegel predicted that human consciousness would proceed, via a 
                                                          
75 Shadia Drury in Alexandre Kojeve: The Roots of Postmodern Politics, explains that Kojeve “was Hegel’s 
most famous interpreter, reading Hegel through the eyes of Marx and Heidegger simultaneously” (1994: i). A 
“French philosopher of Russian origin,” his lectures, as noted by Tom Rockmore in “Hegel in France,” were 
attended by some of the biggest names in French thought, including Klossowski, Bataille, Merleau-Ponty, and 
Lacan, and for a time, “Kojeve became…even more important than the author” he so famously interpreted 
(2013: 323).  
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dialectical process of negation, towards a state of perfected human consciousness.” What this, 
in effect, meant was “that consciousness will develop by negating the errors of past 
consciousness, [until] reason and rationality emerge from the tension between the rational 
and the irrational” (1998: 15). Yet this schema, predicated on a belief in a progressive purity 
of thought, emerged as hopelessly naïve in the 1960s. Finally, the third feature of post-
structural thought is its rejection of totalizing conformity in favour of the “small story” within 
history, and correlatively the affirmation of the “anti-political individual” (Sarup 1993: 105). 
In effect, then, the aim of post-structuralism was to promote “the notion of difference in all its 
facets” of life (Lechte 1998: 128), and it was within this philosophical ambit that the work of 
Gilles Deleuze proved to be of seminal importance. 
In his Deleuze and Guattari, Ronald Bogue describes Deleuze’s 1962 work, Nietzsche 
and Philosophy, as part of the movement that saw Nietzsche’s rise to prominence in French 
philosophical thought in the 1960s and 1970s, and he further argues that it is in this work that 
many of the themes and concerns of Deleuze’s later work find their first enunciation (1989: 
15). Nietzsche was a philosopher of difference, whose genealogical approach to morality, art, 
and philosophy made conspicuous the ruptures rather than the ostensible progressive 
continuity of the related traditions, and thereby opened up the possibility of radical invention 
and tangential exploration in a world of increasingly staid academic discourse (Descombes 
1980: 7). Robert Williams in his Tragedy, Recognition, and the Death of God: Studies in 
Hegel and Nietzsche, concurs with Descombes’ assessment of Nietzsche’s appeal to Deleuze 
and his contemporaries, and adds that, in the case of Deleuze’s Nietzsche and Philosophy, it 
is the “anti-Hegelianism [which] runs through Nietzsche’s work” that is emphasized “as its 
cutting edge” (2012: 38).  
To be sure, even though Nietzsche’s work certainly resonated greatly with the French 
post-structuralists’ interests, their appropriation of his philosophical concerns, methods, and 
concepts was not simply a repetition of his various arguments, but rather a creative and 
dynamic application of his thought to their respective contexts.76 This approach is particularly 
evident in Deleuze’s Nietzsche and Philosophy, which is not only a meticulous and rigorous 
examination of Nietzsche’s works, but also a creative encounter in which Deleuze presents 
                                                          
76 Michel Foucault’s seminal texts of the 1970s, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison and The History 
of Sexuality: Volume 1: The Will to Knowledge, for instance, apply the Nietzschean genealogical method both to 
show the competing and mutating discursive features evident in contemporary society, and to illustrate their role 
in the formation of subjectivity. Similarly, while Derrida uses Nietzsche’s idea of ‘affirmation,’ applying it 
specifically within the sphere of language, Lyotard’s avowed incredulity toward meta-narratives is couched in 
thoroughly Nietzschean terms (Anderson 2003: 79; Schrift 1995: 159).    
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Nietzsche as a philosopher of difference and ‘becoming’ (rather than stable ‘being’). This 
creative encounter was also the first of Deleuze’s many encounters with various other 
marginalized ‘Nietzschean’ figures and their philosophical texts, through which Deleuze 
turned increasingly to the “anti-rationalist tradition,” in order to destabilize “the metaphysical 
presuppositions of traditional philosophy” (Bogue 1989: 2-3). In particular, in Dialogues, 
Deleuze refers to this stream of thinkers as “authors who seemed to form a part of the history 
of philosophy, but who escaped it on one side or in all directions: Lucretius, Spinoza, Hume, 
Nietzsche, [and] Bergson” (1977: 21).77 In terms of this project of destabilization, Deleuze 
not only thematized but also augmented the various works of the ‘anti-rationalist’ 
philosophers in his canon, to correlate with his own aim. That is, while these various 
philosophers’ thoughts certainly, in many instances, remain resonant with Deleuze’s 
arguments, one must make the fine distinction between the original thinker’s concept and 
Deleuze’s appropriation of that concept, in order to identify Deleuze’s philosophical 
contribution. In his assessment of Deleuze’s approach to thought, John Marks suggests that 
“Deleuze’s aim, throughout the course of his writing, is to push philosophy to its limits, often 
attempting to explore the borderline at which philosophy meets that which becomes ‘non-
philosophy.’” This much is evident in Deleuze’s argument, which echoes Nietzsche, that “to 
think is to encounter and [to] question” (Marks 1998: 13).78 In short, for Deleuze, as an 
emerging thinker in his own right and someone operating in the inhibited environments of 
Gaullist France and Hegelian/structuralist-dominated academia, the appeal of Nietzsche is 
quite understandable. 
Deleuze, difference, and desire 
Of Deleuze’s overall contribution to post-structural thought, Keith Ansell Pearson in Deleuze 
and Philosophy: The Difference Engineer, writes: 
 
Over a period of thirty years, Gilles Deleuze (1925–1995) has had a profound 
influence on the direction of philosophical and social thought. His presence is felt in 
contemporary debates in feminism, political theory and continental philosophy 
                                                          
77 As a point of interest, a further name, Salamon Maimon, could be added to this list. Although not explicitly 
mentioned by Deleuze as part of his ‘anti-rationalist’ tradition, Bogue writes that Deleuze called Maimon a 
“great, great philosopher.” Bogue furthermore argues that “two exigencies laid down by Maimon – the search 
for the genetic elements of real thought (and not merely the conditions of possible thought), and the positing of a 
principle of difference as the fulfilment of this condition – reappear like a leitmotif in almost every one of 
Deleuze’s books to 1969, even if Maimon’s name is not always explicitly mentioned” (1989: 65-67).  
78 Similarly, Nietzsche himself noted, in a letter to his sister Elisabeth, that “if you want to achieve peace of 
mind and happiness, then have faith; if you want to be a disciple of truth, then search” (Middleton 1969: 7).  
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where he has challenged and overturned many theoretical dogmas…[Moreover] his 
work marked a significant turn toward the poststructuralist movement as a whole 
and its influence increases as it unfolds. (2002: i) 
 
The mention of an aversion to dogmatic thinking is important, and Ansell Pearson elaborates 
on this when he evocatively advances that “Deleuze was a monster,” insofar as his work is 
marked by “a subversive, perilous attempt to map out a new becoming of thought” that is 
“beyond good sense and common sense.” Indeed, in Deleuze’s hands, “thought becomes 
monstrous because it forsakes the desire for an image of thought” (2002: 3). Although 
somewhat nebulous at first glance, what Ansell Pearson means by this emerges through 
consideration of some of Deleuze’s major theoretical contributions. 
 Although Deleuze’s first work was Empiricism and Subjectivity, published in 1953, it 
was the aforementioned Nietzsche and Philosophy, published in 1962, that saw him assume a 
Nietzschean commitment to the generation of radical difference. Following this text, the 
1960s heralded a productive period for Deleuze in which he published seven works, including 
Difference and Repetition, which served as a meticulous indictment of the tendency to 
privilege and re-produce problematic ideas, and which correlatively focused on thinking 
difference-in-itself (Deleuze 1994: 28).79 The following decade saw further prolific output, 
but also, significantly, Deleuze’s pairing up with the psychoanalyst and activist, Félix 
Guattari. Significant works during this time include Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia (1972) and Kafka: Towards a Minor Literature (1975), both co-written with 
Guattari. While the former text criticized the coagulated ideological environment of the 
contemporary era, which canalized desire in Oedipal terms and through capitalist 
normativity, the latter text provided examples of how, through minoritarian literary means, a 
move away from such dominant modes of desire could be facilitated.80  In turn, the 1980s 
saw Deleuze building on his efforts to de-stabilize dogmatic thought. In Francis Bacon: The 
Logic of Sensation (1981) he elaborated on acts of resistance – explored earlier in relation to 
the works of Kafka – within the realm of art. And books on Foucault and on cinema then 
followed, in which the possibilities for difference – thematised in relation to the paintings of 
                                                          
79 Deleuze’s publications in the 1960s were: Nietzsche and Philosophy (1962), Kant’s Critical Philosophy 
(1963), Proust and Signs (1964), Pure Immanence (1965), Bergsonism (1966), Masochism: Coldness and 
Cruelty (1967), Difference and Repetition (1968), The Logic of Sense (1969), and Spinoza: Practical Philosophy 
(1970). 
80 Deleuze’s other works in the 1970s included Rhizome (1976), Dialogues (1977), and “One Less Manifesto” in 
Super-positions (1978); in these he similarly argued for a move away from dogmatic thought that disallows or 
eschews difference. 
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Bacon – were extrapolated, respectively, to Foucault’s archaeological and genealogical 
phases, along with his work on subjectivation, and to the movement- and time-images of 
cinema. But it was A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (1987), the 
counterpart to their earlier Anti-Oedipus, that emerged as perhaps the most powerful example 
of Deleuze and Guattari’s ‘nomadic thought.’ In the forward to this text, entitled “Pleasures 
of Philosophy,” Brian Massumi explains nomadic thought as replacing “the closed equation 
of representation” by virtue of “the modus operandi of nomad thought [which] is 
affirmation.” In other words, unlike representation, which analyses “the world into discrete 
components, reducing their manyness to the One of identity,” nomadic thought “arrives from 
outside to break constraints and open new vistas” (2004: xiii).81 Similarly, Ronald Bogue in 
Deleuze’s Way: Essays in Transverse Ethics and Aesthetics, points out that “nomad thought 
is anti-identiterian, affirmative and free from the negative [and] lies entirely outside the 
domain of the reproducible, of representation” (2007: 139).82 Within the above texts, a 
number of key concepts emerged, which can be related to the events of May 1968, and 
consideration of which correlatively helps to demonstrate the nature of Deleuze’s 
‘monstrous’ philosophy of difference. These are, in order, desiring-production, 
schizoanalysis, bodies-without-organs, nomadic war machines, the rhizomatic, and de-
territorialization.  
Paul Patton sums up Deleuze’s aim in Difference and Repetition as the production of 
a “systematic philosophy of difference.” In this work of “prodigious conceptual invention,” 
Deleuze “draws upon his earlier readings of Plato, Hume, Bergson, Nietzsche and Kant, as 
well as elements of contemporary science and art, to weave together a physics and a 
metaphysics of difference.” And through doing so he seeks to critique and de-stabilize the 
“philosophy of representation” or the “image of thought” that has so dominated thinking 
(Patton 1968: xi).83 Fundamental to Deleuze’s project in this regard, as Ronald Bogue 
                                                          
81 Massumi further points out that nomadic thought goes by many names, and he cites Spinoza’s “Ethics,” 
Nietzsche’s “Gay Science,” Artaud’s “Crowned Anarchy,” Blanchot’s “Space of Literature,” and Foucault’s 
“Outside Thought” as being resonant with to Deleuze and Guattari’s radical attempts to usher in difference 
(2004: xiii).  
82 Nomadism also echoed through two other texts, What is Philosophy? (1991) and Essays: Critical and Clinical 
(1993), which followed before Deleuze’s death in 1995.   
83 The dogmatic way of thinking associated with such a philosophy of representation is neatly explained by 
Todd May in his Gilles Deleuze: An Introduction, when he advances that “representation mediates everything, 
but mobilizes and moves nothing.” As such, as Deleuze himself notes, and as cited by May, “representation fails 
to capture the affirmed world of difference” (2005: 74-75). This is because it operates by fixed categories and a 
common sense that reinforces strict boundaries of acceptable thought, and this is what we ‘recognise,’ 
automatically, as it were. But such recognition is thus a “model of judgement,” and Deleuze divides this model 
of judgement into four types, namely “identity, analogy, opposition, and resemblance.” Problematically, these 
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explains in Deleuze and Guattari, “is a single, Nietzschean conception of the cosmos as the 
ceaseless becoming of a multiplicity of interconnected forces.” A multiplicity that “admits of 
no stable entities but only of ‘dynamic quanta,’” such that it must “be understood in terms of 
difference rather than identity” (1989: 150). This type of thinking is well demonstrated in 
Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition, particularly in his discussion of the “Image of 
Thought,” where this ‘image’ signifies a common-sense view of experience that is often 
monotonously replicated without an openness to the various ‘multiplicities’ and ‘intensities’ 
that are present in any exchange.84 In short, through de-stabilizing the common-sense 
understandings of ‘repetition’ and ‘difference,’ Deleuze demonstrates, firstly, that repetition 
is not a generality, but rather each time – or repetition – entails a new event that is uniquely 
situated in time, and secondly, that difference is not necessarily something oppositional. That 
is, it is not necessarily opposed to any extant identity but rather different in itself.85  
Published in 1972, Anti-Oedipus in many respects entails a politicization of the above 
concept of difference, and in this sense, as Ian Buchanan argues, it is “a 1968 book” (2008: 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
four ways of encountering the world are based on the aforementioned categories that we automatically assume 
to be fixed and incontestable – and this is the ossification argued against by Deleuze throughout his works 
(2005: 76-78). As Patty Sotirin, in “Becoming Woman,” argues, in Deleuze’s quest to counter the dogmatic 
thought of representation, he attempted to create a “positive ontology” by “affirming the possibilities of 
becoming something else,” by opening “new pathways down which living and thinking can travel,” that are 
“beyond the avenues, relations, values, and meanings that seem to be laid out for us” (2011: 59).  
84 With regard to terms such as ‘multiplicities’ and ‘intensities,’ Deleuze drew heavily on Henri Bergson’s work, 
as will be discussed in further detail in Chapter Five. Briefly, though, through his discussion on ‘multiplicities’ 
and ‘intensities’ (1910: 45-47; 10-19), Bergson distinguishes dynamic intelligence from the homogenization of 
experience, which he associates with instinctual patterns or tendencies (1977: 25).  
85 As an example of the affirmative nature of his work in Difference and Repetition, one can look at Deleuze’s 
writing on three different conceptions of time, which comprise a continuum, from the first which is 
encompassing and constraining, through the second which is unstable, to the third which is far more creative and 
affirmative. Accordingly, the first order of time is attributed to the philosophy of Descartes, the second order of 
time to the philosophy of Kant, and the third order of time to the philosophy of Nietzsche (Deleuze 1994: 88-91; 
95-108; 135-136). To simplify things, the first order of time is circular, based on seasons and myths, and is thus 
repetitive, and such a conception of time disallows difference because the present is governed by external 
factors that endorse its continuity, the most important of which is God, who guarantees the unfolding of time 
(1994:88). The second order of time, associated with Kant, dramatically breaks this thinking by conceiving of 
time in terms of a straight line, and in a way that allows for a profound re-orientation of the human relationship 
to time, insofar as time is situated within the mind, as it were, and conceived of as a crucial factor in human 
agency (1994: 94). The third order of time – attributed to Nietzsche, and reflected in the work of Proust – is the 
idea of the ‘eternal return’ in Nietzsche, or ‘time regained’ in Proust (1994: 95). In this conception of time, 
repetition becomes the central focus, but it is creative and affirmative, in that every moment cannot be the same 
as before. Rather, every repetition bears the signature of difference, through the malleability of memory, and 
indeed, the creative experience of memories of the past that have never been present. The latter will be 
elaborated upon later, in Chapter Five, in relation to Deleuze’s appropriation of the work of Bergson. But for 
now it will suffice to say that such creative remembering of a past that was never present – as when Proust 
remembers Combray, through tasting the madeleine, in a way that he has never remembered it before (Proust 
2001: 48) – constitutes an example of such difference in itself, and correlatively, the creation of new time.  
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8).86 In short, it involves an attack, from a Nietzschean position, on conceptualizations of 
integral subjectivity, particularly that of Freud’s ‘psychological subject’ and Marx’s ‘political 
subject.’ In this regard, Deleuze and Guattari’s main contention with Freud is their idea that 
desire is always characterized by ‘lack,’ which is by default tied to negation. Instead, for 
Deleuze and Guattari, desire is productive (‘desiring-production’ involving ‘desiring-
machines’), multiple, and in a constant state of flux.87 Similarly, Marx’s appropriation of 
Hegel’s dialectical method is criticized by Deleuze and Guattari, as is his argument that class 
struggle overcomes ‘lack.’88 Accordingly, framing the discussion in terms of ‘desiring-
production,’ on the basis of what they term ‘schizoanalysis,’ Deleuze and Guattari initiate a 
new way of ‘remembering’ social relations.89 And this new approach comprised Deleuze and 
Guattari’s response to what they considered to be the foremost inhibitory dynamic operating 
within their immediate context of 1960s/1970s France, namely the State Apparatus co-joined 
with the axiomatic of capitalism.  
One of the primary objectives of Anti-Oedipus then, was to remember differently how 
the state operated, both in the past and in their present day. In terms of this, having re-defined 
the way in which desire functions, Deleuze and Guattari used their concept of ‘desiring-
production’ to reinvigorate Marx’s understanding both of how states organize themselves, 
and of how capital functions within this relation.90 In their discussion of “The Barbarian 
                                                          
86 Eugene Holland in Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus: Introduction to Schizoanalysis, concurs with 
Buchanan’s assessment, arguing that Anti-Oedipus should be understood “partly as an inspiration and a 
reflection of May 1968” (1999: ix).   
87 For Deleuze and Guattari, a machine is a site were desires flow and compete, and this can apply to something 
tangible like the human body, through to abstract machines such as the state (2004: 38) 
88 Admittedly, as Nicholas Thorburn points out in Deleuze, Marx and Politics, the relationship between Deleuze 
and Marx was not as antagonistic as his relationship with Freudian psychoanalysis. Rather, “Deleuze himself 
more than once proposed that he and Guattari were Marxists,” and at the time of his death, Deleuze was working 
on a book entitled Grandeur de Marx (2003: 1-2).  
89 Adrian Parr in Deleuze and Memorial Culture: Desire, Singular Memory, and the Politics of Trauma, 
explains that for Deleuze and Guattari, a new way of remembering “neither supposes a universal memory, nor a 
past with a determinate identity.” Rather, it involves an active engagement with history, one that is “active,” and 
a “mode of willing.” In doing so, “the course of remembering the social field is prompted to connect what 
previously seemed to be disparate events, giving rise to a memorial cultural activity” that is “productive” (2008: 
182).  
90 Leon Baradat in Political Ideologies: Their Origins and Impact, provides us with a clear overview of Marx’s 
understanding of how states organize themselves. In this overview, he traces Marx’s concept of societal 
progression from primitive communism, through empire formation to feudalism, and then into bourgeois 
democracy before the great proletarian revolution. As a first point, he notes that although Marx disagreed with 
Hegel, “he adopted the dialectic as the fundamental logic of history.” In other words, for him, history moves 
through a number of stages, with theses, antitheses, and syntheses ultimately resulting in a utopian form of 
society. In the first stage, or primitive communism, “people were unorganized and unsophisticated,” and the 
antithesis to this state of things “developed as people began to specialize in the production of goods.” But this 
division of labour was fraught with problems, in that “it also caused a major division in society,” and the 
“original collectivism of society was lost.” It is at this point that people began to consider possessions their own, 
and resultantly, “the concept of private property was born.” Also, because society valued “various objects 
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Despotic Machine” and “The Urstaat,” which according to them precede “The Civilized 
Capitalist Machine,” Deleuze and Guattari trace societal development in terms of a series of 
organizational phases, and the concomitant blockages of desires that result from each. In the 
first mode of organization, at a distant time in history, Deleuze and Guattari advance the 
“despotic machine or the barbarian socius” as involving a despot’s challenging of the “lateral 
alliances and the extended filiations of the old community.” And through breaking with that 
community and imposing “a new alliance system,” in terms of which he places himself “in 
direct filiation with the deity,” he assumes the role of endorsing or watching over their world. 
They point out that the aforementioned break can occur for a variety of reasons, but that it 
principally entails “an opposition” between the new despotic machine “and the primitive 
territorial machine,” which ushers in “the birth of an empire” (2004: 210-211). Furthermore, 
in order for the empire, and indeed its despotic ruler, to exercise control over its territory and 
people, it establishes multiple codes which then regulate desires accordingly. Unsurprisingly, 
such regulation leads to muted negative exchanges, whereby “the eternal ressentiment of the 
subject answers to the eternal vengeance of the despots” (2004: 233).91 In the second mode of 
organization, Deleuze and Guattari argue for the emergence of the State, or the Urstaat. It is 
at this point that the dynamic identified above becomes more sophisticated, insofar as old 
codes are, where necessary, broken down to suit the requirements of the emerging state – 
such as “private property, wealth, commodities, and classes” (2004: 238). Using Feudalism as 
a case in point, Deleuze and Guattari argue that it “not only presupposes an abstract despotic 
State that it divides into segments according to the regime of its private property and the rise 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
differently,” and concurrently, “the value of the individual was equated with the things he or she owned,” a class 
stratification began to develop. At this point, “deep prejudices” between groupings began to develop – with 
dominant groups subordinating others “into servitude.” And it was the development of Empire that emerged 
from this system of relations. Once more, the antithesis to this was the barbarian challenge, and its eventual 
success, which ultimately resulted in Feudalism. In this system, “a landed aristocracy provided…protection to 
the peasants, who soon became serfs (people legally bound to the land [or] land slaves.” Yet while manors 
staffed by serfs were for a time self-sufficient, resulting in a great decline in trade, “the demand for luxury items 
stimulated a rebirth of trade.” And because the “aristocrats…usually looked down on commerce,” trade and its 
profits were left to “a new class, the bourgeoisie.” This new class eventually toppled the aristocracy in the great 
revolutions that led to huge upheavals in France and elsewhere, and the new post-aristocracy era “featured 
capitalism as its economic system.” Accordingly, Marx claimed that these capitalist states adopted the term 
democracy as “a pretence of popular government,” because they refused to cede any control of the system, and 
as such, the workers they employed (or proletariat/wage slaves) would rise up against them “as the antithesis in 
the fourth historical era” (Baradat 1994: 162-163). 
91 Ressentiment is a Nietzschean term denoting a negative and resentful manner of living. For Nietzsche, 
ressentiment (or resentment) “refers to the process of allocating responsibility and blame for the pain one 
suffers,” or taking “the outside world seriously as a cause of the pain one suffers,” which is predicated on the 
idea “that if only one could deal with the outside world the pain would be alleviated” (Strong 1988: 245 - 246). 
This leads to a very negative way of dealing with life, insofar as one negates the present and attaches oneself to 
concepts that logically explain injustices; a process which causes “bitter recrimination” and the “perpetual 
accusation” of the whole world and life within it (Deleuze 2006: 20). 
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of its commodity production.” In addition, it also does not rid itself of its despotic nature, 
with “the despot [returning] as the absolute monarch” (2004: 239). But beyond this, Deleuze 
and Guattari also point to more recent State systems, such as that of “modern capitalist and 
socialist States,” which “take on the characteristic features of the primordial despotic State” 
(2004: 241). As Athina Karatzogianni and Andrew Robinson clarify in Power, Resistance 
and Conflict in the Contemporary World: Social Movements, Networks, and Hierarchies, 
“the despotic-signifier and the ‘Urstaat’ (the State form) do not vanish with Capitalism,” but 
rather “function as its means to suppress whatever escapes Capitalism itself (2010: 63).92 
Consequently, within Capitalistic modes of organization tied to States, desire has been 
channelled and coded to a highly restrictive degree. However, as Deleuze and Guattari point 
out, it is helpful to use the machine as a mechanism for understanding relations between 
competing desires, because machines are never capable of running perfectly smoothly for an 
indefinite period, and instead sooner or later begin to break down (Deleuze and Guattari  
2004: 8). And as they do, it becomes possible for Full Bodies without Organs to emerge and 
precipitate difference. 
In this regard, the concept of the Full Body without Organs runs through Anti-Oedipus 
and challenges the dominant notion of “the articulating, self-defining and enclosed subject.” 
93  That is, the Full Body without Organs can be understood as the inclination which “offers 
an alternative mode of being or experience” (Parr 2005: 32-34) the opportunity to manifest 
and grow, or the tendency of openness to difference that constitutes the genetic condition of 
possibility of such difference emerging. As such, rather than seeing the Full Body without 
Organs as oppositional, it is more useful to construe it as a deviation that makes possible the 
yet-to-be imagined. Accordingly, this deviation thereby offers the possibility of experience 
outside of prescribed normativity, offering a chance to ‘become’ different rather than to ‘be’ 
or remain the same. Correlatively, for such a Body without Organs to remain full, what it 
precipitates through its explication should remain in a constant state of modulation, or, in 
                                                          
92 In this regard, Deleuze and Guattari also reference Wittfogel, a German-American thinker – and at one point a 
resolute Marxist – who is best known for his 1957 text Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total 
Power, in which he, according to Allessandro Stanziani in After Oriental Despotism: Eurasian Growth in a 
Global Perspective, used “his Marxist training and Marx’s notion of the Asian mode of production” to describe 
“the USSR under Stalin as despotism” (2014: 17).  
93 The term originates from a radio play of Antonin Artaud’s entitled To Have Done with the Judgment of God 
(1947), in which he extended his concept of a “theatre of cruelty” by producing a thoroughly estranging and 
cacophonous piece that was initially banned. Lee Jamieson in Antonin Artaud: From Theory to Practice, 
explains the theatre of cruelty as being informed by Nietzsche, in that Nietzsche’s “definition of cruelty informs 
Artaud’s own, declaring that all art embodies and intensifies the underlying brutalities of life to recreate the 
thrill of experience...Although Artaud did not formally cite Nietzsche, [their writing] contains a familiar 
persuasive authority, a similar exuberant phraseology, and motifs in extremis” (2007: 21-22).  
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other words, it must remain “a never-completed process” (in Parr 2005: 34); a process of 
unending creative alterity. In many respects, Deleuze and Guattari’s rearticulation of the 
Marxist theory of history in terms of desire – a rearticulation which differs from the stratified 
and dogmatic vision of Marx but which is itself tentative, playful and open-ended – 
comprises an explication of a Full Body without Organs, insofar as openness to the 
possibility of thinking outside of Marx’s framework is the genetic moment implicated by 
their alternative description of societal development. A further good example of the 
explication of a full Body without Organs is the art of Francis Bacon. In Francis Bacon: The 
Logic of Sensation, Deleuze approaches the aforementioned artist’s work not through the lens 
of art criticism, orientated around conformity to a given set of criteria through which art is 
valued, but rather as a creative conduit through which, as Daniel W. Smith notes in “Deleuze 
on Bacon: Three Conceptual Trajectories in The Logic of Sensation,” Bacon effectively 
creates “a series of philosophical concepts” (2002: ix). As such, “there is little discussion of 
the sociocultural milieu in which Bacon lived and worked; nor of his artistic influences or 
contemporaries, such as Lucian Freud or Frank Auerbach; nor of his personal life” (2002: ix). 
This is because, for Deleuze, to contend with such aspects is to reduce and thus miss the 
genetic potential of Bacon’s work, as a never-completed process of differentiation. Rather, 
Deleuze focuses his attention on Bacon’s paintings in themselves, describing Bacon’s work as 
“the confrontation of Figure and field…that rips the painting away from all narrative as well 
as from all symbolization” (2002: xxxii), in a way that resists any form of rigid and extensive 
categorization. Indeed, when discussing Bacon’s Figure, that is, the strange entities enacted 
upon by various forces or sensations that appear in his work, Deleuze makes the connection 
between Bacon and Artaud, advancing that  
 
Bacon and Artaud meet on many points: the Figure is the body without organs 
(dismantle the organism in favour of the body, the face in favour of the head); the 
body without organs is flesh and nerve; a wave flows through it and traces levels 
upon it; a sensation is produced when the wave encounters the Forces acting on the 
body, an “affective athleticism,” a screambreath. (Deleuze 2002: 40)  
 
A key factor in Bacon’s art – consideration of which draws its relationship to the Full Body 
without Organs into conspicuity – is his use of “free marks.” These are “accidental” marks 
“because they depend on the act of chance and express nothing regarding the visual image.” 
But once made – and “they have to be made rather quickly” – they are allowed to function as 
the genetic point around which the painting is orientated, which “destroy[s] the nascent 
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figuration [or representational tendency] in it and…give[s] the Figure a chance” to emerge 
(Bacon in Deleuze 2004: 93-94). As such, the Full Body without Organs is Bacon’s 
inclination or tendency to be open to free marks, as the genetic points of an aesthetic 
development that will exceed the representational constraints of the figuration so embedded 
in the art tradition. Such an understanding, applied to any field, allows for a far more 
dynamic approach toward any development which has traditionally been inhibited by a 
narrow set of definitions and concomitant pre-suppositions that relate to an extant dogmatic 
‘image of thought.’ 94 This is because Full Bodies without Organs, while they engender a 
multiplicity of creative appropriations and experimentations, never masquerade as a model 
which, on the basis of some or other legitimacy, demands conformity to its parameters.  
However, Deleuze and Guattari also make the distinction between the open-ended 
Full Body without Organs, as discussed above, and its more limiting cousins of the 
Fascist/Cancerous Body without Organs, and the Suicidal/Catatonic Body without Organs. 
With regard to the first, aspects of the Urstaat – even in its current form under the guise of 
Capitalism – constitute the explication of a Fascist/Cancerous Body without Organs, insofar 
as they comprise a series of rules that disallow deviation or experimentation, in favour of 
constituting a form of organization that canalizes desire in profitable ways, such that 
movement is allowed but little room to manoeuvre, as it were. With regard to the second, 
other aspects of Capitalism – such as relentless consumerism – comprise explications of a 
Suicidal/Catatonic Body without Organs, insofar as the constant flooding of existence with 
the latest advertisements and uniform commodities precludes both the possibility of openness 
to creative difference, and the possibility of such genetic differences being afforded the space 
to grow.   In short, the tendency to passively attach oneself to the consumerism of 
contemporary capitalism, so that with each identification and correlative purchase, one 
becomes more depleted, dissolute, and incapable of producing creative difference.   
In turn, Deleuze and Guattari respond to the challenge posed by the above two 
limiting Bodies without Organs in their book Kafka: Towards a Minor Literature (1975), and 
build on the related form of resistance in A Thousand Plateaus (1987), where they elaborate 
                                                          
94 The concept of the Body without Organs is increasing being utilized in a wide array of fields. For instance, in 
his article, “Towards socially just pedagogies: Deleuzoguattarian critical disability studies,” Dan Goodley, 
understanding the Body without Organs as “conceived in ways that question the hierarchical and systemic 
organization of the organs [and] conceived in ways that open up to new connections” (Goodley 2007: 327), uses 
it as a means of attempting to establish a far more creative pedagogy in relation to disabled children. Similarly, 
Pieter de Vries, in his article, “Don't compromise your desire for development! A Lacanian/Deleuzian 
rethinking of the anti-politics machine,” discusses the idea of development in terms of it being a Body without 
Organs, or an “assembled and assembling body of desires” (De Vries 2007: 37) that is always open-ended. 
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further on the concept of the Full Body without Organs in conjunction with what they term 
nomadic war machines. That is, in Kafka: Towards a Minor Literature, Deleuze and Guattari 
remain consistent in their stance against the concept of integral subjectivity, and the limiting 
perspectives indissociable from it, by adhering to Walter Benjamin’s assertion that “there are 
two ways to miss the point of Kafka’s works…Both the psychoanalytic and the theological 
interpretations equally miss the essential points” (in Bensmaia 1986: ix). Accordingly, in 
their interpretation of Kafka’s work, Deleuze and Guattari seek instead to thematize the 
genetic potential of the Full Body without Organs that explicates itself in his literary output, 
and which is correlatively implicated by such minor literature. For them, minor literature is 
characterized by three things, namely “a high coefficient of deterritorialization,” a “political” 
orientation, and “a collective value” insofar as it entails a “collective enunciation” (1986: 16-
17). In relation to this, firstly, they thematise Kafka’s anomalous linguistic context; that is, 
his being a Jew in Czech territory, and simultaneously obliged to operate in German (the 
official language of the territory), which led to him writing in Prague German. Deleuze and 
Guattari argue that this was a “deterritorialized language,” in which elements from Yiddish, 
Czech and German had been appropriated to constitute an unstable and protean language. 
Through this, they argue, Kafka becomes a linguistic nomad, as it were, on account of how he 
(mis-)appropriates aspects of the linguistic State Apparatus of German and mutates them to 
suit his own ends. Secondly, with regard to political orientation, Deleuze and Guattari argue 
that minor literature – unlike major literature which uses “the social milieu…as a mere 
environment or a background” – amplifies all the aspects that affect a person therein. In this 
way, all individual crises or issues emerge as inextricably connected to “other triangles – 
commercial, economic, bureaucratic, juridical,” in a teeming political environment where all 
these aspects constantly intersect and jostle for power. Thirdly, in terms of collective 
enunciation – unlike major literature – minor literature houses no masters and knows no 
canon. Moreover, on account of its constantly mutating character, any attempt at establishing 
a hierarchical code or normative discursive framework would simply collapse because there 
is no basis for it (1986: 17). Instead, because of all of the above, an immense dynamism 
exists within Kafka’s work, which Deleuze and Guattari remind us entails radical play and 
experimentation that should not be devalued, as it has been in psychoanalytic or theological 
interpretations of his literature – both of which tend to seek in it ressentiment and suffering in 
the characters’ experiences as reflective of the author’s life, rather than to thematize the 
creative innovation it involves as the explication of a Full Body without Organs.   
91 
 
Such play and experimentation are important for Deleuze and Guattari because, 
through such a creative response to the State Apparatus, Kafka effectively develops a 
nomadic war machine. To explain this term – and its relation to the generation of difference 
and correlative resistance to restrictive State Apparatuses – we can turn to Deleuze and 
Guattari’s discussion of nomadic tribes in A Thousand Plateaus. Here they show that certain 
concepts can generate an assemblage hitherto unimaginable; for instance, the invention of 
stirrups by nomadic peoples to produce a new human-animal hybrid, with manifold and 
radically unpredictable politico-economic and socio-cultural consequences. In relation to this, 
it is posited that nomadic war machines produce “a people yet to come” (Deleuze and 
Guattari 2005: 345, 399), through both the conditions for the production of difference and the 
radical self-transformation which ensues from it. Although such descriptions are often 
associated with violent historical examples, such as the fifteenth century destabilization of 
sedentary society by nomadic hordes,95 war machines are not necessarily either technical 
instruments, like stirrups, or violent in orientation. In fact, Deleuze and Guattari identify 
nomadic war machines as primarily aesthetic, and cite as examples modernist works such as 
the above discussed minor literature of Franz Kafka, which reveal a people in the process of 
formation, and the paintings of Francis Bacon, which allow art and the spectator who engages 
with it to become different, on account of the radical indeterminacy through which such art is 
produced. In both cases, the most important possibility of such operations is the birth of a 
people who do not yet exist, “a people yet to come” (2005: 345, 399), who are marked by the 
differences they express and pursue, which in turn implicates a Full Body without Organs.  
Also in A Thousand Plateaus, and in relation to the above concept, Deleuze and 
Guattari in their idiosyncratic way describe a system of relations that such nomadism could 
precipitate, namely rhizomatic relations. And they explain the ‘rhizomatic’ as follows: 
 
A rhizome as subterranean stem is absolutely different from roots and radicles. 
Bulbs and tubers are rhizomes. Plants with roots or radicles may be rhizomorphic in 
other respects altogether: the question is whether plant life in its specificity is not 
entirely rhizomatic. Even some animals are, in their pack form. Rats are rhizomes. 
Burrows are too, in all of their functions of shelter, supply, movement, evasion, and 
breakout. The rhizome itself assumes very diverse forms, from ramified surface 
                                                          
95 This is a reference to the Mongols who invaded Europe at this time. According to Dariusz Kolodziejczyk in 
The Crimean Khanate and Poland-Lithuania, the word derives from the Polish “horda,” which refers to groups 
of nomads, such as the Tartars, who participated in the Mongol invasion of Europe (including Poland) (2011: 
536). 
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extension in all directions to concretion into bulbs and tubers. When rats swarm 
over each other. [My Italics] (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 6-7)  
 
Anticipating confusion on the part of the reader, the duo propose to “enumerate certain 
approximate characteristics of the rhizome.” As a first point, they argue that the rhizome 
functions according to “principles of connection and heterogeneity,” insofar as all points in a 
rhizome are in some way connected to one another. Thus, a rhizome does not follow a fixed 
delineated order. Rather, they argue, the rhizome arranges itself according to the “principle of 
multiplicity” and not “pseudo-multiplicity” in that it has no positions or points and, most 
importantly, no central hierarchical structure. Deleuze and Guattari contrast the rhizome to a 
tree when they write that “any point of a rhizome can be connected to anything other, and 
must be. This is very different from the tree or root, which plots a point [and]… fixes an 
[arboreal] order.” That is, with the rhizome, as different connections are made a pre-
determined pattern is not repeated, but endless configurations are instead brought into 
existence. The rhizome thus also lends itself to rupture, because, “a rhizome may be broken, 
shattered at a given spot, but it will start up again on one of its old lines, or on new lines.” For 
example, “you can never get rid of ants because they form an animal rhizome that can 
rebound time and again after most of it has been destroyed” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 7-
9).  
An important issue here are the dynamics of deterritorialization and 
reterritorialization. Jennifer Bay in “(In)Formation: Bodies and Writing in Network Culture,” 
referencing Deleuze and Guattari’s famous wasp/orchid relation, elaborates on the rhizome in 
terms of re- and deterritorialization. She explains that “Deleuze and Guattari liken the 
rhizome to the relationship between wasp and orchid.” This is because “the orchid 
deterritorializes by forming an image, a tracing of a wasp; but the wasp reterritorializes on 
that image.” On the one hand, “the wasp is…deterritorialized, becoming a piece in the 
orchid's reproductive apparatus. But [on the other hand] it reterritorializes the orchid by 
transporting its pollen” (Bay 2004: 941). In effect, then, what the rhizome entails is a constant 
and dynamic exchange in which there is no one element or aspect that can totally dominate. 
A further related principle is the “principle of cartography and decalcomania.” Here Deleuze 
and Guattari argue for a distinction between “a map and a tracing,” once more referencing the 
metaphor of the tree in their insistence that “a rhizome is not amenable to any structural or 
generative model.” For them, unlike the arboreal model, which “articulates and hierarchizes 
tracings” – with “tracings [being] like the leaves of a tree” – the rhizome is completely 
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different, in that it crucially allows for experimentation. Returning to the orchid/wasp 
example, they argue:  
 
Make a map, not a tracing. The orchid does not reproduce the tracing of the wasp; it 
forms a map with the wasp, in a rhizome. What distinguishes the map from the 
tracing is that it is entirely oriented toward an experimentation in contact with the 
real. The map does not reproduce an unconscious closed in upon itself; it constructs 
the unconscious. (1987: 12)  
 
And this creative mapping explicates a Full Body without Organs, in contrast to a restrictive 
tracing which explicates a Fascist/Cancerous – or even a Suicidal/Catatonic – Body without 
Organs. What Deleuze and Guattari’s above vivid descriptions demonstrate is their deep and 
enduring commitment to experimentation and the production of difference. And, as noted 
earlier by Buchanan and Holland, this commitment was always a political one; that is, the 
production of difference in an attempt to confront the restrictive normative frameworks 
informing the academia of the time, and dictating State action within the context of – and in 
the wake of – Gaullist France.  
Deleuze and Guattari on desubjectivation through becoming-animal  
The generation of difference is Deleuze’s (and Guattari’s) main philosophical project, but this 
begs the question of what concepts can make that difference relevant within the context of the 
current environmental crisis. One of the key concepts that Deleuze and Guattari employ in 
this regard is, of course, the concept of becoming, and of particular interest to this thesis – 
because of its environmental orientation – is the sub-category of this concept, namely 
becoming-animal. Yet before one can contend with becoming-animal as a concept, it is 
important to briefly note precisely what Deleuze and Guattari mean when they employ the 
term becoming. As a first point, for them, becoming is indissociable from affect. As they 
explicitly state, “affects are becomings” (1987: 256), and as Felicity Colman explains, 
“Deleuze uses the term ‘affection’ to refer to additive processes, forces, powers and 
expressions of change.” Furthermore, she suggests not only that “affect can produce a 
sensory or abstract result,” and that it “is determined by chance and organisation.” In addition 
to this, she also advances that “it consists of a variety of factors that include geography, 
biology, meteorology, astronomy, ecology, and culture.” Lastly, she notes that “affect is not 
only an experiential force,” but that it can also “become a material thing,” and as such can 
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“compel systems of knowledge, history, memory and circuits of power” (2005: 11-12). 
Similarly, Cliff Stagoll notes that becoming is the Deleuzian antithesis to what Deleuze 
believes to be “the Western tradition’s predominant and unjustifiable focus on being and 
identity.” Specifically because of this, “becoming is the very dynamism of change” (2005: 
21-22) – as we are continually affected by various forces, we change in relation to those 
forces, and this change can be a very productive and affirmative one. Crucially, though, this 
can only occur if one is open to the affects that surround us. If this is not the case – and for 
Deleuze and Guattari it is more often not the case, due to the dominance of ossified dogmatic 
modes of thought – then the potential for transformative exchange is lost. Thus their 
understanding of becoming comports with their concept of the Full Body without Organs, 
discussed in the previous section. 
 Specifically with regard to Deleuze and Guattari’s conception of becoming-animal, 
their foray into examining the relations between human subjectivity and the animal kingdom 
was linked, as ever, to the underlying project of generating affirmative difference against 
restrictive and negating normative frameworks of thought; particularly those that precipitate 
ideas of stable being and separate identity . As Elizabeth Grosz reminds us in Chaos, 
Territory, Art, through their philosophical output, Deleuze and Guattari provide an opening 
up of “both nature and culture to unrecognized and open-ended forces” (2008: 2). But
 Grosz also argues that it is the work of the Estonian biosemiotician Jakob von Uexküll 
that most influenced their conception of becoming-animal (2008: 40). Admittedly, Ronald 
Bogue in Deleuze’s Way: Transverse Ethics and Aesthetics, focuses instead more on a 
literary inspiration for the conception, arguing that the likely genesis of becoming-animal lies 
in Deleuze and Guattari’s encounter with Franz Kafka’s Metamorphosis. Yet he nevertheless 
echoes Grosz’s sentiments on the aim of Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of becoming-animal, 
namely to facilitate “a process of becoming-other that allows people to undo conventional 
codes of the human through an interaction with animals” (2007: 158). And Tamsin Lorraine 
in Irigaray and Deleuze: Experiments in Visceral Philosophy, not only supports both Grosz’s 
and Bogue’s understanding of what becoming-animal entails. In addition, she also provides a 
crucial disclaimer, when she explains that it is in no way the imitation of animal behaviour, 
but rather entails “destabilizing recognisable patterns of organization” and attempting to 
articulate them. This is because “articulating these becomings not only demonstrates our 
ongoing participation with nonhuman as well as human processes but also indicates new 
possibilities in self- and world- transformation” (1999: 181).  
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For the purposes of better contextualizing the Deleuzoguattarian project in this regard, 
it is helpful at this point – before engaging with the primary text, namely Deleuze and 
Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus – to pursue the aforementioned two points of genesis for the 
concept of becoming-animal.96  
 With regard to the first point of genesis, namely the writings of Uexküll, Grosz notes 
that Deleuze and Guattari “use his work to develop an account of the centrality and species-
specific notion of milieu…or Umwelt…in understanding the ways in which particular species 
experience their lifeworlds” (2008: 40). And Brett Buchanan in Onto-Ethologies: The Animal 
Environments of Uexküll, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Deleuze, provides detailed 
elaboration of how Uexküll influenced the thought of Deleuze and Guattari. He begins by 
discussing the contribution of Uexküll in itself, referring to the biologist’s 1934 “picture 
book” publication, A Stroll Through the Environments of Animals and Humans, which 
Buchanan advances as an invitation to move away from an anthropocentric view of nature. 
Indeed, “what concerns [him] here, as well as elsewhere in his writings, is how we can 
glimpse natural environments as meaningful to the animals themselves.” And to do this, 
“rather than conceiving of the world according to the parameters of our own human 
understanding – which, historically, has been the more prevalent approach,” one must 
“rethink how we view the reality of the world.” In doing so, Uexküll allows for two new 
viewpoints to emerge. That is, he allows us both to “multiply the world into infinite animal 
environments,” and correlatively to “transform our understanding of the animal away from its 
traditional interpretation.” In accordance with this new approach, he proposes to “understand 
the ‘life story’ of each animal according to its own perceptions and actions,” rather than 
approaching the animal as a “mere object.” And the importance of such an approach, in turn, 
is that it can “unlock the gates that lead to other realms.” For Uexküll, “all that a subject 
perceives becomes his perceptual world [Merkwelt], and all that he does, his active world 
[Wirkwelt],” while specific and differing actualizations from these two vast fields of 
perceptual stimuli “together form a closed unit, the Umwelt” (2008: 2). Grosz provides 
further elaboration on this when she explains the exchange between perception and action 
with regard to an Umwelt, in suggesting that “each organism in every species is surrounded 
by its Umwelt, an ‘island of the senses.’” In terms of both perception and action, then, 
responses to this milieu are “always a considerable simplification of the information and 
                                                          
96 As will be discussed in some detail in the following chapter, it should also be noted that Guattari – unlike 
Deleuze – expressed great concern over the environmental crisis, and pursued these concerns in his individual 
works.  
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energy provided by [that] milieu.” Indeed, “the Umwelt of the organism is precisely as 
complex as the organs of that organism.” In relation to this thought, Uexküll accordingly 
“advocates an extreme perspectivism in which objects are not autonomous or independent 
sets of qualities and quantities,” but rather “opportunities for engagement that offer 
themselves in particular ways to particular organs.” In other words, “organisms are sense-
bubbles, monads composed of coextensive overlapping beings and fragments of milieus.” 
Thought of this way, nature emerges “as dynamic, collective, lived rather than…fixed, 
categorized, or represented” (2008: 40-41), and for Deleuze and Guattari, with their 
commitment to moving beyond category and repetition, the general appeal of such thinking is 
clear.  
But it is not sufficient to stop there, because the question remains of what precisely 
Deleuze and Guattari took from Uexküll’s radical understanding of how life operates. 
Buchanan, in the aforementioned text, provides an answer to this in “The Animal-Stalks-at-
five-O’clock: Deleuze’s Affection for Uexküll,” when he argues that it was Deleuze’s 
problem with the concept of the ‘organism,’ and correlatively Uexküll’s creative response to 
this concept, which drew the philosopher to the biologist. That is, for Deleuze, “the organism 
is the enemy,” insofar as it – although by no means exclusively – “exemplifies a kind of 
conceptualization of life that requires further probing.” In effect, Deleuze has a problem with 
the concept of organism because such categorization, in providing a solution to lived 
existence within the world, stops one from further examining “the ontological processes that 
create what we are accustomed to calling the ‘organism.’” And it is in the work of Uexküll 
that one finds a counterweight to such ossified and limiting understanding of lived existence, 
because Uexküll describes the organism not in terms of what it is, but rather in terms of how 
it both affects and is affected by its milieu, or Umwelt.97 For Deleuze, such thought goes 
beyond the simple solution of the relatively closed concept that is ‘organism,’ by offering the 
opportunity for a far more open and affirmative encounter with the non-human. The best 
known example of specific affect is, of course, that of the tick, and Grosz sums it up, 
describing how “the tick is blind, deaf, and mute. It sees and hears nothing; at most it feels 
temperature through its photosensitive skin and has an acute but highly focused sense of 
                                                          
97 Importantly, Buchanan cautions against ascribing too much influence to Uexküll’s thought on Deleuze’s 
work. Remembering that post-structuralism is a creative appropriation of often already radical thought, 
Buchanan notes that “there is not a ‘discovery’ of Uexküll that changes the course of Deleuze’s thought,” and 
“he [does not] prove to be a missing link that had previously escaped Deleuze.” Rather, Uexküll’s work, when 
accessed by Deleuze, forms “an additional dimension to the rhizomatic composition of Deleuze’s thought” 
(2008: 155).   
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smell.” She further explains that once the female tick has mated, she heads up any available 
foliage toward light, so that she can be in a favourable position to access the warm blood of a 
mammal. For this purpose, “her organs of smell are well developed, orientated to discern 
only one particular smell, that of butyric acid, an odour common to all mammals in their 
sweat.” When a mammal passes by the foliage, its specific odour signals to the tick that it 
must drop. Once on the mammal’s body, the body’s warmth once more triggers it “to begin 
sucking, which engorges [it] with blood.” Once sufficiently bloated, it drops off its host, 
deposits its eggs and dies (Grosz 2008: 41).  Uexküll thematizes what is of interest in this 
exchange, when he advances that “we are not concerned with the chemical stimulus of 
butyric acid, any more than with the mechanical stimulus (released by the hairs), or the 
temperature stimulus of the skin.” Rather, what is of immense interest is “the fact that, out of 
hundreds of stimuli radiating from the qualities of the mammal’s body, only three become the 
bearers of receptor cues for the tick” (Uexküll 1957: 11). For his part, Deleuze finds interest 
in such a reading, because of how the biologist defines the animal by its affects – in this case, 
light, olfactory, and thermal – which comprise a curious world of extreme selectivity, one of 
“just three affects…indifferent to all that goes on in the immense forest” (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1987: 257). In sum, what Deleuze finds of most value in Uexküll is, as Buchanan 
notes, “the attention paid not so much to the animal itself, but to what this animal can do.” 
That is, the issue is “how the tick relates to its surroundings, where the emphasis is neither on 
the tick (its species, its colour, whether it has four or six legs, etc.), nor on the environment 
(this or that mammal, a tree, a bird, etc.), but on the ‘affective’ relation itself.” And this takes 
us to the crux of the matter and illuminates the value of Uexküll to Deleuze; if one were to 
“understand life, each living individuality, not as a form, nor as a development of form, but as 
a complex relation,” then numerous possibilities begin to emerge, including a rethinking of 
relations between human beings and nature. This is because, by dismantling the organism as a 
privileged signifier, bodies become open to new connections. Indeed, Deleuze and Guattari in 
A Thousand Plateaus “show little interest in the environmental world of animals” (2008: 156, 
160-161, 177). Rather, they utilize Uexküll’s unique writings on nature as the platform 
through which to argue that relations between human being and animal can be far more open-
ended than previously thought. 
With regard to the second point of genesis for the idea of becoming-animal, Bogue 
suggests that Kafka can be credited as a major influence. As already discussed, the play, 
experimentation and creativity housed in the writings of Kafka were of significant interest to 
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Deleuze and Guattari in their search for ways in which difference could be generated within 
the context of restrictive, ossified modes of thought. And in relation to the concept of 
becoming-animal, they once more turn to the evocative motifs of this same writer. Bogue 
explains that “it is in Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature (1975) that Deleuze and Guattari 
first take up the topic of becoming-animal,” and he credits “The Metamorphosis” as the most 
“likely source of inspiration for the concept than any anthropological text” (2007: 158).98  
Briefly, in this world-renowned novella first published in 1915, Kafka tells the story of a 
travelling salesman, Gregor Samsa, who awakens one morning to find himself transformed 
into a cockroach-like creature. While the cause of the transformation is never revealed, the 
rest of the novella details his post-transformation encounters with his parents and sister, who 
find him both repulsive and a burden (for instance, financially, in that he scares off potential 
boarders who are the sources of the family’s income). The story ends when Gregor isolates 
himself at the behest of his family, and eventually dies (Kafka, 2015). Yet the moral that the 
philosophical duo take from Kafka’s tale, in terms of becoming-animal, is “a real process of 
becoming-other,” in this case an unexplainable estrangement, as opposed to “literal bodily 
metamorphoses of humans” (2007: 158).  And as is often the case in their work, it is via art – 
in this instance, the radical, minor literature of the mystical Kafka – that such encounters find 
enunciation.99  
Thus, although Deleuze did not explicitly thematize environmental issues in his work, 
the use of nature as a conceptual tool therein is certainly apparent throughout his texts, and in 
particular in A Thousand Plateaus. In this text, Deleuze and Guattari engage with the idea of 
becoming-animal, arguing that certain experiences with animals could lead to a de-
territorialization of the self, involving – albeit only momentarily – an exceeding of our pre-
determined modes of interaction with the world. In this regard, it should also be considered 
that Deleuze and Guattari distinguish between three different types of animals (1987: 240-
241), which reflect how animals have been interacted with traditionally. Firstly, they argue 
that one could interact with an animal along sentimental lines. As such, one understands this 
                                                          
98 Bogue strains to make it clear that Deleuze and Guattari were, in fact, not inspired by the “anthropological 
kitsch” of French colonial writings on “leopard-men” in Africa, even though they briefly mention this oddity in 
their work (2007: 156). This argument is, for Bogue, incorrectly put forward by Christopher Miller in his “The 
Postidentiterian Predicament in the Footnotes of A Thousand Plateaus: Nomadology, Anthropology and 
Authority” (1993), and in his Nationalists and Nomads: Essays on Francophone African Literature and Culture 
(1998).  
99 Another literary text that Deleuze and Guattari display great affection for is Herman Melville’s Moby Dick, 
proclaiming it to be “one of the greatest master-pieces of becoming,” and arguing that Captain Ahab, through 
his duel with the great leviathan, in a sense, finds himself making a “pact with the demon” (1987: 243) that 
transforms him through a process of becoming-animal.  
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relationship in an Oedipal sense, missing the potential of such an interaction through locating 
animal sensibility within a domesticated framework which relies heavily on restrictive 
(familial) signifiers. Secondly, they point to the use of animals in symbolism and mythology, 
naming these State animals. Again, through such an appropriation, the potential for 
transformative experience is lost as a result of pre-determined signification. Having outlined 
the first two types of interactions, they then discuss Demonic animals (in the sense of the 
Greek term ‘daemon,’ or between this world and the next). Accordingly, if one were to 
approach interaction with these beings through such a sensibility – as opposed to relying on 
approaches rooted in either Oedipal or State terms, then “desubjectification” becomes a 
tentative possibility insofar as indeterminate affects can facilitate a radically new, 
unanticipated, and correlatively transformative encounter with the ‘otherness’ of the animal 
(Lawlor 2008: 169). As Bruns points out, becoming-animal is thus “not animal 
metamorphosis but an achievement of non-identity, which for Deleuze and Guattari is the 
condition of freedom (for animals as well as for the rest of us, whoever we are)” (2007: 
703).100 
While Deleuze and Guattari had Uexküll’s biological expertise and prodigious 
imagination, as well as the likes of Kafka’s and Melville’s literary output, to draw on in their 
imagining of a different set of relations with nature, today, we additionally have digital 
technology of great capacity, able to present to us nature in a variety of ways previously 
inaccessible or unimaginable. Yet, while digital technology may be able to open us up to 
nature in new and fascinating ways, it also, for Deleuze, presents a severe – even paralyzing – 
challenge to the generation of difference.  
 
 
                                                          
100 As appealing as the above may sound, one must approach this theorization with due caution. As Deleuze and 
Guattari point out in their preceding work Anti-Oedipus, “schizoanalysis…is suspicious of all principles, 
including its own” (Genosko 1998: 121). And correlatively, the concept of becoming-animal must be seen in the 
light of not only a Deleuzoguattarian approach, but also in terms of responses to it. Alain Beaulieu, in his “The 
Status of Animality in Deleuze’s Thought,” traces some of the suspicions generated by Deleuze and Guattari’s 
concept. Beaulieu points to Donna Harraway, who in her When Species Meet, argues that the animal remains 
above all conceptual for Deleuze and Guattari. She also takes issue with their claim that developing a 
relationship with an animal in a domesticated setting is a sign of Oedipal regression, arguing instead that such a 
relationship is suggestive of our capacity to overcome anthromorphism by learning how to live in a post-human 
environment (Beaulieu 2011: 80). Yet the above criticism notwithstanding, it is without doubt that through their 
concept of becoming-animal, Deleuze and Guattari open up an exciting range of possibilities for moving away 
from the restrictive normativities that enforce certain modes of thought centred on stable being and static 
identity.   
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The digital challenge to difference: Deleuze’s “Postscript on Control Societies” 
In his 1990 work, “Postscript on Control Societies,” Deleuze argued that the current 
information age is impacting very negatively on the generation of difference, through its 
capacity to normatively infiltrate ever more pervasively all aspects of everyday life, where it 
renders difference exceedingly difficult to achieve. Accordingly, Deleuze expressed 
pessimism over the potential implications that the cyber age – and its resultant ‘societies of 
control’ – held for the production of new thought.101  
Before one contends with Deleuze’s conception of such digital ‘societies of control,’ 
it is helpful to briefly recount Michel Foucault’s description of disciplinary society, because 
Deleuze uses it as his point of departure. Against the backdrop of growing awareness of 
totalizing forms of power and the 1968 critical response to it, in his Discipline and Punish: 
The Birth of the Prison (1975), Foucault attempted to uncover how power has been exercised 
from the eighteenth century through to the twentieth century. In this regard, he begins his 
account by examining the French Revolution of 1789, in which monarchic formations of 
sovereign power were violently removed and replaced with bureaucratic formations of 
disciplinary power.  According to Foucault, the shift from sovereign to disciplinary power 
had a profound effect on how ordinary people saw themselves. That is, whereas under the 
monarchy, the masses had remained largely anonymous, with only the aristocracy having a 
well-established and documented identity, in the bureaucratic period following the French 
Revolution, this dynamic became inverted. Now the State, functioning via its vast 
bureaucracies, was protected by anonymity, while each person of the previously anonymous 
mass became identifiable via technologies of documentation and surveillance. Correlatively, 
whereas in the past the monarchy had resorted to the brutal spectacle of public torture in 
order to produce collective fear and thus enforce power, under a disciplinary regime the State 
exercised power through more discrete means. This occurred, firstly, through the division of 
                                                          
101 Mark Poster, in Deleuze and New Technology, suggests that Deleuze was very pessimistic in this regard, 
arguing that “at heart Deleuze adopts a limited view of digital culture as simply ‘control’” in his “Postscript on 
Control Societies.” On account of this, maintains Poster, Deleuze does not anticipate that “digital culture moves 
in two opposite directions at the same time: towards control and towards freedom from control” (in Poster and 
Savat 2009: 261). Poster’s above perspective comports with that of Verena Andermatt Conley, who in “Of 
Rhizomes, Smooth Space, War Machines and New Media,” argues that with regard to “the accelerated 
circulation of information” associated with “societies of control…Deleuze seems rather pessimistic about the 
emergence of new singular and collective assemblages” (in Poster and Savat 2009: 37). However, as will be 
discussed later in this study, although we can describe Deleuze’s position in this text as pessimistic, as Poster 
himself later points out, Deleuze also offers various remarks on how to resist the homogenization of informatic 
control societies through his concept of counter-information, which does not preclude the use of digital media to 
this end.  
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space and the regulation of time. In terms of the division of space, we can look at the 
Foucauldian concept of the art of distributions within a disciplinary society. Here Foucault 
discusses four inter-related categories, namely enclosure, the use of functional sites, 
partitioning and the creation of rank. In terms of the first category, “enclosure” entailed “the 
specification of a place heterogeneous to all others and closed in upon itself,” that produced a 
“protected place of disciplinary monotony” in which only certain activities were permitted. 
This, in turn, gave rise to the second category of functional sites, or the “coding of a space 
that architecture [had previously] generally left at the disposal of several different uses.” This 
development brought into existence an entire range of location-orientated divisions of labour, 
which, in effect, dictated how individuals should regulate themselves and what acts they 
could perform in the spaces in which they were located. In terms of the third category of 
partitioning, individuals were further assigned specific places within the new functional sites, 
insofar as “each individual ha[d] his own place; and each place its individual” (Foucault 
1991: 141-143). This functioned to dissolve the possibility of collective resistance forming 
because, through it, disciplinary power was able to “avoid distributions in groups; break up 
collective dispositions; [and] analyse confused, massive or transient pluralities” (Foucault 
1991: 143). In short: 
 
Disciplinary space tend[ed] to be divided into as many sections as there are bodies 
or elements to be distributed. One [had to] eliminate the effects of imprecise 
distributions, the uncontrolled disappearance of individuals, their diffuse 
circulation, their unusable and dangerous coagulation; it was a tactic of anti-
desertion, anti-vagabondage and anti-concentration. Its aim was to establish and to 
locate individuals, to set up useful communications, to interrupt others, [and] to be 
able at each moment to supervise the conduct of each individual…It was a 
procedure, therefore, aimed at knowing, mastering, and using. (Foucault 1991: 143) 
 
A further element, rank, also proved essential for this system of operations to function 
effectively, insofar as it engendered cognisance of “the place one occupies in a classification” 
(Foucault 1991: 145). Through such a mechanism, discipline individualized bodies not only 
through situating them in ever more specific actual locations, but also by “distribut[ing] them 
and circulat[ing] them in a network of [virtual] relations” – a virtual network which ensured 
further atomization, competition, and correlative isolation (Foucault 1991: 146). In other 
words, within such a configuration, people of a higher rank, or those hoping to achieve higher 
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rank, are obliged to perform supervisory or surveillance functions on lower-ranked 
individuals, who, in turn, cannot identify with those ranked above them. The above was also 
coupled with an exhaustive regulation of time in disciplinary societies, underpinned by “the 
principle of a theoretically ever-growing use of time; exhaustion rather than use” that entailed 
“extracting…from time…ever more available moments and, from each moment, ever more 
useful forces” (Foucault 1991: 154). Through this, disciplinary individuals were increasingly 
caught in a rigid, unyielding and unforgiving system of increasingly efficient operations. 
Moreover, within this restrictive spatio-temporal setting, the related subordination to 
normative expectations was difficult to resist, because of the technologies of “Panopticism” 
and “the dossier.” While the first subjected individuals to surveillance – a gaze which they 
could not confirm was directed toward them, but which obliged them to act as if it were 
(Foucault 1991: 200), the second recorded their transgressions and moments of disciplinary 
achievement, so that the threat of a recalcitrance in the past returning to haunt them in the 
present, in the form of normative judgement, obliged further compliance (Foucault 1991: 
169). In sum, while the regulation of space and time restricted and inhibited the movement 
and activities of individual bodies, the technologies of observation/surveillance gave these 
bodies an increasing specificity, or “individuality,” that was marked by pronounced 
docility.102 
As mentioned above, Deleuze begins “Postscript on Control Societies” by recalling 
the above parameters and dynamics of disciplinary society, which Foucault associated 
primarily with the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. However, he also thematised how 
Foucault himself suggested that after World War II the disciplinary model was already 
eroding and being replaced by “an altogether different aim and operation” (Deleuze 1990: 
177). In terms of this, Deleuze advances that the contiguous confinement associated with 
disciplinary societies was being replaced by a continuity of control, with rapid technological 
advances and economic shifts precipitating such transformation. And he called societies 
operating under these new conditions “control societies” (1990: 178). As Michael Peters 
points out in Post-structuralism, Marxism, and Neoliberalism: Between Theory and Politics, 
control societies do not completely replace disciplinary structures, but rather extend their 
                                                          
102 In The Will to Knowledge: The History of Sexuality, Foucault elaborates further on the later increase of such 
docility. While disciplinary power was the discursive development that gave birth to a docile individual, the 
emergence of bio-power in the late eighteenth century extended the parameters of this docility, making the 
subject even more powerless to the point of infantilization, most notably through imperatives to confess – to 
medical practitioners – thoughts, desires, etc., which by definition they were precluded from understanding or 
being able to interpret themselves (Foucault 1998: 65-67).  
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reach through “interconnected, flexible and networked architectures,” and they do so, on the 
one hand, in relation to an increasingly rapacious form of capitalism, and on the other hand, 
through the capacity for surveillance monitoring made possible through information 
technology (2001: 97-98).  
With regard to the new system of neoliberal economic exchange, Deleuze explicitly 
pointed to the above digital technology as the set of machines that makes such societal 
organization possible. For him, “control societies function with a third generation of 
machines, with information technology and computers,” which are inextricably intertwined 
with “a mutation of capitalism” (1990: 180). Indeed, he makes a distinction between the 
capitalism which informed and operated within disciplinary societies, and the capitalism 
associated with control societies. Accordingly, the mutation occurred through a move away 
from nineteenth century capitalism – which was “concentrative, directed towards production, 
and proprietorial,” and which rendered sites of production into sites of confinement – and 
toward a capitalist orientation that “is no longer directed toward production.” Rather, present-
day neoliberal capitalism is orientated toward “metaproduction,” outsourcing various aspects 
of production, focusing on abstract notions such as the selling of services, and operating as an 
assemblage, in which everything is “transmutable or transformable.” Thus, in contrast to the 
contiguity and confinement of disciplinary societies, in control societies, everything becomes 
“short-term and rapidly shifting, but at the same time continuous and unbounded.” Perhaps 
the best example of this is Deleuze’s excellent summation that, within control societies, “a 
man is no longer a man confined but a man in debt” (1990: 180-181). And it is precisely 
digital technology, according to Deleuze, that makes such continuous control possible. As he 
warns, “We don’t have to stray into science fiction to find a control mechanism that can fix 
the position of any element at any given moment” (1990: 181), before he provides a list of 
examples of digital technology that allow for such control – from electronic tagging devices 
to electronic cards that allow or disallow (and record) access to certain areas at specific 
moments in the day. The major implication of such a form of societal organization, for 
Deleuze, is that one is constantly engaging with the features that the State – tied to capitalism 
– aims to promote. Accordingly, this debilitates populations far beyond the docility 
engendered through disciplinary societies by effectively disallowing them the time to operate 
in adversarial ways outside of its confines. That is, Deleuze suggests that within the 
disciplinary societies thematized by Foucault, one was always beginning or starting again, as 
one moved from the school, to the barracks, and from the barracks to the factory, etc.; 
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consequently, interstices existed between disciplinary institutions where the formation of 
resistance – or the generation of difference – was in principle always possible. In contrast, 
Deleuze argues that “in control societies, you never finish anything – business, training, and 
military service being coexisting metastable states of a single modulation, a sort of universal 
transmutation” (1990: 179). Moreover, disciplinary societies had “two poles: signatures 
standing for individuals, and numbers of places in a register standing for their position in a 
mass,” which allowed power to simultaneously amass and individuate. But this is no longer 
the case; rather, control societies, on the one hand, replace signatures with numbers and codes 
or “passwords,” which one gains and utilizes for the purposes of access through compliance 
with the status quo. On the other hand, within control societies it is no longer possible to 
distinguish between the “individual” and the “mass” – as it was in disciplinary societies – but 
only between “dividuals and…samples” (1990: 179-180). In this regard, Robert Williams 
explains that Deleuze’s “notion of the dividual grasps a vital part of the dynamics of modern 
technology: the intersection of human agency and high-technology in the constitution of 
selves” (Williams 2005: 1). And from Deleuze’s viewpoint, what this entails is the 
progressive loss of the agency still possible for docile disciplinary subjectivity, through the 
dissolution of critical individuality and its transformation into coded economic data, 
dividualized to the point where resistance is not only difficult, but de facto unimaginable.  
Conclusion 
The pessimism of Deleuze’s stance toward digitality in the above text is unmistakable, and 
his concern over its capacity to canalize thinking and desire in ways that limit thought – and 
by implication, the generation of difference – stand in marked contrast to his earlier 
exploration of difference in philosophy, art and literature. And this accordingly begs the 
question of whether or not the generation of difference is indeed possible in relation to the 
digital, even though the environmental crisis has rendered such difference – particularly in 
terms of becoming-animal – utterly crucial. But as will be discussed in the next chapter, 
although Deleuze did not elaborate on the concept, he did advance ‘counter-information’ as a 
means through which such digital hegemony could be resisted. 
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Chapter Four – Contemporary reflections on Deleuze’s concern over 
digitality, and resonances between Deleuze’s ‘counter-information’ and 
Guattari’s ‘post-media’ 
Introduction  
Despite Deleuze’s forebodings over digitality, discussed in the previous chapter, he does 
offer some rudimentary remarks on features within control societies that may facilitate 
resistance to such totalizing domination. In this regard, Deleuze argues in “Control and 
Becoming”– an excerpt from a late interview with the Italian Marxist sociologist Antonio 
Negri – that “since ‘information is precisely the system of control’…counter-information 
becomes a form of resistance” (in Tampio 2009: 383). However, as Mark Poster points out in 
Information Please: Culture and Politics in the Age of Digital Machines, Deleuze 
unfortunately fails to elaborate more fully on what such counter-information entails, and he 
asks rhetorically, “Does he mean that critical content is resistance? Or does the form of the 
critical content constitute resistance?” (Poster 2006:60). Additionally, in his “Control and 
Becoming,” Deleuze is equally laconic in his assessment of what constitutes a response to the 
restrictive totalizing information technology features of control societies, writing only that 
“forms of delinquency or resistance (two different things) are also appearing. Computer 
piracy, and viruses for example” (Deleuze 1995: 175). But while he repeats this assertion in 
his “Postscript on Control Societies,” when he notes that “with information technology and 
computers…the passive danger is noise and the active, piracy and viral contamination” 
(1990: 180), he again fails to discuss this issue at length. Consequently, although these 
remarks seem intriguingly relevant when one considers the current informational landscape, 
they remain, as Poster rightly points out, underdeveloped.  
 This is, of course, quite understandable, because Deleuze died in 1995, and thus never 
encountered the hyper-rapid proliferation of information technology developments after 
1995, specifically the dizzying changes that have occurred in this regard in the twenty-first 
century. But a consequence of this is that Deleuze’s pessimism over digitality in “Postscript 
on Control Societies,” has often served as a point of departure for contemporary theorists 
who echo his call that the digital is a negative development for the generation of difference – 
and in what follows, these views will be explored in the first section of this chapter. After 
this, Deleuze’s two suggestions concerning what might constitute a counter-informational 
response to the restrictive totalizing information technology features of control societies – 
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namely viruses and piracy – will be considered in association with Guattari’s concept of post-
media. That is, in the work of Deleuze’s long-time collaborator, Félix Guattari, particularly in 
relation to his idea of post-media, one finds a viewpoint that draws heavily on Deleuze’s 
promotion of difference, but which also valorises digital space as a potential zone through 
and within which subjectivity can be experimented with and changed – provided certain 
conditions are met. And while Deleuze and Guattari may have differed on the capacity of 
information technology to produce difference, with Guattari assuming a more positive 
outlook in this regard, in certain respects his concept of post-media comports with, and 
indeed clarifies, aspects of Deleuze’s counter-information. Accordingly, with a view to 
exploring this issue, in the second section of this chapter, Guattari’s context and his 
conception of post-media, particularly in relation to its philosophical underpinnings, will be 
examined. Finally, and as with the above-mentioned contemporary theorists who echo 
Deleuze’s pessimism over information technology, focus will fall on those contemporary 
theorists who in relation to the work of Guattari – and Deleuze’s concept of counter-
information – express far more optimism over the potential of the digital to usher in 
difference. 
Reflections of Deleuze’s pessimism over digitality in contemporary theory  
Deleuze’s reservations regarding digitality within the context of control societies find further 
enunciation in the issues thematized by an array of contemporary theorists. For instance, 
Jeffrey Bell in Deleuze’s Hume: Philosophy, Culture and the Scottish Enlightenment, points 
to the coercive effects of digitality on personal relations and desires. For him, societies of 
control “utilize constant and rapid communications (memos, emails, advertisements, and so 
on) to inform people where they stand in the constantly shifting field of interpersonal 
relations.” And he argues further that if one does not participate in this field – which is 
inextricably tied with “inexpiable rivalry and competition” – one risks falling off the grid, as 
it were, and thus becoming an undesirable “unknown variable,” who will undoubtedly begin 
to “fall behind.” As Bell darkly notes, “the net result is that we come to desire the very 
systems that control and monitor us” (2009: 151).103 To this, Alexander Galloway in his 
Protocol: How Control Exists after Decentralization adds a further insight, when he 
compares Deleuze’s notion of control societies with the ideas advanced by the media theorist 
                                                          
103 The immense popularity of social media sites such as Facebook, where users willingly disclose their personal 
information, innermost thoughts and anxieties, along with their successes – however arbitrary these might be – 
under the auspices of a belief that one only is insofar as one is digitally articulated in this way, immediately 
come to mind when considering Bell’s argument.  
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Friedrich Kittler in his Discourse Networks, 1800/1900. Galloway writes that Kittler’s work, 
“reminiscent of Foucault’s genealogies,” illustrates “how the store of knowledge changed 
from a ‘kingdom of sense’…based on understanding and meaning, to a ‘kingdom of 
pattern’…based on images and algorithms” through the shift from disciplinary to control 
society. And that this profound change in societal experience correlates with Deleuze’s claim 
that control societies, based on hyper-speed, digital simulation and replication, leave virtually 
no space for adversarial reflection, creativity, and indeed, modes of experience different to 
that of ubiquitous dividuality (2004: 22).104  
Consequently, certain contemporary theorists, such as Ian Buchanan, are critical of 
the trend – both popular and academic – of appropriating the Deleuzoguattarian model of the 
rhizome for understanding the Internet and the interactions it facilitates. For example, in his 
article “Deleuze and the Internet,” Buchanan undertakes a five-point analysis of why the 
Internet cannot be seen as rhizomatic. That is, although he concedes that at first glance “there 
are…excellent grounds for thinking that the internet meets some if not all the basic criteria of 
the rhizome” (2007: 9), he goes on to consider a range of compelling counter-points for why 
this is not the case. Accordingly, he considers the internet in terms of connection, 
multiplicity, homogeneity, mapping, and the rhizome, and his ideas in this regard are 
resonant with the concerns of various other theorists.  
That is, Buchanan’s first consideration relates to the idea of connection, or more 
specifically, to how people’s experience of the internet is not quite as free-flowing and 
agency-promoting as many people believe. Rather, as he points out, one does not “surf the 
Internet,” but instead moves from “one fixed point in space to another, which is interestingly 
not at all what surfers do,” and which implies that the internet is more schematic than some 
have suggested. In support of such an assertion, Siegworth and Tiessen in their article 
“Mobile Affects, Open Secrets, and Global Illiquidity: Pockets, Pools and Plasma,” 
emphasize the predetermined parameters of such schematization. Quoting John Cheney-
Lippold, they maintain that “we are entering an online world where our identifications are 
                                                          
104 As a supplementary point, one can consider for instance this disturbing entry from The Internet 
Encyclopaedia: Volume 1: A-F (edited by Hossein Bidgoli) on the subject of Mass Personalization. It reads: “In 
general, personalization refers to making a Web site more responsive to the users’ individual 
needs...Personalization is usually based on building predictive models of customer behaviour, preferences, and 
interests. Given its ability to build successful predictive models, data mining is an excellent personalization 
approach for building customer profiles, providing recommendations to the customers, and delivering 
personalized Web content. Most of the existing personalization tools make extensive use of different data 
mining techniques” (2004: 401).  
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largely made for us,” and that this “‘new algorithmic identity’…removed from civil discourse 
via the proprietorial nature of many algorithms…simultaneously enjoy[s] an unprecedented 
ubiquity in its reach to surveil and record data about users.” They moreover equate this 
concept directly with Deleuze’s concerns, arguing that “these are the continuous algorithmic 
modulations and open exposures described by Deleuze…in his vision of the control society: 
an undulating series of actions-upon-actions that often feel so very intimate (even if at a 
distance)” (Siegworth and Tiessen 2012: 54). Indeed, even more disturbingly, there appears 
to be a growing public acquiescence to being treated as a data sample. For example, there 
have been numerous concerns aired against Google’s newest browser, Chrome, pointing to it 
“essentially acting as a key logger, potentially recording users’ every keystroke” (Keizer 
2008). Yet, despite such reservations, the browser has a pervasive reach, with users 
continuing to access it en masse despite it receiving near-constant criticisms with regard to its 
dissolution of people’s privacy.105 
Buchanan’s second criticism functions as an adjunct to the above, and is directed at 
the “many people [who] think of the Internet as the realisation of the Deleuzian ideal of 
multiplicity.” Against this type of thinking, Buchanan argues that “the incredible proliferation 
and constantly expanding number of websites does not by itself mean that the Internet can be 
classed as a multiplicity in Deleuze’s sense.” This is not least because, while according to 
Deleuze and Guattari’s definition of the rhizome, removal of a component alters the whole, in 
contrast, if one were to remove thousands of websites, the Internet would remain practically 
unaffected. Similarly, while Vincent Miller in Understanding Digital Culture writes that “the 
internet is fully able to sustain breakages without much effect on its function” (2011: 27), 
Allison Cavanagh – for analogous reasons – in Sociology in the Age of the Internet writes that 
even though “Deleuze and Guattari’s position has a certain resonance for examining the 
internet, the application of their concepts [to it] is profoundly problematic” (2007: 47).  
Thirdly, and related closely to the above two points, Buchanan argues that if the 
rhizome “operates by variation, expansion, conquest, capture and offshoots,” or by the 
principle of heterogeneity, then we must acknowledge that the internet, in many ways, acts in 
a manner contrary to this, as a “homogenising and standardising machine.” A good 
supporting example of online developments that have precipitated such limitation and 
                                                          
105 According to the browser statistics website, w3schools.com, as of May 2016, Google Chrome had the highest 
share of users (71.4 %) in relation to their competitors – with Mozilla Firefox coming in second at 16.9 % of 
user share (W3 Schools, 2016).  
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restriction – rather than space for personal experimentation – can be found in the recent 
dispute over the mobile application, Whisper. The aforementioned application, aimed at both 
the widely used Android and Apple iOS operating systems, was launched in 2012 and was 
initially met with great excitement, because of how the application purportedly allowed users 
to send and receive messages anonymously on the most personal of topics. In doing so, it 
ostensibly offered a ‘safe space’ in which to discuss any range of issues a user might be 
troubled by, and in an article entitled “The Genius of Whisper, the Massively Popular App 
You Haven’t Heard Of,” Alexis Madrigal of The Atlantic accordingly gushed about it, even 
calling the application “ephemeral” (Madrigal, 2013) – although he eventually settled for a 
more moderate but still positive appraisal of its features. He neatly summed up his 
understanding of the application as follows:   
 
Anyone can post an anonymous message to the service in the form of an image 
macro: text overlaid on a picture. When you open the app, you see six such images. 
Each one has a “secret” on it. You can respond to a message publicly or privately, 
choosing a public anonymous post or a private pseudonymous chat. Users don’t 
have a public identity in the app. While they do have persistent handles, there’s no 
way to contact them except [through] the messages they post. (Madrigal, 2013) 
 
The popular appeal of such anonymity was clearly evinced in its garnering some “2.5 Billion 
page views a month” (Madrigal, 2013), and Whisper accordingly seemed to comprise a 
substantial online development. However, on 16 October 2014, the UK paper The Guardian, 
in an article entitled “Revealed: how Whisper app tracks ‘anonymous’ users,” alleged that the 
application, among other things, not only monitored some users even after they had opted out 
of “geolocation services,” but also “shared information with the US Department of Defense,” 
and even “collated and indefinitely stored…user data…in [a] searchable database” (Lewis 
and Rushe, 2014).106 What this reveals once more is Deleuze’s keen foresight that digital 
space, rather than being a smooth space of exploration, creativity and possibility, would 
ultimately come to function as a striated intermediary, through which Capital enterprise and 
the State would co-operate to extend their collective hold over communication and 
interpersonal relations. Buchanan also adds to his above argument concerning digital 
homogenization by thematizing an important related point that applies specifically to such 
                                                          
106 The company behind the application responded to the allegations on 19 October, with CEO Paul Heyward 
“not [disputing] the accuracy of The Guardian’s reporting” (Lewis and Rushe 2014). 
110 
 
media, when he emphasizes how “pre-existing media” are being compelled “to adapt 
[themselves] to suit the internet environment.” Pointing to bloggers and citizen journalists, 
among others, Buchanan argues that the Internet has “set off a massive expansion of media 
operations into virtually every corner of existence” (2007:11). This seems to confirm the 
ultimate Deleuzian nightmare in this regard, and a brief consideration of Google helps to 
illustrate this point. Julian Assange, in an interview with The Huffington Post, discusses some 
of Google’s current infrastructure and its plans at expansion. According to him, “Google 
controls 80 percent of Android phones now sold, [and] YouTube,” a subsidiary of Google’s, 
bought in 2006, “is buying up eight drone companies. It’s deploying cars, it's 
running…Internet service providers,” and it even “has a plan to create Google towns.” Going 
on to liken Google to a “high-tech General Electric,” Assange proposes that the company 
represents “a push towards a technocratic imperialism or digital colonialism,” in which 
“Google envisages pulling in everyone, even in the deepest parts of Africa, into its system of 
interaction” (in Grim and Harvard, 2014). Problematically, 
 
that system of interaction concentrates global power into those people who already 
have a lot of it, and that means not just companies like Google but a lot of the 
alliance of interests – organizations like the National Security Agency and 
contractor… institutions like Google and Facebook, which directly or indirectly are 
involved in the worldwide collection efforts of those organizations. At a less 
geopolitical level and at a more personal level, the global erosion of privacy for the 
average person [will] bring…democratic states socially into a position…where they 
are more like authoritarian states. (in Grim and Harvard, 2014) 
 
Turning to the concept of the map as a fourth point of discussion, Buchanan argues that, in 
his view, Deleuze and Guattari intended the rhizome to operate as “a therapeutic tool,” so to 
speak, insofar as acknowledgment of rhizomatic relations would “produce the unconscious, 
and with it new statements [and] different desires.” However, with regard to popular ideas of 
a cyber-rhizome, he argues that the “internet cannot simply be the pre-existing network of 
connected computers. Rather, we have to conceive it in terms of the set of choices that have 
been made concerning its use” (2007: 12). In relation to this, we can think back to Deleuze’s 
explicit linking of his conception of digital control societies to “a mutation of capitalism,” in 
which people, fixed to “a control mechanism that can fix the position of any element at any 
given moment,” find themselves no longer confined – as in disciplinary society – but rather 
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“in debt.” An arrangement in which they are no longer individuals in relation to a mass, but 
“dividuals and…samples” (1990: 179-181). By way of example, it can be argued that 
Google’s digital infrastructure, rather than producing a space for therapeutic explorations that 
are couched in creativity and openness to experimentation, controls according to its interests. 
In this regard, David Vise in his Foreign Policy article “Google,” provides a good overview 
of some of the major questions surrounding the behaviour of the company. Claiming that it 
has drawn “scepticism from Wall Street and the ire of human rights groups” (2006: 20), Vise 
thematizes how Google has been discredited on a number of counts.107 Although some of 
these criticisms are market-orientated,108 issues concerning Google protecting its approach to 
business, and the privacy of its users, remain important (2006: 22-24). In terms of Google’s 
claims that it is not operating within a standard business mould, Vise highlights how Google 
functions strongly along the lines of the dominant corporate ethos of today, with a 
“traditional management team to operate the business [and] traditional mechanisms to 
measure the company’s financial performance” (2006: 23), and he argues that because of this, 
despite their declarations to the contrary, the company operates according to the dictates 
associated with neoliberal capitalism. The consequent issue that emerges, then, is how this 
private enterprise, in conjunction with government, is less concerned with facilitating free 
participation and free information exchange, and more focused on trying to find ever more 
efficient means through which to exercise control within a digital space – as Deleuze 
feared.109 Correlatively, in terms of privacy, Vise explains how the company acts in its own 
                                                          
107 It is curious that Vise begins with a note on how Google is seen by the financial world, before moving onto 
the criticisms it has drawn from human rights groups; an order which may well indicate priority in the author’s 
mind.  
108 For instance, he attempts to refute the claim that Google is global by pointing to South Korea, which has 
strong “domestic Web search firms” that make it difficult for Google to compete within this particular country 
(2006: 20). In support, The Economist reports that, as of 1 March, 2014, Google had still not been able to 
reverse its South Korean situation, stating that “South Korea’s biggest web portal has [both] thrashed Yahoo and 
kept Google at bay” (The Economist, 2014). 
109Beyond Google, an additional example compellingly demonstrates this system of relations. When the 
whistleblowing website, WikiLeaks, via U.S. soldier Bradley Manning, published “a flood of classified 
documents that went to the heart of America’s military and foreign policy operations” (Leigh and Harding 2011: 
3), documenting serious misconduct by the Americans in Iraq and Afghanistan, controversy erupted. And after 
further leaks, specifically the release of “251 287” diplomatic cables from around the world, which WikiLeaks 
claimed to be the “the largest set of confidential documents ever to be released into the public domain” (2011: 
210-211), the non-profit organization was in serious trouble. At this point, WikiLeaks, which as a non-profit 
organization relies on donations, came under sustained attack; under severe pressure, several companies – 
including MasterCard and the online payment service provider PayPal – closed WikiLeaks’ accounts, and in 
doing so, partially crippled the organization. Other tech-giants, such as the online retailer and web-hosting 
service Amazon, as well as smaller firms such as Tableau Software, which provided WikiLeaks with “data 
visualization” (Finley 2010), similarly withdrew infrastructural support. In many respects, what this 
demonstrated was the power relations and resultant censorship dynamics operative in cyberspace, and 
correlatively, the extent to which the digital realm is profoundly unfree. 
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interests, protecting information only when disclosure could lead to it “losing its competitive 
edge,” that is, when revealing too much information on how “its users search the Internet, 
[might allow] its competitors…to decipher secrets of its technology.” In relation to this, Vise 
cites examples of how, in the past, Google has failed to co-operate with the U.S. Justice 
Department, when this governmental wing requested “a week’s worth of searches [related to] 
a child pornography investigation” (2006: 22). Alternatively, as has been suggested by 
reports on the more recent NSA (National Security Agency) spying scandal, Google, along 
with the social networking site, Facebook, have indeed co-operated with governmental 
authorities. Jason Leopold of Al Jazeera America, neatly sums up the controversy. He 
explains that “disclosures by former NSA contractor Edward Snowden about the agency’s 
vast capability for spying on Americans’ electronic communications prompted a number of 
tech executives,” such as those from Google and Facebook, “whose firms cooperate…with 
the government to insist they…do…so only when compelled by a court of law.” However, 
“email exchanges between National Security Agency Director Gen. Keith Alexander and 
Google executives, Sergey Brin and Eric Schmidt, suggest a far cosier working relationship,” 
further intimating that “not all co-operation was under pressure” (Leopold, 2014). 110  
                                                          
110 The corollary of this is the relative powerlessness of the individual to contest such machinations. For 
instance, the British technology site The Register, following a discussion between WikiLeaks founder Julian 
Assange and another news site (PandoDaily), recounts some of Assange’s criticisms against Google. Assange, 
speaking with reference to his recently published book When Google Met WikiLeaks, “dubs Google, Facebook 
and Apple ‘surveillance barons’” (Orlowski 2014) – which, as is also pointed out in the article, is disturbingly 
no revelation. And he goes on to demonstrate how the tech-giant, tied to commercial and governmental 
interests, often works against the interests of its users. A related example from the article markedly illustrates 
this point, in relation to “Google’s network of ‘digital rights’ groups.” In this regard, it is suggested by Assange 
that “Google funds 150 academic departments, think tanks and ‘citizen groups,’ offering them advertising, 
analytics help and fund-raising tools – and often hard cash.” In doing so, the company obtains the support of 
these supposedly critical groups established to protect individuals accessing the Internet, but who help to “shape 
the policy agenda [so] that [it] doesn’t disrupt Google’s business” (Orlowski 2014). In such an arrangement, the 
individual user clearly becomes subordinate to commercial interest, with the mechanisms meant to support 
individual users’ interests undermined significantly. In effect, robust monitoring of any potentially unethical 
online practice is replaced by a collection of groups’ dependant on those they are meant to hold accountable for 
any violation – a clear conflict of interest. And Orlowski notes a further case which demonstrates such issues, 
when he discusses an individual case against Google. In an echo of his previous point, he notes that “a better 
indicator of Google's influence is not when money changes hand, but when it doesn't.” Accordingly, he cites a 
2014 case brought forward to the Court of Justice of the European Union by Mario Costeja Gonzalez, supported 
by the Spanish Data Protection Agency (the AEPD), against Google Spain and Google Inc. In his complaint, 
Gonzalez contended that “when an internet user entered his name in the search engine of the Google group, the 
list of results would display links to two pages of La Vanguardia’s newspaper of January and March 1998.” 
Problematically for Gonzalez, these pages “contained an announcement for a real-estate auction organised 
following attachment proceedings for the recovery of social security debts owed by [him].” Arguing that the 
legal proceeding against him had been fully resolved and subsequently closed, Gonzalez wanted the pages, 
which discussed his personal information, firstly, to be removed or altered by the newspaper in question, and 
secondly, for Google to remove or conceal the links in its search engine attached to his name which led users 
directly to the newspaper’s site (CJEU 2014). In accordance with European data protection law, or the right to 
be forgotten, Gonzalez won the case. But, while legally Gonzalez could claim victory, as Orlowski reports, in 
the court of public opinion the matter became deliberately obscured. He writes that roughly two months after the 
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It is in relation to the above that Buchanan discusses the fifth and final point, namely 
that of the rhizome. That is, while “the rhizome is acentred, nonsignifying, and acephalous,” 
he argues that the internet, even though it seems this way in its appearance and construction, 
in terms of “the reality of its day-to-day use still does not live up to this much-vaunted 
Deleuzian ideal.” Citing our behaviour online, Buchanan advances that instead we tend to 
follow set patterns – for instance, oscillating between three or four different sites consistently 
– such that we move from point to point on the internet. For him, this suggests that “there is 
no liberated line of flight in cyberspace,” and that we are instead held hostage, in a sense, by 
infrastructural developments online. One example is, of course, PageRank, or Google’s 
ability to predict what one will search for, and so forth (2007: 10-13). Admittedly, while there 
may be a distrust of the seemingly impersonal operations of Google, which most users 
encounter simply as an excellent search engine that fulfils their various search requests, 
Facebook continues to attract great personal investment on the part of its users. After all, your 
Facebook profile is you, and so it becomes hard for users of the site to see it for what it is, 
namely a programmed website running on codes and algorithms that are backed up by 
servers, cabling, and other material infrastructure. In relation to this problematic dynamic, 
Tiana Bucher in “Want to be on Top? Algorithmic power and the threat of Invisibility on 
Facebook,” discusses the algorithm EdgeRank, used by Facebook to determine what 
information users are exposed to in their news feeds (a collection of updates drawn from their 
pool of ‘friends’ that is displayed as a single, central page). On the one hand, she explains 
that, in the EdgeRank system, to become “visible is to be selected by the algorithm,” and that, 
accordingly,  “inscribed into the algorithmic logic of the default News Feed is the idea that 
visibility functions as a reward, rather than as punishment, as is the case with Foucault’s 
notion of Panopticism” (2012: 1174). But on the other hand, certain behaviours on the site 
linked to constant presence and action – such as ‘Posting’ information through text or 
pictures, ‘Liking’ items posted by ‘friends,’ or ‘Commenting’ on these items – guarantee that 
one’s individual profile will be picked up on by the EdgeRank system and placed at a priority 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
case was decided, “The Media Society, supported by ITN, held a discussion of the ruling... and featured a 
representative from Google, along with a barrister, an academic and an ITN executive who were all hostile to 
the decision, on numerous occasions citing misleading evidence,” while the last panellist “was the UK 
Information Commissioner, who is legally obliged to be even handed between the data processor (Google) and 
the individual.” In effect then, as the author acerbically notes, “four and a half panellists represented Google, the 
data processing giant, and half a panellist represented the individual – some of the time” (Orlowski 2014). While 
the author admits that no direct funding link can be established between the names mentioned above and 
Google, it is quite clear that an individual involved in any such dispute holds very little power. Thus, far from 
being a democratizing space, as is often claimed, it would seem the internet – and particularly the companies 
that have emerged as giants within its framework – simply replicate the unequal dynamics of the past, albeit in a 
far more pervasive form. 
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spot on one’s friends’ news feeds. Consequently, such behaviour becomes normalized and 
indeed promoted as desirable, which does fit well into the Foucauldian framework of 
disciplinary technologies that inculcate repetitive behaviour. However, it equally serves to 
demonstrate Deleuze’s complimentary and cogent point that such behaviour “imposes a 
particular conduct on a particular human multiplicity” (Deleuze 2006: 29). After all, 
Facebook users subordinate themselves to a system of interpersonal relations set out by an 
algorithm, and in this sense, the social networking site represents one of the greatest threats to 
the generation of difference. That is, in a continuous pursuit of popularity, manipulated by the 
aforementioned algorithm, people using Facebook literally begin to lose the time to be 
different, operating rather in accordance with a set of behaviours set by Facebook’s 
programmers. Indeed, it is hard to imagine how there could be any adversarial reflection 
within the confines of this continuous narcissistic information flow. And when a concept like 
‘virtual identity suicide’ becomes a topic of exploration, as evinced in Stieger, Burger, Bohn 
and Voracek’s “Who Commits Virtual Identity Suicide? Differences in Privacy Concerns, 
Internet Addiction, and Personality between Facebook Users and Quitters,” then it would 
seem that Deleuze’s worst fears have been realized.111 In relation to this, and returning to 
Siegworth and Tiessen’s work on Deleuze and digital spaces, further description is given of 
how Facebook users operate under the influence of a particular digital infrastructure. 
Referencing Mark Andrejevic, they discuss the concept of “digital enclosure,” or in other 
words, “the creation of an interactive realm wherein every action and transaction generates 
information about itself.” In such an enclosure, there is no “pre-determined shape or form;” 
rather, “a digital enclosure is continually produced in and through the volunteered co-
ordinates and the subsequent movements of interactions themselves.”112 These interactions 
have two components to them, insofar as they entail “temporary closure on one side (the 
participant side),” while they tend to be “leaky or open on the other side (the network side).”  
It is on the latter side that information becomes available to interested third parties, be they 
governmental agencies or more commonly “marketshare-seeking corporate entities”(2012: 
55-56). Thus, as Andrejevic argues in iSpy: Surveillance and Power in the Interactive Era, 
                                                          
111 This article explores the experiences of those users who have recently quit Facebook, citing privacy concerns 
as their primary motivation for doing so, and the problematic implications ‘offline’ of having done so, 
particularly in terms of the reactions toward these former users by those users who have stayed with the site 
(2013: 629).   
112 Nigel Thrift in “Life world Inc. – and What to do about it,” understands how we relate to digital 
infrastructure in a similar way. He argues that “the introduction of new forms of information 
technology…produced a general capacity to track movement and is likely to end with the redefinition of the 
world of persons and objects as constituent elements of a mutually constitutive moving ‘frame’” (2011: 7).  
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we become “cybernetic commodities” (2007: 7), performing certain actions prompted by the 
imperatives of a particular code or algorithm, while at the same time having all these actions 
monitored for their monetary potential. When one considers Facebook in such a critical light 
– as a digital enclosure producing cybernetic commodities, or in Deleuzian terms, dividuals – 
then its appeal becomes hard to fathom. However, active Facebook devotees, as alluded to 
previously, would no doubt tend to reject any claims that they were merely algorithmic 
identities, whose identifications have been largely made for them (Siegworth and Tiessen 
2012: 54), and would no doubt instead argue that Facebook remains a highly user-friendly 
framework through which they can express their unique personalities.113 
However, while the engendering of narcissistic behaviour through the site is worth the 
attention it has garnered, because of the socio-cultural problems that accompany such a 
disposition, 114  what is more pertinent for the current argument are the ways in which 
Facebook users fail to make the distinction between digital (virtual) space and their offline 
(actual) lives. Something that Sherry Turkle in her Alone Together: Why We Expect More 
From Technology and Less From Each Other, neatly captures in her concept of “the robotic 
moment” (2011: 3) – a moment that strongly confirms Deleuze’s suspicion of growing 
dividuality. For Turkle, the robotic moment constitutes “the moment in which we are 
philosophically ready for technology to replace human interaction” (2011: 3), or the process 
of “remaking human values and human connection,” but in a non-affirmative way 
(Moskowitz, 2013). And Turkle provides a wonderful example that powerfully explicates the 
features of such a moment. Discussing a visit with her teenage daughter to “the Darwin 
exhibition at the American Museum of Natural History in New York,” she describes “at the 
exhibit’s entrance…two giant tortoises from the Galapagos Islands, the best known 
inhabitants of the archipelago where Darwin did his most famous investigations.” The two 
tortoises, one hidden from view and the other completely still, failed to impress her young 
daughter, who, “unmoved by [their] authenticity,” noted: “They could have used a robot” 
                                                          
113 The idea of Facebook as a conduit through which one expresses one’s unique personality is well documented 
in academic study, particularly within psychological studies. See, for example, Gosling et al. Manifestations of 
Personality in Online Social Networks: Self-Reported Facebook-Related Behaviours and Observable Profile 
Information (2011), and Zwier et al. Boundaries to the Articulation of Possible Selves Through Social 
Networking Sites: The Case of Facebook Profilers’ Social Connectedness (2010).  
114 See also, Mauri et al. “Why Is Facebook So Successful? Psychophysiological Measures Describe a Core 
Flow State While Using Facebook” (2011), Espinoza and Juvonen’s “The Pervasiveness, Connectedness, and 
Intrusiveness of Social Network Site Use Among Young Adolescents” (2011), Yin Zhang et al. “Gratifications, 
Collective Self-Esteem, Online Emotional Openness, and Trait like Communication Apprehension as Predictors 
of Facebook Uses” (2011), Zizi Papacharissi’s “Look at us: Collective Narcissism in College Student Facebook 
Photo Galleries” (2010), and Soraya Mehdizadeh’s “Self-Presentation 2.0: Narcissism and Self-Esteem on 
Facebook” (2010). 
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(2011: 3). If one were to think about this moment in relation to Deleuze’s concern over the 
dissolution of difference through digitality, what the robotic moment illustrates is the triumph 
of information over the recognition of existence. Indeed, in this example, a thing is seen only 
for its informational value, and if one were to apply this to the information flow produced by 
Facebook users, a similar idea emerges, namely that people are becoming dividuated 
collections of information, rather than human beings who exist in time and space, and who 
comprise sites of multiplicities.115 When everything is already documented, and presented as 
information that one can access, it would appear that in a pervasive digital culture, we can no 
longer be “half-secrets, even to ourselves” (Siegworth and Tiessen 2012: 54).116 And even 
though Buchanan is not wholly negative over the internet and its impact on society, but rather 
aims to temper some of the more enthusiastic understandings of the Internet-as-rhizome, the 
point remains: in many ways, the concept of the internet as a totalizing force within our new 
societies of control is not easily dismissible.  
Consequently, in light of the above, the possibility of generating openness to 
difference through this medium, particularly in relation to the environmental crisis, appears 
extraordinarily limited. However, counter-weights to such pessimism thankfully do exist.  
                                                          
115 This dissolution of the individual is taken even further by online practices engendered through web-cam 
based chat sites, such as Chatroulette. Turkle neatly explains how the site functions. She writes that in 
Chatroulette “you sit in front of your computer screen and are presented with an audio and video feed of a 
randomly chosen person, also logged into the game,” and “you can see, talk to, and write each other in real 
time.” Statistically-speaking, the popularity of the site is evinced by the fact that by February 2010, “it had 1.5 
million users [translating to] about thirty-five thousand people logged onto Chatroulette at any one time” (2011: 
225). More recent figures for the site also show further growth, with the site claiming 50,000 users active at any 
given point in time, and it is estimated that 11.6 million users visited the site from 1 February 2015 to 1 July 
2015 (SimilarWeb, 2015). Although pairing up with random users around the world for conversation may sound 
like a fairly innocuous and interesting practice, it is a well-known joke in popular Internet culture that the site is 
a hub of pure reduction, something which Turkle demonstrates vividly when she describes entering a chat 
session during a class she was presenting at MIT. She remembers the encounter: “It took only a few seconds for 
me to meet my first connection. It was a penis. I hit next, and we parted company. Now my screen filled with 
giggling teenage girls. They nexted me. My third connection was another penis, this one being masturbated.” 
Turkle thinks of the encounter as “faces and bodies [becoming] objects” (2011: 225), and we could, if we apply 
a Deleuzian framework to understand such behaviour, broaden her conclusion. Through such a lens, 
Chatroulette is an immensely dividuating experience, insofar as it presents, for the most part, what users 
consider to be the most essential information they can communicate at the expense of any vague simulation of 
real contact and engagement. No longer presenting themselves as human beings, Chatroulette’s users seem 
content with experiencing themselves and others as a rapidly shifting series of images, each one as inter-
changeable and fleeting as the next. 
116 In this regard, the mobile application TimeHop markets itself as a time capsule of you, and is described by 
Liz Gannes of the website All Things D, as “a daily time capsule of everything I shared online on today’s date a 
year ago, two years ago, and as far back as it goes.” Besides sounding like a terrifying echo of TimeHop’s 
slogan, albeit in longer form, Gannes’ gushes further over the application when she writes, “It’s especially cool 
on birthdays and holidays, when I can see patterns from pictures of how I’ve celebrated and where I’ve travelled 
across the years” (Gannes 2013). If one were to consider similar such applications, like the “life-logging” 
application Saga, which “compiles users’ locations, travel times, and posts to [multiple] social networks into one 
Lifelog” (Gannes 2013), then it would seem that the exchanges between actual users and their virtual identities 
have become even more blurred. 
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Deleuze and counter-information  
Deleuze’s concept of counter-information did not arise solely from his encounter with 
digitality, but rather, relates to a very specific political history. As Albert Moran explains in 
TV Formats Worldwide: Localizing Global Programs, “counter-information” tactics were 
initially employed by the “Italian radical left movement” of the 1960s, long before they were 
“championed by famous intellectuals from Deleuze and Foucault to Meaghan Morris” (2009: 
212). In short – as already discussed – in the 1960s Italy was experiencing a multitude of 
problems, exacerbated by a weak and ineffective “centre-left coalition that had been marked 
by a constant failure to bring promised reforms to Italian society” (libcom.org, 2008). In 
response to such stagnation, “Italy’s extra-parliamentary revolutionary movement…took as 
its starting point the need to fill the void” created by two associated factors, namely the 
“growing moderation of the official Communist party,” and the growth of “the American-
dominated capitalist status quo in Italy” (Drake 2008: 450). And this response, termed 
counter-information, took a number of forms, including the spreading of messages that 
criticized the status quo, the provision of competing perspectives, the exposure of the state 
broadcaster’s lies and omissions, and the use of humour to mercilessly poke fun at the 
shortcomings of the political and bureaucratic establishment (Moran 2009: 210-211). Gino 
Moliterno provides an excellent example of the type of tactics employed in the 
Encyclopaedia of Contemporary Italian Culture, in an entry on the actor, playwright and 
director, Dario Fo. He explains that Fo (along with his collaborators) “terrorized the Italian 
bureaucratic and political establishment…with their unique brand of theatre which aimed 
primarily to provide the working class with ‘counter-information’ on the real state of national 
and international affairs.” And this was because they felt that the working class had been 
“deprived of critical viewpoints on current affairs by the state-owned media monopoly” 
(2005: 336). Accordingly, this is the framework that preceded Deleuze’s thoughts on counter-
information as a possible antagonistic force within digital societies of control. And in 
“Having an Idea in Cinema (On the Cinema of Straub-Huillet),” Deleuze states specifically 
what he means by the act of producing counter-information, when he advances that “counter-
information only becomes useful when it is – and it is this by nature – or when it becomes an 
act of resistance,” and that “counter-information is effective only when it becomes an act of 
resistance.” Thus if one concurs with Deleuze that “information is the controlled-system of 
order-words used in a given society,” then any challenge posed to this digital system, whether 
through individual viruses/error or the collective act of piracy, can be regarded as a form of 
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counter-information. And Deleuze further elaborates on the concept of counter-information 
through a reference the films of Straub/Huillet, and their use of “disjunction between auditory 
and visual image.” In this regard he writes, “each act of [such] art is not an act of resistance, 
and yet, in a certain sense, it is” (in Kaufman and Heller 1998: 18-19). As Nadine Boljkovac 
in Untimely Affects: Gilles Deleuze and an Ethics of Cinema explains, counter-information 
should thus be understood as utilization of the opportunity “to counter-actualise,” or, in other 
words, to “refold, break open, and recombine thought” (2013: 20). Put another away, Michael 
Shapiro in Methods and Nations: Cultural Governance and the Indigenous Subject, advances 
that while “to propagate information uncritically is to reaffirm the dominant order within 
which the information is intelligible,” through “oppositional modes of artistic production…of 
what…Deleuze calls counter-information” such otherwise automatic reaffirmation of a 
troubling dominant order is problematized (2004: ix).  
  Admittedly, Deleuze never elaborated on his two suggestions of viral contamination 
and piracy within the context of control societies, but various theorists have recently, albeit in 
different ways, understood both these suggestions as relating to actions online that rupture the 
continuity of control.  
Deleuze’s counter-information in contemporary digital theorization 
Contemporary writers certainly do seem to share the view of the internet as a space of 
counter-informational possibility, with this possibility thought of largely in terms of error, or 
what Deleuze termed a virus. As Nunes argues in Error. Glitch, Noise, and Jam in New 
Media Cultures, digital “error” in relation to global digital networks “signals a path of escape 
from the predictable confines of informatic control: an opening, a virtuality, a poiesis.” With 
regard to this, and drawing heavily on the work of Deleuze and Guattari (both on their 
collaborative work and on their individual texts), Nunes advances that in a “network society 
predicated on the control of information…strategies of misdirection serve as both cultural and 
artistic interventions.” And it is these interventions that facilitate “creative openings and lines 
of flight that allow for a reconceptualization of what can (or cannot) be realized within 
existing social and cultural practices” (2011: 3-4). As a first example, Nunes draws attention 
to the infamous ‘HTTP 404 Error’ message, or more precisely, the standard response code 
one receives if a command entered via a web browser is not understood by a given server. In 
relation to this, Nunes writes that “errors come in many kinds, but increasingly, our errors 
arrive pre-packaged,” with “failure notices” in our networked lives “correspond[ing] to a 
specific category of error.” And it is this category of error that is one already predicted by the 
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system, in that it is “a potential error that the system must predict before it has actually 
occurred.” Thus, “while the error notice signals failure, it does so within the successful, 
efficient operation of a system.” For Nunes, at first glance, such an exchange admittedly 
signals a reaffirmation of Deleuze’s explanation of how societies of control operate. Indeed, 
he even concedes that such “control systems do not deal in the singularities of instances, but 
with fields of the possible,” and that, as such, the correlative initial fear is that they will 
increasingly produce homogenization in terms of communication exchange. On further 
reflection, though, and via reference to the work of Stuart Moulthrop, Nunes finds a strong 
counter-argument to such a pessimistic reading.117 He writes, “Error 404 can also highlight 
‘the importance of not finding’: that error marks a path in its own right, and not merely a 
misstep.” And it is such a critical perspective that “runs contrary to a dominant, cybernetic 
ideology of efficiency and control,” by demonstrating that digital space is not as enclosed a 
system as it is often made out to be. Nunes closes by arguing that while we “may find 
indulgence for errors, glitches, and noise” in fields such as literature, music, or art, “such 
erratic behaviour finds little favour in a world increasingly defined by protocol and 
predictable results.” Consequently, it is precisely within the latter domain that error is such a 
seductive phenomenon, because “uncaptured error refuses to signify within a system of 
feedback control” (2011: 13-14). In other words, although the digital interface is pervasive, it 
is not a perfectly refined machine in which no differentiation – whether through deliberate or 
accidental error – can occur. And such errors comprise key moments of counter-information, 
albeit at a formal, cyber-infrastructural level, which can precipitate a reconsideration of 
subjectivity. Indeed, as Benjamin Mako Hill points out in “Revealing Errors,” errors like the 
above - which are statistically inevitable – can lead to “users” considering some troubling and 
potentially critical questions. And he refers to the following relatively common scenario:  
 
Anyone who has seen a famous “Blue Screen of Death” – the iconic signal of a 
Microsoft Windows crash – on a public screen or terminal knows how errors can 
thrust the technical details of previously invisible systems into view. Nobody knows 
that their ATM runs Windows until the system crashes. Of course, the operating 
system chosen for a sign or bank machine has important implications for its users. 
Windows, or an alternative operating system, creates affordances and imposes 
limitations. Faced with a crashed ATM, a consumer might ask herself if, with its 
                                                          
117 Nunes provides reference for Moulthrop’s article: Stuart Moulthrop, “Error 404: Doubting the Web,” 
http://iat.ubalt.edu/moulthrop/essays/404.html. 
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history of rampant viruses and security holes,…she [should] really trust an ATM 
running Windows? (2011: 27)  
 
What such a scenario neatly demonstrates is that information technology is a mediator, or a 
“hidden intermediary,” and in serving this function is inevitably held hostage by its own 
limits and constraints. In this regard, Hill argues that “errors are underappreciated and 
underutilized in their ability to reveal technology around us,” and that in such revelation, 
“scholars and activists can reveal previously invisible technologies and their effects more 
generally” (2011: 27). Hill provides a wonderfully elucidating example of how one such 
error, revealed to subscribers of a particular publication, led to some troubling practices being 
exposed, and to some difficult questions being asked by the publication’s readership. He 
explains:  
 
ONN [One News Now, a news site run by the Christian American Family 
Association, or AFA] provides Christian conservative news and commentary. One 
of the things they do is offer a version of the industry standard Associated Press 
news feed. Rather than just republishing it verbatim, however, AFA runs software 
to modify the feed’s language so it more accurately reflects their organization’s 
values and choice of terminology. They do so with a hidden intermediary in the 
form of a computer program. (2011: 34) 
 
However, in the run up to the 2008 Beijing Olympics, and covering the athletic efforts of US 
sprinter Tyson Gay to qualify for the global showpiece, ONN made use of an Associated 
Press article on the matter. But, while the AP article read, “Gay eases into the 100m final at 
the Olympic trials,” the computer software employed by ONN/AFA automatically changed 
the headline to “Homosexual eases into the 100m final at the Olympic trials.” As the article 
progressed, each mention of the athlete’s surname was replaced with the term ‘homosexual,’ 
leading to jarringly awkward passages and continual references to a “Tyson Homosexual.” 
To be sure, the glaring mistake brought significant attention to the publication’s website, and 
bemused many of its readers. But in the surrounding controversy, the fact that AFA/ONN 
“changed words in its AP news feed” was also brought to light, as users of the site had never 
before realized that the information they were receiving was being manipulated. And the 
revelation brought about through error, of “the presence of a hidden script,” led to serious 
questions being asked of the ideological commitments of the paper. As Hill notes of the 
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Tyson Gay error, it revealed “a set of values that AFA…have about the terminology around 
homosexuality and the way that these values invisibly frame users’ experience of reading an 
AP article through their system.” In short, on the one hand, the error served to indicate to 
users “the power that designers and service providers have over their users” (2011: 35). But 
on the other hand, it also revealed how, despite such power, the conduit through which it is 
exercised remains a faulty one, and not a totalizing generator of informatic control that is 
beyond query or resistance.118 
One should also consider errors of judgement made by those in positions of power, in 
relation to a profound misunderstanding of what behaviours and personal creations online 
constitute. Elizabeth Losh in her article, “The Seven Million Dollar PowerPoint and Its 
Aftermath: What Happens When the House Intelligence Committee Sees ‘Terrorist Use of 
the Internet’ in a Battlefield 2 Fan Film,” discusses one such instance. In this regard, she 
shows how entities that exercise control are often shown up as both incompetent and ill 
equipped to contend with the rapid proliferation of developments and trends online that are 
the primary feature of networked societies. And where this occurs, however incrementally, 
power is shifted back toward the ordinary person within the digital space. In her article, Losh 
discusses a fan video created by someone from the Netherlands, celebrating the computer 
game Battlefield 2, and uploaded for fellow enthusiasts on the Planet Battlefield forum – a 
space designated for users to discuss various aspects of the game, swap strategies, and so 
forth. The fan video in question, which “represented an imperfect rendering of a popular 
mash-up aesthetic that was created for a particular remix culture around global gaming,” 
made use of the soundtrack from the satirical puppet movie Team America, audio clips from 
press gaffes committed by former U.S. President George W. Bush, as well as music from 
Anthony Quinn’s 1981 film Lion of the Desert.119 While those familiar with this online 
practice around popular games would have been able to interpret the creator’s purpose 
                                                          
118 An error such as this one, in which an unsophisticated programme lacks the ability to take context into 
account, is well represented throughout digital spaces. Consider, for instance, the very similar and quite 
common “clbuttic effect,” which relates to a curious past phenomenon online found specifically on online 
forums. These sites, using software that filtered user language deemed inappropriate, were not sophisticated 
enough to distinguish between ‘swear’ words and non-offensive words which contained the same collection of 
letters as the offending word. Most famously, the software would pick up on the word ‘ass’ and change it to 
‘butt.’ However, because this configuration of letters is very common in a number of words, many user posts 
were soon rendered unreadable. As an example, and this is where the effect derives its name from, the word 
‘classic’ would be reconfigured to ‘clbuttic.’   
119 Team America: World Police is a satirical 2004 film by duo Trey Parker and Matt Stone, which pokes fun at 
the rampant jingoism of the George W. Bush era, while Lion of the Desert is a cult Libyan film, directed by 
Moustappa Akkad, that tells the story of Arab resistance to the imperial aspirations of Benito Mussolini in Libya 
before the outbreak of the Second World War (IMDB, 2014).  
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clearly, the U.S. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence were far less capable of 
decoding the video accurately. As Losh writes, “federal investigators on the intelligence 
committee” found the video difficult “to rationalize and interpret.” Indeed, “the main 
message of online smack talk, virtuoso individual performance, and parodic reappropriation 
was overlooked, because it did not fit the narrative of serious terrorist evangelization.” With 
the investigators reading an innocent fan video as “carefully crafted political statements from 
a group of malevolent opponents,” one can see that although the digital reach of 
governmental structures is pervasive, it can – and often is – prone to serious error. In a 
Deleuzoguattarian sense, then, one could argue that re-territorialization is often undermined 
within the digital sphere by its inability to keep up with very specific trends online that 
operate by their own logic. And Losh demonstrates such profound misunderstanding clearly 
when she discusses reactions to the video at a congressional hearing entitled, “Terrorist Use 
of the Internet.” She points out that, by this point, the video had already been “misidentified 
as material for terrorist indoctrination at least twice” by supposed experts – “the military 
contractor SAIC…and once more by Pentagon witnesses who had reviewed SAIC reports.” 
As the misidentification proliferated, one congressional representative dramatically called the 
subsequent presentation on the video “very compelling and sobering” (2011: 133-134). While 
the situation by this stage could be described as thoroughly absurd, what the experts had 
demonstrated was a profound misunderstanding of not only fan generated content, but also 
the massive commercial enterprise that is video gaming. Of the many errors in their analysis, 
they had focused on the fact that the video’s protagonist was a terrorist, and not a traditional 
American or Allied soldier, as would often be the case in commercial video gaming that 
focuses on contemporary conflicts for its storylines and settings. In this, they had committed 
a fundamental misreading. As Losh points out of the producers of commercial video games:  
 
The industry practice of allowing such role-reversal in the first person shooter genre 
strengthens brand loyalty by extending play time and player engagement, and 
therefore it also solidifies the commitment of so-called “hardcore gamers” to a 
given company’s products and guarantees profits in the most reliably lucrative 
segment of electronic entertainment’s market share. (2011: 135) 
 
Again, rather than having its capacity to control extended by digital space, as Deleuze would 
have it, such examples serve to demonstrate that the State Apparatus struggles to make sense 
not only of standard commercial enterprise online, but also more specifically of creative 
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individual re-appropriations of the products generated by these enterprises. And in their 
response, they do not successfully re-territorialize, but rather grope and fumble for 
understanding and control, incapable of distinguishing between legitimate and bogus 
interpretation. Indeed, put differently, their error produces a site of counter-information that 
can precipitate a renegotiation of subjectivity.  
Guattari and post-media   
However, while the above writers provide us with a fair insight into the contemporary 
parameters of Deleuze’s first suggestion of virus/error as counter-information which resists 
the homogenizing tendencies of digital control societies, it is Guattari who illuminates the 
dynamics of Deleuze’s second suggestion, namely, piracy, in relation to his concept of post-
media. Yet before detailing Guattari’s conception of post-media, it is important to examine 
the context within which he operated. This is not only because such exploration provides 
clearer insight into the issues that informed Guattari’s approach. In addition, it is also because 
it correlatively allows for a more balanced perspective on the Deleuze-Guattari partnership, 
by allowing the relationship between Guattari’s individual work, and his input into the 
creative philosophical experiments in thought that resulted in provocative texts such as Anti-
Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus, to emerge into conspicuity.  
 The French historian who specializes in intellectual history, Francois Dosse,120 in 
Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari: Intersecting Lives, provides an evocative and colourful 
historical account of Guattari’s earlier years. Discussing his childhood, Dosse notes that 
Guattari came from a “traditional, conservative family,” and that having turned 15 in 1945, 
“was able to go to the university thanks to the Liberation.” He further explains that by this 
time, Guattari was already “precociously politically aware,” and that he accordingly “joined 
the [highly politicized] Student Hostels organization [and] started to attend Communist Party 
meetings” – much to the distress of his father, who remained “a stalwart Gaullist.” In terms of 
his studies, Guattari, despite a profound interest in philosophy, “did his first internship in 
pharmacy in July 1948 in Bécon les Bruyères,” but failed this course dismally on both his 
                                                          
120 As Jean-Pierre Herubal explains in “Observations on an Emergent Specialization: Contemporary French 
Cultural History – Significance for Scholarship,” French cultural history mostly “privileges specialization in 
nineteenth- and twentieth-century French phenomena,” but “its historiographic innovation and publication 
extend to an international audience.” And he defines “contemporary French cultural history as a specialization 
and as a vector in the contemporary historiographic landscape” (2010: 216). For this reason, the next few pages 
lean relatively heavily on Dosse’s critical biographical account of Guattari, as Dosse’s information is both 
immensely detailed, and relatively rare in its approach to the often marginalized Guattari.  
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initial and second attempts (2010: 21-26). At this point he reconsidered his studies and 
registered at the Sorbonne for a degree in philosophy (2010: 27), while his various political 
commitments – all related in various ways to the French Communist Party – continued 
unabated. (2010: 30-36). Another highly influential strand of his academic development was 
his interest in the prestigious psychoanalytical philosopher, Jacques Lacan. With regard to 
this, Dosse explains that by the 1950s, “Guattari was known both for his political militancy 
and for being a specialist in Lacanian ideas,” and he attributes his interest in the latter to 
Guattari’s meeting with the psychiatrist Jean Oury, who introduced him to the work of Lacan 
before it became the toast of the Parisian intellectual scene. As a consequence, “Guattari read 
Lacan’s texts on the mirror stage, aggression, and the family earlier than the rest of the 
intellectual world  [and]…was so affected by them that he learned them virtually by heart.” 
Later, “in 1953, Guattari went to a lecture on Goethe that Lacan gave,” and “at the end of 
1954, Lacan invited Guattari to his seminar at the Sainte-Anne psychiatric hospital in Paris” 
(2010: 37). As Guattari enthusiastically noted, “I was the first non-psychiatrist, non-doctor to 
take the master’s seminar” (in Dosse 2010: 37-38). Subsequently, Lacan also further 
enhanced Guattari’s interest in the field of linguistics, through his “famous Rome lecture, 
where he established the importance of linguistic methods for psychoanalysis” (2010: 38).121 
At this point, one could argue that Guattari’s experience of philosophical enquiry, as opposed 
to Deleuze’s frustration with the Hegelian framework foisted upon the discipline, was one of 
immense creative relief – an outlet from which he could escape both his conservative 
upbringing, and his earlier problematic encounter with the study of pharmacy.  
These two strands – namely his association with the French Communist Party and his 
interest in Lacan’s work – were moreover interwoven and actualized in his work at La Borde, 
and in his subsequent contribution to a radically reflexive engagement with psychoanalysis. 
Admittedly, this was partly facilitated by the context of La Borde, which was “an unorthodox 
                                                          
121 The other major influence on Guattari’s academic development was the work of Jean-Paul Sartre. With 
regard to this, Dosse writes that Guattari discovered Sartre’s work – in particular, his famous Being and 
Nothingness – in the early 1950s, and never “repudiated his taste for Sartre” (2010: 28), as evinced by his 
statement in the 1990s that, “for me, Sartre is an author like Goethe and Beethoven, it’s all or nothing. I spent 
fifteen years of my life completely immersed in Sartre’s work and actions.” He furthermore advanced that 
“everything I said or did was obviously affected by him. His reading of annihilation, of 
detotalization,…becoming for me, deterritorialization, his idea of seriality, of the pratico-inert, which informed 
my idea of the group-subject, his understanding of freedom, and of the commitment and responsibility of the 
intellectual, which he embodied, all of these remained imperatives or at least immediate givens for me”(Guattari 
in Dosse 2010: 28-29). Interestingly, Sartre was no less important for Deleuze; in Desert Islands, Deleuze 
writes, “That’s what Sartre was for us (for us twenty-year-olds during the Liberation). In those days, who except 
Sartre knew how to say anything new?” Indeed, Deleuze even suggests that Being and Nothingness was “an 
event,” through which “we learned…the identity of thought and liberty” (2004: 77). 
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psychiatric clinic where mental illness was treated unconventionally,” insofar as it “reject[ed] 
the traditional approach of isolating people with psychiatric disorders.” In this regard, the 
clinic was seen as “a real utopia” in that it offered a progressive and experimental approach to 
mental illness (2010: 40). And because La Borde thus offered “new approaches” the space to 
grow, “letting chance and spontaneity play an important role” (2010: 44), it is unsurprising 
that Guattari was drawn to this particular clinic.122 With regard to Guattari’s challenge to 
certain theoretical features of psychiatric practice, Gary Genosko in The Guattari Reader: 
Pierre-Félix Guattari, points out that Guattari should be considered as one of the “radical 
psychiatrists” who emerged in the 1970s as a response to “the anti-psychiatry movement” of 
that decade, which emphasized  “the close relationship between psychiatric and other forms 
of repression.” Indeed, rather than ignoring such criticism, these radical thinkers tried to 
combat France’s (and Europe’s) archaic asylum system, by putting together a more 
progressive approach to national mental health. And it was during this period, or during “the 
second wave of anti-psychiatry,”123 that Guattari came to an important realization that began 
to inform his subsequent writings – both his individual works and his collaboration with 
Deleuze. In terms of this, Genosko refers to Guattari’s statement at the time that “no 
fundamental problem will be solved in this domain as long as we do not have the goal of 
what they call a depsychiatrization of madness.” Accordingly, for Genosko, “in developing 
his perspective on ‘popular alternatives to psychiatry,’ Guattari emphasized that mental 
illness was irreducible to social alienation and the critique of capitalism” (1996: 3-4). In 
effect, and as Genosko further notes in his later work Félix Guattari: An Aberrant 
Introduction, “Guattari, in addition to being a leading theoretician of the innovative La Borde 
psychiatric clinic, was also a militant political activist,” and, as such, “always sought to link 
his (anti)-psychiatric reforms and theorization to working-class and community-based 
revolutionary politics” (2002: 30-31). And the events of 1968 were to prove pivotal in this 
regard.  
Indeed, Guattari’s meeting and subsequent highly productive collaboration with 
Deleuze is generally attributed to the spirit of rupture and experimentation generated by the 
                                                          
122 Dosse also notes that, in more practical terms, Guattari’s friend and influence, Oury, had made his way to the 
clinic earlier (2010: 43), and thereby paved the way for Guattari’s entry into this highly sought after place of 
work.  
123 The first wave of anti-psychiatry is associated with thinkers such as the American psychiatrist, Thomas Szasz 
(Genosko 1998: 109). As Oliver Ralley explains in “The Rise of Anti-Psychiatry: A Historical Overview,” 
Szasz, “in his foremost work, The Myth of Mental Illness: Foundations of a Theory of Personal 
Conduct…explains how mental illness’ cannot exist in any real sense and why psychiatry therefore has no right 
to rule over those who are diagnosed as ‘mentally ill’” (n.d, 1).  
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events of May 1968 (Bogue 1988:1; Alliez and Goffey 2011: 58). However, while the related 
intellectual atmosphere set the conditions for a meeting between the two thinkers, it was a 
more personal connection that ultimately brought them together, and this connection was 
“Jean- Pierre Muyard…a medical student” specializing in psychiatry “in Lyon and a militant 
member of the left wing of the National French Students’ Union” (Dosse 2010: 2). Through 
his activities, Muyard was well acquainted with Guattari, but over time he developed an 
interest in the work of Deleuze and befriended him, partly because of his own interest in 
Deleuze’s work on Sacher-Masoch, and partly because of Deleuze’s desire to “better 
understand the world of psychotics” (2010: 2). Accordingly, in response to Deleuze’s 
interests, Muyard arranged a meeting between him and Guattari, and the resultant output, 
Anti-Oedipus, became one of the defining texts of the post-1968 intellectual scene. Yet, 
Ronald Bogue makes an additional important point concerning the book. He argues that while 
many readers “saw a philosophical expression of the spirit of the May 1968 student-revolt” in 
the book, as a result of its “irreverent radicalism and critique of psychoanalysis,” it should 
also be remembered that it was neither “a spontaneous effusion of May’68 irrationalism nor 
an opportunistic exploitation of the cult of Lacanism.” Instead, Bogue argues that Anti-
Oedipus “was the result of nearly twenty years of investigation in philosophy, psychoanalysis 
and political theory on the part of its authors.” And in many respects, this description can be 
extended to all of Deleuze and Guattari’s collaborative works. That is, although the various 
concepts presented therein are truly a joint venture, each man’s lengthy and individual 
preceding engagement with different strands of theory – for Deleuze, his work on Hume, 
Kant, Nietzsche, Proust, Bergson, and so on, and for Guattari, his deep interest in Sartre and 
Lacan, as well as his experience in radical psychiatric practice and militant politics – should 
not be understated as important components in forming the subsequent Deleuzoguattarian 
concepts.  
Apart from the above collaboration, Guattari also continued to produce theoretical 
work on an individual basis. And this work continued to reflect the concerns he had 
developed in his own considerations of the prevailing problematic social relations of his era. 
Of these works, those that have been translated into English include The Machinic 
Unconsciousness (1979), Molecular Revolution: Psychiatry and Politics (1984), 
Schizoanalytic Cartographies (1989), The Three Ecologies (1989), Chaosmosis: an Ethico-
Aesthetic Paradigm (1992), and Chaosophy (1995). And as is clear from these titles, many of 
the themes of Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus were deeply resonant with his own 
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perspective.  Stephen Zepke in Art as Abstract Machine: Ontology and Aesthetics in Deleuze 
and Guattari, neatly captures Guattari’s orientation in these above works, when he draws 
attention to a passage in Guattari’s Chaosophy. Discussing art as having the potential to be 
creative and thus political, Guattari suggests that, “promoting a new aesthetic 
paradigm…involves overthrowing current forms of art as much as those of social life. I hold 
out my hands to the future” (in Zepke 2005: 183). In many respects, this passage encapsulates 
the resonance between Deleuze and Guattari, which led to such a productive relationship. 
That is, while Deleuze was the supreme theoretician who rigorously promoted difference 
through the rejuvenation of oft-maligned philosophers, and via the generation of concepts 
borrowed from diverse and (seemingly) unrelated fields of study, Guattari, the practicing 
doctor and militant activist, advocated movement or deterritorializations away from stale 
formulations, the effects of which he witnessed daily in his line of work.  
Yet, while Deleuze did not elaborate further on what ‘counter-information’ entailed, 
despite it being so crucial to resisting the dividualizing forces of digital control society, Félix  
Guattari was far more explicit in his description of the capacity of information technology to 
engender difference, as evinced by his concept of post-media. In this regard, particularly in 
his 1992 text Chaosmosis: An Ethico-Aesthetic Paradigm, Guattari – referencing the 
conceptual tools he had developed with Deleuze in their co-authored works, primarily Anti-
Oedipus, Kafka: Towards a Minor Literature, and A Thousand Plateaus – advanced his idea 
of post-media.124   
 In order to understand what Guattari means by post-media, it is helpful to briefly 
consider Chaosmosis in context. It was not only this author’s last published work, but also 
comprised an attempt at complexifying subjectivity, against the backdrop of the advances 
made in Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus. As discussed in the previous chapter, 
through these works Deleuze and Guattari proceeded beyond Freud and Marx via their 
                                                          
124 It is important to clarify that Guattari’s post-media differs from two other well-known uses of the same term, 
namely, the post-media advanced by Rosalind Kraus, and the concept of post-media aesthetics advanced by Lev 
Manovich. In Beyond New Media Art, Domenico Quaranta draws the distinction between Guattari’s and Kraus’s 
uses of the term. He writes that firstly, in Guattari’s use of post-media, “the term seems to be a front for a more 
complex theory,” which furthermore “starts with a reflection on the independent media and free radios of the 
1970 to posit, at the end of the consensual era of mass media,” an era “in which the media would be a tool of 
dissent.” Secondly, Quaranta points out that Kraus, in her celebrated A Voyage in the North Sea: Art in the Age 
of the Post-Medium Condition (1999), actually uses the term “post-medium” as opposed to “post-media” in her 
reflection on the decline of the “concept of media specificity.” As such, her post-media has “a different meaning 
from that posited by Guattari” (2013: 199-200). With regard to Lev Manovich, his use of the term is also 
dissimilar to Guattari’s insofar as it forms part of the debate precipitated by Kraus over medium-specificity. In 
terms of this, Manovich proposes “a new postmedia aesthetic that focuses on a cultural analysis of software and 
informational behaviours” which allows us to “see old and new cultures as one continuum” (Kinder 2014: 8-9).  
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exploration of the politics of desire in relation to the construction of radically different 
subjectivities. Similarly, from the opening chapter of Chaosmosis, namely “On the 
Production of Subjectivity,” Guattari pursues further complexification by pointing out that his 
conception of subjectivity is rooted in a Bakhtinian understanding of subjectivity, as 
something “plural and polyphonic,” rather than based on any “traditional systems of binary 
determination.”125 Accordingly, and in keeping with his earlier projects with Deleuze, 
Guattari argues in this chapter that “at least three types of problem prompt us to enlarge the 
definition of subjectivity beyond the classic opposition between individual subject and 
society.” These are, firstly, “the irruption of subjective factors at the forefront of current 
events, [secondly,] the massive development of machinic productions of subjectivity,” and 
thirdly, “the recent prominence of ethological and ecological perspectives on human 
subjectivity” (1995: 1-2). While the latter issue of the environmental crisis was discussed at 
length in Chapter One, the first refers to the collapse of the Eastern Bloc following the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union, and the second to the growing momentum in the 
development and capacity of information technology.126  Referencing models of analysis that 
do not explicitly contest classic conceptions of subjectivity, such as “sociology, economic 
science, political science, and legal studies,” Guattari goes on to propose that they are “poorly 
equipped” in their ability “to account for the mixture of archaic attachments to cultural 
traditions that nonetheless aspire to the technological and scientific modernity characterising 
the contemporary subjective cocktail” (1995: 3-4). And it is in relation to this deficit that 
Guattari attempts to create a “schizoanalytic meta-modelisation” (1995: 58) that can help 
thought move forward toward an “Ecosophy” (1995: 119). That is, an understanding of how 
subjectivity is an ever-augmenting result of a heterogeneous combination of productive 
forces; something which can run ‘counter’ to the flow of ‘information’ through State 
Apparatus channels.   
 Importantly, in the above endeavour, Guattari focuses heavily on information 
technology as a conduit through which the kind of subjectivity generated by State Apparatus 
                                                          
125 Sue Vice in Introducing Bakhtin, explains that polyphony “refers precisely to the construction of the voices 
of characters and narrator in the novel.” For these to be considered polyphonic, they should feature the “co-
presence of independent but interconnected voices” (1997: 112). The importance of such an arrangement is 
made clear by Steinby and Klapuri, who in Bakhtin and his Others: (Inter) Subjectivity, Chronotope, Dialogism, 
argue that polyphony is correlative to the production of “polysubjectivity” (2013: 38).  
126 Importantly, if one considers the collapse of the Soviet Union as coterminous with the dawn of neoliberal 
hegemony – as Alexander Callinicos does (2003: 6) – then this event, along with the rise of information 
technology, parallels the two issues highlighted by Deleuze in his “Postscript on Control Societies” as 
characterizing the contemporary era, and thereby lends further support to the idea of implicit synergy between 
Deleuze’s counter-information and Guattari’s post-media.    
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information flow can be countered, contested and experimented with. And in this respect, he 
attempts to liberate the machine from its typical technological connotations, by insisting that 
it can fulfil an aesthetic function through the generation of creativity, difference and new 
thought. In his first mention of the potential impact of world pervasive information 
technology, Guattari writes that “technological transformations oblige us to be aware 
of…universalising and reductionist homogenisations of subjectivity and of a heterogenetic 
tendency” (1995: 5). Yet through this he not only echoes Deleuze’s concern over the 
normative effects of digitality, but also establishes the need for a circumspect approach that 
does not reject digitality out of hand. This is clear when he suggests that:  
 
We should be on guard against progressivist illusions or visions which are 
systematically pessimistic. The machinic production of subjectivity can work for 
the better or for the worse. There exists an anti-modernist attitude which involves a 
massive rejection of technological innovation, particularly as it concerns the 
information revolution. [But] it’s impossible to judge such a machinic evolution 
either positively or negatively; everything depends on its articulation within 
collective assemblages of enunciation. At best there is the creation, or invention, of 
new Universes of reference; at the worst there is the deadening influence of the 
mass media to which millions of individuals are currently condemned. (1995: 5-6) 
 
Consequently, Guattari contends that “computer-aided design leads to the production of 
images opening on to unprecedented plastic Universes,” and he argues that when 
technological development is tied with “social experimentation,” it becomes possible for 
“these new domains” to “lead…us out of the current period of oppression and into a post-
media era characterised by the reappropriation and resingularisation of the use of media” 
(1995: 5-6).127 Through Guattari’s reference to the collective enunciation detailed in his 
collaborative work with Deleuze on Kafka, it is clear that he sees digitality as a potential 
generator of connections with unpredictable results, in a manner akin to the nomadic 
machines he wrote about with Deleuze in A Thousand Plateaus. And this becomes even more 
conspicuous when Guattari, referencing Deleuze’s work on cinematic movement- and time-
images, maintains that when we are confronted by any form of art, “we are not in the 
presence of a passively representative image, but of a vector of subjectivication” (1995: 25).  
                                                          
127Although Guattari does not dedicate overly much attention to the specific features found within information 
technology that could be ‘reappropriated’ or ‘resingularised,’ he does indicate “access to data banks, video 
libraries, interactivity between participants, etc.” (1995: 6), as the digital aspects he has in mind.  
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Indeed, Guattari takes his argument further than just stating that information 
technology has the potential to counteract the production of isolated and limited subjectivity, 
by making a number of specific related claims further on in his text. For instance, he argues 
that “informatic subjectivity distances us at high speed from the old scriptural linearity,” in 
that it engenders “an ontological heterogenesis,” especially in light of “the proliferation of 
new materials [and] new electronic representations,” and when combined with “a shrinking 
of distances and an enlargement of points of view” (1995: 96). Adding to this, he also 
advances that “machinic mutations…deterritorialize subjectivity” and that “the junction of 
informatics, telematics and the audio-visual will perhaps allow a decisive step to be made in 
the direction of interactivity, [or] towards a post-media era.” Yet importantly, heeding his 
own call for a careful and considered approach, Guattari sees such positive developments as 
possible only if there is a correlative creative engagement with digitality within society as a 
whole. With regard to this, he writes that all of this is possible “provided that society 
changes,” and specifically, “provided that new social, political, aesthetic and analytical 
practices allow us to escape from the shackles of empty speech which crush us” (1995: 97). 
Nevertheless, regardless of whether or not society moves powerfully toward any kind of 
change that may be considered positive, Guattari acknowledges that profound shifts (at his 
time of writing) deriving from the digital revolution have generated a destabilized setting of 
opportunity. With regard to such flux, he argues that in conjunction with “geopolitical 
configurations [which are] changing at a great pace,” we have ever-present and ever more 
pervasive “the Universes of techno-science, biology, computer technology, telematics and the 
media,” all of which “further destabilise our mental co-ordinates on a daily basis” (1995: 
119).  
Guattari’s post-media in contemporary digital theorization  
A number of contemporary theorists have critically considered and ultimately lent support to 
Guattari’s insistence that rapid technological advance has the potential to engender 
difference. For example, in “Post Media Occupations for Writing Theory,” John Tinnell both 
elaborates upon Guattari’s proposition of adopting an “Ecosophy,” and relates it specifically 
to the realm of digital media. In terms of the first point, he argues that the usefulness of 
Guattari’s idea of developing an Ecosophy is in its very Deleuzoguattarian insistence that 
oppositions should not be validated as a form of understanding the self in relation to its 
societal context. That is, “Guattari’s refusal to oppose nature against culture or ecology 
against technology” offers, according to Tinnell, an approach that provides a far more 
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dynamic perspective, one which takes complexity and openness into account (2012: 126). 
And this derives its strength from the fact that “Guattari’s Ecosophy…aims…to theorize the 
production of subjectivity as a dynamic network involving transversal connections among 
collective assemblages of enunciation.” A view which is opposed to the typical perspective of 
“‘separate’ realms of humans, animals, plants, buildings, music, computers, etc.;” realms that 
are related but that exist in “discrete and relatively stable categories.” Indeed, Guattari insists 
that “the world [can be seen] as a dance between chaos and complexity – a multitude of 
productive syntheses between nomadic parts that exist independent of any fixed structure or 
transcendental whole.” Accordingly, the challenge is not to seek to regulate or create a false 
hierarchy or harmony, but rather to “engender institutional and ontological conditions that 
encourage people to encounter the world as a series of open and ongoing syntheses between 
partial objects” (2012: 127-128). And for Guattari, it is precisely the digital that could 
potentially contribute to such dynamic destabilization and promotion of exchange. For his 
part, and in pursuit of such contributions, Tinnell points to the “dynamic software made 
popular by Web 2.0 – such as interactive databases and server-side scripting languages” that 
have the potential to “generate…new writing” (2012: 140).128  
Similarly, in “Digital Ecologies,” Sean Morey further explores the idea of the digital 
as a space of contestation and difference, by discussing Guattari’s idea of post-media 
specifically in relation to the capitalist ethos that it would have to operate in relation to. 
Referencing Guattari’s The Three Ecologies, Morey neatly summarizes the concept of 
Ecosophy as “understanding wholes through heterogeneity rather than homogeneity.” And he 
contends that, for Guattari, it is precisely “a capitalist subjectivity” that demands the 
dissipation of any difference or heterogeneity (2012: 113). In this regard, he quotes Guattari 
who, in The Three Ecologies, advances that such capitalist subjectivity “demands that all 
singularity must either be evaded or crushed in specialist apparatuses and frames of 
references,” and that through doing so, it “forms massive subjective aggregates from the most 
personal” (2010: 33-34). One is immediately reminded here of Deleuze’s concern over 
dividualization within digital societies of control, and Guattari is by no means dismissive of 
this potential problem in his conception of post-media.129 Rather, using the conceptual tools 
                                                          
128 It must be noted that Tinnell focuses specifically on new writing practises, as opposed to a broader 
examination of the digital space, because “writing theory and digital media” is his specific ambit of research 
(2012: 215).   
129 Not only is one immediately reminded of Deleuze’s concern over dividualization when one reads Guattari’s 
words, but the contemporary of such dividualization that also looms large is Facebook. As discussed in some 
detail earlier in this chapter, this pervasive network is, in a sense, omnipresent and the first port of call whenever 
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co-created with his long-time collaborator Deleuze, Guattari proposes a potential practice of 
resistance. That is, unlike Deleuze – who never substantially developed on his concept of 
‘counter-information’ as it pertains to piracy – Morey proposes that in his idea of post-media 
Guattari develops an “electrate, digital ecology,” in which “the media will be reappropriated 
by a multitude of subject-groups capable of directing its resingularisation” (2012: 114). 
Which arguably sheds more light on what Deleuze meant. And to avoid construing this in 
utopian terms, we must remember Guattari’s caveat in Chaosmosis that this would only be 
possible “provided that society changes,” and specifically, “provided that new social, 
political, aesthetic and analytical practices allow us to escape from the shackles of empty 
speech which crush us” (1995: 97). Interestingly, as Byron Hawk in “Curating Ecologies, 
Circulating Musics: From the Public Sphere to Sphere Publics” suggests, reflections of this 
can already be identified. That is, in relation to Guattari’s The Three Ecologies, Hawk finds 
examples of practical realizations of Guattari’s post-media. Referencing Tiziana Terranova’s 
book Network Culture, he demonstrates how Terranova brings forward some evocative and 
exciting ways of looking at the Internet. For example, she argues that “mapping Internet 
traffic shows distinct hubs of activity and connection, not just around the mega sites such as 
Google, Facebook, and CNN, but also around smaller networked archipelagos of like-minded 
sub-sites.” Accordingly, what this leads to is “a fractal ecology of social niches and micro 
niches [that] materialize at the intersection of manifold connections” (in Hawk 2012: 160). 
Another interesting insight is her assertion that in networked space “information is not simply 
transmitted from point A to point B,” but rather, “it propagates and by propagation it affects 
and modifies its milieu” (in Hawk 2012: 174). And Hawk closes on a similarly pro-post-
media position, by making explicit reference to Guattari’s proposition that “computerization 
in particular has unleashed the potential for new forms of ‘exchange’ in value, new collective 
negotiations, whose ultimate product will be more…singular, [and] more dissensual” (Hawk 
2012: 177).  
Indeed, even Castells validates Guattari’s position, when he advances that 
technological means can be employed to counter developments seen as destructive, and 
subsequently provides a number of examples in this regard. For instance, he points out that 
“networking, and particularly Internet-based networking, is of the essence in the anti-
globalization movement” (2010: 154). Thus while Castells, as discussed earlier, does echo 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
one experiences anything at all, even though it is a coded schema which lacks the sophistication to capture 
experience in anything other than the most basic of formulations.  
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certain of Deleuze’s concerns regarding the capacity of the digital to infiltrate and restrict 
populations – the continuous moulding identified by Deleuze as the most salient feature of 
control society, for instance, is analogous to Castells’ writings on work and time – he also 
reflects a Guattarian optimism that the internet can function as an interactive space which can 
help groups of people precipitate change. And at least two examples serve as a testament to 
this more optimistic viewpoint. In a 2001 interview with Harry Kreisler, as part of UC 
Berkeley’s “Conversations with History” series, and in response to Kreisler’s hypothetical 
scenario that computers donated to Nigeria by an oil company could, in turn, be used to 
organize local protest and global dissent against that very company, Castells paints a picture 
of a system of relations that are hard to manage by the more powerful entities within that 
relation. In terms of this, he argues that:   
 
It’s informational guerrilla tactics, if you wish, with different components being 
part or not part of the movement, and, of course, no possibility of control. How do 
you control the movement on the Internet? Yes, you can arrest people or beat up 
people in a particular demonstration, but the media effect of that…in fact…help[s] 
the anti-globalization movement to introduce a debate that did not exist. Until three 
or four years ago, it was clear in the official ideology of companies, governments, 
[and] institutions that “globalization is good and you just have to explain it to 
people. Technology, by definition, is good, and if you are quiet and patient for a 
couple of decades, everybody will begin.” Well, the anti-globalization movement, 
right or wrong, has created a space for social and political debate that did not exist. 
And this is thanks to the ability of environmentalists and other groups to connect 
with the Internet, relate to the public opinion through the media, and connect their 
locality to the global processes through specific events and demonstrations. 
(Castells 2001: 5)  
 
Thus, unlike Deleuze, who foresaw digitality primarily as a move toward further societal and 
conceptual restriction, Castells, with the benefit of access to a multitude of subsequent 
developments in relation to information technology, sees it as a far more multi-faceted 
domain, in which the generation of diverse effects is possible. And in doing so, Castells 
validates Guattari’s position that post-media has the capacity to act as an agent of difference 
generation. Indeed, Castells even updates and extends such thought in his 2012 work 
Networks of Outrage and Hope: Social Movements in the Internet Age, in which he discusses 
the nature of the new networked social movements that came to prominence during 2011 – 
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first in Tunisia and Iceland, and then spreading from these countries elsewhere. Here he 
argues that “Internet social networks…are spaces of autonomy largely beyond the control of 
governments and corporations” (2012: 2), and he furthermore praises these movements for 
their weariness of mainstream media, their lack of affiliation with orthodox political 
organizations, and their decentralized means of operation, citing virtual space or cyberspace 
as the means through which physical, actualized protest was galvanized and organized (2012: 
4).  
  Beyond this, Deleuze and Guattari’s terminology, and especially the concepts they 
advanced in texts such as Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus, are featuring with 
increasing prominence in various analyses of how people and the internet interface, and the 
implications thereof. In particular – and notwithstanding Buchanan’s reservations discussed 
earlier – contemporary theorists seem very much drawn to the Deleuzoguattarian concept of a 
rhizome as a means by which to understand the workings of this interface, as well as the 
related Deleuzoguattarian concepts of assemblage/s, nomadism, lines of flight, 
smooth/striated spaces, and deterritorialization/reterritorialization. Agnieszka Wenninger in 
“Territory (ies) Internet: A Deleuzian perspective on ownership and identity on the web,” 
explains that such an approach allows for a far more dynamic and reasoned engagement with 
trying to understand the internet as both a restrictive and a creative space. And she writes that 
“along with Deleuze, one can state that [the] Internet is neither terra infinita to be explored, 
nor an electronic library, but should rather be conceived of as a battlefield of (on) 
territories/domains as well as deterritorialization and reterritorialization movements” (n.d. 2). 
Admittedly, it would have been more correct for her to also cite Guattari in this regard, since 
her related sentiments are more an optimistic echo of his post-media than of Deleuze’s 
thoughts on digitality in general. Nevertheless, in employing such an understanding, she 
returns to Castells’ assertion that “the Internet is no longer a free realm, but neither has it 
fulfilled [an] Orwellian prophecy” (Castells 2001: 171). To be sure, we have already seen 
how both the State, through surveillance and the creation of laws that allow its interference, 
and Capital, through its monopolization of Internet infrastructure and its commodification of 
information, constitutes a large chunk of what the internet now is. But by employing the 
rhizomatic schema to the Internet, it also becomes apparent that total homogeneity online is 
not a possibility. As the anonymous author on thing.net writes, with specific reference to 
deterritorialization and reterritorialization, “rhizomatic-nomadic resistant Internet 
actors…will need to map out new territory and terrain,” because “the Panopticon sees all, but 
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only in territory it knows.” Thus, “resistant actors will need to create new territory and act 
while the panoptic forces of State and capital play catch up” (N.A. 1997).130 
Arguably, what the appeal of vivid conceptualizations such as Deleuze and Guattari’s 
rhizome serve to demonstrate is a contemporary commitment to the production of difference 
and experimentation. As Scott Sundvall in “Post-Human, All too Non-Human: Implications 
of the Cyber-Rhizome” enthuses, “the cyber-rhizome is a becoming-everything, an n-1 
system, endlessly producing multiples, asignifying and uncoding its apprehensions along its 
course of flight, along smooth, flat lines.” Moreover, for him, the cyber-rhizome is “both/and, 
not (n)either/(n)or,” insofar as it is “a constant and virtual ‘becoming-other’” (2012: 16). In 
turn, Jennifer Bay employs the Deleuzoguattarian concept of an assemblage, which “relies on 
the structure of the rhizome,” to discuss the social capabilities offered by information 
technology.131 Focusing her analysis on “smart mobs,” which she explains as “the 
phenomenon of people acting in concert regardless of whether they know one another” – 
reminiscent of the hacktivists working together on Operation Payback132 – Bay writes that the 
assemblage is “a machinic assemblage of bodies, of actions and passions, an intermingling of 
                                                          
130 Edward Shanken in Art and Electronic Media, and Mark Tribe and Reena Jana in New Media Art, both 
explain the idea behind ‘the thing’ (thing.net) as “an international net-community of artists and art-related 
projects that was started in 1991 by Wolfgang Staehle.” In short, it was launched in 1991 as “a mailbox system 
accessible over the telephone network in New York feeding a Bulletin Board System (BBS) in 1991 before their 
website was launched in 1995.” However, on account of its increasing popularity, “by the late 1990s, The Thing 
grew into a diverse online community” (Shanken 2009:50; Tribe and Jana 2006: 22-23). Although the 
community is seemingly far less active at present, statements such as the one quoted above reflect the 
excitement over the potential of the internet as a creative space. That is, although the State and Capital have 
certainly further encroached onto and into the cyber domain, the author’s initial point stands, namely that these 
forces will always be ‘playing catch up’ within such a dynamic communication space; a viewpoint that 
constitutes a good response to Buchanan’s reading of cyberspace, discussed earlier, and one that moreover 
validates Guattari’s concept of post-media.   
131 Diane Currier in “Feminist Technological Futures: Deleuze and Body/Technology Assemblages,” explains 
Deleuze and Guattari’s conception of the assemblage as “functional conglomerations of elements” where “the 
component elements are not taken to be unified, stable or self-identical entities or objects, that is, they are not 
grounded on a prior unity. In each assemblage the particles, intensities, forces and flows of components meet 
with and link with the forces and flows of the other components: the resultant distribution of these meetings 
constitutes the assemblage” (2003: 325). The effect of this, as Grosz points out in Volatile Bodies, is that the 
body as assemblage allows for “an altogether different way of understanding the body in its connections with 
other bodies” (1994: 165).  
132 Although all the companies that suspended WikiLeaks’ accounts as a result of governmental pressure denied 
that any such pressure had been exerted on them to sever ties with WikiLeaks, public response, although varied, 
was in many cases less than convinced of this. Accordingly, seeing the denial of service as “an attack on liberty 
and free speech,” many people started “coming to WikiLeaks' defence” (Bradley, 2010). In this regard, the 
Operation Payback campaign, operating under the moniker Operation Avenge Assange, consisted of a number 
of decentralized distributed denial of service (DDos) attacks by individual hackers (or “hacktivists”) on 
companies involved in freezing WikiLeaks’ account (Sklar 2011). In terms of a more ‘legitimate’ response, the 
“Philadelphia, PA-based mobile payments firm Xipwire, Inc.” stepped in to act “as an intermediary for 
WikiLeaks after the world’s largest credit card providers halted all electronic donations to the non-profit media 
outlet,” arguing that, in their view, “people should be able to make their own decisions as to who they donate to” 
(Webster, 2010). 
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bodies reacting to one another; [but also] a collective assemblage of enunciation, of acts and 
statements, of incorporeal transformations attributed to bodies” (2004: 491). This 
“intermingling of bodies in a society,” according to her, is made ever more possible by 
advances in information technology, and in particular by social networking, through which 
people connect, for among other reasons, “political action.” In terms of the actualization of 
political positions discussed online, she also writes that “these ad hoc mobile networks enable 
human bodies to spontaneously assemble in a physical place through [their] mobile 
connections” (2004: 492), and thereby express a view strongly indebted to Guattari’s post-
media.133  
 
                                                          
133 Even outside of the ambit of Deleuzoguattarian studies, academic writers have been quick to spot the various 
collective potentials engendered through the rapid changes undergone by the medium. For instance, while Zizi 
Papacharissi in The Virtual Sphere: The Internet as a Public Sphere, discusses the growth and spread of 
Guattarian group subjectivity in the form of people collaborating online in pursuit of democracy, Stale Stenslie 
in Virtual Touch: A study of the use and experience of touch in artistic, multimodal and computer-based 
environments, discusses the possibilities of developing haptic technologies associated with the digital. And in 
his book Convergence Culture: Where Old and New Media Collide, Henry Jenkins, hailed as “the 21st Century 
McLuhan” (Rheingold, Smart Mobs), provides an evocative example of the unpredictable nature of the internet. 
Far from being a striated space, in which desire is channelled, and in which activity is controlled ever more 
pervasively by the State Apparatus and free-market capital, Jenkins demonstrates how even a singular action or 
image can have unpredictable effects that are difficult to control. Jenkins’ story focuses on events taking place 
in 2001, when “Dino Ignacio, a Filipino-American high school student created a Photoshop collage of Sesame 
Street’s (1970) Bert interacting with terrorist leader Osama bin Laden” (2006: 1). This image was only one of a 
series of images featuring Bert, with the character in each case situated next to various notorious historical 
figures and criminals. These images were all featured on Ignacio’s personal homepage, and not intended for any 
serious distribution beyond his local network of friends and acquaintances. However, Jenkins explains that post 
9/11 “a Bangladesh-based publisher scanned the Web for Bin Laden images to print on anti-American signs, 
posters and T-shirts,” and in doing so, picked up on Ignacio’s image, and printed and distributed thousands of 
items bearing the picture. When CNN, covering one such anti-American demonstration, filmed protestors with 
images of the unlikely duo, a maelstrom of accusation, confusion, and further distribution and re-appropriation 
of the image erupted. Jenkins reports that “Representatives from the Children’s Television Workshop, creators 
of the Sesame Street series, spotted the CNN footage and threatened to take legal action” (2006: 2). It was here, 
much like in the Battlefield 2 video misunderstanding, discussed earlier, that the dissonance between individual 
digital practice, digital flow, and the sanctioned frameworks tasked with controlling information distribution 
become abundantly clear. The intellectual property attorneys employed by the offended party found it difficult 
to pursue any legal action, or indeed, to control the distribution of the image. They could not pursue claims for 
damages against CNN, as the network was simply reporting on an event and the images had been coincidental to 
that event. Similarly, the Bangladesh-based publisher formed part of a loose and ambiguous set of relations in a 
different part of the world, and thus was almost impossible to prosecute. Beyond this, while the publisher had 
initially distributed the offending image, the resulting replications had been made by others, over a dispersed 
geographical region. Pursuing the high school student Ignacio would have been of no use either, as he had not 
intended to distribute the image – it had only been a ruse designed to entertain a select group of friends. As the 
media, and thus the public, picked up on the dispute, the Children’s Television Workshop lost complete control 
of their intellectual property. Users amused themselves by mimicking Ignacio’s original concept, creating 
images of various Sesame Street characters posing with a collection of notorious historical and contemporary 
figures. As Jenkins summarizes: “From his bedroom, Ignacio sparked an international controversy. His images 
criss-crossed the world, sometimes on the backs of commercial media, sometimes via grassroots media.” And 
for Jenkins, this example serves to demonstrate that in the convergence culture precipitated by the internet, “old 
and new media collide [and] grassroots and corporate media intersect,” in ways that are often-times erratic. As 
he writes, in convergence culture, “the power of the media producer and the power of the media consumer 
interacts in unpredictable ways” (2006: 2).  
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Conclusion  
In closing, while Guattari pursued heterogeneity actively in Chaosmosis and The Three 
Ecologies through his concept of post-media, Deleuze only alluded to the possibility of 
counter-information engendering difference, but never developed the concept more fully. But 
rather than Guattari’s concept of post-media clashing with Deleuze’s concept of counter-
information, the former in many respects can be understood as an elaboration of certain 
features of the latter, particularly the aspect of piracy mentioned explicitly by Deleuze. 
Moreover, while Guattari’s post-media similarly entails acknowledgment of the 
homogenizing dangers of a digital society of control, it also maintains openness toward the 
digital production of heterogeneity. And, through this, Guattari – perhaps more so than 
Deleuze – in many ways reinvigorates and makes applicable Deleuzian/Deleuzoguattarian 
thinking for theorizing the Internet as a potential place for the production of difference.  
  A certain irony hangs over this issue, though, as it is often the case that the work of 
Deleuze in relation to digitality is read through a Guattarian post-media lens, and then 
broadly attributed to Deleuze. That is, despite being widely available, Guattari’s theoretical 
contribution is often minimized in favour of attributing the conceptual tools he uses in 
discussing the digital – as a space of potential difference – to either Deleuze himself, or to a 
collaborative Deleuzoguattarian framework. Gary Genosko in Félix Guattari: An Aberrant 
Introduction, explores this tendency of ignoring Guattari in favour of Deleuze, and points out 
that  
 
despite the…publications of English translations of two books, The Three Ecologies 
and Chaosmosis, Guattari remains unknown, unless it is through his problematic 
subsumption as a partner of Gilles Deleuze. [Yet] even under such less than 
desirable conditions, Guattari’s influence may be said to be quite strong but 
unacknowledged, and poorly understood. (2002: 1)  
 
Trying to account for such marginalization, Genosko traces the problem back to how Guattari 
was perceived in his native France, writing that he was either viewed as an “activist or 
intellectual: but not both.” As such, despite being “a star” of sorts, as a result of his perceived 
straddling of both pursuits, the popular instantiation of this binary public identity “kept him 
outside the orbit of intellectuality.” As a further reason for his marginalization, Genosko 
notes that “in the English-speaking world, Guattari has occasionally been poorly mounted as 
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a specimen of postmodernism.” And his situation within a “category of convenience for all 
those thinkers that lack a proper place” has led to the reluctance of “organizations and 
administrators” to take the risk of publication and promotion in case profits are not realized 
(2002:1). Beyond these two unfortunate circumstances, Genosko points to a third factor, in 
“Deleterious Deleuziana,” where he identifies the word ‘Deleuze’ itself as an order word, or 
one of those words that “issue commands and arrange bodies in standardized ways.” Put 
differently, these are words that place emphasis on a particular aspect in a relation, and in 
terms of this, Genosko argues that “the order-word – ‘Deleuze’ – has come to haunt the 
burgeoning critical literatures on ‘Deleuze and Guattari.’ Indeed, he even remonstrates that 
“no matter how creative the combination” of “Deleuze and Guattari. D+G. D/G. D–G. D&G. 
DaG, Deleuzo-Guattarian, Philosopher and psychoanalyst/activist…none adequately evoke 
the remarkable accomplishments of Deleuze and Guattari’s collective projects,” which were 
created in collaboration “between one another” (2002: 41). Moreover, beyond re-orientating 
our perspective to read Deleuzoguattarian concepts as a series of works created between two 
thinkers, whose individual contributions are lost within the concepts they created together – 
between one another – it should also be considered that, as Ronald Bogue argues in Deleuze 
and Guattari, “Guattari’s several independently written works reveal…[how] his is an 
incisive and engaging intellect that merits serious attention in its own right” (1989: 9).  
 And this is all the more so today because, in the serious exploration of information 
technology and the possibility of continued agency in the generation of difference, it is his 
concept of post-media, built on his collaborative work with Deleuze, which to a large extent 
is being endorsed and expanded upon by contemporary theorists in the absence of a more 
detailed account of what Deleuze meant by counter-information. Yet in the same breath one 
must also acknowledge the value of Deleuze’s concept of duration, which underpinned his 
concept of difference, and of the need to include it in any consideration of counter-
information, in the interest of augmenting its adversarial efficacy – efficacy which, after all, 
is indicated as its defining feature. And it is to such consideration that we now turn.  
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Chapter Five – Deleuze, durationality, difference, and digitality  
Introduction  
As discussed in the previous chapter, despite Deleuze’s misgivings over the relationship 
between digitality and societies of control – misgivings which have been echoed and 
elaborated upon by a range of contemporary theorists – Deleuze did allude to the possibility 
of contesting the informational flows of control society through the production of counter-
information. And although these allusions remained vague and, in the words of Mark Poster, 
“underdeveloped” (2006:60), more clarity over what Deleuze had in mind can be achieved if 
the tendency to marginalize Guattari’s work through seeing him as an addendum within the 
Deleuzoguattarian collaboration, is relinquished. In this regard, Guattari’s post-media was 
explored as a concept not only resonant with Deleuze’s counter-information, but also helpful 
in establishing the dynamics and parameters of the latter, which to a certain extent it 
elaborates upon. However the question of what Deleuze meant when he insisted that counter-
information could be identified by its efficacy, remains. And it is important to explore this 
because it opens up the issue of the relationship between duration and difference, in a way 
that can guide the production of counter-information.  
That is, to ignore Deleuze’s insistence that duration is inextricably linked with difference, 
is a problematic oversight because it displaces a key point of reflection with regard to digital 
technology, in the absence of which only a superficial – and ineffective – application of 
Deleuzoguattarian concepts to the realm of the digital is possible. In relation to this, and in 
order to provide a fuller perspective on the matter, the focus of this chapter will fall initially 
on Deleuze’s writings on the durational component of difference, a theme already developed 
by Deleuze to some extent in his Nietzsche and Philosophy, and which he engaged further 
with in his Difference and Repetition, Proust and Signs, and Bergsonism. After this, focus 
will shift to Deleuze’s two texts on cinema, namely Cinema 1: The Movement-Image and 
Cinema 2: The Time-Image, because of how in these two works Deleuze conjoins his quest 
for durational difference with the technological phylum that is analog cinema. Here, Deleuze 
provides a profound and meticulous meditation on the potential of analog technology to 
engender difference as a result of its reflection of and upon duration. Next, and against this 
backdrop, the discussion will centre on whether digital cinema – and relatedly digital 
technology – can continue and extend such durational reflection in the interest of engendering 
difference, or whether digitality is indissociable from a different ontology inimical to the 
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durational contemplations so important for Deleuze in this regard. In terms of this, focus will 
fall on the debate over the capacity of the digital to generate durational intuition with 
reference to three prominent Deleuzian scholars; one of whom is somewhat sceptical of the 
capacity of digitality in the above regard, namely David Rodowick, and two of whom contest 
such scepticism, namely Brian Massumi and Ronald Bogue. And ultimately, the counter-
arguments of Massumi and Bogue – who advance, respectively, that the digital cannot be 
extricated from its analog context, and that any new, non-dogmatic thought is dependent on 
an aesthetic dynamic before any dependency on technological means through which the 
aesthetic is pursued – will comprise the basis for the argument in the following chapter, 
concerning the importance of hybrid digital durationality.  
Nietzsche, duration and Deleuze  
Among Nietzsche’s many books, three of his texts gained particular notoriety as adversarial 
works, namely The Birth of Tragedy, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, and Twilight of the Idols,134 
and through consideration of some salient themes in these, intimations of the important 
relationship between awareness of duration and the generation of difference emerge quite 
clearly. In what follows, firstly, related reflections will be traced in The Birth of Tragedy, 
where Nietzsche thematizes the decline of culture, from the tragic heights of Aeschylus’ work 
to the limited (and limiting) form of culture reflected in the work of Euripides. Secondly, 
with reference to Thus Spoke Zarathustra, the manner in which this limiting conception of 
life can be defined in terms of the negation of duration and how, according to Nietzsche, it 
has come to inform modern culture, will be thematized. Thirdly, Nietzsche’s explicit and 
thunderous reaction to such a restrictive reality in Twilight of the Idols, along with his 
identification of its roots in ressentiment against, and a hiding away from, durational 
awareness, will be considered. Fourthly, against this backdrop, how Deleuze’s appropriation 
of Nietzsche involves an emphasis on such durational awareness, and its engendering in the 
interest of pursuing difference, will be investigated with reference to his Nietzsche and 
Philosophy and Difference and Repetition.   
                                                          
134 The Birth of Tragedy with its fire-and-brimstone tone caused considerable consternation among Nietzsche’s 
fellow academics, and was poorly received by many of his contemporaries. In Nietzsche: Untimely Meditations, 
Daniel Breazeale notes that Nietzsche not only struggled to get the book published (1997: ix), but that straight 
afterwards, it was “savagely attacked” by “the then-young classicist Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Mollendorf,” who 
“directly challeng[ed] the professional competence of its author.” This particular critique proved, in a sense, 
quite fateful, serving to reinforce “the growing doubts about [Nietzsche’s] professional soundness.” Indeed, of a 
total of 156 students attending the University of Basel, whereas before the publication of Wilamowitz-
Mollendorf’s influential criticism Nietzsche had 21 attending his lectures, afterwards he had only two (1997: x). 
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To begin with, in The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche’s exploration is twofold. Firstly, he 
discusses the changing face of Greek tragedy, tracing the movement from the plays of 
Aeschylus, whose conception of tragedy he celebrates, through those of Sophocles, whose 
work he regards as marking the decline of the artform, to those of Euripides, whose plays he 
labels as “in some sense ‘diseased’” (Burnham and Jesinghausen 2010: 37). To elaborate, 
Nietzsche begins The Birth of Tragedy by posing the question, “What purpose was served by 
Greek art?” (1999:04), and then answers it through an application of his genealogical method. 
In doing so, he refuses to see this Greek artform through the classicist lens of his time, as the 
portrayal of a “beautiful, calm and happy sphere of Greek culture and its Olympian gods,” 
which according to Burnham and Jesinghausen “dominated throughout the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries” (2010: 52). Rather, in accordance with his genealogical approach, 
which was both “opposed to absolute values” and which saw “the history of a thing, in 
general, [as] the succession of forces which struggle for possession” (Deleuze 2006: 03), 
Nietzsche sought an ‘unmasked’ reading of Greek culture – one which would bring into sharp 
focus crucial differences between the exalted names of this ancient world, and the 
implications of their varying approaches. In his reading, he identifies three central figures 
which for him best represent shifts in the conception of tragedy, namely the playwrights 
Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides. And he attributes such shifts in their work to the loss of 
the tension between Apollo and Dionysus that characterizes Aeschylus’ work, which occurs 
through the progressive dominance of Apollo in the works of Sophocles, and culminates in 
the negation of Dionysus in the work of Euripides (Winnington-Ingram 1980: 111; Nussbaum 
1998: 36; Ward 2013:1). What is less often thematized is the immensely close relationship 
between Dionysian movement and time, and for that matter, Dionysian expressions such as 
music which can only be encountered through the passing of time.135 Accordingly, while 
Apollo stands for reason, logical thought, and the stable image, on the one hand, on the other 
hand, Dionysus stands for the more chaotic elements of emotion, passion and music (Hatab 
2001: 49). Yet neither can be isolated from the other, insofar as together they form the poles 
of a continuum, with the excess of each balancing those of the other. For Apollo, unmitigated 
                                                          
135 As will be discussed in due course, Henri Bergson makes a similar point concerning music and duration, 
when he suggests that “a melody to which we listen…comes close to coinciding with this time which is the very 
fluidity of our inner life,” insofar as we recognise and appreciate melody only to the extent that the notes played 
in the immediate past persist in our memory alongside those notes played in the present, which, in turn, does not 
cease to pass (Bergson 1945: 44). This is, of course, not to suggest that the melody to which Bergson refers is 
similar in form to the dithyrambic music thematized by Nietzsche, which was marked instead by a powerful 
“primitive” form which would  “excite the mood” of listeners to “such a degree” that they would “forget their 
normal identities in real life” (Crawford 1999: 279). 
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excess would entail stasis and death, while for Dionysus, it would involve dispersion and 
death. As Elaine Miller explains in her “Nietzsche on Individuation and Purposiveness in 
Nature,” Nietzsche saw the Apollonian as “embodying the principle of individuation,” while 
Dionysus, “as the other natural aesthetic force…[represents]…the counterpart to Apollo’s 
formative impulse” (in Ansell Pearson 2006: 58).  It is thus important to remember 
Nietzsche’s suggestion that “we must understand Greek tragedy as the Dionysian Chorus 
which ever anew discharges itself in an Apollonian world of images” (1999: 44), and his 
argument that “the glory of activity which shines around the Prometheus of Aeschylus,” must 
be contrasted with the “glory of passivity” found in Sophocles, and further extended by 
Euripides (1999: 48). This is because such recollection allows one of Nietzsche’s central 
concerns to emerge into view, namely the progressive loss of durational awareness through 
music, which occurred through the displacement of the Aeschylean chorus by the increasing 
reification of reason in the tragedies of Sophocles and Euripides.  
For Nietzsche, the implications of this decline are manifold, but can be summed up in 
the rise of a dialectical approach to thought, which involved an attempt to grasp, hold, and 
reflect upon reality that was indissociable from a denial of how such reality remained part of 
the ocean of time – or duration – characterized by perpetual movement and change. 
Although distant from us in time, for Nietzsche, the above aesthetic shifts in fifth 
century BCE Greece were of immense cultural importance, because of the ways in which 
they filtered into, and subsequently informed, the modern culture that surrounded him, and 
which he found so limiting on account of its denial of tragic time.136 In terms of this, he 
establishes the first link between Euripides and Socrates, whose rationality informed 
modernity via Plato (1990: 60). As Nietzsche unapologetically declares: “The deity who 
spoke out of…[Euripides] was not Dionysus, nor Apollo, but an altogether new-born daemon 
called Socrates” (1990: 60). And in turn it was “Plato [who] assume[d] (in The Republic as in 
his other writings) that Truth is something eternal, unchanging, and unchangeable” 
(Ebenstein 1999: 24). For Nietzsche, the dialectical reasoning represented by Socrates/Plato 
constitutes one of the most intense expressions of a growing subordination to Apollo, and a 
correlatively increasing rejection of the Dionysian counter-weight so crucial to pursuing an 
affirmative, creative life in relation to time. Also, Socrates was the precursor to both Plato 
                                                          
136 As Foucault points out in Discipline and Punish, this effectively entailed a domestication of time through its 
disciplinary regimentation in the eighteenth century into minutes and seconds, in the service of an obsessive 
emphasis on industrial productivity that was couched in salvific terms (1991: 148-151).  
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and Aristotle, whose respective ideas went on to collectively form the basis of the Christian 
morality that Nietzsche so despised.137 Consequently, as Alexander Nehamas writes in “Who 
are the Philosophers of the Future? A Reading of Beyond Good and Evil,” it is no surprise 
that Nietzsche describes Socrates as “his greatest enemy” (Nehamas 1988: 55), and as “the 
archetype of a [new] form of existence,” namely that of “theoretical man” (Nietzsche 1999: 
72) who, by definition, is distanced from the durational intuition which Nietzsche heard 
echoing in Aeschylean tragedy via the music of the chorus.  
Notwithstanding his sweeping strides through the history of drama, philosophy and 
religion, for Nietzsche the fundamental tension between the Greeks of the past and the new 
Socratic Greek – the theoretical man which informs the subsequent degeneration of culture –
derives from their different attitude toward the Apollonian/Dionysian dynamic and the 
concept of difference. While the former did not deny Dionysus, and instead led a creative, 
affirmative life,138 the latter not only increasingly embraced a reactive, pessimistic mode of 
being, through their progressive rejection of the Dionysian element. In addition, this approach 
also gained near hegemony via its amplification through Christianity. For Nietzsche, its basis 
had thus to be challenged urgently because the “Socratic-Platonic dishonesty” had resulted in 
a degenerate cultural spiral (Strong 1988: 82; 155). To be sure, it has been argued that this 
idea of a decline of Western culture due to a subscription to the Apollonian sphere at the 
expense of the Dionysian, was informed by the work of Schopenhauer. As Paul Raimond 
Daniels notes in Nietzsche and The Birth of Tragedy, “the text is replete with reference to the 
‘true’ nature of the world (the Dionysiac) as corresponding to the Schopenhauerian 
conception of the world as will, [or] as a ‘mysterious primordial unity’…and a ‘primal 
contradiction and pain.’” In contrast, and to “complete the dichotomy,” Daniels further points 
out that “the Schopenhauerian concept of representation seems to find its embodiment in the 
Apolline” (2013: 60).  However, Gemes and Sykes in their Individual and Community in 
Nietzsche’s Philosophy, make an important observation with regard to Nietzsche’s 
subscription to Schopenhauerian thought. They advance that “Schopenhauer is in a sense an 
ahistorical and hence global thinker,” and “Nietzsche and Wagner are in a sense local 
thinkers.” Indeed, “while Schopenhauer was concerned with the eternal problem of suffering, 
                                                          
137While Plato’s thought found succinct expression in Augustine’s work – with the parallels between Plato’s 
Republic and Augustine’s City of God unmistakable (Harding 2011: 172), Aristotle’s work resounds through the 
ideas of the other great Christian scholar, namely Aquinas (Velasquez 2010: 298), whose writings (along with 
those of Augustine) comprised the foundation of Christian theology. 
138 Once more, music plays a key role in this regard. As Paul Raimond Daniels notes in Nietzsche and The Birth 
of Tragedy, Nietzsche is in agreement with both Schopenhauer and Wagner that “musicality grounds our being” 
(2013: 60).  
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Wagner and Nietzsche were very much concerned with a cultural malaise they took to be 
endemic to their time.” As such, they argue that Nietzsche more readily “is a follower of 
Wagner, and not Schopenhauer,” preferring Wagner’s idea of “art and illusion lead[ing] one 
to affirm life and hence willing,” over Schopenhauer’s position that  “art…provide[s] a 
means to a release, at least temporary, from the bondage of the Will” (2015: 68). After all, it 
was Nietzsche himself who stated of The Birth of Tragedy, that “the cadaverous perfume of 
Schopenhauer sticks only to a few” pages (in de Almeida 2006:4). No matter the exact 
sensibility, and even though Nietzsche was later to part company with Wagner,139 even this 
dispute was underpinned  by a persistent attempt to seriously contend with time, because of 
how for Nietzsche it was only through such honesty toward the passing of time that an 
affirmative and creative life can be lived.  
Deleuze, in his work on Nietzsche, neatly summarizes the issue when he explains 
Nietzsche’s conception of Aeschylean tragedy as fundamentally opposed to two things: 
Firstly, the dialectical thought moved toward by Sophocles and pursued enthusiastically by 
Euripides – under the influence of Socrates. And secondly, the Christian thought inspired by 
Plato and expressed later in Hegelianism. Accordingly, Deleuze points out that, for 
Nietzsche, tragedy had three related ways of dying: by Socratic dialogue (or its ‘Euripidean’ 
death), by Christianity, and finally by the combined blows of the modern dialectic (Deleuze 
2006: 10).140  Moreover, Deleuze maintains that the increasing dominance of the dialectic has 
had significantly negative consequences for the generation of difference, insofar as it has 
removed ‘joy’ from life, and placed it instead within a limited and binding framework of 
‘pleasure.’ What Roland Barthes calls the “specious good” of “bourgeois taste” (Barthes 
1977: 167) that stands in contradistinction to the “effacement of pleasure” which occurs 
through a “progression of jouissance” – something he identifies as the dynamic underpinning 
tragedy (Barthes 1975: 48). A dynamic which involves the honest joy of experiencing an 
excessively Apollonian integrity shattering and thus returning to the moving ocean of time 
from which it has temporarally denied its relationship. That is, whereas “the tragic is the 
aesthetic form of joy,”141 the dialectic is “a moral solution to pain, fear or pity” which is “not 
                                                          
139 In the critical essay, “Nietzsche contra Wagner,” published in 1895, Nietzsche takes back any praise he had 
formerly given the composer.  
140 In The Case of Wagner, Nietzsche also includes Wagner as a collaborator in the ‘final death’ of tragic 
thinking, his earlier praise of Wagner in The Birth of Tragedy notwithstanding (Nietzsche 1999: 5-8; 2005: 231-
263).   
141 The link between Deleuze’s thought and stoicism (Sellars 2010: 155) is helpful to recall here. As Pierre 
Hadot explains, a stoic “does not find his joy” in himself, but rather “by transcending” himself, through 
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a [joyfully] tragic vision of the world…but, on the contrary…the replacement of the tragic 
vision by a theoretical conception or a Christian conception,” orientated around producing the 
pleasure of a spurious form of harmony (Deleuze 2006: 16-17).  In effect, as Kathleen 
Higgins explains, for Nietzsche, “since Socrates, the Western world has been one-sidedly 
rational, privileging a truncated Apollonianism as the correct way of interpreting the world.” 
An Apollonianism comprising of an “imbalanced perspective” at odds with “the healthy 
vision of individuality afforded by Greek tragedy” (1988: 138), in terms of which an 
awareness of duration and the irresistible change it entailed comprised a safeguard against its 
coagulation into a state of morbid integrity.  In response to this degeneracy, 
“Nietzsche…wished the ‘overcoming of philosophers, through annihilation of the world of 
being’” (Strong 1988: 82), and the pursuit instead of ‘becoming’ through limit-experience, or 
“the ecstasy [or jouissance] of the Dionysiac state, which destroys the usual barriers and 
limits of existence” (Nietzsche 1999: 129). And Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra and 
Twilight of the Idols can be identified as two key texts which demonstrate the nuances of this 
trajectory. 
In Thus Spoke Zarathustra, one of Nietzsche’s primary aims is to overcome the 
Christian mode of thinking that dominated Europe during his time. As Del Caro and Pippin 
point out, the central character in Nietzsche’s text, namely Zarathustra, functions as a prophet 
“calling people, modern European Christian people especially, to account for their failings 
and encouraging them to pursue a new way of life.” Importantly, though, through him 
Nietzsche does not seek to produce a replacement religion, but rather to establish a new way 
of thinking orientated around a far more affirmative way of living, which is couched within 
appreciation of the inexorable flow of time. In short, they sum up his use of the figure of 
Zarathustra – who originally established that the central struggle in human life was between 
good and evil142 – as a mechanism to teach people how to move beyond the dualism of good 
and evil established through Christian principles (2006: ix). A dualism that defined good in 
terms of moral repetition undertaken to achieve the temporal stasis of immortality, and evil as 
deviation from the related normativity into the realm of difference. Difference which entails, 
among other things, contestations of the legitimacy of speaking of an integral soul, in the face 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
“accept[ing] the destiny imposed on [him]…by cosmic reason” (Hadot 1995: 207), rather than shying away 
from it through the pursuit of pleasure.  
142 Zarathustra is based on Zoroaster, an ancient figure who is thought to have lived in north-east Iran or 
northern Afghanistan at some time between 1700 and 1300 BCE (Schlerath 1977: 133-135). However, in 
Germany and the Imagined East, Lee Roberts reminds us that there are “clear boundaries between Zoroaster the 
historical figure and Nietzsche’s Zarathustra” (2009: 117).  
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of time, change, and music, which regularly reveal the emptiness of such an Apollonian 
illusion.  That is, while for Christian morality, good versus evil was defined as “selflessness 
and benevolence” versus “egoism and self-interest,” it was Zarathustra’s task to break such 
static thinking, and to promote a far more dynamic form of life, “without sliding into a bovine 
contentment or a violent primitivism” (2006: ix). Deleuze lists the categories of 
Semitic/Christian morality according to Nietzsche, namely “ressentiment (it’s your fault), bad 
conscience (it’s my fault) and their common fruit (responsibility).” And what Nietzsche 
denounces here is “our deplorable mania for accusing, for seeking out those responsible 
outside, or even inside, ourselves,” replacing “interpretation by depreciation” (2001: 20-21). 
In effect then, in Christian thought – and in its associated bourgeois mediocrity – Nietzsche 
saw the absolute triumph of reactive, life denying forces, and accordingly criticized such 
triumph vehemently. Indeed, his position on the culture of his time that had embraced a 
reactive life, characterized by ressentiment, is best summed up in his description of it as “a 
mass of ponderous herd animals with uneasy consciences who commit themselves to 
promoting egoism,” which “reduces the greatness of life to a vengeful ‘loan’ of ‘happiness’” 
(in Murray 2015: 27).  
This struggle by Nietzsche against Apollonian dominance of Dionysiac time was also 
subsequently reflected in his Twilight of the Idols: Or How To Philosophize with a Hammer, 
which strongly captures Nietzsche’s “fire and brimstone” condemnation of the limits placed 
on affirmative temporal living by the stabilizing discursive parameters of modern Western 
thought. Despite Nietzsche’s emphasis on laughter,143 the sub-title of the book intimates that, 
for him, proceeding beyond any given limit is a traumatic, violent affair. Indeed, Nietzsche 
claimed that the book amounted to “the end of the old truth” (2005: 137),144 and it 
accordingly comprised an opportunity for him to lash out at German and neighbouring 
cultures, which he perceived as regressive, decadent, and ultimately restrictive in their 
myopic eschewal of durational awareness. With regard to German culture, it was specifically 
its subscription to the “diseased” Socratic mode of thought, its attachment to Christianity, and 
                                                          
143 As Walter Kaufman argues in Basic Writings Nietzsche, “for [him], laughter becomes less a physical 
phenomenon than a symbol of joyous affirmation of life and of the refusal to bow before the spirit of gravity” 
(2000: 153).  
144 This claim by Nietzsche refers back to Plato’s One Truth. In this regard, one should also consider the 
remarks of Alfred North Whitehead, who, in his Process and Reality, famously declared that Western 
philosophy can be described as a “series of footnotes to Plato” (1967: 63). 
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its association with Wagner, which elicited Nietzsche’s strongest disdain.145 And with a view 
to combatting these ills, Nietzsche proposed that we instead live affirmatively and creatively 
in relation to time – by pushing toward limit-experience in the face of such popular, negative 
appropriations of experience.146 Admittedly, though, toward the end of the text, in “The 
Hammer Speaks,” the lines between affirmative laughter and a rather merciless attitude 
toward oneself for failing to remain sufficiently resolute, become increasingly blurred. This 
much is clear when Nietzsche laments: “Why so soft?...Why so soft, so submissive, so 
yielding? Why is there so much denial in your hearts? So little destiny in your gaze?” before 
he delivers the Draconian ultimatum: “If your hardness doesn’t want to flash and cut and tear 
things apart: how will you ever be able to join me in – creating?” (2005: 229). On the one 
hand, the trauma associated with a limit-experience that involves exceeding the stability of 
Apollonian constraints can scarcely be missed. But on the other hand, such violence is only 
experienced where Apollonian clinging predominates, and where the flow of time is 
accordingly resisted – the most noticeable expression of which is a refusal of difference and, 
correlatively, a reification of sameness.  
In contrast to such clinging and refusal, in Nietzsche and Philosophy, Deleuze 
explores possibilities for generating difference in relation to time, in a manner akin to 
Nietzsche himself. As Bogue writes of Nietzsche and Philosophy, “Deleuze exploits certain 
possibilities in Nietzsche’s work (i.e. the eternal return) and attempts a creative reorientation 
of Nietzsche’s thought in terms of those possibilities” (1989: 33). In this regard, when 
explaining the concept of eternal return (or eternal reoccurrence in the text),147 Deleuze firstly 
breaks the concept down into a “physical doctrine” (2006: 43) and an “ethical doctrine” 
(2006: 63). That is, on the one hand, the “conception of the eternal return as the synthesis of 
forces which affirms becoming, multiplicity, and chance, Deleuze calls the physical doctrine 
                                                          
145 Marina Cominos in “The Question of Nietzsche’s Anti-Politics and Human Transfiguration” (2008: 95), 
along with R.J. Hollingdale in Nietzsche: The Man and his Philosophy (1999: 98), provide detailed discussion 
of Nietzsche’s battles with German culture.  
146 In this regard, Nietzsche laments: “We, however, who consist of and are completely trapped in semblance, 
are compelled to feel this semblance to be that which truly it is not” (1999: 26).  
147 Nietzsche’s conception of the eternal return is explained succinctly by Eugen Fink in Nietzsche’s Philosophy. 
As a first point, Fink notes that with this concept, “Nietzsche questions the world in its entirety,” and moreover 
“conceives it temporally,” in that “the world as such is understood as the totality of time, as the eternity of time 
and as the eternal temporal existence of the world.” Against the backdrop of such understanding, “Nietzsche 
looks ahead,” and in doing so “opens himself towards the unsayable and still-nameless” (2003: 81). Robert 
Ackermann, in Nietzsche: A Frenzied Look, provides a further insight into Nietzsche’s tragic insight of the 
eternal return when he clarifies that “the affirmation of the tourist, saying ‘wow’ to every new experience, is not 
Nietzschean affirmation.” Rather, Nietzschean “affirmation involves the simultaneous realization that what we 
confront will disappear (will to power) and will return forever (the Eternal Return).” As a result, it produces at 
the same time “the deepest despair and the highest joy” (1990: 154).  
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of the eternal return.” On the other hand, he maintains that “it is also an ethical doctrine, 
which provides a preliminary means for man – the essentially reactive animal – to transform 
himself or herself” through engendering “the affirmative will to power.” Additionally, “the 
thought of the eternal return, makes possible the elimination of all the half-desires and 
hesitant yearnings, the qualified excesses and provisional indulgences, of a cautious and 
calculating will,” which is the legacy of ressentiment against time (Bogue 1989: 31). In effect 
then, what Deleuze proposes is a constant becoming-active, that entails an enduring 
overcoming and involves a creative, affirmative life, based on “the transmutation of values, 
or transvaluation” (Deleuze 2006: 66) of the reactive forces that otherwise typically inform 
our limited and stabilizing understanding of the world and ourselves. In “To Choose To 
Choose,” Ronald Bogue carefully explains how the key departure from Nietzsche by Deleuze 
is in terms of the concept of the eternal return. He writes that “a key element of Deleuze’s 
ontology of difference is Nietzsche’s concept of the eternal return, which Deleuze presents as 
a perpetually repeated cosmic throw of the dice.” However, he argues that “in Deleuze’s 
ontology…this repetition is not purely chaotic,” because instead, “the series of dice throws is 
like a Markov chain, a formal model in which a discrete set of possibilities produces a second 
set of possibilities, which in turn produces a third.” Thus, while “each set in the chain of 
events [is] affected and partially determined by the preceding set,…each set’s potential for 
subsequent differentiation always [remains]…multiple and undeterminable” (2009: 120). 
Similarly, in relation to such transvaluation, in Difference and Repetition Deleuze 
elaborates on his understanding of the fundamental durational aspect of difference, by 
identifying three orders of time. While the first order of time he associates with the 
philosophy of Descartes and the second order of time with the philosophy of Kant, he points 
out that the third order of time derives from Nietzsche’s philosophical contribution (Deleuze 
2001: 88-91; 95-108; 135-136). And it is this third order of time that, according to Deleuze, 
engenders a spirt of radical creativity, which allows for both resistance against reactive 
‘thoughtless’ desires and dynamics, and correlatively, the generation of difference. That is, 
the first order of time is repetitive and cyclic, based on seasonal change and guaranteed by 
God; it is a conception of time that encompasses all and which is construed as unfolding 
according to a divine plan. In other words, within such time everything takes place as time 
unfolds in a teleological fashion, the direction of which effectively disallows difference. And 
it is an order of time which both preceded Descartes’ philosophy, and within which the latter 
and certain subsequent philosophies of the seventeenth and early eighteenth century were 
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embedded (Deleuze 1994:88). The second order of time, associated with Kant, dramatically 
breaks with this thinking, fracturing such teleology by conceiving of time – along with space 
– as referential frames that are located within the mind of the individual subject, and which 
mediate and indeed facilitate all experience. However, although this conception allows for a 
significant reclaiming of time from the first order of Cartesian time, as it were, Deleuze 
argues that full reclamation was only achieved later, through the third order of time attributed 
to Nietzsche, based on the idea that time only passes through the creation of difference. An 
idea indissociable from the valorization of a creative and affirmative generation of difference 
as the only means of proceeding into the future, and correlatively, away from a dogmatic past 
of congealed thought (1994: 94-95).  
Deleuze’s insistence that difference is tied to duration in this way also has certain 
implications for the ego. That is, the fracturing of the I that began with the Kantian second 
order of destabilizing time, reaches its completion in the Nietzschean third order of time. In 
the latter regard, Deleuze maintains that “there is always a time at which the imagined act” of 
surmounting an obstacle “is supposed ‘too big for me.’” But when one accepts the challenge 
and becomes “equal to the act,” self transformation and the passing of time occur, with the 
consequence that when the future correlatively takes place, one is necessarily no longer the 
same person one was before taking up that task. And for Deleuze, the new person is “the man 
without name…the already Overman” (Deleuze 1994: 86-90). Through this, Deleuze 
“desire[s] to undermine what he often refers to as the three metaphysical certainties of God, 
the self (le moi) and the world” (Bogue: 2008: 152). That is, because “for Deleuze, persons 
are the interceptors of flows,” or the “point of destination for numerous flows” and “the point 
of departure for the production of new flows” (Smith 2012: 169), the prevalent conception of 
an integral subject existing within time is flawed because it can never be as stable as it is 
presumed to be. Indeed, as Robert Williams in his Gilles Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition 
further explains,   
 
It makes sense to speak of individuals, things and everything when we think about 
principles but, in [Deleuze’s] philosophy, this does not mean that the individuals are 
necessarily well defined human individuals. On the contrary, the individual is a 
thing where thought takes place as an event but not necessarily the conscious 
thought of a human being. (2001: 6) 
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That is, for Deleuze, “the individual is, rather, a series of processes that connect actual things, 
thoughts and sensations to the pure intensities and ideas implied by them,” and, as such “an 
individual is not a self-conscious ‘I,’” but instead “a location where thoughts may take place” 
(2001: 6). For the sake of clarification, Williams offers a reflection that succinctly expresses 
Deleuze’s idea of the individual, when he suggests that: 
 
When you stand, daydreaming, looking out over your favourite land- or cityscape, 
or staring into another’s eyes or flesh, or allowing your body to become an 
automaton through repeated work and exercise, allowing thought and sensation to 
drift through you, you are closer to Deleuze’s idea of the individual than when you 
squeeze your head in your hand, reflect and consciously toil with a problem. 
(2001:6) 
 
Proust, duration and Deleuze  
Arguably, it was with a view to exploring the dynamics that underpin the emergence of 
difference as it is experienced by the individual – understood in the above qualified sense – 
that Deleuze engaged with the work of Marcel Proust. That is, couched within a thoroughly 
Nietzschean conception of what affirmative existence entails, Deleuze found in the work of 
Proust a highly nuanced memorial means of pursuing and achieving difference, which 
moreover served to undermine the conception of an integral and stable subjectivity; the 
metaphysical certainty of which Deleuze, as already discussed, regarded as an obstacle to 
thought.  
In Proust and Signs, Deleuze refers to Marcel Proust’s classic In Search of Lost Time 
– published in seven volumes between 1913 and 1927 – as a text that produces “signs of 
different orders” (Deleuze 2000: ix). And he advances that four types of signs are to be found 
in the text, namely Worldly Signs, Signs of Love, Sensuous Material Signs, and Signs of Art. 
For Deleuze, each sign is linked to different temporal experiences, which range from those of 
limited and limiting parameters to those that engender and precipitate the creation of 
difference and, indeed, time. In this regard, Bogue writes that “to search for truth is to 
interpret signs, but the act of explicating the sign, of unfolding its hidden sense, is inseparable 
from the sign’s own unfolding,” and that in this sense, “the search for truth is always 
temporal” (2001: 5). And Patrick Ffrench concurs with this appraisal in “Time in the Pure 
State: Deleuze, Proust and the Image of Time,” when he argues that “different levels of 
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temporality are associated with [the] signs,” from the prosaic to the sublime (2000: 162). 
Similarly, Miguel de Beistetegui in Proust as Philosopher: Art as Metaphor, argues that the 
progression through what Deleuze calls an “apprenticeship in signs” involves a walk through 
“distinct but related kinds of time,” from “Saturnian, destructive time” through to “the 
creative, artistic, and redemptive time of eternity” (2007: 116-117). Accordingly, in relation 
to Deleuze’s order of signs, while one ‘loses time’ through acquiescence to Worldly Signs, 
and ‘wastes time’ by pursuing the deceptive Signs of Love, it is through encountering 
Sensuous Material Signs that one ‘regains time,’ and via their potential amplification in Signs 
of Art that one rediscovers the possibility of difference through the ‘recovery of time.’ 
Importantly, though, when Deleuze identifies these four types of signs, as well as their 
relation to time, he draws on the Nietzschean concepts of ressentiment and affirmation, 
discussed earlier, linking Worldly Signs and Signs of Love with the former, and Sensuous 
Material Signs and Signs of Art with the latter. Thus, in keeping with Deleuze’s schema in 
this regard, and with a view to rendering increasingly conspicuous the importance for 
Deleuze of duration for the generation of difference, in what follows, the features of the 
Worldly Signs and the deceptive Signs of Love will be explored in relation to ressentiment, 
before the features of the Sensuous Material Signs and the Sign of Art will be explored in 
relation to affirmation that is indissociable from the generation of difference. In each case, for 
the sake of clarity, relevant sections of Proust’s In Search of Lost Time will be referred to in 
order to illustrate the dynamics at play, and how they contrast with one another.  
A good example of a Worldly Sign from Proust’s work is found in the Narrator’s 
observations concerning a discussion between his mother and father as to who should be 
invited to a dinner with the eminent Marquis de Norpois, because in this discussion the 
surfacing of petty moralities and their associated social conventions/restrictions quickly 
become apparent.  In short, the discussion revolves around whether or not to invite the 
eccentric Swann, for fear that he may be seen as a “pestilent” fellow by the aforementioned 
important guest (2001: 419-420). On the basis of this principle, which endorses the 
undermining of those who are different and who consequently may not quite ‘fit in’ within 
normative social frameworks informed by bourgeois decorum, Deleuze characterizes Worldly 
Signs in pejorative terms. For Deleuze, a Worldly “sign appears as the replacement of an 
action or thought” and thus effectively “stands for action and for thought.” More precisely, 
“the worldly sign does not refer to something, it ‘stands for’ it,” and “claims to be equivalent 
to its meaning” (Deleuze 2000: 6). Consequently, this type of sign is characterized by its 
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limitation, insofar as it is a totalizing default position, involving the automatic articulation of 
experience in terms of established principles that are not challenged because they are 
construed as self-evidently valid. In Nietzschean terms, this sign would be informed by a 
subscription to Apollo involving a deference to conventional thinking for the sake of stability 
and the maintenance of appearances. As a further example of this, Deleuze makes reference 
to a moment in the narrative when during a get-together at the Verdurins’ residence a joke is 
told, prompting an exchange of related signs despite the absence of humour. As he writes, 
“Cottard makes a sign that he is saying something funny, Mme Verdurin makes a sign that 
she is laughing; and her sign is so perfectly emitted that Mr Verdurin…seeks in his turn for 
an appropriate mimicry” (Deleuze 2000: 6). In this charade, no new experience is achieved 
and the generation of difference and the challenges this would give rise to are kept at bay, 
because of both an inability to rise to such a challenge, on account of weakness, and the 
correlative desire to refuse admission to those strong enough to do so – because of how their 
presence would make such weakness conspicuous. Accordingly, when Deleuze discusses 
Worldly Signs, he identifies the related tendency as informed by the passivity of ressentiment 
– when “one does not think and does not act, but [simply] makes signs” (Deleuze 2000: 6). 
And in thematizing this, “Deleuze…develop[s] in his studies of Proust…a highly unorthodox 
dualism of tumultuous, interfused bodies and inessential ideas, the latter constituting a realm 
of surface effects [and] simulacra” (Bogue 1989: 54).  
Signs of Love differ from the above in that, unlike Worldly Signs with their strictly 
coded formulations and associated empty gestures, Signs of Love involve a “plurality of 
worlds.” At first glance, these signs may consequently seem somewhat more dynamic, but 
they ultimately prove to be just as confining and orientated around ressentiment. A good 
example of such a sign is when the Narrator recalls an episode where Swann visits Odette late 
at night, only to be dispatched by the “peevish and on edge” Odette, who seems in no mood 
for his company. Returning home, Swann falls into a fit of uncertainty, entertaining the 
thought that perhaps Odette sent him home in order to spend the night with another man. 
Battling against these thoughts, Swann soon gives in to his jealousy and sets off to Odette’s 
place to set his mind at ease. At her window, through which he can see movement and hear a 
male voice, his jealousy and suspicion are compounded, but upon knocking at her door, he 
discovers that he has come to the wrong house, and skulks off in burning shame (2001: 266 - 
269). Shame which derives as much from his error, as from the extent to which – in an 
unequivocal display of ressentiment – he places the blame for his unhappiness and the 
153 
 
possibility of its amelioration entirely in the hands of something outside of himself, in the 
world, namely Odette’s fidelity. As Deleuze argues, Signs of Love relate to the way in which 
“love is born from and nourished on silent interpretation,” with “the beloved [expressing] a 
possible world unknown to us,” which must then be “deciphered [or]…interpreted” (Deleuze 
2000: 7). And it is within this interpretation that possible dangers lie. As Stephen Hawkins 
writes, “the signs of love are actions between bodies, but human beings construct, also, 
massively complex systems of strictly formal signs, which seem to have nothing to do with 
love” (Hawkins 2007: 1). This correlates with Deleuze’s claim that the Signs of Love are 
necessarily “deceptive signs” (Deleuze 2000: 9). This is because, in trying to interpret the 
signs of the beloved, countless possibilities are imagined and acute jealousies are 
experienced, with these manifold interpretations often tied to a deeply problematic frame of 
reference – namely, those Worldly Signs that we acquiesce to. The negative and destructive 
nature of this type of thinking is neatly evinced in Proust, in relation to Swann’s jealous 
behaviour toward his beloved, Odette, in the above example. The limiting nature of such 
thinking is perhaps best summed up in the following passage from the novel:  
 
At every other period in his life, the little everyday activities of another person had 
always seemed meaningless to Swann…But in this strange phase of love the 
personality of another person becomes so enlarged, so deepened, that the curiosity 
which he now felt stirring inside him with regard to the smallest details of a 
woman’s daily life, was the same thirst for knowledge with which he had once 
studied history. (2001: 268) 
 
The deceptive Signs of Love thus lead one to refuse one’s fate, insofar as one refuses to 
“affirm chance and the necessity of chance” (Deleuze 2006: 33), and instead to construct a 
vortex of possibilities in relation to one’s beloved, and to torture and burden oneself in 
relation to them, because of the immense significance with which one has imbued them. In 
relation to this, Deleuze annotates the three main characteristics of ressentiment, namely, “the 
triumph of reaction or passivity,” the “inability to admire, respect or love,” and “the 
imputation of wrongs, the distribution of responsibility [and] perpetual accusation” (2001: 
109-111) – all three of which thoroughly underpin deceptive Signs of Love and – for that 
matter – Worldly Signs.  In short, while through the denial of the variation and complexity of 
life via Worldly Signs, one loses the time to be different, via the deceptive Signs of Love and 
the obsessive jealousy they precipitate, one wastes the time to be different. 
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However, in Proust, the possibility of escaping from such loss and wasting of time 
through ressentiment is also thematized; escape which involves the regaining of time through 
seeing beyond limiting and reactive modes of thought, and exceeding them. As Deleuze 
writes in Nietzsche and Philosophy, “in order to become active it is not sufficient for a force 
to go to the limit of what it can do, it must make what it can do an object of affirmation” 
(2006: 63), and in Proust this takes place in relation to Sensuous Material Signs and via their 
amplification through Signs of Art.  
Deleuze writes that in Proust’s work, “the third world is that of sensuous impressions 
or qualities.” These Sensuous Material Signs lead to two experiences on the part of the person 
encountering them. Firstly, while these signs give us a “strange joy,” involving an enigmatic 
sense of happiness, they also transmit “a kind of imperative.”  This is because when one first 
encounters such a sign, “a prodigious joy” is felt initially, but then followed by “a kind of 
obligation” in relation to the “necessity of a mental effort to understand the sign’s meaning.” 
Once this mental exertion has taken place, the meaning of the sign may appear more clearly 
to us, but this is not always the case, and a “new stage of interpretation, an ultimate stage,” 
may then be required. This type of encounter is well demonstrated in the famous scene in 
Swann’s Way, in which the Narrator’s memory is jogged after he eats a madeleine dipped in 
tea. Trying to recapture the memory of his childhood in Combray, beyond superficial and 
intellectually contrived images of this time, the Narrator struggles profoundly, declaring: 
“Each time the cowardice that deters us from every difficult task, every important enterprise, 
has urged me to leave this thing alone, to drink my tea and to think merely of the worries of 
today and my hope for tomorrow, which can be brooded over painlessly” (Proust 2001: 47). 
But it is in the midst of this reflective struggle against reactivity that the Narrator suddenly 
has a memory reveal itself to him. That is, the taste and smell of the madeleine dipped in his 
tea combine to open up for him “the vast structure of recollection” (2001: 48), bringing 
memories of Combray flooding back, so that he sees and understands his duration there like 
never before, in a process that involves the regaining of time. As such, although such signs 
may not yet in themselves be ‘adequate’ signs, in the sense that they may be partially opaque 
rather than well-defined, crucially, they are no longer “empty” Worldly Signs or “deceptive” 
Signs of Love that cause “factitious exaltation” or “make us suffer.” Rather, unlike the 
previous two signs examined, Sensuous Material Signs emerge as affirmative because they 
do not negate the experience of time through seeking to stabilize it by negating difference, 
but are rather open to the inexorable production of difference through time (Deleuze 2000: 
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11-13). Underscoring Nietzsche’s lamentation in Twilight of the Idols against the senses 
being ignored as an area of focus and study by academic philosophy, Deleuze, through this 
category of signs, emphasizes the differential value of ever greater openness to sensual affect. 
And he indicates that this process can lead to an affirmative, active encounter with life in 
relation to time, which moves beyond the parameters of ressentiment set by the previous two 
limited and limiting signs. As Deleuze writes, “for Nietzsche, the capacity for being affected 
is not necessarily a passivity but an affectivity, a sensibility, a sensation” (2006: 58), and this 
is also the case for Proust.  
However, while Sensuous Material Signs encourage openness to one’s duration in a 
way that is opposed to the denial of such intuition through Worldly Signs and the deceptions 
of the Signs of Love, they are admittedly still tied to “a material base” (Deleuze 2000:13), 
namely “physical sensation” (Looz 2010:1). Consequently, beyond this, Deleuze introduces 
the Signs of Art, which he argues are the ultimate form of signs. For him, “these signs, as 
though dematerialized, find their meaning in an ideal essence,” and in turn have an effect on 
all the other signs – “most notably on the sensuous signs” – insofar as “the world revealed by 
art…integrates them, colours them with an aesthetic meaning, and imbues what was still 
opaque about them” (Deleuze 2000: 13-14). In other words, if the Sensuous Material Signs 
are those that encourage a move away from unthinking or deceptive interactions with the self 
and others, and toward durational intuition and an accordingly affirmative regaining of time, 
the Signs of Art amplify this exponentially. The potential of art to produce difference was of 
paramount importance to Deleuze; as Coleman writes, “Deleuze’s descriptions of art remind 
us that it is one of the primary mediums with which humans learn to communicate and 
respond to the world” (2005: 15). Signs of Art are thus the ultimate sign which can generate 
multiplicity in a way that combats the unthinking, deceptive, and material limitations of, 
respectively, Worldly Signs, Deceptive Signs of Love, and Sensuous Material Signs. As 
Gilda Looz reminds us, while each of these are “linked to a material base; the world, the 
lover, the physical sensation,” it is “the signs of art [that] rise above the material and provide 
meaning to the apprentice” (Looz 2010:01). Yet Deleuze’s insistence in Proust and Signs, 
that art has the potential to transform experience, is not a new claim but rather a continuation 
of his argument in Nietzsche and Philosophy. That is, 
 
Deleuze employs ‘art’ as a category of ‘critique,’ taking on Nietzsche’s observation 
that [while] the world is emotive and sensory…any analysis of this world is bound 
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by epistemological structures. For Deleuze, the descriptive nature of art lies with 
art’s ability not merely to redescribe, [because]…art has a material capacity to 
evoke and to question through non-mimetic means by producing different affects. 
(Coleman 2005: 15) 
 
Ansell-Pearson lends further support to this observation in “Time, Space, Forced Movement 
and the Death-Drive: Reading Proust with Deleuze,” arguing that, for Deleuze, “the finality 
of art resides, in a phrase he borrows from Bergson, in an ‘enlarged perception,’” or a 
perception “enlarged ‘to the limits of the universe’ and which requires creating art in such a 
way that perception breaks with the identity to which memory rivets it” (2004: 1). Bogue 
similarly sums up the power of such perception in Deleuze’s Way: Essays in Transverse 
Ethics and Aesthetics, when he advances that “recovered time is the pure form of time, an 
unspecified temporal medium within which various temporal experiences may be 
actualized[;]…a floating time unmoored from any tense, person, or direction, an essence of 
temporality that serves as a generative medium” (2012: 56).   
Bergson, duration and Deleuze  
Deleuze not only borrows from Bergson the idea of an ‘enlarged perception’ – as indicated 
above – but also went on to employ much of Bergson’s framework of time and memory, 
particularly in his works on cinema, which will be discussed shortly.148  That is, published in 
1966 – two years after completing Proust and Signs – Deleuze’s Bergsonism thematizes and 
explores Bergson’s concepts of the ‘actual’ and the ‘virtual’ in relation to duration, along 
with his concept of Élan Vital, as the memorial mechanisms that make Signs of Art – and 
indeed difference – possible. In this regard, while Elizabeth Grosz in her article “Bergson, 
Deleuze, and the Becoming of Unbecoming,” identifies the major overlap between Deleuze 
and Bergson as revolving around “the production of difference by duration” (2005: 04), Rune 
Moelbak further notes in “A Deleuzian Reading of Bergson,” that there is “a ‘zone of 
indistinction’” between Deleuze’s and Bergson’s respective thoughts (2007: 353), a zone 
within which the crucial terms ‘virtual’ and ‘actual’ overlap. Furthermore, as Hugh 
Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam advance in their “Translator’s Introduction” to Deleuze’s 
Bergsonism, “Deleuze and Bergson…have a number of important ‘problems’ in common,” 
                                                          
148 Henri Bergson, whose work will be discussed in what follows, was a philosopher whose thought appealed to 
Deleuze because his philosophical project entailed a kindred promotion of sense, multiplicity and difference, at 
the expense of those habitual patterns of thinking utilized to render our experiences monotonously intelligible. 
Similarly positioned against the Hegelian dialectic that Deleuze so rallied against, Bergson, from the outset of 
Deleuze’s studies, constituted one of his most important theoretical allies (Baugh 1993: 259).  
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with “Bergson’s work [providing] Deleuze with materials for his own toolbox, for the 
manufacture of his own concepts and his own war machines” (in Deleuze 1991: 9).  
 In light of the above overlap, it is important to contend with Bergson’s influence on 
Deleuze, an influence both adumbrated in Proust and Signs and evident in Deleuze’s 
philosophical project after Bergsonism, because this allows for a broader understanding of 
how Deleuze attempts to push the limits of thought in relation to time. And a brief 
consideration of three of Bergson’s works, namely Time and Free Will: An Essay on the 
Immediate Data of Consciousness, Matter and Memory, and Creative Evolution, along with 
his essay on “The Two Sources of Morality and Religion,” is helpful in this regard.149 Albeit 
in different ways and to various degrees, in all of these works, as Suzanne Guerlac writes in 
Thinking in Time: An Introduction to Henri Bergson, for Bergson “duration becomes 
synonymous with existence – with life as perpetual change and invention of novelty” (2006: 
6), understood as the given end result of intelligence which always at some point exceeds the 
static instinctual parameters of the ‘same.’ 
 Bergson’s Time and Free Will is generally seen as a response to Immanuel Kant’s 
conception of space and time. In terms of this, as Moulard-Leonard explains in Bergson-
Deleuze Encounters: Transcendental Experience and the Thought of the Virtual, “Bergson’s 
major contribution in Time and Free Will is the argument of “integral experience,” or the idea 
that the “conditions of experience are no longer external to it.” Through this insight, Bergson 
problematizes the “Kantian or traditional phenomenological framework” (2008: 3), in terms 
of which experience is viewed as something outside of the subject, on account of how “space 
and time serve as indispensable tools that arrange and systemize the images of the objects 
imported by our sensory organs” (Ben-Zvi 2005:1). Instead, for Bergson, ‘integral 
experience’ is linked to duration, and he carefully distinguishes between space and time, by 
discussing quantitative and qualitative multiplicities (1910: 45-47; 10-19).  In this regard, he 
uses the activity of counting to demonstrate quantitative multiplicity (1910: 77), which he ties 
in with spatiality, and he argues that although, for example, a flock of sheep is seemingly 
homogenous, due to each member of the flock having a distinct spatial location, we can 
simultaneously identify each one, and subsequently enumerate the whole. In contrast, in 
terms of qualitative multiplicity, which is bound up with time or duration, Bergson discusses 
                                                          
149 The dates for the books/essay are as follows: Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of 
Consciousness (1889), Matter and Memory (1896), Creative Evolution (1907) and “The Two Sources of 
Morality and Religion” (1932).  
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moral feeling – specifically the concept of sympathy – to demonstrate that heterogeneity does 
not automatically mean clear juxtaposition (1910: 18-19). As Lawlor explains in Early 
Twentieth-century Continental Philosophy, for Bergson, sympathy constitutes a heterogeneity 
of seemingly contradictory turns, such as “a transition from repugnance to fear, from fear to 
sympathy, and from sympathy itself to humility, [and yet] no one would be able to juxtapose 
them” (2012: 29-30). Indeed, rather than contradicting one another, these thoughts inter-
mingle and intersect, with no one particular thought negating another in the constitution of 
moral feeling, with the consequence that in heterogeneity – or duration – there is no negation 
(Lawlor and Moulard-Leonard 2013:6).  
However, while Time and Free Will might be said to operate in the realm of the 
psychological, as it were, in Matter and Memory Bergson expands his project by focusing on 
the philosophical problems deriving from the relation between body and spirit, and 
subsequently delves into issues of perception. Here Bergson focuses on memory as a means 
of clarifying the problem, and it is within this argument that the concepts of the ‘actual’ and 
‘virtual’ first find enunciation. The first distinction that Bergson makes is between two types 
of memory: On the one hand, “habitual memory” serves a utilitarian function, and consists of 
a “set of intelligently constructed mechanisms” that allow us to adapt to the demands placed 
upon us in daily life (1991:151). On the other hand, in “pure memory” or “true memory,” we 
find a far more contemplative orientation rooted in the images of the past we encounter in the 
present, which extend into memories of the past that have never been present. In this regard, 
the Sensuous Material Signs identified by Deleuze in Proust’s work – such as the adult 
Narrator’s recollection, after eating the madeleine, of what it meant to live in Combray as a 
child – comprise a helpful example of this, as do the Signs of Art through which such 
memorial dynamics can be amplified (1991:151). In his discussion of such pure memory, 
Bergson introduces the diagram of the inverted memory cone (See Figure 1 below), which 
neatly represents the relation between the actual present which passes, and the virtual past 
which co-exists with or persists in the present (1991: 162).  
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Figure 1: The Bergsonian Memory Cone  
 
The mechanisms attached to the expanding virtual cone of memory are ‘rotation’ and 
‘contraction/relaxation,’ and in Creative Evolution Bergson advances the telescope as the 
clearest metaphor through which to understand how they operate. Accordingly, rotation 
would refer to expansion and the relation of memories in a contiguous sense, as through the 
various rotations adjoining memories come into focus.150 Similarly, the cone’s second 
mechanism, contraction, also allows for movement and reflection. In this example, as Lawlor 
and Moulard-Leonard explain, “we can see that the images of the constellation must be 
narrowed, brought down to the tube so that they will fit into the eyes. Here we have a 
movement from singular images to generalities, on which action can be based” (2013: 12-13). 
Yet, importantly, through the above, Bergson does not advance a reductive intellectual point 
of view that sees memory as a static image stored away to be referenced later. Rather, he 
maintains that memory is something fluid, mobile, and dynamic, and thus potentially 
liberating and affirmative, because of the creativity inherent in any given actual-virtual 
interface – not least because, as already indicated, it can entail memories of the past that have 
never been present.  
                                                          
150 Lawlor and Moulard-Leonard further explain that “what we are supposed to visualize with the cone is a 
telescope that we are pointing up at the night sky…[W]hen I am trying to remember something, I at first see 
nothing all. But [when] I try to focus, as if I were rotating the rings that control the lenses in the 
‘telescope’…then some singular images come into view” (2013: 12). 
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In the above regard, Bergson elaborates on this theme even further in Creative 
Evolution in relation to evolutionary time. That is, while acknowledging its crucial 
importance to life, Bergson was also cautious over the mechanistic and techno-scientific 
domination of habitual perception and experience. And by way of response, in Creative 
Evolution, he attempts to account for both “temporal movement informed by duration and 
retained in memory,” and “the practical necessities imposed on our body and accounting for 
our habitual mode of knowing in spatial terms” (Lawlor and Moulard-Leonard 2013: 13). 
That is, Bergson begins his book by challenging the theory of evolution made popular by 
Charles Darwin, which despite its central tenet of continual change, Bergson found to be too 
deterministic on account of its attributing of all change to instinct.151 Against this position, 
Bergson demonstrates the limitations of a deterministic view of evolution to account for the 
watershed decisions made at crucial moments in biological time, which ultimately gave rise 
to the immense biodiversity we now encounter.152 Indeed, he argues that it is because of 
biological science’s problematic relationship with time – and correlative denial of 
intelligence and emphasis instead on instinct – that “the very mobility of being escapes the 
hold of scientific knowledge.” To clarify, he contrasts the conception of time held by thinkers 
such as Galileo and Kepler, with the conception of time of ancient philosophers such as Plato, 
Aristotle, and Plotinus, but argues that even though in their respective conceptions “the 
difference is profound,” this difference is one of “degree rather than kind.” That is, whereas 
the ancients divided time into life phases, as it were, for a modern scientist like Kepler, for 
instance, time “has no natural articulations” so that we can “divide it as we please,” with no 
moment having “the right to set itself up as a moment that represents or dominates the 
others.” While this may seem like a radically different conception, it similarly fails to move 
past the problem of spatializing time. As Bergson writes, “a science…that considers one after 
the other, undivided periods of duration, sees nothing but succeeding phases, forms replacing 
forms,” and is accordingly content with a reductionist “qualitative description of objects, 
which it likens to organized beings.” In contrast, if one asks – as Bergson does – “what 
                                                          
151 As Gerhard Wichler notes, in Charles Darwin: The Founder of the Theory of Evolution and Natural 
Selection, the famed biologist took on a very “‘modern’ view” on the idea of instinct, because for Darwin, “an 
instinctive action never changes into an intelligent action.” And it is on this point that Bergson and Darwin 
clashed. To be fair to Darwin, though – and as Wichler also points out – Darwin did indeed disclaim that “it is 
not excluded that in a largely instinctive action a little dose of judgement or reason comes into play, even with 
animals low in the scale of nature” (1961: 121).  
152 In this regard, Krishnamurthy writes that biodiversity, or more precisely “biological diversity;” is “an 
umbrella term referring to organisms found within the living world,” or “the number, variety, and variability of 
living organisms” (2003 : 1) Accordingly, it in effect entails the “condition of being different,” or as Darwin 
advanced, a show of “Life’s endless forms” (2003 :1). Yet it was on the subject of the generation of these 
endless variations of life form that Bergson and Darwin disagreed. 
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happens within one of these periods, at any moment of time,” one would be “aiming at 
something entirely different” that is resonant not only with Proust’s, but also with Nietzsche’s 
(and Deleuze’s) conception of time as memorial creativity.  However, for Bergson, both 
ancient philosophy and modern science fall short in this regard, because while ancient 
thought “applied to concepts,” modern science in turn seeks only “to measure” and to 
discover “laws.” Bergson then demonstrates in a compelling manner the limitations of both 
approaches through recourse to geometry. In short, Bergson argues that while “the science of 
the ancients is static,” modern science “built up around the discoveries of Galileo and 
Kepler,” has as its problem the subscription to a model. With specific relation to geometry, 
once more, “for the ancients, geometry was a purely static science. Figures were given to it at 
once, completely finished, like the Platonic Ideas.” In contrast, “the essence of Cartesian 
geometry…was to regard every plane curve as defined by the movement of a point on a 
movable straight line;” a curve which can then be defined once “we can state the relation 
connecting the space traversed on the movable straight line to the time employed in 
traversing it.” While the ‘equation’ of modern science thus replaced the ‘figure’ of ancient 
thought, problematically, “the science of matter [nevertheless] proceeds like ordinary 
knowledge.” That is, although “it perfects this knowledge, increases its precision and scope,” 
it nevertheless still “works in the same direction and puts the same mechanism into play.” 
While modern science aspired “to take time as an independent variable,” it only succeeded in 
dividing a model of time up in ever more precise degrees, but in doing so, it effectively 
continued to consider moments to be immobilities – in a manner akin to ancient philosophy. 
And under the influence of such myopia, “real time, regarded as flux, or…the very mobility 
of being, [continues to] escape the hold of scientific knowledge,” as it did the hold of ancient 
philosophy (1944: 360-366). In short, only points within the flux are noted, but never the flux 
itself.  
Indeed, for Bergson, this will to organize – with which Darwin’s conception of 
evolution is indissociable – is informed more by instinct than by intelligence, the heightened 
scientific and academic register in which it is articulated, notwithstanding. In relation to this, 
it is useful to consider Bergson’s “The Two Source of Morality and Religion,” as it offers 
further elaboration on the distinction between instinct and intelligence, “both of which 
operate as ‘forms of consciousness,’” but which represent “two divergent lines of evolution 
with societies at the extremities of each” (1949: 137-138). As Johan Normark points out in 
“Archaeological Haecceities,” both instinct and intelligence are “two solutions to the same 
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problem of confronting and manipulating matter” (2009: 2), and Bergson positions instinct – 
or the compulsion to organize, put into structure, and thus establish orthodoxy – against 
intelligence. Intelligence which by definition exceeds the boundaries of the past through 
memorial creativity – or the recollection of a past that has never been present – and embarks 
into the future in accordance with a related new trajectory. Importantly though, instinct and 
intelligence are not mutually exclusive, but rather imbricated, such that while one 
predominates in different societies, the other always remains as a possible avenue of 
recourse.  In this regard, Bergson begins by examining the workings of hive insects (in 
particular, ants and bees), and notes that within these instinctual structures, “the individual is 
riveted to his task by his structure, and the organization is relatively invariable,” being open 
to change only in extreme situations – as in the intelligent adaptation of ants and bees to the 
modern world. In contrast, in human society, although we all function within systems of 
social obligation, there is indeed a dissociation between obligation and instinct. And the 
reason for this is our heightened capacity for intelligence. Bergson writes that “obligation as a 
whole would have been instinct if human societies were not, so to speak, ballasted with 
variability and intelligence.” Bergson then emphasizes the contrast when he suggests that, on 
the one hand, “the social instinct of an ant [or bee] – I mean the force by virtue of which the 
worker, for example, performs the task to which she is predestined by her structure – cannot 
differ radically from the cause.” But on the other hand, “a human being feels an obligation 
only if he is free.” Indeed, having started at the “primitive basis of obligation,” Bergson asks 
whether such obligation can “radiate, expand, and even come to be absorbed into something 
that transfigures it.” And this question leads Bergson to make a crucial distinction between 
the tendency to structure and organize – underpinned by primitive instinct – and the tendency 
toward intelligent openness. In relation to the latter, Bergson offers a historical account of 
such intelligent appeals, offering a number of examples of how humanity has always sought 
out figures who seemingly incarnate an associated morality. In his reflection he writes that, 
“before the saints of Christianity, mankind had known the sages of Greece, the prophets of 
Israel, the Arahats of Buddhism, and others beside.” From this, two inter-related ideas 
emerge, namely the “generality of the one [consisting] in the universal acceptance of a law,” 
on the one hand, and on the other hand, the “common imitation of a model” whose sentiments 
exceed the limits of their immediate social context. Here the instinctive social duty of animal 
morality is replaced by a concept that is both “broadened and weakened,” becoming “human 
duty” – a concept to aspire toward as it has been approximated by the various spiritual figures 
listed above. Thus, while the above instinctual exchange personifies the “closed soul,” or one 
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within which instinct predominates over intelligence, the “open soul,” characterized by such 
spiritual figures, is something intelligently different – with such difference informed by a 
deep durational intuition.  
Bergson does, however, argue that one often becomes paralyzed when this duty has to 
be actualized; that is, even “a generous nature, eager to sacrifice itself, experiences a sudden 
chill at the idea that it is working ‘for mankind’”(1949: 140-144). Importantly, though, the 
open soul involves primarily an openness to aspire to such a disposition, rather than any 
proclamation on Bergson’s part of what people should, or even can, become. In this regard, 
he writes that “the [open soul] does not yield to the attraction of its object; it has shot beyond 
and reached humanity only by passing through humanity.” And such an orientation, involving 
a recognition of shared duration, is an “attitude [that] is acquired,” and which “calls for, has 
always called for, an effort.” Indeed, while the closed soul fixes “its feelings by the things 
with which they are associated,” the open soul is a “psychic attitude” or “physic motion” that 
does not attach feeling toward specific things, such that it acts in an exclusionary manner 
(1949: 145-147). Understandably, Bergson’s conception of such a morality, or an openness to 
the duration of all life, is also tied to his concept of vital impulse – or élan vital – in which he 
argues that all life has a common original impulse (1983: 87). One from which human beings 
have become estranged through passive submission to the habitual thought, or instinctual 
behaviour, on which all human knowledge – both that of ancient philosophy and modern 
science – is based (1983: 151). And it is in this regard that he criticizes the reductive 
scientific and technical language of Darwin’s theory of evolution, which emphasizes instinct 
in the continual changes exhibited by all life forms, as itself an expression of instinct, insofar 
as it evinces the tendency to organize, categorize, and ultimately establish orthodoxy. 
Orthodoxy which can eclipse the role played by intelligence in this process, or intuition into 
duration, which has allowed for radical biodiversity to emerge through creative evolution. 
Elizabeth Grosz in “Bergson, Deleuze, and the Becoming of Unbecoming,” sums up 
Bergson’s philosophical project neatly when she argues that his project can be understood as 
“the transformation of the concept of being through the generation of an ontology of 
becoming, of the actual in terms of the elaboration of the virtual, and of intelligence through 
the intervention of intuition” (Grosz 2005: 10). Similarly, Deleuze writes in Bergsonism that 
“Duration, Memory [and]…Élan Vital mark the major stages of Bergson’s philosophy” 
(Deleuze 1988: 13), and the appeal of Bergson for Deleuze also becomes clear through this. 
After all, Bergson’s insistence on multiplicity, the affirmative power of creative memory, and 
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vital impulse, dovetail with Deleuze’s attempt to engender intelligent difference in the face of 
an instinctually-driven pursuit of homogenous stable experience, informed by the 
ressentiment criticized by Nietzsche, and seen in the Worldly Signs and Deceptive Signs of 
Love within Proust’s In Search of Lost Time. And the influence of Bergson’s concept of 
memory and duration on Deleuze’s work on cinema, is profound.  
Deleuze and duration in Cinema 1 and Cinema 2 
In Deleuze’s lengthy meditations on cinema, namely his Cinema 1: The Movement-Image 
and Cinema 2: The Time-Image, he sheds light on his view of the potential of this particular 
technology to precipitate difference through its reflection of and upon duration.  
Indeed, in many respects, cinema for Deleuze comprises a site of both individual 
Proustian reflection upon time, and non-subjective Bergsonian reflection of duration, which 
together comprise the poles of a continuum of difference informed by the Nietzschean third 
order of time. And in relation to each pole, cinema also has the ability to provide, on the one 
hand, an indirect image of time passing through movement-images, and a direct image of the 
passing of time through time-images. To elaborate, David Rodowick in Gilles Deleuze’s Time 
Machine, indicates that the post-war cinema of Deleuze’s time proved an immense draw card 
to the philosopher. This was because, for Deleuze “image practices [comprise]…social and 
technological automata where each era thinks itself by producing its particular image of 
thought.” This, in turn, allows philosophy the opportunity to “map this image in mental 
cartographies” that are not bound to restrictive, dogmatic, and representational conceptions of 
experience. And, “in its largest sense,” Deleuze understands “historically specific cinematic 
practices as ‘spiritual automata’ or ‘thought machines.’” In other words, for him, cinema is an 
“artificial intelligence” that functions as “a machine for the fabrication of concepts,” and it is 
in relation to such creative space that “Deleuze claims an interest in film because it provides a 
complex moving picture of duration” (1997: 6-7). In short, cinema can afford us a profound 
picture of an actual-virtual interface that occurs through the power of élan vital, and which – 
as will be argued in what follows – manifests in images situated along a continuum of 
Proustian-Bergsonian reflections. 
To begin with, in Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, Deleuze draws heavily on the 
work of Bergson, extracting “from Bergson’s account of Matter and Memory three types of 
movement-image” (Bogue 2003: 35), and expropriating these movement-images for his own 
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reading of cinema.153 These three images are those of perception, affection and action. 
Importantly, for Deleuze, recalling Bergson’s assertion that images are an interval or “a kind 
of relay system” (Bogue 2003: 36), such images are not static but are rather subject to a 
movement that runs through the series. As Deleuze writes, “all Bergson asks for are 
movements and intervals between movements which serve as units,” but then adds – in 
support of his appropriation of Bergson for cinematic purposes – that this “is also exactly 
what Dziga Vertov asked for in his materialist conception of the cinema” (1986: 61).154 
However, Bergson can be forgiven for his oversight because of the prevalent use of a 
stationary camera during his time, in terms of which the camera assumed the position of the 
theatre spectator so that the frame corresponded more or less to the proscenium view of 
traditional stage productions (Douglas 1999: 213).155 But with the mobility of the camera – 
which first began to emerge around 1917 (Nelmes 2012: 119) – the point-of-view shot 
allowed the audiences to see what the characters were ostensibly seeing. The adage that a 
picture says a thousand words applies here, since the many thousands of words of acutely 
detailed descriptions of the nuances of everyday objects and phenomena found in Proust’s 
work, now found expression in the point-of-view shot, through which any aspect of the world 
is focused upon. Accordingly, if what “actualizes virtual movement-images is the ‘center of 
indetermination’ of a living image, [or] an interval or gap in the universal interaction of 
matter flows,” then “a ‘perception-image’ is the first side of the interval,” whereby we 
                                                          
153 It must be noted here that Bergson himself was critical of cinema, even dedicating his final chapter of 
Creative Evolution to a damning critique of the medium. Paul Douglass notes in “Bergson and Cinema: Friends 
or Foes,” that Bergson “damned the cinematographical mechanism of thought as the apotheosis of spatialisation 
which must be overcome.” However, as Douglas also points out, already “in 1918, Marcel L’Herbier argued that 
Bergson’s critique of the camera in no way undermined his profoundly cinematic conception of time and 
experience,” and he furthermore emphasizes that “Deleuze has repeated the argument that Bergson’s critique of 
cinema was ‘overhasty’ and poses no obstacle to a marriage of Bergsonism and film semiotics” (in Mullarkey 
1999: 209).  
154 David Abelevich Kaufman, or Dziga Vertov, was a pioneering documentary film maker and cinema theorist, 
who was active between 1917 and 1954, and best known for his “creative transformation of newsreel into the 
new form of documentary film” (Hicks 2007: 1). Indeed, as Yuri Tsivian explains in Lines of Resistance: Dziga 
Vertov and the Twenties, Vertov declared film to be “an experiment in cinematic communication,” and quite 
radically – especially for his time – further argued that film can “speak to the viewer without the aid of sets or 
actors, without a scenario, and…without the aid of inter-titles” (2004: 2). In this regard, well before Deleuze, 
Vertov saw the potential of film to capture experience outside of the orthodoxies imposed upon cinematic 
representation and narrative. In particular, one of his major contributions to film theory was his concept of the 
“Kino-Eye.” Johnson et al. in China’s iGeneration: Cinema and Moving Image Culture for the Twenty First 
Century, sum up this concept neatly when they advance the “movie camera as the machine eye,” and present the 
notion that “the apparatus of the movie camera can be seen as an extension of the human body and, in fact, 
human life” (2014: 131).   
155 Rodowick makes an illuminating observation on this point when he explains that “Bergson notes in the last 
chapter of Creative Evolution that his ideas concerning the ‘cinematographic illusion’ were developed during 
his 1902-3 course on the idea of time at the Collège de France.” As such, “whatever commercial films he may 
be referring to would thus fall within the period of ‘primitive cinema’” (1997: 213).   
 
166 
 
selectively register “incoming movements” – taking in certain features while filtering out the 
rest. And in terms of cinema, the perception-image indirectly represents to the viewer how 
time passes for the characters within a film, by revealing to the viewer what the character in 
question sees. However, a character is also always affected by what they are exposed to, and 
cinematic representation of this – via facial expressions, a change in posture, gestures, etc. – 
forms part of the ‘affection-image,’ or the alternate side of the interval. That is, something 
resonant with Bergson, for whom “sensations, and ‘bodily feelings’ in general, or 
‘affections,’ are qualitatively distinct from perceptions, though sensation/affection bears a 
necessary relationship to perception and…always accompanies it.” Thus, what we call 
perception is, in fact, “a mixture of external perception and internal affection” (Bogue 2003: 
36), with the affection-image “surg[ing] in the centre of indetermination, that is to say in the 
subject, between a perception which is troubling in certain respects and a hesitant action” 
(1986: 65). Again, the immense Proustian sensibility to shifts in mood and disposition, 
betrayed at times through barely detectable adjustments in posture, or the stiffening of facial 
features, etc., find their parallel in affection-images (Arnheim 1957: 127-132; 183). Finally, 
in relation to such perception and affection, the ‘action-image’ demonstrates how characters 
respond to what they see and feel. Describing the action-image, Deleuze writes that “one 
passes imperceptibly from perception to action,” and that “the operation under consideration 
is no longer elimination, selection or framing.” Rather, it entails “the incurving of the 
universe, which simultaneously causes the virtual action of things on us and our possible 
action on things” (1986: 65). Accordingly, while it is the gap or interval between “the 
perceptive and the active” that affection occupies, it is through the active that the indirect 
passing of time is most saliently evinced – with a slow pace occurring through repetitive 
actions of everyday life, and a rapid pace occurring in the face of challenges which, when 
triumphed over, entail a fracturing of the subject in accordance with the Nietzschean third 
order of time. That is, when a subject finds itself exceeding the limits of what it previously 
believed its capacity to be (Deleuze 1994: 86-90). This rapid personal ‘growth’ – or passing 
of time – is neatly reflected in the accelerated montage, or montage of tempo, referred to by 
Eisenstein as the primary feature of American cinema (Goodwin 1993: 114). Here, an 
intercutting between, for example, the damsel in distress, the villains who seek to harm her, 
and the hero as he rushes to save her, becomes increasingly rapid as they move toward the 
same point in space, until all three meet in the same frame. And the excitement of such 
scenes derives not simply from the desire to see bourgeois order restored – as Eisenstein 
would have it (Eisenstein 1977: 235, 244) – but also from the intuition that deep and 
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irrevocable transformation within the characters is taking place, which we can glimpse 
through the indirect images of time passing that appear on the screen before us.  
Yet, such Proustian perception/affection/action-images are only one pole of the 
continuum, which corresponds to the “signs of composition” in Deleuze’s taxonomy (Bogue 
2003: 70).156 In terms of the other pole, cinema is equally important for Deleuze because the 
camera also affords us a non-human perspective, which allows for escape from our subjective 
position through presenting a non-subjective reflection of Bergsonian duration, one that 
corresponds to the “signs of genesis” in Deleuze’s taxonomy (Bogue 2003: 70).157  As 
Rodowick explains, for Deleuze – working against the background of Bergsonian insights – 
“what movement expresses is qualitative change [or]…change in duration or in the whole; 
therefore, real movement involves temporal rather than spatial relations” (1997: 37). Indeed, 
in camera-consciousness, or the non-human perspective afforded by the mobile camera, 
Deleuze finds a means of encountering time not afforded to Bergson, due to his limited 
exposure to primitive cinema as a result of his historical context. In this regard, Deleuze 
explicitly advances that “the essence of the cinematographic movement-image lies in 
extracting from vehicles or moving bodies the movement which is their common substance,” 
or “extracting from movements the mobility which is their essence” (Deleuze 1986: 23). That 
is, through various mechanical means, cameras provide perspectives that are alien to the 
dimensions of the human sensory-motor schema, discussed previously, because while they 
similarly operate in terms of perception, affection, and action, they can also do so from 
radically different viewpoints instead of a character’s point of view. And although “diverse 
                                                          
156 Roger Dawkins in “Deleuze, Pierce, and the Cinematic Sign,” explains this most succinctly when he writes 
that “Deleuze begins by noting only two aspects of the cinematic sign. He calls these Genesis and 
Composition.”  That is, “in the first stage of expression, attributes are constituted” in that “they are the basic 
forms from which life is developed and they are potentially infinite in number.” And it is “for this reason [that] 
Deleuze identifies attributes with genesis, calling them genetic elements.” In contrast, “the second stage is based 
on the expression of an essence in the attributes by a particular thing, which Deleuze refers to generally as a 
body (a plant, animal and rock are all bodies).” And Deleuze furthermore “notes that a body expresses a genetic 
element of substance (attribute) through the “composite or complex relations of its parts” (2005: 3). In relation 
to cinema, we could assert that signs of composition relate to a more Proustian reflection on duration, whereas 
signs of genesis tend to offer a more Bergsonian reflection of duration. 
157 Please see footnote above. Additionally, although not within the scope of this chapter to discuss it, David 
Martin-Jones, in his Deleuze and World Cinemas, makes an interesting point with regard to Deleuze’s taxonomy 
of images, and in particular his historical portrayal of the move from movement-images to time-images through 
the crisis of the action-image, brought on by the horrors of the Second World War. He advances that “Deleuze’s 
rather brief mention of World War Two as a defining moment suggests that this may have been somewhat 
incidental to his thinking, which may well have been more absorbed in the construction of his taxonomy of 
images.” And he further argues that “other parts of the world have their own defining moments, distinct from 
World War Two that are equally disruptive to their cinemas (dictatorships, economic crises, geopolitical 
transformations under globalization, etc.). For this reason I would argue that Deleuze’s categories of the 
movement- and the time-image are a product of his selection of certain films for discussion, and his lack 
of…certain others. Not least of these was popular Indian cinema” (2011: 206). 
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methods may be used to rationalize and normalize camera movements within commonsense 
[human] spatio-temporal schemas, the mobile camera tends to extract pure movement from 
bodies” (Bogue 2003: 46). Considered in this light, as Deleuze notes, “the sole 
cinematographic consciousness is not us, the spectator, nor the hero; it is the camera – 
sometimes human,” but also “sometimes inhuman or superhuman” (1986: 20) in its ability to 
provide multiple and interlinked snapshots of duration that exceed the perspective of any one 
person. In this regard, it is not only the footage of the mobile camera but also the 
arrangements of such footage through editing processes which give rise to such movement-
images. As Bogue notes, for Jean Epstein,158 in every film “all the surfaces divide, truncate, 
decompose, [and] break apart,” with the result that “each of these splintered surfaces provides 
its own perspective on the world.” In this respect, “every film divides in time into multiple 
plans, each with its own incommensurable perspective,” with each plan being “a particular 
slice of movement, and hence [providing] a specific view of time, or temporal perspective.” 
Furthermore, not only is “each perspective…itself dynamic, [and] in constant variation;” in 
addition, all these multiple perspectives joined together to form the cinematic piece are also 
not captured by a human consciousness, but rather by a tool that takes on, at certain moments, 
“non-human functions or qualities” – namely the camera (2003: 47). 
 This encounter with time, albeit an indirect encounter, is dealt with differently by 
film-makers from various schools, and Deleuze identifies four montage practices, namely the 
American organic, the Soviet dialectical, the French quantitative, and the German intensive 
montage (Deleuze 1986: 29-40), each of which in different ways entails a superhuman 
perspective. For instance, D.W. Griffith’s Intolerance (1916), considered a masterpiece of 
American organic montage, allows the viewer access to four parallel story lines occurring in 
very different eras in history, while the eras remain thematically linked by a shot of a figure 
rocking a cradle. Presented in a non-linear way, the film thus provides the viewer with a 
glimpse into the same struggles occurring side by side, but within completely different 
moments in time (Hicks 2007: 163). In turn, in terms of Soviet dialectical montage, Sergei 
Eisenstein’s Strike (1925), for example, in its presentation of workers’ rising up against the 
unjust conditions imposed upon them by the Tsarist regime, not only condenses the Marxist 
dialectical process of history into a series of montage cells. In addition – and while doing so – 
it also presents an array of events across Russia at the same moment in history which no one 
                                                          
158 Jean Epstein was a French film-maker and theorist who was active from 1922 onwards. Christophe Wall-
Romana, in his preface to Epstein’s The Intelligence of a Machine, writes that his theoretical work “greatly 
influenced later generations of cinema philosophers, notably Gilles Deleuze and Jacques Ranciere” (2014: i).  
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human could ever have been privy to, from the massacre of workers on the outskirts of the 
city to a butcher going about his work in Moscow at the same time. In this way, through a 
series of explosive juxtapositions, the film presents an emotive, visceral and politically 
orthodox – at least at the time – message to audiences who would have experienced the 
various excesses of the Tsarist regime, while at the same time capturing the transformation 
underway with the greater whole of duration (Briley 1996: 525-535; Salvaggio 1979: 289-
297). With regard to French quantitative montage and its presentation of a non-
human/superhuman perspective, Colin Crisp in The Rediscovery of editing in the French 
Cinema, 1930-1945, offers some compelling insights. He writes that while 1920s French 
cinema was characterized by “intense editing,” which featured the use of more fragmented, 
quick shots that were filled with symbolism, this editing rate also increased significantly from 
1932 onwards. Moreover, “whole scenes tend[ed] to be fragmented into a series of glances – 
hypothetically, those of an interested on-looker” but also potentially the perspective from 
empty space (1987:203, 209-210). Accordingly, what both camera/editing practices signalled 
is emphasis on a perspective not afforded to humans in their everyday experience of duration 
that is occurring around them while they are concerned with other things. Finally, for 
Deleuze, German intensive montage practice, with its focus on the interplay between 
darkness and light, as found in the films of “the great masters of expressionist cinema such as 
Murnau, Lang, [and] Pabst,” captures “a dynamic rather than a mathematical sublime.” This 
is because such “cinema [is] not of metrical relations of movement reaching the 
incalculable,” like French montage, but “rather one of intensive magnitude” in which “light 
and dark are conceived as infinite forces.” And through them the viewer encounters an 
“assemblage of movements and durations” that furthermore jeopardizes any “oppositional 
distinction between the ‘organic’ and the mechanical or the technological” (2015: 119); 
something that collapses the reference points through which an integral human perspective is 
otherwise maintained, in a way that opens the spectator up to the duration of the Whole. 
But such montage practices are situated only halfway along the Proustian-Bergsonian 
continuum of movement-images, insofar as, while they exceeded a human perspective in 
various ways and to different degrees, they do not break entirely from it. For such images, 
one must proceed into the realm of other experimental cinema, which Deleuze categorized 
under the ‘signs of genesis’ in his taxonomy of movement-images. And in this regard 
Deleuze turns to the likes of Dziga Vertov, who in his 1929 Man with a Movie Camera 
discovered the “genetic element of the image, or the differential element of movement.”  
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Indeed, in the “Vertovian photogramme,” one such example of which are the intercutting 
shots of an editor splicing other images (an old woman, a young factory worker, three 
children at a magic show, etc.) he had taken to life, as it were, “cinema goes beyond human 
perception toward another perception,” because it captures its “genetic element” (Bogue 
2003: 75). As Nicole Brenez notes in “Recycling, Visual Study, Expanded Theory,” in many 
respects the “Vertovian Gramme appears at a decisive point: it is the genetic element of the 
perception-image,” which allows “the invention of a new kind of entity: cinema’s originary 
molecule” (2011: 159). Thus, in such movement-images, we are no longer encountering signs 
of composition, in a Proustian manner, but rather, signs of genesis that entail a Bergsonian 
reflection on duration – changes in the Whole seen from the ‘perception of things.’   
In terms of Deleuze’s historical overview of cinema, the movement-image entered a 
state of crisis after the Second World War, but it was out of this that time-images were 
ultimately to emerge. As Deleuze maintains, “the crisis which…[shook] the action-image… 
depended on many factors which only had their full effect after the war.” Of course, this is 
not to say that the experiences of the war and the resultant crisis of the action-image 
fundamentally altered all film production. Rather, as Deleuze himself points out, “the greatest 
commercial successes” have not altered their orientation whatsoever. However, importantly, 
he adds that “the soul of the cinema demand[ed] increasing thought,” and such “thought 
beg[an] by undoing the system of actions, perceptions and affections on which cinema had 
fed up to that point” (Deleuze 2005: 210). In this regard, Deleuze focuses quite heavily on the 
European cinematic response, and thematizes in particular the dynamics of Italian neo-
realism, which for him entailed the birth of “a new kind of image…outside [of] Hollywood;” 
one that would precipitate “the upsurge of the new thinking image…beyond movement” 
(Deleuze 2005: 219).  
Born out of the ashes of the Second World War, the film movement that became 
known as Italian neo-realism entailed an attempt to break from the cultural heritage of 
Fascism which had dominated Italy under Mussolini’s regime. Accordingly, the movement, 
with its focus on authenticity as opposed to clichéd representations of good, clean living – 
characteristic of the propaganda films invested in by the aforementioned dictatorship – is 
exemplified in the cinema of Roberto Rossellini, Vittorio De Sica, and Federico Fellini, 
among others.159 Deleuze begins his discussion of Italian neo-realism by pointing out that, in 
                                                          
159 This turnaround in orientation, on the part of Italian film-makers, from the cliché of propaganda to the 
‘authentic’ thematization of social problems in the 1940s, is even more interesting if one considers their 
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relation to the after-effects of the war, Italy – unlike France or Germany – could neither 
“claim the rank of victor,” nor could it be completely dismissed as an uncritical Fascist 
collaborator due to “a resistance and a popular life underlying oppression.” As such, it was 
caught in an ‘in-between’ space, as it were, which allowed “the Italians…an intuitive 
consciousness of the new image in the course of being born.” Indeed, it was the Italian 
directors, Deleuze claims, who forged the characteristics experimented with later in certain 
types of post-war American cinema, which, in turn, inspired movements such as the French 
New Wave. In this regard, Deleuze provides a number of examples, pointing to Rossellini’s 
Rome, Open City (1945) as capturing a “dispersive and lacunary reality,” and to his Paisa 
(1946) as presenting “a series of fragmentary, chopped up encounters.” Similarly, Deleuze 
points to the work of De Sica, who  in films such as The Bicycle Thief (1948) and Umberto D 
(1952),  presents no “vector or line of the universe which extends and links up events,” and 
who shows how even “insignificant events…have a vital importance for the protagonists.” 
According to Deleuze, Fellini takes this even further in I Vittelloni (1953), in which his 
portrayal of five young men drifting through life in a small provincial town not only explores 
“the insignificance of events,” but also testifies both “to the uncertainty of the links 
between…[events]” and to “their non-belonging to those who experience them in this new 
form of voyage.” Clearly, all this stands in marked contrast to the resoluteness and sense of 
purpose and agency that characterized the four pre-war American, Soviet, French and 
German montage schools, discussed earlier, because what now proliferates are open 
encounters with no set resolution or direction, which occur moreover within the “any-space 
whatevers” of the films (2005: 216).  
Elaborating on the impact of the above on cinema, Deleuze advances that certain directors 
classified as part of the French New Wave, such as Jean-Luc Godard, reflected further on 
how to creatively respond to the void left by the crisis of the action-image. And he notes in 
particular that in Godard we can find “formulas which express the problem: if images have 
become clichés, how can an Image be extracted from all those clichés, ‘just an image,’ an 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
previous association with cinema during the Mussolini era. For instance, Peter Bondanela in The Films of 
Roberto Rossellini, points out that one of the most contentious issues when dealing with Rossellini’s legacy is 
his “relationship to…Fascist cinema and to important Fascists associated with the cinema” (1993: 3). Similarly, 
in The Films of Federico Fellini, Bondanela notes that a young Fellini, in 1937, “published his first drawings in 
a magazine issued by the Opera Balilla, [a] Fascist youth organization” (2002: 11). Yet it has been argued that 
the earlier associations of these two great directors should not be seen as evidence of their collaboration or 
support for the Fascist regime, but rather as a reality endured by them, and one which informed the sensibility 
present in Italian neo-realism. Indeed, this is neatly summed up in the post-war critique of Cesare Zavattini, who 
declared that “the two decades under Fascist rule had not produced ‘a single film…that was worth discussion’” 
(1993: 3).  
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autonomous mental image?” Indeed, he even muses, “where does the cliché end and the 
image begin?” (2005:214-15).160 Moreover, in terms of the American cinematic response to 
the crisis of the action-image, Deleuze finds in certain post-World War Two American films 
a similar recurring concern over cliché.  Firstly, referencing films such as Robert Altman’s 
Nashville (1975) and A Wedding (1978), he argues that in them “globalising or synthetic” 
situations have been replaced by an image that “is dispersive.” Accordingly, this is achieved 
by Altman in his portrayal of multiple characters, multiple sound-tracks, and the use of an 
anamorphic screen (2005: 211).161 Secondly, and in relation to Altman’s Quintet (1979), 
Deleuze argues that here “the line or the fibre of the [film] universe which prolonged events 
into one another” is replaced by “linkages, connections, or liaisons [which are] deliberately 
weak.” Thirdly, he maintains that this type of orientation toward time in cinema is augmented 
by “the sensory-motor action or situation” being replaced “by the stroll, the voyage and the 
continual return journey.”162 While this new American cinema thus operated under a new 
image, characterized by “the dispersive situation, the deliberately weak links, the voyage 
form…[and] the condemnation of plot” (2005: 214), it was nevertheless still problematized 
by its relation to cliché. And it is in relation to this issue that Deleuze argues “the American 
cinema finds its limits” (2005: 215), because that which binds the films “are clichés, and 
nothing else”– be they “physical, optical, auditory [or] psychic” (2005: 212-213). However, it 
                                                          
160 Wheeler Winston Dixon in The Films of Jean-Luc Godard, provides a further example of the director’s battle 
with cliché. Citing Godard’s 1963 film Les Carabiniers, he explains it as “an ugly film about a world bereft of 
beauty, in which meaningless conquests are followed by equally arbitrary betrayals.” The two main characters 
are in essence “nonpersonages” and operate against a background of “high-contrast imagery…[and] a series of 
visual and narratological clichés.” In doing so, Godard’s aim is to turn “the photographic process back upon 
itself.” And against criticism of the film – such as when Michel Cournot called it a “badly made, badly lit, badly 
everything film” – Godard responded by saying, “I consider these lines as praise indeed” (1997: 36-38).  
161 An anamorphic screen, which was refined and popularized in the 1950s, allows for a stretching of images, so 
that more may be displayed in the frame; i.e. the audience experiences a feeling of depth or texture to the shot 
(Malkiewicz, Mullen 2005: 65). Directors like Altman used this to great effect, as Joe McElhaney points out in 
A Companion to Robert Altman. He writes, “if the frame is centripetal” and the “screen is centrifugal,” then 
“Altman’s fondness during the 1970s for the anamorphic widescreen possibilities of Panavision, and his use of 
an almost constantly mobile frame, are symptomatic of this centrifugal impulse.” The effect of this on the 
viewer, along with the creative deployment of non-synchronous sound, amounts to a profoundly unsettling and 
destabilizing experience. Indeed, in Altman’s films, people appear more as “chromatic vibrations,” with the 
foreground and background equally significant (2015: 148).  
162 By way of example, he references Scorsese’s Taxi Driver (1976) and Lumet’s Serpico (1973), in which the 
respective protagonists display little deliberate agency, being portrayed instead as subject to an unpredictable 
constellation of forces affecting them. For instance, the driver in Taxi Driver “wavers between killing himself 
and committing a political murder and, replacing these projects by the final slaughter [of a pimp and his 
associates] is astonished by himself.” Similarly, in Lumet’s film, “everything happens in continual trips and 
return journeys, at ground level, in aimless movements” – and it is such depiction of experience in time that 
Deleuze argues “is in fact the clearest aspect of the modern journey,” in that it happens in “any-space-
whatever,” in a way that places certain post-war films “in opposition to [the] action which most often unfolded 
in the qualified space-time of the old realism” (2005: 212). 
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is the critical American film-makers’ response to such cliché which he finds problematic; 
according to him, their fatal flaw is that, within them,  
 
all the aesthetic or even political qualities…remain narrowly critical and in this way 
even less ‘dangerous’ than if they were being made use of in a project of positive 
creation. Then, either the critique swerves abruptly and attacks only misuse of 
apparatuses and institutions, in striving to save the remains of the American Dream, 
as in Lumet; or it extends itself, but becomes empty and starts to grate, as in 
Altman, content to parody the cliché instead of giving birth to a new image. (2005: 
215) 
 
Consequently, the great post-war American genres – such as film noir – “collapse[d] and yet 
maintain[ed] their empty frame,” and this is why Deleuze turns his attention instead to Italy, 
and to a lesser extent, to France, as the cinematic terrain in which “the great crisis of the 
action-image took place” (2005: 215), and was responded to in a way that precipitated the 
birth of a new image. Indeed, in relation to such post-war cinema, Deleuze maintains that “far 
from being satisfied with a negative or parodic critical consciousness, [such] cinema is 
engaged in its highest reflection,” which it “constantly deepened and developed” in relation 
to time (2005: 216).  
Ronald Bogue in Deleuze’s Way provides a helpful description of the changes in 
cinema which eventually led to the production of time-images. Accordingly, Deleuze’s 
division of the history of film into two basic phases – namely classic cinema and modern 
cinema – demonstrates two distinct methods of organizing space and time within film. 
Whereas classic cinema “is dominated by an organization of space and time according to a 
rational, commonsense, Newtonian/Cartesian ‘sensory-motor schema,’” modern cinema is 
marked by “a breakdown of the sensory-motor schema and the creation of images that no 
longer conform to a single unified spatio-temporal structure.” Crucially, these images are not 
only “disconnected” from their “orthodox, commonsense chains of association,” but are also 
“re-link[ed]” so that a “productive difference emerges between images” (2007: 64).163 In this 
distinction, the variance between the Cartesian first order of time and the Nietzschean third-
                                                          
163 In Cinema 2, with particular reference to Godard’s method specifically, and through alluding to his 1976 
collaboration with Anne-Marie Mieville, Here and Elsewhere, Deleuze makes clear the importance of modern 
directors’ relinking of images. He writes, namely “Given one image, another image has to be chosen which will 
induce an interstice between the two. This is not an operation of association, but of differentiation, as 
mathematicians say, or of disparation, as physicists say: given one potential, another one has to be chosen, not 
any whatever, but in such a way that a difference of potential is established between the two, which will be 
productive of a third or something new” (2005: 179-180).  
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order of time, thematized by Deleuze in Difference and Repetition and discussed earlier, is 
clearly reflected, along with the creative capacity of the latter, to usher in difference. 
  In effect, “guided by maximum interaction…the sequences [of time-images] are not 
readily assimilable with standard interpretive schemas” (2007: 65), and this is precisely the 
point for Deleuze. Time-images do not reflect the old interaction between perception, 
affection, and action, but rather a different kind of interface, one in which there is constant 
interaction between new and different configurations, at the level of both the actual present 
and the virtual past which co-exists with it. And through such means, cinema is capable of 
presenting a direct image of time passing. In this regard, while cinema that is primarily 
orientated around the movement-image – and thus informed by the organic regime – might be 
understood through the metaphor of “a window,” the crystalline regime, or the utilization of 
time-images in post-war cinema, is better understood through the metaphor of “a mirror.” In 
terms of this, the former “affords the viewer a vision of the world that…is still recognizable 
as a possible domain of existence…governed by relatively stable sensory-motor schemata 
and causal/logical linkages [that enable] effective action.” In contrast, in the latter, “the 
characters of a film are observed concomitantly losing and finding themselves…in such 
cinema, the viewer does not always encounter actual – or even possible – domains of 
existence,” and these encounters do not always follow “the imperatives of any sensory-motor 
schemata.” Rather – and representing a fundamental shift in orientation away from the 
agency underpinning movement-images – cinema that utilizes time-images tends to envision 
not “the transformation of the world through effective action, but rather the transformation of 
the characters’ (and…the viewer’s) subjectivity” (Konik 2011: 17).  
 Arguably, though, such transformation – like with movement-images – similarly takes 
place along a continuum between discrete Proustian reflections on the virtual-actual interface, 
on the one hand, and broad non-subjective reflections of Bergsonian duration, on the other 
hand. And Deleuze discusses four dynamics that operate within this crystalline regime, which 
bear some resemblance to the four signs he identified in Proust’s work,164 and which each 
demonstrate a different type of interplay between the actual and the virtual. As a first point, 
though, it is helpful to return to Deleuze’s dictum – based on his Bergsonian understanding of 
time – that “the crystal-image may well have many distinct elements, but its irreducibility 
consists in the indivisible unity of an actual image and its virtual image” (1989: 78). This is 
                                                          
164 As discussed, the four signs identified in Deleuze’s Proust and Signs are the Worldly Signs, the Deceptive 
Signs of Love, Sensuous Material Signs, and the Signs of Art.  
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because the following four dynamics adhere, albeit in different ways, to such ‘indivisible 
unity,’ even though they range from highly restrictive to openly generative of difference. To 
begin with, and in relation to the first crystal, Deleuze writes that, 
 
our actual existence…duplicates itself along with a virtual existence, a mirror-
image. Every moment of our life presents the two aspects, it is actual and virtual, 
perception on the one side and recollection on the other. Whoever becomes 
conscious of the continual duplicating of his present into perception and 
recollection will compare himself to an actor playing his [role] automatically, 
listening to himself and beholding himself playing. (1989: 79) 
 
But Deleuze also provides cinematic examples of the loss of the actual in the virtual – or the 
subordination of the actual to the hegemony of the virtual – in the films of Max Ophüls. A 
poignant example of this is found in the first story of his Le Plaisir (1952), a cinematic 
representation of three short stories by Guy de Maupassant, where an old man is so obsessed 
with, and hence dominated by, recollection of his youthful enjoyment of dancing, that he 
cannot help but try to mimic them in what amounts to a grotesque parody of his former self; 
something which he undertakes even though the exertion of dancing will surely kill him. In 
this case, Ophüls’s film presents to us an actual man who is effectively imprisoned by the 
virtual, and this theme continues through the remainder of the film as Ophüls plays with 
different configurations of this dynamic, through presenting an array of characters who are 
trapped by their memories, and unable to actualize difference against the virtual backdrop 
which continues to dominate them (1989: 83-84). The second crystal, Deleuze maintains, is 
visible in the works of Jean Renoir. Here, the virtual hegemony thematized in Ophüls’s films 
is destabilized to some extent, because “in Renoir, the crystal is never pure and perfect, it has 
a failing, a point of flight, a ‘flaw.’” In short, “it is always cracked” and “what depth of field 
reveals” is that “something is going to slip away in the background, in depth…through the 
crack” (1989: 85). In Grand Illusion (1937) for example, although the main characters – two 
captured French officers – are subjected to the near-hegemonic virtual components of 
German nationalism, they are not entirely enveloped by this virtual field, but rather, through 
personal orientations and pre-dispositions, as well as surprising encounters, are finally able to 
escape it (1989: 87). In the works of Luchino Visconti, however, Deleuze identifies the third 
crystal, in terms of which the erosion of the virtual tends to be gradual, occurring most often 
through decay, which Deleuze describes as “the crystal in the process of decomposition” 
(1989: 94). As an example of this, he looks at Ludwig (1972), in which the king distances 
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himself from the world through his obsessive devotion to aestheticism. However, while 
squandering his wealth, he fails to notice the changing political climate around him, and his 
impending overthrow is represented by the rotting of his teeth. In this instance, the virtual 
crystal established by the main character – a kingdom of art above the actual political and 
military forces of his day – is steadily eroded, until the latter breaks free from the hegemony 
of the former, when Ludwig is eventually dethroned. Finally, it is in the work of Federico 
Fellini that Deleuze identifies the fourth crystal, which entails a wonderfully creative virtual-
actual exchange. That is, Deleuze argues that, rather than representing virtual domination of 
the actual, or either representing an eventual crack in the virtual mirror in question, or the 
decay of its hegemony to the point where the actual becomes free, Fellini manages to capture 
the constant birth of new time through a virtual-actual flow. Indeed, he argues that in Fellini’s 
films, “the crystal [is] caught in its formation and growth, related to the ‘seeds’ which make it 
up…[and] which incorporate…the environment and force it to crystallize” into new 
configurations (1989: 88-89). In Roma (1972), for example, a creative and dynamic 
representation of the virtual-actual interface occurs when a group of schoolboys and their 
teacher cross the Rubicon River. As they do so, not only do they re-member, as it were, the 
historical event of Julius Caesar’s crossing of the very same river, but in addition this 
memory is also conflated with many other memories of the city of Rome. In this way, their 
actual environment undergoes a transformation, but at the same time Rome emerges as multi-
faceted, complex and impossible to capture in any totalizing manner. Here, the power of 
memory to transform the present – and the affirmative nature of such transformation through 
a creative virtual-actual exchange – is powerfully communicated.  
However, time-images are by no means limited to such Proustian production of ‘Signs 
of Art,’ but can also range between the related signs of composition and the other poll of the 
continuum, namely non-subjective signs of genesis through which Bergsonian reflection of 
duration is achieved. And images which constitute such genetic signs occur, for example, in 
the films of the Daniele Straub and Jean-Marie Huillet. In this regard, Bogue provides an 
excellent description of the power of their film-making techniques when he advances that, 
“frequently, Straub/Huillet offer long, slow pans of fields, pastures, deserts, and landscapes 
that have been the sites of massacres, battles, sacrifices, and executions.” And these “buried 
histories of bloodshed are obliquely alluded to by voices and by shots of written texts or 
monuments.” Importantly, however, “the landscapes remain insistently resistant to their 
histories,” and appear like “geological faults displaying enigmatic layers in need of 
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explication” (2003: 189). Furthermore, key objects or crucial actions are often not shown, and 
thus the audience is compelled to imagine them in a creative engagement with the text (2003: 
190-194). Moreover, through employing such technique, not only does the duo’s very 
Bergsonian reflection on the nature of the interface between virtual and actual emerge with 
clarity. In addition, as Barton Byg notes in Landscapes of Resistance: The Films of Daniele 
Huillet and Jean-Marie Straub, even in their most nihilistic films, the duo both “refuse to 
accept limitations” and display a “profound optimism” (1995: 29), because of their 
recognition of an irrepressible élan vital within the virtual-actual exchanges they thematize.  
In sum, then, Deleuze, in an echo of his work with Guattari on the writings of Kafka, 
maintains that “art, and especially cinematographic art, must take part in this task: not that of 
addressing a people…but of contributing to the invention of a people.” And he argues that it 
can do so because it is “no longer constituted on the basis of a possibility of evolution and 
revolution, like the classical cinema, but on impossibilities” (1989: 209-211). Impossibilities 
that are facilitated by a dynamic understanding of how everything is constituted by time; of 
how we – and indeed the world around us from which we are indissociable – are expressions 
of duration, of an actual present which never ceases to pass, and a virtual past which co-exists 
with the present, but which can only ever be remembered differently.  
Analog duration versus digital information 
While Deleuze readily extended his philosophy of difference to the technological phylum of 
analog cinema, the increasing domination of digital technologies from the early 1990s 
onward brought about a host of theoretical problems concerning the generation of difference 
through cinema that is shot, produced, and distributed via digital means. As already 
discussed, in his “Postscript on Control Societies,” Deleuze advanced that the digital 
Information Age heralded a distressing turn toward ever more invasive and pervasive forces 
of control, which he understood as severely problematizing the generation of difference. And 
following on from Deleuze’s pronouncements in this regard, arguments have been made that 
creative digital works, be they musical compositions, photographic images, or indeed 
cinematic works, have – on account of their reliance on binary code – lost an important 
component which previously linked them to the past, and with this have been transformed 
from durational into informational artefacts.  
That is, in Gilles Deleuze’s Time Machine, Rodowick acknowledges Deleuze’s 
fascination with analog cinema, and its radical potential through movement-images and time-
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images to reflect and precipitate durational intuition. But this potential, according to 
Rodowick, has also become problematized with the emergence, and ultimately the rise to 
dominance of, digital technology, as the primary means of film production, storage and 
distribution. Rodowick begins his argument by indicating why the cinema of Deleuze’s time 
(post-war cinema) proved such a draw card to the philosopher. As already indicated, he 
writes that “Deleuze depicts image practices as social and technological automata where each 
era thinks itself by producing its particular image of thought.” And this, in turn, allows 
philosophy the opportunity to “map this image in mental cartographies” that are not bound to 
restrictive, dogmatic, and representational conceptions of experience. Indeed, “in its largest 
sense, then, the image describes historically specific cinematic practices as ‘spiritual 
automata’ or ‘thought machines,’” and in many respects, Deleuze considers cinema to be a 
form of “artificial intelligence” that functions as “a machine for the fabrication of concepts.” 
But he was particularly interested in it “because it provides a complex moving picture of 
duration” (1997: 6-7).  
However, Rodowick also poses the question – which resonates with Deleuze’s 
reservations regarding the digital – of whether or not the capacity of film to provide such an 
experience is severely compromised in the digital era, specifically on account of the switch to 
digital modes of production.165 That is, in his later work, The Virtual Life of Film, Rodowick 
centres much of his exploration of the above issue on a question asked by Babette Mangolte 
in her essay “Afterward: A Matter of Time.” The question posed is as follows: “Why is it 
difficult for the digital image to communicate duration?” And in relation to it, Mangolte 
expresses her concern over the digital image’s inability “to establish and construct an 
experiential sense of time passing,” and her correlative wonder over how “the projected film 
image [did so] effortlessly in the past and still can.” Rodowick similarly admits that while he 
continues to “feel engaged by many contemporary movies,” he also feels “a deep sense, 
                                                          
165 Relatedly, in “The World, Time,” Rodowick points out that “the turn to film as an important site of ethical 
interrogation is…curious.” And he notes that “if there is something that can be called ‘film philosophy’ 
today…undoubtedly, this is due to the influence of Stanley Cavell as the contemporary philosopher most 
centrally concerned with the problem of ethics in film and philosophy,” specifically through “his 
characterization of an Emersonian moral perfectionism.” In reading Cavell, Rodowick picks up on a strange 
resonance with Deleuze, insofar as “in Cavell’s Emersonian ethics, there are also curious and powerful echoes 
with Gilles Deleuze’s Nietzschean and Bergsonian perspectives on cinema, wherein concepts of movement and 
time are related as the expression of belief in the world and its powers of transformation.” And in this regard, in 
relation to the ‘non-cross-over’ between Cavell and Deleuze, he writes: “But I am haunted by the idea of a 
dialogue, as if in a real conversation, but between partners who seem only dimly aware of one another;” 
something which is all the more evocative because, while “Deleuze’s cinema books, published in 1983 and 
1985, respond to Cavell’s The World Viewed (1971) and Pursuits of Happiness (1981),” Cavell’s “Contesting 
Tears (1996) and Cities of Words (2004) echo some of the most provocative thinking in The Movement-Image 
and The Time-Image” (Rodowick 2009: 98-99). 
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which is very hard to describe or qualify, of time lost.” Accordingly, Mangolte’s question 
thus constitutes for him both a sympathetic intuition of this sense, and a key through which to 
explore the ontology of the digital image – one which, for Rodowick, is fundamentally 
different to that of the analog cinema. By way of example, Rodowick compares two film 
projects – one analog and the other digital – to illustrate his point. That is, on the one hand, he 
recalls a 1971 film by Jean Eustache called Numero zero, and explains its importance: 
 
Before his first feature was released to theatres, Jean Eustache shot a long film that 
he called, significantly, Numéro zéro. Shown only once in abridged form on French 
television, the film disappeared for more than thirty years before being rediscovered 
and returned to its original form for a 2003 release in France. For me it is uncannily 
important that this work should reappear so long after it was shot, as if to remind us 
what cinema was and wherein film’s powers lay in the pre-digital era. (2007:80) 
 
He further elaborates that this film was one hundred and ten minutes long, and examined a 
particular filmic automatism; that is, “the utopia of filming continuous duration.” In short, the 
film is set in the apartment of Eustache’s grandmother, Odette Robert, and features her 
recounting her life “across six generations of French history” to Eustache. The entire film is 
recorded in “one take filmed from two static camera positions,” one which frames Eustache, 
and the other which frames Robert. Furthermore, Eustache “marks the slate in what seems to 
be the middle of the shot. In this manner we come to realize that the run times of the two 
cameras are staggered so that the magazine of one can be changed while the other continues 
to film,” with the film eventually ending when the raw stock is used up. In this attempt at 
capturing time without loss, Eustache thus creates a film about both “passing time and the 
powers of time’s passing.” Indeed, as Robert recounts her memories (importantly, a unique 
account of one person’s duration within six decades worth of time), we witness the light 
streaming in from the window changing, we see the cigarettes pile up in the ashtray, slowly 
burning out, bottles and glasses gradually empty, and so forth (2007: 80-82). And what this 
deeply personal film accordingly allows is a deep reflection on our own duration, as 
something that never ceases to pass, and that with each passing instance distances us from the 
moment of Eustache and Robert’s conversation (about passing time). Moreover, the 
durational image – burned into the light sensitive material of the film – remains for us a 
haunting material memory not least because of the fragility of the medium that, like Eustache 
and Robert, will inexorably be overcome by time. With regard to this, Rodowick poignantly 
notes: 
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This conceit or folly of wanting to film uninterrupted duration is a way of showing 
that (real) time is neither homogeneous nor continuous. Certainly, the film 
documents a presence and a memory conveyed through voice; but it also documents 
passing time as embedded in a space – the precious conservation of time and 
memory in small and fragile fragments of space that time will always overwhelm, 
for both Odette and Eustache are dead. (2007: 82) 
 
On the other hand, referencing Alexander Sokurov’s 2002 film Russian Ark, a weighty 
reflection on Russian history, Rodowick points to a featurette included in the DVD, entitled 
Film in One Breath, in which the film’s producer, Jens Meurer, offers a revealing statement 
that gets to the heart of cinema production within the digital era. Meurer indicates that 
Russian Ark is a “work that includes more than 30, 000 ‘digital events,’” and it is this term 
that allows Rodowick to begin to articulate his intuitive feeling regarding digital cinema’s 
inability to capture time. He begins by contrasting the digital event with analog modes of 
production, advancing that “digital capture, synthesis, and compositing are the three principle 
operations of digital cinema,” and that of these three, the first – capture – has been considered 
as being very similar to analog camera capture. Yet he argues that it is because the digital 
image is split into “a discrete mosaic of picture elements,” each of which take on “distinct 
mathematical values,” that it is separated from the films of the analog era. In effect, captured 
images converted to digital format become fragmented “mathematically discrete and modular 
elements,” open to “any number of programmable transformations,” and such openness to 
post-shot manipulation is not without implication. Indeed, in its control of information, the 
digital breaks “the continuity of automatic analogical causation,” and in doing so, entails a 
different ontology. In this regard, it is no longer concerned with “overcome[ing] our temporal 
alienation from the past,” but is rather focused on “the present” and on the “control of 
information” in that present. Put differently, “cinema has become more like language than 
image, with discrete and definable minimal units (pixels) open to transformations of value 
and syntactic recombination” (2007: 163-166). Rodowick also takes this issue of the 
reduction of captured duration into informational units further, through his reference to Lev 
Manovich’s provocative formula on digital film. Manovich writes that: 
 
Since a computer breaks down every frame into pixels, a complete film can be 
defined as a function that, given the horizontal, vertical, and time location of each 
pixel, returns its colour. This is exactly how a computer represents a film…For a 
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computer, a film is an abstract arrangement of colours changing in time, rather than 
something structured by ‘shots,’ ‘narrative, ‘actors,’ and so on. (in Rodowick 2007: 
166) 
 
As a consequence, “the experience of duration has lost its precariousness [and]…causal links 
to physical reality have become weakened.” Correlatively, “new relations with space and 
with time are developing that involve expectations of interactivity and control.” And it is 
accordingly “important to understand that digital information expresses another will to power 
in relation to the world.” A will that “is neither better nor inferior” to analog technology, 
“but…different both in its values and its modalities of expression” (2007: 174-175, 179).  
Digitality and difference 
Moving beyond the effect of the digital era on cinema, Rodowick extends such critique to 
other forms of contemporary visual culture that make use of digital images. Specifically, he 
turns his attention to computer gaming, and in relation to this ever-more popular medium – 
particularly in terms of its representation of movement and time – he writes that “nothing 
moves, nothing endures in a digitally composed world. The impression of movement is really 
just an impression” involving “the numerical rotation and transformation of geometrical 
elements.” As such, “the sense of time as la duree gives way to simple duration or to the ‘real 
time’ of a continuous present” (2007: 167-169). However, here Rodowick nevertheless leaves 
space for various possibilities and experimentations, and in no way suggests that the digital 
era has nothing to offer in terms of the promotion of difference. The distinction made is 
between first-person gaming and the game Myst (1993), a graphic adventure puzzle game 
played through a first-person perspective. In this regard, Rodowick writes that although “the 
real-time interactivity of first-person games is…linear and teleological,” games such as Myst 
offer “the possibility of a different kind of immersion in digital time, one characterized  more 
by memory and thoughtfulness as well as by movements whose objectives are more oblique 
and less delineated.” Indeed, Rodowick even suggests that the virtual worlds housed in games 
such as these represent different “dimensions, frontiers, and parallel worlds,” and in doing so 
build up narratives that are “both spatially elaborate and temporally complex.” Yet he 
cautions that, even though the outputs of contemporary visual culture have potential, it is a 
different potential to that found in analog production in that it relies on “a manipulation of 
layers of the modularized image subject to a variety of algorithmic transformations,” as 
opposed to being “an expression of time and duration” (2007: 170-173). In other words, the 
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ontology of the digital image entails a will “to control information and to shape ourselves 
through the medium of information.” That is, “forged in the logic of information, the [related] 
ethics of perceptual realism is based on a vision of a world that is entirely mathematical in 
nature,” or at least “a nature that is mathematical before it is or could be imagined as 
physical.” Accordingly, “if we feel duration less in the numerical image, this may be because 
through [digital] symbolic expressions we want to control time – not to preserve an image 
against the flow of time” (2007: 175). The will described above – and annotated as a 
“database complex” by Manovich – has elicited different reactions. While for Manovich, the 
will to information is a process that is one of “peace and comfort,” for Rodowick, the process 
expresses “a profound intensification of time” that, because of its “deep immersion in the 
present,” impinges on our capacity to produce difference through durational reflection.  
Yet despite such anxiety, Rodowick also finds potentially redeeming qualities in the 
ontology of the digital image. For instance, he writes that the “will to share, copy, and 
transmit [information] relies less on a notion of the individual…than in the always virtual 
presence in time of a collective monad or a collectively of monads,” which he defines as 
“highly volatile and ever-evolving communities linked by common interests.” Ultimately, 
though, he leaves the discussion open by suggesting that, although “digital expressions are 
finding it difficult…to become something other than information,” for “future minds,” they 
may well “become philosophical.” And in relation to this, he points to “the more powerful 
expression of digital automatism in other creative acts: in videogames and the varieties of 
online interactions,” as contemporary visual experiences in which “something new [could be] 
felt in relation to digital screens” (2007: 175-180). With regard to such sentiment, Brian 
Massumi, in his exploration of digital space in relation to duration, in Movement, Affect, 
Sensation: Parables for the Virtual, provides a significant theoretical expansion on 
Rodowick’s understanding of the digital. In this regard, it is Massumi’s assertion that “digital 
technologies have a connection to the potential and the virtual only through the analog” 
(2002: 138). This is because, for Massumi, digital code in itself has no significance, unless it 
is transformed into thought through analog process, and to demonstrate his point he uses the 
example of word processing.  
 
All of the possible combinations of letters and words are enveloped in the zeros and 
ones of ASCII code. You could say that entire language systems are enveloped in it. 
But what is processed inside the computer is code, not words. The words appear on 
screen, in being read. Reading is the qualitative transformation of alphabetical 
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figures into figures of speech and thought. This is an analog process. Outside its 
appearance, the digital is electronic nothingness, pure systemic possibility. Its 
appearance from electronic limbo is one with its analog transformation. (Massumi 
2002: 138).  
 
This example serves as a key insight into how Massumi views the interplay between the 
virtual and the actual through digital interface. For Massumi, “the virtual is best approached 
topologically,” because in using topology – which he understands as “a purely qualitative 
science” that represents “the science of self-varying deformation” – one views a topological 
figure as one which is defined as “the continuous self-transformation of one geometrical 
figure into another.” By way of example, he turns to a pliable coffee cup; while one can twist 
this figure into any number of configurations, essentially, the figure itself remains the same, 
albeit one that has been mutated into differing versions of itself. Applied to the computer 
code that constitutes production through digital technology, a topological reading reveals that 
the capacity for the production of difference is not lost. Rather, while the digital code 
remains, relations to it shift continuously, and are crucially analog.  
Massumi complicates the matter further when he states that digital interfaces do not 
operate strictly via a virtual-actual interplay. Instead, he argues that “the actual occurs at the 
point of intersection of the possible, the potential, and the virtual [which constitute] three 
modes of thought.” Furthermore, “the actual is the effect of their momentous meeting, 
mixing, and re-separation,” and it is the “meeting and mixing that is sensation.” Accordingly, 
for him, “sensation [is] always on arrival a transformative feeling of the outside, a feeling of 
thought” which is “the being of the analog.” In effect, sensation felt in relation to any external 
stimulus, regardless of the medium from which this stimulus is derived, is always analog in 
nature.  
 Discussing the three modes of thought introduced above, Massumi explains that, 
firstly, “possibility, for its part, can be approached quantitatively,” and he sees probability as 
one of the forms “the possible’s quantitative expression may take.” Defining probabilities as 
“weightings of possibilities according to the regularity with which they might be expected to 
appear,” he argues that such an approach is necessarily limited, in that, “since probability 
approaches possibilities en masse, it [only] approximates potential.” In effect, it can only 
target any event at “the general level,” and thus “appl[ies] not to the event but only to an 
averaging of the mass of events.” Secondly, for its part, “potential doesn’t ‘apply’ to the 
event either.” This is because, as “a multiplicity of possibilities materially present to one 
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another, in resonance and interference,” he argues, “their coming-together is singularity, 
compulsively felt, so intensely that the sensation cannot be exhausted in one go.” And thirdly, 
potential functions in relation to the virtual, in that “the virtual centre is like a reserve of 
differentiation or qualitative transformation in every event” that never “appears as such 
[because] it is insensate [and] it cannot be felt.” Indeed, “it appears only in the potentials it 
drives and the possibilities that unfold from their driving.”    
 In terms of the digital, which relies on “a numerically based form of codification 
(zeros and ones),” it becomes evident that the digital – as “a numeric way of arraying 
alternative states so that they can be sequenced into a set of alternative routines” – cannot 
involve the virtual-potential interplay in its operation. In this regard, Massumi is unequivocal 
in his statement that “the medium of the digital is possibility, not virtuality, and not even 
potential. It doesn’t bother approximating potential, as does probability. Digital coding per se 
is possibilistic to the limit.” As such, for him, “nothing is more destructive for the thinking 
and imaging of the virtual than equating it with the digital,” because “digital technologies in 
fact have a remarkably weak connection to the virtual, by virtue of the enormous power of 
their systemization of the possible” (2002:135-138). However, Massumi does note that “all 
arts and technologies, as series of qualitative transformations” – or in Deleuzoguattarian 
terms “machinic phylums” – “envelop the virtual in one way or another.” As such, digital 
technologies “may yet develop a privileged connection to [the virtual] far stronger than that 
of any preceding phylum” (2002: 137). 
 Indeed then, rather than equating the digital with the virtual, we should see digital 
technologies as having a connection to the virtual (or the potential), and then only through 
analog means. And Massumi at this point adds to his earlier word processing example by 
explaining that digitality is primarily accessed through analog sensibilities. His first example 
in this regard is hypertext. This electronic document text, connected to other related sections 
of text or graphic material has, according to Massumi, been characterized by some critics as 
“not…liberating but downright totalitarian,” because “all possible links in the system are 
programmatically prearrayed in its architecture.” However, while such a definition is valid in 
its outlining of the parameters of what is possible for digital infrastructure, “what it fails to 
appreciate is that the coding is not the whole story: that the digital always circuits into the 
analog.” That is, while the digital infrastructure that is hypertext might be bound by the 
restrictions of its coding, the user is not forced to operate by the same principles. Indeed, 
“hypertext reader[s do] something that the co-presence of alternative states in code cannot 
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ever do,” in that they “serially experience effects, accumulate them in an unprogramemd way, 
[and] in a way that intensifies, creating resonances and interference patterns.” Thus, again, it 
is the analog that dictates the experience of the digital, and not the other way around. And 
Massumi opens up such reflection further when he discusses “structurally open” hypertext 
environments, such as the World Wide Web.166 While again he concedes that it is true that all 
material online is pre-programmed, “the notion of a dictatorship of the link” carries little 
weight. Indeed, “search engines allow un-prearrayed linking, and the sheer size of the Web 
means that it is always changing.” As such, this open architecture “lends itself to the 
accumulation of analog effects,” while in conjunction with this, “image and sound content 
alongside text provides more opportunities for resonance and interference, between thought, 
sensation, and perception” (2002: 138-140).  
 In closing, Massumi repeats his assertion that, with regard to digital technology as 
phylum, “whatever inventiveness comes about, it is a result not of the coding itself but of its 
detour into the analog;” put differently, “the processing may be digital – but the analog is the 
process” (2002: 141-142).  
 In turn, Ronald Bogue in Deleuze on Cinema, contributes a further point for 
consideration with regard to digital images and duration. He notes, in relation to a discussion 
of television, that this medium operates via the “electronic image,” with this image being 
created through “a rapid scanning of lines of pixels by a beam of electrons.” With regard to 
this, he references the video artist Nam June Paik, who observes that “the essential concept, 
in regard to television, is time,” and Bogue interprets this as “the time of an oscillating 
electron beam passing over an interwoven mesh of pixels.” The result of this is that “the 
television image as constant scanning of lines is fundamentally a type of time-image.” 
Additionally, as an electronic image, it also “lends itself to digitalization,” and with this, 
lends itself to an “essential mutability,” something which opens up an interesting avenue of 
consideration. In this regard, Bogue cites Edmond Couchot, who construes digital images as 
“transformable emissions of ‘immedia’ without clear origin or final destination.” Such 
thinking in relation to the digital is resonant with Massumi’s earlier suggestion that the 
analog experience of a digital image could constitute an open and creative exchange, while 
the mutability of the digital image also suggests further implications. In terms of this, Bogue 
writes that such flexibility and variability, in a technical sense, “undermines the screen 
                                                          
166These are “structurally open” in contrast to “closed architectures like hypertext novels on CD-ROM or DVD 
or the commercial reference packages included in many computer purchases” (2002: 140).  
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dimensions of up and down, right and left, rendering the screen less a window on the world 
than the site of transferable data.” As such, “the video screen becomes a ‘table of 
information,’” representing in its form “an opaque surface on which ‘data’ are inscribed.” 
Thus, while such technological development alters dramatically the landscape of that which 
is possible to represent, Bogue presents an important caveat.  He writes that “without a 
‘powerful will to art’ no technological innovation leads to genuine artistic creativity.” That is, 
while new technologies, be they television or information technology, “in general provide 
external conditions of possibility for creativity in the cinema (and in other arts),” it is always 
a different, internal set of conditions which makes possible the production of new images of 
thought. In other words, new thought remains dependent on an aesthetic dynamic before any 
dependency on technological means through which the aesthetic is pursued (2003: 196). 
Garret Stewart in “Cinemonics versus Digitime,” makes an interesting related point when he 
asks why, “even when contextualized in a youth culture saturated by commercial electronics 
at every turn,…so many recent films, despite their obvious digital enhancement at the level of 
technique, [are] concerned in their plots with a non-electronic virtuality?” (2009: 328). 
Similarly, Bogue uses an example from cinema in order to illustrate this. Referencing the 
director Alain Resnais, he argues that this director’s “memory space is consonant with the 
brain world of free-flowing digital information-images, but computers and video screens do 
not induce his cinematic images.” In this regard, the constant memorial modulation of his 
Last Year in Marienbad (1961) do indeed resonate with the digital manipulation of past-
events to the point where what actually happened is effaced, or recognized as unattainable. 
But such technologies simply provide the “general external context” within which Resnais 
conducts his various contortions (2003: 195-196). In short, this director makes use of the 
power of his art – cinema – in the construction of challenging, difference-promoting images 
of thought, while the technological means accessed in the production of such imagery remain 
decidedly secondary.167  
Conclusion 
In Cinema 1: The Movement Image and in Cinema 2: The Time Image, Deleuze identifies 
analog cinema as a powerful medium through which people can experience indirect, and – 
following the Second World War – direct images of time. And the ability of such cinema to 
capture duration from multiple perspectives is for Deleuze a remarkable feat of this particular 
                                                          
167 Although often remembered for his Last Year in Marienbad (1961), it should also be remembered that his 
last film Aimer, Boire et Chanter (2014) – or Life of Riley – was shot in digital (IMDB, 2016). 
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technological phylum, and one with important consequences in terms of the promotion of 
difference. Yet, with the emergence of the new digital technological framework that has 
displaced the analog as the primary means of producing visual material, Rodowick is 
certainly justified in his argument that the digital operates via a different ontology to the 
analog; one that can function exclusively in terms of a will to power over information in a 
way that negates duration, and with it, the generation of difference so important for Deleuze. 
However, as Massumi and Bogue (and Stewart) demonstrate, this does not necessarily 
preclude the experience of duration in relation to digitality. Indeed, while Massumi shows 
that the digital is literally nothingness without our analog-based appropriation of it, Bogue 
demonstrates that the mutability of this mode of capture and organization makes it an exciting 
medium through which difference can be generated, provided that those who employ it in 
their quest to produce difference privilege a ‘powerful will to art’ over a technophilia that 
could potentially reduce image production to mere manipulation of information.  
Accordingly, as will be discussed in the next chapter, it is also possible to suggest that 
indeed a new type of durationality has emerged as a result of the dominance of digital 
technology – a durational digitality. While perhaps not precisely the same as the durationality 
contended with through the analog technology dealt with in Cinema 1 and Cinema 2, it 
nevertheless has the potential to be effective – and affecting – in its ability to promote 
difference in relation to those who encounter its creations. Creations which, as will be 
explored, present new and fascinating possibilities for becoming-animal.   
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Chapter Six – Emerging connections to the environment: Hybrid digital 
durationalities 
Introduction  
As discussed in the previous chapter, for Rodowick, the ontology of digitality as a technology 
can be construed as different from the ontology which underpinned both the analog 
technology of the movement- and time-images valorized by Deleuze, and for that matter, the 
Nietzschean-Proustian-Bergsonian philosophical complex which informed Deleuze’s 
approach to cinema. But, in light of the assertions of Massumi and Bogue – and to some 
extent Rodowick – it may nevertheless be possible to generate durational awareness through 
digital means because its different ontology does not preclude its use in this regard, on 
account of the analog dimensions of our experience, and the priority of aesthetic dynamics in 
the production of new thought. Accordingly, and under the auspices of Deleuze’s counter-
information – elaborated upon earlier in relation to Guattari’s post-media – the digital can be 
utilized to positively affect people’s relationship to nature, insofar as an encounter with 
nature represented in digital form can conceivably precipitate durational intuition and thus 
positively affect the user’s sensibility toward their connection with the environment. 
 With a view to exploring this issue, in what follows the focus will fall on certain 
digital artefacts that have the potential to render their users aware of how they are linked with 
other non-human beings in duration. Thus, in the digital artefacts selected, the ‘other’ is some 
kind of representation of animal. In this regard, the first artefact identified is the popular 
1990s device, the Tamagotchi, which constitutes an example of a digital animal extending its 
dominion over humans on the basis of its limited duration and the needs it experienced during 
this time. And this will be categorized as an example of first-order hybrid durationality. In 
turn, the second artefact identified is the 2012 point-and-click adventure game, Botanicula, 
which constitutes an example of a somewhat more open human-animal digital exchange, in 
which the digital framework acts as a conduit for an affirmative encounter with nature within 
which human duration – understood in terms of memory and creative exploration – interfaces 
with the duration of nature and the lives and time of animals therein. And this will be 
categorized as an example of second-order hybrid durationality. Finally, the third artefact 
identified is the mobile application, Shark Net in association with Ocearch, which constitutes 
examples of an open and dynamic human-animal digital durational interface, which through 
the use of an open variable – tagged and tracked sharks – within their digital framework, 
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move beyond the hybrid durationality of games like Botanicula, and instead offer a 
potentially profound durational human-animal encounter. Accordingly, they will be 
categorized as examples of third-order hybrid durationalities.   
First-order hybrid durationality: The Tamagotchi  
While there are a fair amount of artefacts to choose from in relation to digital representations 
of animals,168 a good place to start – due to its immense popularity and world-wide cultural 
impact – would be the hand-held ‘pet’ known as the Tamagotchi, first released in 1996 in 
Japan. What is most interesting about this phenomenon is that, although the little portable 
device was relatively unsophisticated, both in terms of the range of commands programmed 
into it, and in terms of its ability to represent in any visually realistic way a ‘pet,’ it 
nevertheless gained global popularity, particularly among children.  
David Bell in An Introduction to Cybercultures, provides an explanation of how this 
device originated and functioned. That is, he recalls that the device was produced by a 
Japanese company called Bandai, and that according to popular lore concerning its origins, it 
came about when a Japanese mother who did not have space in her home for a live pet, 
conceived of a virtual pet to satisfy her children’s desire for animal companionship. In terms 
of how it worked precisely, Bell describes the device as something akin to a “digital watch” 
in appearance, insofar as it came “in the form of a small plastic casing with a LCD display in 
the centre and tiny push buttons on the sides.” Once the device was activated for the first 
time, a “cartoon egg on the screen hatch[ed] out” and, in this way, “the Tamagotchi [was] 
born as a simple digital image, vaguely animal-shaped.” Once digitally born, though, the 
onus was on the owner of the Tamagotchi to enter commands – for feeding, cleaning, 
disciplining, etc. their pet – via the inputs. And if the owner neglected to do this, the pet 
quickly died, and the aim of the game was thus to constantly monitor it so as to preserve it, 
healthy and happy (with indicators for these on-screen), for as long as possible. In this regard, 
the owner observed, much like one would with a living pet, “a series of transformations in its 
limited life course” (2001: 49). And in the earliest versions of the device, as Kathleen 
Richardson points out in An Anthropology of Robots and AI: Annihilation, Anxiety and 
Machines, once the virtual creature died, the device itself “terminated completely.” This 
complete shutdown was however reversed in later versions, both because of traumatised 
                                                          
168 Other examples are games such as Freddi Fish, Living Legends, Tiger Trial, and Elephant Odyssey, along 
with the game-boy phenomenon of the 1990s and early 2000s, Pokémon.  
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children,169 and because of the fury of adults who were accordingly obliged to buy new 
devices with varying levels of frequency – depending on the success of their children’s care 
of their virtual pets. As such, in later versions, one could reset the device and re-use it once 
the pet expired. Describing the Tamagotchi as a “fascinating instance…of the production and 
consumption of computer technology in a play context,” Bell also borrows from Sherry 
Turkle when he rightly terms such manifestations of digital technology as “computational 
objects” (2001: 49).   
 Beyond such general descriptions, both Richardson and Bell provide astute 
observations on the interactions enabled by the device, and because this was truly a world-
wide cultural digital phenomenon,170 one can read these as observations of a seminal moment 
in human-digital interaction. For her part, Richardson notes that it was not the user who 
issued commands to the Tamagotchi, but rather that users followed commands from the 
Tamagotchi (2015: 70). Indeed, “in this context, the Tamagotchi revealed the extent to which 
its users were obligated to a machine to keep it virtually living” (2015: 70). And in relation to 
this, it is worth noting, as Bell does, that it was children who were most affected by the 
device – with a number of consequences worth considering. Firstly, he argues that while 
“adults, predictably, were perplexed by the Tamagotchi, [and] unable to understand their 
appeal,” it was children who took it on with enthusiasm, and this is because “children have 
often led the way when it comes to using ‘computational objects’ to think with, settling into 
ways of relating to them that differ radically from the ways the grown-ups experience them.” 
Secondly, in this particular human-digital exchange, the major difference between the young 
and the old was that for the former, Tamagotchis were devices to be “enjoy[ed]” as 
“boundary objects blurring the distinctions of what counts as ‘alive’” (2001: 50). In this 
regard, Anne Allison in Millennial Monsters: Japanese Toys and the Global Imagination, 
                                                          
169 Richardson notes some examples of “young owners taking the ‘dead’ objects to Tamagotchi burial grounds” 
(2015:70), as an indicator of how attached some users became to these devices. And Anne Allison, in her work 
on imagination and electronic toys, provides some further insight into such attachment. She writes: “There have 
been a host of virtual memorials…printed mainly over the Web but even in obituaries published in regular 
newspapers. There are reports, as well, of Tamagotchi mourning counsellors.” She furthermore notes that the 
treatment or mistreatment of the device has prompted similarly passionate responses, explaining that “some 
users purposefully try to kill off their Tamagotchi, a practice that has sprouted chat rooms, Web sites, and user 
groups devoted (both for and against)  to the issue of sadism against Tamagotchi” (2006: 176). This level of 
seriousness can further be attested to by noting that, at the height of the craze, a number of books on how 
precisely to care for your virtual pet found enough commercial interest for publication; see Doris Betz’s 
Tamagotchi: The Official Care Guide and Record Book (1997) and Tracey West’s Electronic Pet Care (also 
1997), among others.  
170 The most commonly cited number of units sold is 40 million (Bell 2001: 50; Vogt 2014). However, estimates 
vary, and it is noted that by 2010, 80 million units had been purchased – with revisions of the device still being 
produced and sold, although not with similar momentum to the original devices (Thornhill, 2013).  
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argues that “the way in which the Tamagotchi plays with the boundaries of the imaginary is 
symptomatic of the social reality we inhabit.” And, she describes such social reality as one in 
which “virtuality is becoming increasingly integrated into [the] everyday life and movement, 
of both people and things,” via a process of integration that is “rapid and intense” (2006:177). 
In certain respects, this line of argument echoes Deleuze and Guattari’s idea from their work 
on Kafka of a people yet to come. That is, facilitated by digital exchange, and in response to 
the impasses of the contemporary era – ranging from limited space in the case of the Japanese 
mother who invented the Tamagotchi, and limited time in neoliberal societies which 
precludes the possibility of having a little pet, along with the impossibility of freeing oneself 
from the desire for animal companionship – we see the emergence of those who intuitively 
relate differently to the digital artefacts produced by the information age. However, as 
Deleuze also notes, not all lines of flight end well (1987: 229), and in this particular example 
– returning to Richardson’s concerning observation – it would seem that the related digital-
human exchange is far from positive, in the sense of generating creative difference. Rather, 
through the Tamagotchi a generation of children became desensitized to compulsively 
following the prompts of a computer programme, encased within the appearance of a genteel, 
domestic animal. Accordingly, the device entailed the explication of a Fascist/Cancerous 
Body without Organs, especially insofar as – much like the time-images found in Max 
Ophüls films – it held up a virtual mirror in which many children actually became lost, on 
account of the virtual hegemony it wielded in conjunction with the related marketing 
campaigns. In this regard, it is important to note that the generation that encountered and 
grew up with the Tamagotchi were also quick to adapt to the various information technology-
based phenomena of the twenty-first century – the social media networks, the smart phones, 
etc. That is, the little device may well have functioned as a gateway to ever closer relations 
with the digital, to the point where its presence – and subordination to its dictates – has 
become normalized.  
 This is reflected in many of the popular reactions to the Tamagotchi, as expressed in 
the mass media, which often concerned its effect on children. While, as indicated above, 
youngsters took to the device with fervour, and while this certainly reflected a new 
orientation toward the digital, the worries of older generations – disconcerted by the ubiquity 
and potentially negative effects of the device – remains important because thematization of 
them exposes the epistemic and axiological rupture between them and their children. In 
particular, in articles on the subject, it is time that emerges as the most focused upon talking 
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point. Melissa Batchelor Warnke, in a 2015 VICE news article entitled “Why we are addicted 
to our Tamagotchis,” provides a comprehensive overview in this regard – and divides her 
discussion into exploring two inter-related aspects of the device’s appeal, namely connection 
and time. In terms of the first aspect, she quotes new media academic Adrian David Cheok, 
who makes the observation that the connection provided by the device is partial realization of 
an often held fantasy for children throughout history. He tells Warnke that the Tamagotchi 
“was the right toy at the right time,” and explains this by arguing: “I’m sure even in ancient 
Greece, the children wished their dolls were alive. It’s a human dream.” However, in his 
estimation, “until the technology caught up that couldn’t happen;” accordingly, the release of 
the Tamagotchi “was the intersection of what children have desired for millennia, and what 
technology could provide” (Warnke, 2015). But while the appeal of the device on this level is 
perhaps unsurprising, on account of such interest and enjoyment being a normal stage in 
one’s development, the second aspect of how time is experienced in relation to the device 
begs a range of questions. After all, stuffed animals, dolls, and other such conduits for the 
expression of imagination and play cannot, unlike the Tamagotchi, make demands on a 
child’s time. And Warnke provides a number of thoughts in this regard. Firstly, she remarks 
that due to its mobility – “they were on a keychain” after all – the device remained ever-
present, unlike the toys of old which tended to be located in one place, and accordingly only 
accessed at certain times. Secondly, while they may have been tethered to, and thus in near-
continuous proximity to, their owners, “the Tamagotchi never promised forever.” Rather, 
“one of the Tamagotchis distinguishing features is its unwillingness to shield users from life’s 
most difficult reality,” namely death (Warnke, 2015). Paradoxically then, in its ability to die, 
combined with its neediness (or prompting of users to satisfy its various requirements), the 
Tamagotchi came to life. As such, this particular digital device produced a strange 
constellation of dynamics around it, dynamics that operated in relation to both the age-old 
need for companionship, and a very new ability to demand time set aside for it through code 
that was timed to require certain inputs at certain times, paired with coded random events that 
impacted on one’s virtual creature. For her part, Warnke closes by asking what made the 
advent of the Tamagotchi such a “memorable moment in time,” and decides that part of the 
answer would be the possibility of “fervent caring, combined with the illusion of control,” 
that together made “a strong imprint on the young mind.” She adds to this by evocatively 
closing with a quote from Saint-Exupery’s famous children’s book The Little Prince, where it 
is written that “you become responsible, forever, for what you have tamed” (Warnke, 2015).  
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Yet, for the most part, the power relationship between the user and their virtual pet 
was not ‘user-to-device’ but rather ‘device-to-user,’ and this furthermore had the greatest 
impact on the time of those users. Accordingly, it was this relationship of command, and its 
correlative effect on children’s time, that saw anxious reflection on the part of parents and 
writers in various media entries on the subject during the late 1990s. And two articles 
published in 1997 on the matter exemplify these concerns, namely Ryan Weinstein’s “We 
Gotta Have a Tamagotchi, Children Squeal,” published in the Sun Sentinel, and Julie 
Deardorff’s “Parent’s Finding New Pet Peeve Is Virtual Insanity,” published in the Chicago 
Tribune. In his article, Weinstein interviews a number of children obsessed with their new 
digital pets, among them, nine year old Jessica Levine, who reveals to him that “beeping 
Tamagotchis became so popular in her class…that her teacher threatened to confiscate them.” 
While schools struggled to compete with the virtual demands placed upon the young users of 
the Tamagotchi, parents equally felt the brunt of the demands of the virtual creature at home. 
Weinstein interviews Jessica’s mother, Linda Levine, who tells him that her daughter’s 
Tamagotchi kept beeping in the middle of the night and, as such, she saw the devices as 
“worse than new-borns” (Weinstein, 1997). This concern was also reiterated by the parents 
Deardorff interviewed. And while Weinstein discusses the complaints of educators and 
parents separately, Deardorff uncovers a more nuanced dynamic at play. She writes that 
because “many elementary and middle schools in the U.S, Japan, Thailand, and Hong 
Kong…banned the needy, distracting electronic toys from classrooms,” perversely, “the 
burden of virtual pet care…landed in the laps of unsuspecting parents.” In this regard, she 
chronicles some of the ways in which such parents either coped or failed to measure up to the 
dictates of their children’s relationship with the demanding virtual prompters. The articles 
thematize two contrasting accounts of the imposition. In the first exploration, stay-at-home 
mother Madeleine Sayer Umans, after “realiz[ing] she has forgotten to feed her daughter’s 
beloved pet” and has thus mistakenly killed it, either “brac[es] herself for the wrath of her 5-
year-old,” or has “to reset it quickly because if she comes home and sees it’s dead, she’s very 
upset. Not so much because it died, but because I didn’t take care of it.” Such apparent 
absurdity finds even worse expression when Deardorff notes how “working parents can be 
seen toting the toys to the office and secretly keeping them alive between phone calls and 
sales meetings.” Meanwhile, in Deardorff’s second exploration, “fed-up mothers, like 
Ramonita Lovada-Valencia…are revolting against the responsibility and are deliberately 
killing the electronic creatures.” Lovada-Valencia, who “tried to drown her daughter’s toy,” 
bitterly describes it as “worse than a pager.” Yet in both parents responses, whether 
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accommodating or rebellious, what is clear is that, driven by a group of users who clearly did 
not distinguish between the time of a machine and the real time required to maintain it, a 
highly restrictive, and burdensome exchange between digital device and human had been 
ushered in. Of course, as is most often the case, rather than pausing for reflection on this 
troublesome new dynamic, the capitalist societies in which the Tamagotchis operated found a 
way to both accommodate – and make money from – the problems associated with the entry 
of this digital device into the parent-child relationship. In this regard, Deardorff recalls the 
proliferation of baby-sitting services for the devices, offering the example of the “Cape Cod 
Potato Chip Co. in Hyannis, Massachusetts…which opened a…day-care centre for virtual 
pets,” and which – at the time of writing – had 10 enrolled.  Beyond this, she notes that 
“Internet sites have [also] sprung up to help.” Here, “experienced virtual pet parents offer 
advice and pointers about the best way to keep the critters alive,” which further contributed to 
the discursive momentum that accommodated and ultimately normalized this system of 
relations. And Deardorff ends by offering a solution beyond such disturbing normalizations – 
“the pause button.” That is, she quotes a mother who discovered the trick online, and who 
tells her: “You just pause it and then reset it to whatever time you like…it’s a lifesaver” 
(Deardorff, 1997). But what happens when the pause button becomes ever more difficult to 
locate? Or, indeed, when the pause button is no longer included as an option?  
 Certainly, then, in the cultural phenomena that was the Tamagotchi, one can easily 
find some of the worst excesses of digital technology; excesses that tend to validate 
Deleuze’s pessimism concerning its societal effects. After all, in his “Postscript on Control 
Societies,” as discussed earlier, Deleuze advances concern over precisely such a state of 
affairs – human beings reduced ever more from individuals to dividuals, through being 
trapped by a network of continuous prompts, where there is increasingly less time in-between 
for the pursuit of something critically self-reflexive, agency-promoting, and affirmative. In 
this regard, the timing of the device’s entry into the world should also be noted, because this 
seemingly innocuous digital mechanism effectively stepped in to fill a vacuum created, 
ironically, by the very same technology. As demonstrated earlier through reference to the 
work of Castells, the proliferation of digital technology in the 1990s was a highly disorienting 
experience for many, insofar as it created an “age rife with dislocatedness, flux and 
alienation” (Allison 2006: 183). And it was the digital Tamagotchi that stepped in to restore 
calm to the frenzy brought about by the augmenting capacity of digital/information 
technology. As new media theorists Bloch and Lemish write in “Disposable love: the rise and 
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fall of a virtual pet,” in many respects, the “Tamagotchi is a metaphor of our times, 
representing the blurring of boundaries between real reciprocal relationships and surrogate, 
one-way imaginary ones.” This is because of the way in which “it highlights the dominant 
role of technology in our lives; no longer simply a tool for use in science and industry, but 
now a substitute for human relationships” (1999: 295). And if one considers the digital-
human hybrid durationality discussed above – so neatly encapsulated by Bloch and Lemish – 
through a Deleuzoguattarian lens on the issue of becoming-animal, then the relationship 
emerges as deeply troubling insofar as it affirms Deleuze’s position on digital technology 
posing a threat to the generation of difference. 
As discussed in Chapter Five via the debate between the Deleuzian scholars 
Rodowick, Massumi, and Bogue – digital technology has the capacity to affect people on a 
durational level, and thus has the capacity to promote related difference. Yet in the case of the 
Tamagotchi, while the device certainly did impact on many of its users’ time, this was often a 
profoundly negative experience. Whether the user of the device was a child, or an adult 
tasked with caring for it on behalf of an expectant child, the relationship forged between 
human and digital machine was one of anxiety-laden imposition. Prompted constantly by the 
code responsible for the progression of the central character housed by the device, users 
would forsake their own time for that of a virtual entity. Accordingly, instead of facilitating 
creative, affirmative moments that recapture time and correlatively augment the differential 
parameters of the present, the relationship described above falls under the limited and 
limiting signs which Deleuze identified in his work on Proust. That is, the Tamagotchi and its 
impact on the time of those caring for it involves both the Worldly Signs and the deceptive 
Signs of Love. With regard to the former, it should be remembered that the Tamagotchi was 
very rudimentary in terms of the code it employed. Indeed, the virtual pet had only two 
progress bars, one for health and one for happiness, and tied to these two bars, the 
programme permitted only a handful of inputs across a few categories – feeding, cleanliness, 
play, and so forth. Thus, in relation to this, the user had very little room for creativity. In fact, 
it could be argued that the only differential was life-span – how long one could keep one’s 
creature alive. But in this endeavour, no experimentation or differentiation was possible, as 
the user could only ever simply and repetitively hammer in the various inputs required to sate 
the needs of the device. As such, the exercise epitomises the Worldly Sign, where one simply 
responds to stimulus without ever pausing for reflection on it. Yet, in addition, the 
relationship can also be seen through the prism of deceptive Signs of Love. While the adults 
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tasked with caring for the digital pets might have been unable to forge a relationship with the 
device, as thematized in the above articles, children habitually failed to erect any such 
boundary. To be sure, this relation has been partly elaborated on above, in Bell’s discussion 
on children’s easy acceptance of computational objects, and through Cheok’s idea that the 
Tamagotchi fulfilled a desire that has always been expressed by the young – namely that their 
toys could come to life. But one also cannot help but see parallels between children’s 
relationships with their Tamagotchis, and the relationship between Swann and Odette in 
Proust’s work; a relationship characterized by obsession and a reduction of horizons of 
possibility to the parochial. That is, exploiting a pervasive social need for companionship, or 
pursuing the fulfilment of a childish desire, or offering calm in a world operating at hyper-
speed (enabled by information technology), the makers of the Tamagotchi created in the 
young users of the device an obsessive desire to keep track of the time of their pets. 
Accordingly, much like Swann, who painstakingly traced and analysed – and whenever 
possible responded to – the utterances, behaviours, and movements of Odette, so too, young 
users of the Tamagotchi keenly observed each and every clue they could glean about the 
status of their pet’s health and happiness. But just as Swann’s world used to be immense 
before his obsession with his beloved Odette, so too, through the Tamagotchi, the potentially 
infinite world of children’s imagination was hijacked into a repetitive and obsessive series of 
inputs, by a device that preyed on their best qualities – their innocent empathy. Similarly, and 
in relation to Deleuze’s appropriation of Bergson’s work, while the interplay between the 
actual and the virtual has the capacity to open up a kaleidoscope of memory, which can 
precipitate affirmative engagement with both the past and present, a device such as the 
Tamagotchi, with its limited range of abilities, in contrast only ever functions at the level of 
habitual memory, and moreover infuses children’s duration with these limited and limiting 
dynamics. It is in this sense, then, that in addition to explicating a Fascist/Cancerous Body 
without Organs, the Tamagotchi also entails explication of a Suicidal/Catatonic Body without 
Organs, insofar as it creates a smooth space of habitual repetitions where nothing new can 
grow; ironically, at the very moment in a child’s life when their capacity for imagination and 
the generation of difference are otherwise at their most unrestrained.  
 Yet, while the relations engendered in terms of time by the Tamagotchi certainly seem 
to validate Deleuze’s doom-laden claims against the digital in his “Postscript on Control 
Societies,” it must also be remembered that the virtual character employed by the device – 
and so beloved by its many users – was a representation of an animal. That is, the cultural 
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device appropriated the characteristics of a domesticated animal, and through its various pre-
programmed prompts asked humans to engage with it, which they accordingly did – often 
obsessively. In relation to this, it is important to recall how, in Chapter Three, Deleuze’s 
philosophy of generating difference against ossified thought was explored in terms of his 
work (both individual and in collaboration with Guattari) on desire and desubjectivation, and 
specifically in terms of becoming-animal. And it was demonstrated that Deleuze and 
Guattari’s conception of becoming-animal was built, firstly, on the understanding that desire 
was productive, and secondly, on the idea that transformative exchanges in relation to such 
desire were possible to achieve through an engagement with cultural artefacts that stimulated 
a becoming-animal. Examples here included the literary works of Franz Kafka and Herman 
Melville, in association with Deleuze and Guattari’s engagement with the works of the 
Estonian biosemiotician, Jakob von Uexküll. Of course, whereas a reader’s experience of 
Gregor Samsa’s bizarre isolation in his becoming-cockroach, or of Captain Ahab’s strange 
and haunting battle to become-whale, or of the umwelt of the tick highlighted by Uexküll, 
entailed an encounter with a vast, mysterious, oblique and atypical exchange between human 
being and animal, the encounter with the representation of the animal via the Tamagotchi 
remains a far more closed and repetitive affair. This is because, in the case of the 
Tamagotchi, desire is continuously marshalled by a code that activates at the virtual animal’s 
birth, and moves forward rapidly through a series of prompts, toward a pre-determined end 
point. Accordingly, while through reading Kafka, Melville, or Uexküll, one cannot help but 
be pulled into considering the duration – the unique movement within time – of the 
human/animal creatures represented, with the Tamagotchi, one assumes (however 
fallaciously) the position of asserting control over the animal represented. And this control 
entails the Oedipilization of desire that Deleuze and Guattari sought to move beyond. That is, 
with the Tamagotchi, on the premise of control, one approaches the signified animal from a 
perspective that discounts that animal, because instead of thoughtful reflection over what it is 
in itself, or what it might be, and how its difference might change the one who approaches it, 
the user is simply manipulated into keeping it alive, as it were, in order to satisfy their own 
objectives – be they competitiveness with their friends, or a sense of duty, or a sense of care, 
and so forth. In effect, the user attempts to humanize and domesticate a virtual pet that 
ironically has the user firmly trapped in a Pavlovian nightmare, which smacks of ressentiment 
against those strong and brave enough to explore the difference of becoming-animal, in a 
manner akin to Kafka, Melville, and Uexküll.     
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Second-order hybrid durationality: Botanicula  
While the Tamagotchi does, in many ways, amount to a realization of Deleuze’s deep 
concerns over the capacity of the digital to canalize and control every aspect of our desires, it 
must also be remembered that a rapid sophistication of digital technologies occurred after 
1996, which brought with it the potential for more affirmative and creative digital-human 
hybrid durationality in relation to the environment.  
While a number of nature-based digital artefacts exist,171 the point-and-click 
adventure game Botanicula, released in 2012, and conceptualized and coded by Czech 
developers Amanita Design and Jaromir Plachy stands out in this regard. This is because the 
game is explicitly concerned with addressing the environmental crisis through its association 
with the World Land Trust, an organization “which protects the world’s most biologically 
important and threatened habitats acre by acre” (WLT, 2016).172 In terms of this partnership, 
as per the 25 April 2015 press release from the World Land Trust (Emma Beckett PR, 2012), 
ten percent of the cost of legally downloading the game is dedicated to the various initiatives 
embarked upon by the organization. Secondly, the game has received global recognition from 
the gaming industry, garnering excellent reviews from major gaming publications,173 and 
receiving multiple awards, including the IndieCade (International Festival of Independent 
Games) award for Best Story/World Design, The European Games Award for Best European 
Adventure Game, the Mac App Stores award for inclusion in the Best Games of 2012, and 
Best Czech Game of 2012.174 Such recognition accordingly ensured that Botanicula achieved 
a sizeable user-base; for example, the website softonic.com – which makes the game 
available for download, and which offers detailed statistics on both the number of downloads 
and the geographical location of those downloading it – indicated that as of 5 May 2016, the 
game had (only through this particular website) been downloaded a total of 53, 808 times 
since its original release date in 2012. Moreover, it has seemingly not lost its ability to attract 
new users, and the website counts that the game had been downloaded 196 times in the 
                                                          
171 In addition to those already mentioned in the first footnote of this chapter, another example would be the PC-
based adventure game Discovering Nature. 
172 The World Land Trust was founded in 1989, and is based in the UK. It is a non-profit environmental 
organization which helps NGO’s in various countries buy land for the purposes of protecting it from industrial 
interests and other potentially destructive uses of it (World Land Trust, 2016). 
173 As per the review aggregator Metacritic, these publications include Spain’s Eurogamer, Germany’s 
GameOver, France’s GameBlog, Vandal Online, and Adventure Gamers, among others. 
174 In total, Botanicula won twelve awards, with recognition coming across several categories, and continuously 
focusing on its use of immersive audio, its construction of oblique adventure, and its ability to create evocative 
and entrancing settings. Besides the awarding organizations mentioned in the main text, these awards were 
handed out by, respectively, Booom, JayisGames, IGM (Reader’s Choice), and Adventure Games.  
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month previous. The geographical spread of those accessing it includes a diverse range of 
countries, including the Czech Republic, Slovakia, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Taiwan, 
India, China, Vietnam and Indonesia (Thornton, 2016). Thirdly, and on a related note, the 
game is available across a variety of platforms, namely Apple’s iOS and OSX, Linux and 
Microsoft Windows, and it is additionally available for purchase on the popular iStore and 
Steam websites. As such, both on a mobile device and stationary PC front, it is very well 
represented and well circulated.   
Briefly, Botanicula sees the user take control of five tiny bug-like creatures who must 
save their habitat – their home tree – from the threat of an all-consuming black mass, 
represented in the game as a parasitical black spider. The game is purposefully vague and the 
habitat represented has an ethereal feel to it, made even more enchanting through the music 
chosen to provide the audioscape to the gameplay. Moreover, progression is made by solving 
a number of puzzles that allow one to expand the multiple protagonists’ movements within 
their world. Richard Cobbett, reviewing Botanicula for PC Gamer, explains it as follows: 
“You control a small gang of misfits trying to make it through the madness to save the day;” 
however, “the real star of the game is your mouse pointer – guiding them past danger, poking 
and prodding at bits of the screen to get reactions out of things…and acting almost like a 
character in its own right.” Importantly, Cobbett points out that Botanicula is “not so much an 
adventure game” but more “a gorgeous-looking mix of point-and-clicking surrealism, 
whipped together out of nature, discovery, and adorable humour” (Cobbett, 2012). And this is 
the crucial aspect of the game that should be noted. That is, unlike the Tamagotchi craze with 
its relentless drive toward keeping one’s creature alive as it races toward its inevitable death, 
Botanicula is a slow, circumspect and curious progression within a baffling and “staggeringly 
vague” environment. And within the world, the user also encounters the even smaller worlds 
and creatures that exist within the main represented environment of the tree, and correlatively 
moves in between these inter-connected Umwelts. As such, one is precluded from ever 
becoming lost in any one of the digitally-represented durations on offer. Moreover, although 
ultimately determined by code that leads toward an end point, the user is allowed to linger for 
as long as they desire in the many spaces afforded by the designers of the game. This is 
because there is no pressure, by way of imposed time-limits for example, to move forward. 
As Cobbett writes, “treated as a raw game, you can complain about the lack of logic and 
control,” but “as a more general experience, it’s a beautiful and memorable journey” 
(Cobbett, 2012). Related to the above, crucially, as noted by a number of media houses – as 
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will be documented below – beyond its appeal to adults, Botanicula has also proved 
particularly appealing to children. Again, one is immediately reminded of Deleuze and 
Guattari’s assertion of a people yet to come, and while it was demonstrated earlier in relation 
to the Tamagotchi that such a line of flight is not always necessarily an affirmative 
development, Botanicula – on account of the above features – does entail a far more open and 
creative catalyst. Admittedly, while over two decades have passed since the birth of the 
Tamagotchi, allowing for a fair appraisal of its negative effects on the monopolization of 
people’s time, Botanicula has only been in circulation for four years. Yet, it is good to 
remember the assertion of Thomas Hylland Eriksen, who in “Speed is Contagious,” notes that 
when cell phones first emerged they were intended for facilitating business, and no one 
would have considered then that they would become synonymous with obsessive teenage 
(and adult) social interaction” (2006: 276). Accordingly, it remains an open question whether 
or not Botanicula will succeed where the Tamagotchi failed. But there is growing evidence 
that the game is indeed succeeding if the several articles and reviews of Botanicula are 
anything to go by. In this regard, firstly, one can briefly return to Cobbett’s review, in which 
he writes that: “nature can be cruel, nature can be beautiful, but if nature was more like 
Botanicula, I guarantee kids would be poking and prodding at trees from dawn until dusk to 
savour the weirdness” (Cobbett, 2012). Leaving aside the problematic notion that nature 
should be more like a digital representation of it, when in fact, the digital representation of it 
in this instance captures to a large extent the “weirdness” of nature, the reviewer nevertheless 
touches upon an idea that is often articulated by others when discussing the game. In an 
annotated interview on Radio Praha, Jan Velinger discusses Botanicula with the founder of 
Amanita Design, Jakub Dvorsky. And besides commenting on how the surprise success of 
Botanicula and the preceding Machinarium (a similar game but one telling the tale of a 
broken little robot operating in a decaying Prague-like yet futuristic world) had allowed the 
studio to remain independent, Dvorsky is taken down a line of questioning by Velinger that 
centres on who the target audience of the game was intended to be. Velinger, explaining that 
he had played both games with his young son, asks: “What age group did you have in mind 
originally for these games? Who were these games designed for? Children or adults?” to 
which Dvorsky responds that the game was made “for us. That is our only criteria,” before 
qualifying his statement by adding that: “We make and design games for us. So we can like 
them and be proud of them.” However, after a pause, he also reflects: 
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Surprisingly children…well when we started we didn’t have much experience with 
children but now we have our own and surprisingly even little kids like the games a 
lot. It works for them as well as adults who never played games. And even hard-
core ‘gamers’ who might normally enjoy First-person shooters. They play with their 
girlfriend and so on. (Velinger, 2015)  
 
The broad appeal of the game, which ranges from the ‘hard-core’ players of games made 
more exclusive because of their difficulty and competiveness, to casual gamers and young 
players, as well as the geographical distribution of these players – as evinced above in 
softonic’s statistics – along with the ease of access across multiple popular formats, both 
mobile and stationary, suggests that gaming is no longer a very specific segment of the 
informational technology landscape, but rather a standard feature of it and accessible to 
heterogeneous audiences. However, while relative ease of gameplay, and ease of access on 
multiple formats worldwide, might explain the appeal of Botanicula – and Machinarium – to 
multiple groups usually seen as non-gamers, it does not adequately explain Botanicula’s 
particular appeal to children. In this regard, though, John Walker, reviewing the game for the 
gaming website Rock Paper Shotgun, provides some interesting points. Firstly, Walker writes 
that the game “is more reliant on your delight in clicking all over the screen than by flagging 
the path,” and he argues that the joy of the game is in its “wilful vagueness.” Indeed,  
 
you don’t know if you’re clicking to encourage the world to provide you a new clue 
or item to collect, or just to make something pretty happen, and it never matters. A 
tiny green insect comes to life after a click, and then with another gobbles up a 
nearby leaf, which causes him to become too fat to maintain his grip on the branch 
and he tumbles from view. Nearby twigs grow with each click until they bud into 
flowers, which attracts bee-likes, who musically “do do do” as they collect pollen, 
harmonising with each other. A group of frog-likes, when clicked upon, might burst 
into wonderfully animated song. And this is all enhanced by the reactions of your 
gang of five, who scuttle nervously, leaping in fear at any surprise. (Walker, 
2011)175 
 
While the Tamagotchi demonstrated that in a digital-human relation, the young in particular 
could be trained into willingly subordinating themselves to the demanding and repetitive 
operations of a digital artefact, the interactions thematized above by Walker indicate 
                                                          
175 While the game was released in 2012, Walker bases his review on a preview version of the game. These are 
often released by developers to speciality websites and publications in order to generate and gauge interest 
around a game.  
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something else altogether. Without any imposed time pressures, users are able to immerse 
themselves in a world of textures, colours, interactions, worlds-within-worlds, and music, and 
it is not difficult to understand how such stimulus would appeal to a curious young mind, and 
how such appeal is the consequence of the game explicating a Full Body without Organs, 
insofar as it engenders creative and open-ended exploration of nature. In effect, much like in 
the films of Jean Renoir discussed earlier, the curve balls that Botanicula throws at the player 
never allow them to either become submerged and lost within the virtual mirror of one 
repetitive aspect of the game, or to adopt a subordinate and passive demeanour because of the 
requirements to practise agency through exploration, a requirement that runs counter to the 
ressentiment that underpins the Tamagotchi. In a certain sense, parallels also exist between 
Botanicula and the films of Luchino Visconti, but here it is the virtual hegemony of an 
anthropocentric worldview which has become alienated from nature, that is being eroded by 
the developments of history (the environmental crisis) and technology (advances in 
digitality), and Botanicula is working toward unseating it, much like the usurpers who 
worked toward dethroning Ludwig.  
In “Monsters and Microbiology: The Czech Studio turning nature into amazing 
games,” Christ Priestman, writing for the Guardian, provides further support for this when he 
endeavours to unearth the motivation behind the independent studio’s “award-winning” 
output. He notes, “Venture beyond the city [Brno], into the surrounding forests, and you’ll 
often find Jakub Dvorsky, founder of game development studio Amanita Design, exploring 
and foraging with his young family.” Observing that this is where many of “the city’s folk 
tales originated,” Priestman writes that Dvorsky, who was “born in the region and [who 
remains] a nature lover,” employs both sensibilities in his “investigating [of] nature at every 
level, from microbes to landscapes.” As a result, the games “play out like fairy-tales of 
microbiology, following tiny creatures into subterranean cities populated by woodlice and 
lazy beetles, operating plant-like machinery to solve wordless puzzles.” And for Priestman, it 
is the intersection between Czech mythologies and a deep regard for nature that marks out 
Botanicula (and the other games produced by the studio), as a unique digital artefact. One 
which, we might add, in its blurring of the boundaries between botanical science and folklore, 
exhibits the features of a Deleuzoguattarian nomadic war machine. This emerges as even 
more the case, when the studio’s alternative approach to design is considered. That is, “other 
Czech game companies (Bohemia Interactive, Keen Software, and Madfinger Games)” have 
followed along the channels of desire established by the State Apparatus and underpinned by 
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the axiomatic of capitalism, insofar as they “have developed westernised approaches to 
design” in their respective quests for recognition and income (Priestman, 2016). However, in 
contrast, as pointed out in the Radio Praha interview, the nature backgrounds incorporated by 
Botanicula – and the other games produced by the studio – are instead “beautifully hand-
drawn” (Velinger, 2015). In relation to this, and thinking back to Chapter Five, in which the 
analog-digital debate was considered, it is interesting to note that one of the most striking and 
evocative aspects of the game comes from a non-digital method of design. And that 
transmitted through digital processes, none of the effect is lost. On the contrary, in the game, 
both analog and digital function in a complimentary sense, allowing for the creation of a 
highly affective artefact. In sum then, through accessing a highly specific, non-Western 
tradition of story-telling, coupled with both a deeply reflective orientation toward nature, and 
reliance on the older craft of drawing by hand, Botanicula emerges as a very different kind of 
digital artefact. An artefact which confronts the user with a constellation of highly evocative 
encounters that adults and children alike experience as delightfully atypical.176  
Erik Missio’s “Why Indie Video Games can be great for Kids,” written for the 
Canadian news source CBC’s parenting section, specifically lists Botanicula as an example 
within a wave of other “indie/alternative” games that can have a positive effect on their 
young users.177 Missio begins his argument by advancing that “digital devices, kid-specific 
apps and games and broader tech tools can teach or reinforce reading, math, coordination and 
critical thinking skills.” And while this is broadly accepted, Missio notes that “there’s a world 
of apps and games out there that [go] beyond strictly educational.” In this regard, he asks 
rhetorically, “What about beautiful games that are intended just for fun? Or apps that 
                                                          
176 It should be pointed out, too, that the intention here is not to portray Amanita Design as some kind of 
outsider studio, operating against the current, as it were. The studio, although able to retain a great measure of 
independence due to the unexpected success of the games discussed, has done commercial work for the BBC 
and Nike (Jong, 2010). Indeed, and recalling how in Chapter Two it was argued that change with regard to the 
environment could be affected only by operating within the technological dimension of the Dominant Social 
Paradigm, and not outside of it, Amanita Design emerges as a case in point. They generate income through their 
commercial work, and this then allows for a range of non-commissioned projects, such as Botanicula – 
undoubtedly also commercially orientated – to be developed.  
177 For example, he explains his young daughter’s fascination with an interactive alphabet game named 
Metamorphabet. He writes, “It begins with a letter ‘A’ that starts ambling and arching itself upwards, then 
grows antlers before bluebirds land and we move on to the letter ‘B.’ It doesn’t teach specific lessons and there 
are no points to be won – it’s just a matter of your child (or you, when they’re not around) working through the 
letters by exploring and interacting with the animation.” And he notes further that his “five-year-old especially 
loves some of the more sinister aspects of Metamorphabet. She giggled when her garden burst into ghosts and 
her eyes lit up when she vacuumed up a whole village, citizens and all.” And Missio reinforces this point when 
he interviews Jim Munroe, the “executive director of the Hand Eye Society, [a] Toronto group…dedicated to 
games that are…created from the same impulses as writing books or songs,” or indeed, simply “a desire to 
create something beautiful and personal, primarily as a form of creative expression” (Missio, 2015).  
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combine stunning visuals and music to create exciting experiences for players young and 
old?” These games he terms indie or alternative, and he argues that they have the capacity to 
“wow users with cool, innovative designs,” and in doing so, “promote new ways of thinking 
and experiencing the world” (Missio, 2015). The importance of this should not be 
understated, especially when it is recalled that – as discussed in Chapter Three – for Deleuze 
and Guattari desire is productive, and not characterized by lack. Accordingly, seen through 
such a lens, games like Botanicula have the capacity to participate in the user’s generation of 
a multiplicity of desires. That is, rather than marshalling desire and time in a manner akin to 
early digital artefacts, such as the Tamagotchi, the indie/alternative game scene, in many 
instances, encourages users to open up to change, transformation, and thus at least partly to 
the time of creative engagement. Correlatively, Deleuze’s aversion to digital technology 
emerges as over-cautionary, not least because Botanicula emerges as a popular form of 
counter-information, which moreover evinces many of the features of Guattari’s post-media.  
 That is, if one were to apply Guattari’s conception of post-media to the game, it 
would clearly comport with the more open use of information technology advocated by this 
thinker. As discussed in Chapter Four, Guattari’s conception of post-media involved seeing 
information technology as a conduit through which subjectivity can be contested and 
experimented with, subsequently liberating, as it were, the machine from its typical 
technological connotations by insisting that it can fulfil an aesthetic function, through the 
generation of creativity, difference and new thought. Indeed, Guattari contended that 
“computer-aided design leads to the production of images opening on to unprecedented 
plastic Universes,” and he argued that when technological development is tied with “social 
experimentation,” it became possible for “these new domains” to “lead…us out of the current 
period of oppression and into a post-media era characterised by the reappropriation and 
resingularisation of the use of media.” In many respects, Botanicula meets these 
requirements. As also noted in the discussion on Guattari, his vision was not a utopian 
ramble, but rather a very careful approach to the capacities of the digital. As Guattari himself 
stated, “we should be on guard against progressivist illusions or visions which are 
systematically pessimistic. The machinic production of subjectivity can work for the better or 
for the worse” (1995: 5-6), Botanicula is arguably a case of the former rather than the latter. 
Indeed, with regard to this, the new assemblages created do not just remain within the 
human sphere, because congruency exists between Botanicula and the work of Uexküll.  As 
discussed in Chapter Three, Uexküll’s 1934 “picture book” publication, A Stroll Through the 
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Environments of Animals and Humans, constituted an invitation to move away from an 
anthropocentric view of nature. And this text, along with his other subsequent writings, 
demonstrated Uexküll’s abiding interest in “how we can glimpse natural environments as 
meaningful to the animals themselves” (Buchanan 2008: 40). Similarly, in the immersive 
gameplay of Botanicula, which is exclusively centred on the various worlds-within-worlds 
encountered by the five insect-like protagonists, this is certainly paralleled. To be sure, some 
caution is required here; as discussed in Chapter Three, Deleuze and Guattari borrowed quite 
heavily from Uexküll in their conception of becoming-animal, because of how he required a 
move away from an anthropocentric encounter with animals and the natural world. In 
contrast, Botanicula – while charming and whimsical – ultimately still presents the various 
characters and their respective settings in a humanized way. That is, their sadness at losing 
their habitat, and their subsequent quest to prevent this, is not in any way representative of 
animal perception, cognition and action, but rather a sympathetic human exploration of what 
such loss might mean. In effect, the game reflects a deep human sadness over the loss of 
something intuitively felt as being special and other-worldly – and it does so through the 
conduit of a beautifully designed setting housing a charming set of animal characters. But 
caution here does not mean discounting the game’s ability to affect those playing it; after all, 
while the characters are partly human, they are also always partly animal, and it must be 
recognized that in this instance at least, the digital clearly endeavours to consider an 
experience outside of an anthropocentric schema.  
Indeed, despite its anthropocentric filter, the game is able to communicate in a 
relatively open manner the times and trials of animal ‘others,’ especially when contrasted 
with the Tamagotchi, which forced its users into a matrix of Worldly Signs and deceptive 
Signs of Love, restricting and wasting their time to be different through its constant parochial 
demands. Accordingly, Botanicula, through its open-ended gameplay, which offers the user 
the ability to linger, amble and simply enjoy the world created, does not operate on the same 
side of the Proustian taxonomy of signs. Rather, at the very least, Botanicula entails Sensual 
Material Signs in that it draws the user into a world of oblique and undetermined moving 
images revolving around nature. Images that do not allow for passivity or repetitive input, but 
rather encourage engagement, concentration and indeed the formation of both discrete new 
memories, and subsequently, their kaleidoscopic recollection. As stated before, the game is 
incredibly vague – at times even described by reviewers as infuriatingly so – with the 
consequence that relying on the habitual memory typically required for certain goal-
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orientated games does not serve a player well. Perhaps this is why, as noted by its developers, 
it often appeals to people who do not consider themselves gamers, and more importantly, to 
children.  
That being said, ultimately, while allowing for the leisurely enjoyment of a world not 
operating strictly according to stereotypical game representations, it cannot be ignored that 
there does exist a propulsion forward – after all, this is a game that has an end and the user, 
even if they choose to move slowly, is still propelled toward completion of the game. But this 
has more in common with “the stroll, the voyage and the continual return journey” (Deleuze 
1989: 212) which Deleuze thematized as a key feature of the crisis of the action-image; a 
crisis which, it should be remembered, precipitated the birth of time-images in film. 
Similarly, as will be discussed next, such time-images have their counterpart in third-order 
hybrid durations.  
Third-order hybrid durationality: Shark Net and Ocearch 
While a game like Botanicula may be an enclosed system that prompts the user forward, 
albeit at a tempo that comports with the individual user’s pace, there also exist digital 
artefacts that are, firstly, more dynamic insofar as they operate virtually in relation to the 
open variable of a non-human ‘other,’ and secondly, more durationally-orientated insofar as 
the actual life of this other – rather than a nomadic representation of elements of nature and 
imagined animal lives – is the focus of the virtual interaction. In this regard, the mobile 
applications Shark Net and Ocearch comprise intriguing examples of the potential of digital 
technology to allow for human beings to enter a liminal space, in which their Umwelt meshes 
with the Umwelt of an extremely ‘other’ animal, perhaps the otherest ‘other,’ as it were, 
namely the shark.  
 Although a number of shark tracking applications exist,178 in what follows the focus 
will fall on two of these, namely Shark Net and Ocearch. This is because both applications, 
firstly, have a relatively wide reach due to their availability on iPhone/iPad and Android 
devices, secondly, are the most documented of the digital shark trackers in terms of media 
attention, and thirdly, explicitly attempt to involve the general public in their tracking 
activities in order to create environmental awareness. Most interesting and applicable to the 
                                                          
178 For instance, Expedition White Shark, launched in 2013, claims to allow its app users to “receive live 
tracking data for the tagged Great White sharks, at the same time as the research scientists” (EWS, 2016). 
Others listed by the website, trackingsharks.com, include the Hawaii Tiger Shark Tracker, Guy Harvey 
Research Institute Tracking, and the Western Australia Shark Tracker, to name but a few.  
207 
 
current argument, however, is the technical dispute over which application provides more 
accurate temporal tracking of the animals it follows, because this suggests that, specifically, it 
is the durational aspect of the exchange between human beings, nature and digital 
technology, which is being reified by the ordinary people accessing such applications.   
 Of the two applications, Shark Net is the younger creation, having being launched in 
2012 by a marine research team from Stanford University, and led by Professor of Marine 
Sciences Dr. Barbara Block (McKelvey, 2014; The Global Tagging of Pelagic Predators, 
2014).179 In short, the Shark Net application, available for iPhone and iPad devices, “allows 
users to detect the comings and goings of white sharks along the Northern California coast,” 
and through such means “brings users face to face with a variety of individual white sharks, 
and provides notifications when their electronic tags are detected by underwater listening 
stations.” It is further explained that through the application, “users will be able to interact 
with a detailed 3-D model of several…sharks, to see photos and videos of them from the 
research team, and to receive real-time notifications when one of them is detected by an 
acoustic receiver” (GTOPP, 2014). Cynthia McKelvey, writing for the Monterey Herald 
describes the application and its goals further. She writes that in Shark Net, “each shark has a 
biography and calling-card photo of its dorsal fin. Some sharks also have interactive 3-D 
models and videos that allow users to see how they swim and get acquainted with the curious 
creatures.” Furthermore, she explains that the application “lets users get to know the sharks 
by their names.” And this tactic of naming the tracked creatures is tied to the aim of the 
application. McKelvey, after interviewing Block, proposes that the goal is to reverse negative 
perceptions of an animal bizarrely construed as a threat to human beings – especially if one 
thinks about the likelihood of a shark attack in statistical terms.180 For her part, McKelvey 
attributes such perception to popular culture, writing that “movies featuring the animals run 
the cinematic gamut from the acclaimed ‘Jaws’ to the campy ‘Sharknado,’” and in “most 
movies, the giants are portrayed as ruthless, razor-toothed killing machines.” In contrast, 
                                                          
179 The Global Tagging of Pelagic Predators, or GTOPP, describes itself as “an international, multidisciplinary 
collaboration among biologists, engineers, computer scientists and educators,” whose work “will allow users to 
view and interact with animal tracking data, as well as oceanographic datasets,” with a view to “build[ing] the 
tools required for protecting” ocean ecosystems in the “future.” Especially if one considers the argument of 
Chapter Two, that is, that one cannot operate outside of the DSP in one’s attempts to engage more ethically with 
nature, it is interesting to note that GTOPP states, in terms of its quest to protect the future of oceanic life, that 
“it will also utilize the newly-developed ocean tools in Google Earth.” On a further note, one should also note 
the language employed by GTOPP when it advances that the use of such technology could potentially provide 
“a powerful, intuitive system for accessing and exploring global datasets” (GTOPP, 2016).  
180 Surfer Mag discusses this issue and cites research which states that “1 in 3,748,067 are the lifetime odds 
given for a shark fatality” (Hart, 2015). 
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“Block hopes the app will help people connect with white sharks in a personal way and 
inspire the public to push for greater protection of the sharks and their habitats.” And the way 
in which to “bring the [above more personal] shark story home to the public” is through the 
technological provision of “real-time data” (McKelvey, 2014), enabled by satellite buoys in 
conjunction with digital devices capable of receiving and representing such data. Admittedly, 
at first glance, it appears that the application aims simply to counter the widespread negative 
and inaccurate information on these predators with its own sets of information. Yet, while it 
is true that downloading the application gives a user access to information-dense interactive 
3-D models and so forth, it is also worth considering that beyond the level of information, the 
major appeal of the application is its stated ability to accurately reflect any individual shark’s 
movement in time. And this suggests that the matter is more than simply a battle of 
information to change perceptions, because implicit in it is the idea that allowing people to 
experience the time of a shark – the user’s device pings the moment a shark swims past an 
observation point – will change their understanding of how they relate to nature; and of how 
their time and the shark’s time are playing out together within the durational Whole. 
 The older shark tracker available to the public, Ocearch, was founded in March of 
2011 (Ocearch, 2016), but appears to have, in recent years, outstripped its fellow tracking 
application in terms of both geographical reach and media attention. While Block’s team 
conducted their operations primarily along the Northern coast of California, Ocearch now has 
a far more global reach, tracking sharks travelling down the various coastlines of the Atlantic, 
Pacific and Indian Oceans. And this includes the waters of Southern Africa, where the 
animals are tracked from Gansbaai and Struisbaai, through to the channel of Mozambique. 
Within this immense zone of observation, the Eastern Cape coastline and the waters of Port 
Elizabeth also feature.181 Due to this extensive geographical reach, Ocearch has generated a 
fair amount of interest from the media, and many news and special interest magazines have 
thematized how it works. In this regard, Aaron Souppouris, writing for the technology 
website, The Verge, opens his piece by immediately drawing readers’ attention to the ability 
of the “ambitious [Ocearch] project” to “track the movement of almost 50 sharks in real-
                                                          
181 The local surfing website, millerslocal.co.za., explains that the Algoa Bay, Port Elizabeth tagging venture 
came about as a collaboration between Ocearch, local researchers led by Dr. Matt Dicken, and a host of 
governmental and corporate sponsors. Furthermore, the venture is underpinned and partially funded by the 
South African Environmental Observation Network (SAEON). According to Dicken, some 20 listening stations 
have been set up, and a budget exists for 20 sharks to be tagged. Interestingly, “individuals and corporates” are 
invited to “sponsor tags,” which comports with the assertions made previously, in Chapter Two, that 
environmental action does not have to disassociate itself from the confines of the DSP, and that this is not 
necessarily a death-knell for any such action (Millers Local, 2016).  
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time.” He subsequently explains that “an array of sensors…allow scientists to accurately plot 
their position,” and that the data is then “fed into the OCEARCH Global Tracker, which 
updates the sharks’ location as a dot on a map.” The user of the attached mobile application 
(available on both Android and the iTunes Apple Store) “can click on any of the dots to find a 
picture of the shark along with its size and ‘name,’ and look through where it’s been since 
being tagged.” Moreover, Souppouris notes the impressive reach of the tracking programme, 
maintaining that it collects “around 100 data points every second,” or “8.5 million per day” 
(Souppouris, 2013). Marnie Hunter, writing for CNN on the application, also immediately 
draws attention to the fact that it is a “real-time shark tracker,” and indeed notes that as she is 
constructing her article, “five great whites are actively pinging their locations off the East 
Coast,” adding that the “movements are logged erratically” because they are only “activated 
when the sharks surface” (Hunter, 2014). Importantly, the emphasis on the time-accuracy of 
the Ocearch tracker is an oft-repeated trope in the many articles dedicated to explaining its 
operation (Gutowksi, 2015; WiresNews Corp Australia Network, 2015), and much like with 
Shark Net, this suggests that the central issue in the exchange – enabled by technology – 
between human and nature is time. This idea also finds support in the ensuing arguments over 
which application offers the more temporally accurate ping. That is, consideration of this 
technical dispute reveals the extent to which it is time that is central to the fascination 
generated by these two environmentally-orientated mobile applications. 
 Liat Clark, writing for the technology-focused magazine Wired, explains that Shark 
Net makes use of (as noted above) “acoustic tags” in order to pick up on the location of the 
animals. This means that “when the tagged animal comes within 300 metres of [one of the]… 
receiver[s],” which are strategically placed throughout the ocean, the receiver “picks up the 
acoustic signal and uses it to calculate a location.” In turn, “this data, along with the signal 
and a timestamp are then sent to the team’s station.” The iOS Shark Net application itself is 
linked in to this monitoring system, and “receives a live feed from the network and pushes an 
alert every time a shark tag is picked up” (Clark, 2012). However, the website White Shark 
Café has a slightly different explanation, noting that “the latest generation of acoustic 
receiver buoys are now able to transmit their data via satellite,” making the information 
exchange far more rapid. Indeed, “the buoys dangle an underwater hydrophone that listens 
for the acoustic tags. When the hydrophone ‘hears’ a shark nearby, it transmits the data to the 
buoy, which then sends the data via satellites to Block in real time.” But, while the scientists 
involved receive the ping from the shark in real time, as it were, “Block’s team puts the data 
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into the Shark Net app within an hour” (WSC, 2014). Thus, the real time experience, which 
has served as a major point of interest to the media houses writing on the application, as well 
as to the users accessing it, may not be as precise as it is often presumed to be.  
In terms of Ocearch’s system of shark movement tracking, and their feeding of this 
information to the attached mobile application, similar issues concerning accuracy of the time 
signature exist. In this regard, White Shark Café notes that “in early 2014…Ocearch was 
criticized for claiming real-time tracking of their sharks, which turned out not to be the case.” 
In turn, “in the wake of this scrutiny the company then changed their advertising to state 
‘near real-time.’” In conjunction with this, the “highly controversial SPOT tags” used by 
Ocearch came under scrutiny (WSC, 2014). That is, the Hawaii Institute of Marine Biology 
explains SPOT (or Smart Position or Temperature Transmitting Tagging) as “satellite tags” 
that are “detectable over broad geographical areas,” and which “remotely relay information to 
satellite arrays.” But because the tags “utilize radio transmissions,” they require “air to send 
data [and] hence satellite tags must be externally attached” to the shark under observation 
(HIMB, 2016). And this is where the first criticism comes in, with conservationists 
expressing concern over the potential physical effects on the tagged animal. Accordingly, 
unlike the “acoustic tags applied…with minimal interaction with the sharks,” SPOT tagging 
is a relatively traumatic process, with the animal only recovering and starting to swim 
strongly again within 2-4 hours after release (Hastings Deering, 2014). And the reliance on 
air to send data also has a secondary implication, namely that accuracy is compromised. As 
noted, “SPOT tags transmit a signal to the Argos satellite array whenever the [tagged] dorsal 
fin breaks the surface of the water.” But, “these transmissions result in geo-location estimates 
with location accuracies that range from a few hundred meters to ‘somewhere on planet 
Earth’” (HIMB, 2016) – which is not very helpful at all with regard to the promise of real-
time pings from the sharks involved. Indeed, both White Shark Café and Andrea Mustaine, 
writing for Live Science, remain critical of the Ocearch-affiliated marine biologist and creator 
of the previously mentioned tracker Expedition White Shark, Michael Domeier, because he 
nevertheless continues to advocate “SPOT tagging despite his own evidence that it is 
unnecessary” (Mustaine, 2012; WSC 2015).  
 Thus, it would be fair to say that both of the above two trackers are off the mark in 
terms of dead-on accuracy. Interestingly, though, the issue of spatial accuracy has emerged as 
secondary to the combined concern for the well-being of the animals, and to the desire to 
approximate as far as possible a true real-time ping. And these two key concerns – the careful 
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treatment of the creatures themselves forced into the venture, and the durational quality of the 
tracking technology (represented to the public via its attached Android or Apple operated 
mobile device) – reflect a particular axiology, namely that of care in time. But, as always, this 
fledgling axiology must be considered circumspectly, because of how accompanying features 
of the app have the potential to undermine it before it can take flight.    
That is, in their ability to approximate reflection of the duration of the ultimate animal 
other – the shark – both Shark Net and Ocearch exhibit a potentially very powerful use of 
digital technology in the service of becoming-animal. A service which could extend to the 
natural environment as a whole, insofar as the latter could benefit from the related human 
transformative re-orientations. However, certain facets of their operation may also comprise 
potential inhibitors of any such transformation. This is because, whereas the above discussion 
of both applications focused on the core functions of the actual tracking systems themselves, 
it is often the secondary associated features of these systems that entail more problematic 
dynamics. That is, to begin with, the user initially only operates on the side of the receiver, 
via a simplified platform that distils all the information collected into something 
representative that they can encounter, via a notification on their mobile devices. And in this 
regard, from the above articles written on both Shark Net and Ocearch, as well as a host of 
lesser annotated similar applications, the key idea that keeps emerging is that of the 
importance and appeal of building a different type of connection with nature through time; a 
connection different to its representation within the ambit of the DSP. This is clearly evinced 
by the consistent reference on the part of the above authors to ideas such as real-time, near 
real-time, and so forth. And while the articles might somewhat clumsily use the generic term 
‘connection,’ while talking about time, without necessarily making the link between the two 
explicit, there is sufficient reason to warrant exploration of the connections in temporal terms. 
In effect, what such developments offer us is access to a liminal durational space, an 
indeterminate temporal area between two worlds, involving an interface between two unique 
times – ours and that of the sharks being tracked. The digital platform through which the user 
accesses time stamps from the particular shark they have chosen to track is enabled by the 
coding that allows for identification on the other side of the oceanic mirror, as it were. The 
world of the animal beneath the sea that is still a mysterious one, despite all the information 
we have aggregated on it over time. And correlatively, a ping from the other side entails a 
reminder of its duration, rather than the provision of more information on the Umwelt of the 
animal. In effect, all that we can hope for is that at some point our durations will cross 
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through the ping, which allows us to momentarily link up in this liminal space, in a dynamic 
that is far more intuitive than intellectual. That is, we don’t experience the shark in this 
instance in a purely informational sense, or in a way that is distilled through the sensibilities 
of popular culture; rather, we receive a message from the netherworld, through which it 
reminds us of its continued life alongside our own time world.  
But if the ping sent to the user’s mobile phone is the first encounter, then their 
potential logging onto the various social media sites connected to either Shark Net or Ocearch 
entails a secondary, embellished encounter – and it is here where due care must be taken, 
because the latter could quickly undermine the experiences engendered by the former.  In 
certain respects, Shark Net-affiliated Stanford marine biologist Randy Kochevar gives the 
game away when he enthuses that “the idea behind the app…is to allow everyone to explore 
the places where these sharks live, and to get to know them just like their friends on 
Facebook and Google+” (GTOPP, 2014). At this point, one must carefully consider whether 
the connection sought – through a recognition of an encounter with the duration of the shark 
– is undermined by an anthropomorphism which unwittingly negates the possibility of such 
connection. In the first encounter, or when one is pinged by a shark, as it were, one’s time is 
impinged upon by the movements of the animal, insofar as our respective durations intersect 
via the conduit of the various technologies – acoustic and radio to digital or satellite to digital 
– that enable this ‘meeting’ between us. In the second encounter, or the one in which we 
interact with the sharks via their social media pages, the open variable that is the shark ping 
disappears, and is replaced instead by a will to power that seeks to overcome human 
beholdenness to the shark’s time and movement, by establishing its permanent virtual 
presence. This issue, in effect, parallels the debate thematized in the previous chapter, over 
the different ontologies between analog and digital technology, because while the initial ping 
– insofar as it is produced by the open variable of the shark’s time and movement – remains 
beholden to duration in a manner akin to analog film (even with the above-mentioned time 
lag), the embellished encounter via social media sites bears all the features of the digital 
ontology that seeks to overcome time, and through manipulation to force everything into a 
permanently accessible present. And it is in relation to this pursuit of accessibility that a form 
of ressentiment against the profound otherness of the shark also manifests, insofar as this 
otherness is domesticated, reduced from radical difference to the sameness of human 
parameters, through the anthropomorphization of the shark.  
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Examples of the social media aspect of both Shark Net and Ocearch are abundant. 
Katie Dupere, writing for the popular mashable.com, begins her article by focusing on the 
many myths surrounding sharks which have contributed significantly to their diminishing 
numbers, but advances that “tracking allows researchers to learn about their behaviour and 
migratory patterns, all of which help in aiding crucial conservation efforts.” However, 
beyond this, best of all for Dupere is that now the “average person” can become involved in 
these environmental endeavours. This is because they “can track the same sharks researchers 
are observing from their very own computers and mobile devices,” and can furthermore join 
in on social media, where “individual sharks have their own loyal followings, with entire 
social media accounts dedicated to their every tracked move – and fictional personalities” 
(Dupere, 2015). And it is these fictionalized personalities, operating through channels such as 
Facebook and Twitter, which have received the most attention, with an Ocearch-tagged shark 
named Mary Lee the most discussed. Laura Geggel, writing for Live Science, briefly accounts 
for this particular leviathan. She explains that “researchers tagged Mary Lee in 2012 in Cape 
Cod, Massachusetts,” and that “the battery in her tracker is still going strong.” Of the shark’s 
movements, she describes “Mary Lee [as] constantly on the go, travelling up and down the 
Eastern seaboard of the United States, from Florida to Massachusetts,” even visiting 
“Bermuda in 2013.” Accordingly, since the time of Mary Lee’s tagging and the commission 
of the article, she has swum “31, 823 kilometres” or “a distance equal to driving back and 
forth across the continental United States almost six times.” And Geggel, considerably 
impressed, notes that “over the past 24 hours, the shark has travelled about 156 km” (Geggel, 
2015). Similarly, Charles Poladian, writing for IB Times, also notes the great distances 
travelled by the shark, but tends to focus more on Mary Lee’s impact on the Twittersphere. 
As a first point, he sees developments such as Ocearch as already remarkable, and is 
impressed by the use of “new technology to advance our understanding of these wondrous 
sea creatures.” But related to this, and as a second point, while he concedes that such a “goal 
is worthy enough to get Ocearch lots of attention,” he also asks: “What happens when you 
add the Internet and a touch of personality to the project?” And in answer to his rhetorical 
question, Poladian writes that “you get a viral Twitter account and thousands of 
followers…following Mary Lee the great white shark, as well as her marine pals Lydia and 
Katherine.” Interestingly, too, the article begins with a joke whereby the picture used to 
accompany the article is a stock image of a shark and the sub-editor responsible for the 
picture description quips underneath: “Mary Lee (not pictured) the great white shark has been 
a hit on Twitter.” While obviously in jest, it is certainly worth considering that the various 
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trackers employed (in this case Ocearch) have allowed for a differentiation of this shark from 
others, an individualization of it through the creation of a personality, and the normalization 
of this process to the point where witty remarks are both possible and widely intelligible. A 
host of developments not conceivable a few decades ago. CNN’s Marnie Hunter, referenced 
earlier, also explores the social media angle, with particular focus on the fact that the sharks 
have Twitter accounts. She writes, “Mary Lee tweets occasionally, while Katharine, who’s in 
her late teens, is a ‘chatterbox’ with more than 16,000 followers.” It is furthermore uncertain 
as to who runs these accounts, with “the real identity of the tweeters a mystery.” Hunter asks 
Chris Fischer, one of the founders of Ocearch if he knows, and he replies that he is also not 
certain, stating that “people were inspired to give these sharks voices, and we don’t know 
who they are.” He furthermore “credits the publicly shared shark tracker and the power of 
social media with helping to change the tone of the conversation around sharks” (Hunter, 
2014).182  
While among the users accessing the applications, the perceptions of sharks have no 
doubt in many cases been altered from negative and fearful to positive and appreciative, one 
must nevertheless ask if ‘voicing’ the animals through human sensibilities does not cheapen a 
potentially profound technology-enabled encounter. After all, the anthropomorphic sensibility 
of the applications, and in particular their associated social media presences, do indeed 
humanize the ultimate animal ‘other,’ by not allowing it to be what it is through 
characterizing it in terms of a domesticating human lens. And in doing so, the opportunity is 
missed for a deeper reflection on nature that could facilitate a degree of becoming-animal, in 
favour of a retreat into an ossified mode of (human) understanding.  
But is laying the charge of anthropomorphism not too easy? Is it fair to those users 
quite obviously deeply affected by this new-found ability to interact with the ultimate animal 
‘other’ – so much so that they would go to the effort of establishing social media accounts 
and dedicating some of their time to typing out personalised messages on social media sites, 
in relation to pings from the sharks tracked? Indeed, such human behaviour in relation to a 
ping from a shark passing a beacon, or surfacing above the water briefly, does conceivably 
                                                          
182 While Mary Lee, and Katherine may be Ocearch-tagged sharks, SharkNet also follows the route of 
anthropomorphizing the sharks it has tagged. For example, Sonia van Gilder Cooke, writing for Time, explains 
that Shark Net hopes “people will personally connect with these animals and what’s going on off-shore,” and 
that the app “allows people to monitor and learn about [the] great whites researchers have been studying for 
years, including Bite Head, Mr. Burns, and Chomp” (van Gilder Cooke, 2012).  
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indicate that something altogether different may be in its germinal stage, and to reject it out 
of hand because it has not achieved the radical parameters of what it may yet become, would 
be to ensure that such parameters are never reached, through denying the intuitive time to 
mature. To pursue this point, one could look at two very different types of reactions to the 
ping of a shark, captured by acoustic or satellite means, and beamed through to a user in 
digitized form on their mobile devices.  
The first type of reaction, which entails the explication of a Fascist/Cancerous Body 
without Organs, is evident in the developments tracked by a series of articles across 2015 and 
2016, pertaining to the authorities of New South Wales, Australia, responding to shark 
sightings close to popular beaches and surf spots. The Australian Associated Press reported 
that “New South Wales swimmers could soon use technology to monitor sharks in a bid to 
halt a wave of recent attacks at the state’s beaches,” and that there was a substantial push by 
government to “develop real-time tracking of tagged sharks which surfers and swimmers 
could potentially access on a smartphone app or website.” In this regard, Minister for Primary 
Industries, Niall Blair, is quoted in the article as stating that: “Making our beaches safer is a 
top priority for the NSW government…that’s why we are leaving no stone unturned to make 
sure we look at new and innovative ways to protect our beaches” (in The Guardian, 2015).183 
While Blair’s comments are those that we would expect from a public official in relation to a 
surge in shark sightings and attacks in the area, and in response to a potentially jittery public, 
it is revealing that he twice repeats the claim that the beaches are “ours.” And it is here that 
an ossified anthropocentric approach presents itself clearly, insofar as it is intimated that 
technology should be employed to guard human enclaves of activity and leisure against the 
intrusions of nature. That is, according to such logic, technology should be employed in order 
to carve out a strict delineation between the human realm and that of the animal ‘other.’ And 
one can imagine that when someone accessing a tracking application with such a mind-set 
experiences the pings presented by the sharks, these remain simply informational, with no 
durational significance attached to the time stamp of an animal perceived only as the most 
fearsome of predators. Beyond this, a further issue must be taken into consideration; when 
                                                          
183 Jonathan Pearlman, writing for The Telegraph, provides further detail on the spate of incidents that have 
prompted a reaction from the NSW authorities, when he indicates that, “at least 13 attacks…occurred in the state 
[in 2015], compared with three in 2014.” Indeed, “the attacks included the death in February of Tadashi 
Nakahara, a 41-year-old surfer who was believed to have been mauled just 30 feet from shore by a great white 
shark” (Pearlman, 2015).  
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Jonathan Pearlman, writing on the aforementioned measures employed by the NSW 
government, interviewed the local mayor of the northern region of Ballina, he was told that, 
strangely, “sharks were continuing to congregate close to shore ‘like no one can remember.’” 
And in searching for a reason for this surge in the shark population in the area, Pearlman 
refers to “experts [who] have proposed various explanations for the recent increase in shark 
attacks, including changing ocean temperatures and greater numbers of humans entering the 
water, particularly surfers who can spend longer in the water in winter due to high-quality 
wetsuits.” Additionally, “increasing numbers of whales migrating along the east coast are 
also believed to have attracted growing numbers of deadly great white sharks” (Pearlman, 
2015). As such, the manner in which tracking technologies and their related digital mobile 
applications are construed is in a purely reactive way, which is furthermore myopic in that it 
treats the symptom, but disregards the cause – if Blair’s statements are anything to go by. 
That is, human dominion over nature, whether on a macro scale such as humans’ contribution 
to both rising ocean temperatures, and correlatively to changes in the movements of sea 
creatures affected by such variance, or on a more micro level, such as enabling surfers to stay 
in the cold water, is endorsed unequivocally. That is, even though humans have caused the 
problem of increasing attacks, the solution to this is to protect that which is ‘ours,’ instead of 
reflecting on the human contribution to the problem. Protection that, furthermore, takes the 
form of extending digital surveillance under the auspices of control society to the natural 
environment, and to any potential threat therein to the dividualized, coded economic matter 
that are the financial life blood of sea side resorts.   
 The second type of reaction, which entails the explication of a Suicidal/Catatonic 
Body without Organs, is evinced by those people who – as already discussed – feel 
compelled to send out messages (to strong followings) via Twitter and other such social 
media networks, as the sharks themselves. Accordingly, rather than operating at the level of 
fear, information processing, and subsequent reaction, with a view to extending human 
control over the ocean and its diversity, these individuals – and those who interact with them 
online – present an altogether different sensibility, but one which in its current form is not 
particularly affirmative. Claudia Geib in “Could social media save sharks, or is it just scaring 
swimmers?’ makes some interesting observations in this regard. Noting first that Ocearch’s 
most famous predator, Mary Lee, had amassed 90 000 Twitter followers at the time of 
writing (22 April, 2016), she advances that while  
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under normal circumstances, people would keep their distance from this female 
great white shark – a sharp-toothed, seal-eating, terror-inspiring fish[,]…through the 
magic of social media (and the help of a human typist), Mary Lee can crack jokes, 
talk to her followers, and share stories of ocean conservation. (Geib, 2016) 
 
And Geib further notes that these messages tend to be very well received by the shark’s 
90 000 or so followers. Indeed, “her fans eagerly monitor her real-world movements using a 
shark-tracking map and a mobile app [run by Ocearch].” But, related to this sizeable interest, 
Geib gets to what is at stake when she observes that it is “estimated that over 100 million of 
these ancient fish are killed every year, and many shark advocates see the Internet as a 
valuable tool” to curtail this slaughter. However, the “fear of sharks, after all, is a primal 
instinct, and conservationists are up against deep-rooted aspects of human nature.” And it is 
to such fear that the anthropomorphism of the shark is a response, one that is not without 
commercial implications. In short, to anthropomorphize sharks is to domesticate them so that 
they can be identified with by ordinary people for whom the sharks’ radical alterity would 
otherwise be too unpalatable. And the more people identify with them, the more exposure is 
afforded to the commercial ventures that have funded the development of the related 
technology. With regard to Shark Net, Ella Davies, writing for BBC Nature, notes that the 
Stanford researchers were tasked with developing “a way to deliver the [scientific] data [on 
the sharks] in an appealing way to those without a scientific background,” and for this they 
received “funding from a Rolex Award for Enterprise” (Davies, 2012). Further information 
on the monies accessed by Shark Net in pursuit of their project is also provided by the White 
Shark Café website, who note that Shark Net’s development of “the tools and technologies 
required to monitor the California Current Large Marine Ecosystem,” and related exploration 
of “ways of ensuring that it remains intact for future generations,” is funded not only by 
Rolex, but also by “an International Cosmos Prize from the Expo ’90 Foundation, and a 
research grant from Discovery Communications” (WSC, 2014). With regard to Ocearch and 
the companies putting money into it, Ocearch’s website, Gutowski, and Hastings Deering all 
provide some clarity as to who these funders are. The Ocearch website states that their 
“expeditions and digital outreach platforms are enabled through the support of  Caterpillar, 
Costa, Yamaha, Contender, SAFE boats, Mustad, Xavient, oneQube, and DYT Yacht 
Transport” (Ocearch, 2016), while Gutowski provides further information on the effect of 
these sponsorships, writing that they have enabled 22 expeditions in 2015 alone (Gutowski, 
2015). In their contribution to the topic, Hastings Deering – themselves a funder as they are a 
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Caterpillar Inc. affiliate – focus their discussion on this sub-topic with high praise for 
Caterpillar, advancing that “Ocearch expeditions are sponsored in large part by Caterpillar 
Inc. as part of a socially innovative multi-year partnership,” and that “additional partnership 
support is provided by Costa Sunglasses and Shell, along with DYT Yacht Transport, 
Contender, Yamaha, SAFE Boats, MUSTAD and Landry’s Inc.” (Hastings Deering, 2014). 
Not content to end the statement there, a paragraph on Caterpillar and its contribution to 
society in general follows. It reads: 
 
For nearly 90 years, Caterpillar Inc. has been making sustainable progress possible 
and driving positive change on every continent. Customers turn to Caterpillar to 
help them develop infrastructure, energy and natural resource assets. With 2013 
sales and revenues of $55.656 billion, Caterpillar is the world’s leading 
manufacturer of construction and mining equipment, diesel and natural gas engines, 
industrial gas turbines and diesel-electric locomotives. (Hastings Deering, 2014) 
 
It is thus clearly evident that both Shark Net, and to a larger extent, Ocearch, cannot be 
separated from the commercial groups that sustain them. But the implication of this, in turn, 
is that the anthropomorphizing dynamic of both applications will continue to flood the 
material generated in relation to the sharks, and accordingly, in keeping with an explication 
of a Suicidal/Catatonic Body without Organs, a comfortably smooth human space will 
continue to be maintained, in which the radical difference of the sharks is displaced, and 
nothing new is allowed to grow – because the encounter with alterity that might precipitate 
such growth is not allowed to exist.  
But this is not to say that everyone who encounters the sharks through these 
applications will remain – or even fall prey to – the virtual hegemony of the above 
explication of a Suicidal/Catatonic Body without Organs. After all, Shark Net and Ocearch 
are unlike the Tamagotchi, the virtual hegemony of which was likened to that of a Max 
Ophüls film, and even more open ended than Botanicula, whose cracked crystal was likened 
to the films of Jean Renoir, and for that matter, to the usurping crystal of Luchino Visconti. 
Indeed, in terms of the openness of their virtual-actual interface, the applications are more 
akin to the dynamic interplay found in Federico Fellini’s films. And this takes us back to the 
crux of the matter, namely whether or not digital technology has the potential to explicate a 
Full Body without Organs, by altering deep-rooted patterns of thought and operation and 
ushering in difference. Arguably, based on the popularity of Mary Lee and other sharks, and 
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more so on the extent to which certain people appear willing to go in order to establish some 
sort of connection with the leviathans, it is plausible to suggest that, indeed, within the spaces 
created by such digital technology, typical ways of thinking when it comes to the animals can 
splinter into different orientations. In this regard, the mobile apps do reflect aspects of the 
transformative works of Kafka and Melville, insofar as, once engaged with them, a person 
can find themselves potentially within a nebulous and uncertain liminal space – a space 
between human and animal. But in arguing the above, care should be exercised before one 
exalts the power of technology in itself. As Guattari reminds us, in terms of his conception of 
post-media discussed in Chapter Four, the capacity of information technology is just that – 
potential – as it is up to human beings to bring to that new-found tool an ethical and 
affirmative way of thinking. And this requires a rigorous and self-reflexive engagement with 
the tool in question. With regard to the shark tracking applications, Geib’s sentiments 
comport with Guattari’s argument, when she notes that, “without carefully developed 
educational programmes, some researchers suggest, shark-tracking apps can often backfire.” 
To support this, Geib quotes the University of Sydney social scientist, Christopher Neff, who 
points out that “without targeted education on sharks as part of a healthy ecosystem, tracking 
maps could simply incite fear over what’s lurking offshore.”184 Lending further support to 
this argument, another researcher cited by Geib, namely Marianne Long, the education 
director at the Atlantic White Shark Conservancy, emphasizes the “importance of fact-based 
education to supplement research efforts.” And Long moreover advances that “working with 
kids” remains at the core of any initiative to develop an alternative viewpoint on sharks 
(Geib, 2016).  
Of the two applications focused upon, it is Ocearch that explicitly goes down this 
path. Stephen Gutowski, writing for Free Beacon, explains that “Ocearch is a leader in open 
source research, sharing data in near real-time for free through the Global Shark Tracker,” 
which enables “students and the public to learn alongside PhD’s” (Gutowski, 2015). And the 
Hastings Deering website provides further detail on the educational component tied in with 
the tracker,185 explaining that besides “regular updates” being posted “on the @Ocearch 
Twitter handle as well as the Ocearch Facebook page” – which demonstrates the 
                                                          
184 For his part, Neff argues that “not enough effort is being placed on communicating how little danger sharks 
actually pose to humans.” And he puts the blame for this on the sensationalist tendencies of the mainstream 
media, pointing out that, for instance, a “leading story still reports a ‘shark attack’ when there are no injuries, 
[like for instance] a shark bumping a kayak” (Geib, 2016). 
185 It must be noted that Hastings Deering (which is a Caterpillar affiliate) sponsors certain aspects of the 
Ocearch programme, and as such, their publication on the matter is not journalistic in nature.  
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“collaborative approach to science” that is a “core to Ocearch’s principle of inclusion” – the 
team behind the tracking technologies is also scheduled to present at “school and community 
events.” In a more formal sense, the application is also being incorporated to some extent into 
the Australian schooling system. As the aforementioned website explains in this regard, 
“students will be able to leverage the real time tracking data the sharks create to learn math, 
physics, and other STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering, Math) skills,” thus hopefully 
“making science cool and relevant in their lives through Ocearch’s free STEM curriculum for 
3-8th grade” (Hastings Deering, 2014).186 It is interesting to note that, again, much like with 
the Tamagotchi, and with non-typical games like Botanicula, it is the young who often 
become the principle audience. And one wonders what such digital encounters with animal 
‘others,’ either within a formal education system or via personal mobile apps, can potentially 
generate in terms of new and positively different orientations toward nature – synonymous at 
least in part with a people yet to come. 
Admittedly though, as argued in Chapter Two, it is idealistic to claim that one can or 
should operate outside of the Dominant Social Paradigm, when working toward a more 
ethical stance toward nature. Rather, it was suggested that of the dimensions constituting the 
DSP, the technological dimension was the most amenable to pro-environmental inflection. To 
be sure, any such technological advance would be conjoined with the economic aspect of the 
paradigm, which funds advances within the technological dimension, but it was also argued 
that these advances often remain indeterminate in terms of their effects. Indeed, at the time of 
their arrival, no one can ever be completely sure what desires and effects these creations will 
produce, with the example already cited in this regard being the cell phone. And mobile 
applications such as Shark Net and Ocearch similarly have the potential to produce new sets 
of relations between humans and animals. But to advance their capacity to explicate Full 
Bodies without Organs in this regard is, of course, not to suggest that they can accomplish 
this in a manner akin to, for example, Francis Bacon, whose art was discussed in Chapter 
Three. After all, the applications are the product of a diverse range of players and 
stakeholders and not the result of one man’s artistic inspiration, and this renders their 
explication of Full Bodies without Organs complex. 
                                                          
186 The Ocearch website provides updates on its ambitious collaboration with the formal education system, 
stating that the curriculum has been extended for grades k to 8, and that by 2016, “the Ocearch STEM 
Curriculum will be available for grades k-12” (Ocearch, 2016).  
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Jessica Waters, writing for the Tribune and Georgian, interviewed Ocearch founder 
Chris Fischer, and in doing so, allowed for a further reflection on the related exchange 
between conservationists, scientists, corporate funders, and the public on his application. She 
writes that although Fischer “has his detractors,” he “also has – literally and figuratively – a 
boatload of prominent scientists and conservationists who say his methods are breaking 
ground…in bringing the issue of ocean conservation to the forefront of public attention.” And 
these experts specifically commend his “approach of open-source science, networked data, 
leveraged publicity and corporate-sponsored expeditions,” all of which have been 
furthermore “driven by social media saturation.” Accordingly, this approach has led to a 
move away from “the perception of jealously guarded intellectual property and competitive 
scientific research,” while, as already discussed, Ocearch’s “science-based explorations are 
funded largely by corporate sponsorships,” which similarly “provide a bridge between the 
academics and the practical.” Thus, while “major sponsors such as Caterpillar Inc.” get to 
“leverage the high-profile publicity inherent in Ocearch’s social media-savvy work,” the fact 
remains that these corporate sponsors “have allowed the work of tracking and capturing 
sharks, identifying breeding and feeding areas, and mapping migratory corridors and birthing 
sites,” which collectively have provided invaluable information for both conservation efforts 
and public education.  As stated before, while the corporate sponsorship of such initiatives is 
no doubt self-serving, in a pragmatic sense, without it, Ocearch could not have developed the 
sophisticated networks of research and public interaction, nor facilitated all the personal 
durational experiences potentially generated by their mobile application – however tentative 
these may be. The final word goes to Fischer, who although idiosyncratic in his explanation, 
nevertheless offers an explanation of how working ‘within the system,’ as it were, is better 
than attempting to operate outside of it. In terms of this, he argues that, “An ‘Us versus 
Them’ attitude between environmentalists and the general public is counter-productive, and 
finding the middle ground is the key to coming up with solutions that work in the real world.” 
And in relation to this, he notes that because the M/V OCEARCH “was the only ship in the 
world where scientists could have access to the big animals,” he explains that he “leveraged 
[this reality] to disrupt the institutional approach to research and [instead] forced 
collaboration.” A collaboration he defines as one “that’s ocean-first, that’s planet-first, that’s 
great-grandchildren-first.” Such a collaborative approach – even if forced by necessity, in that 
Fischer’s corporate-funded research ship is the only one sophisticated enough to allow 
scientists and conservationists proper access to the creatures tracked – is also for him a far 
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better option than the alternative approach to environmental protection, which he dubs “the 
polarizing fringe” (Waters, 2016). And on this issue, his argument is encapsulated as follows:  
 
We (Ocearch) are data-driven centrists; [and] one of the reasons I’m trying to build 
a booming brand in the middle that is rooted in science and common senses is to 
drown out the polarizing fringe, because when the whole tone and trajectory of a 
conversation is dominated by the polarizing fringe, nothing happens…They – the 
polarizers – are not negotiating from a position to find practical progress, they’re 
holding on to a position. If you’re a polarizer, you’re as bad as a poacher, and they 
may think they are trying to save the ocean, but when nothing happens, the ocean 
gets whacked. (in Waters, 2016) 
 
It is beyond the scope of this chapter – and indeed this thesis – to enter into a debate with 
Fischer on who precisely the “polarizers” are,187 as all pro-environmental perspectives are 
worth consideration, and in the spirit of dialogue aspects of their contributions will always 
remain valid, whether or not their overall perspectives are legitimated by the dominant 
discourse of our era. However, if one considers how exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, 
it is to effect change outside the parameters of a DSP with which we are all complicit, then 
there is sense to Fischer’s denunciation of those who wish to operate outside of such 
collaboration.  And through such collaboration – which can even entail recourse to aspects of 
the State Apparatus – Fischer facilitates the partial explication of a Full Body without Organs 
not only through his tracker, but also through the oblique and hitherto unchartered approach 
this involves, which amounts to the creation of a nomadic war machine, the dynamics of 
which far exceed those of, for example, Botanicula, discussed earlier.   
 To be sure, advancing either Shark Net or Ocearch as nomadic war machines seems to 
run counter to the argument offered by Deleuze in his “Postscript on Control Societies,” in 
which he expressed concern over the growing capacity of digital technology to monitor and 
infiltrate all human interaction. Indeed, Deleuze, in his more pessimistic mode, would 
possibly have seen the development of Shark Net and Ocearch as the extension of control 
society over even the natural environment. Admittedly, it is remarkable that we have 
developed the capacity, through advances in acoustic, satellite and digital technologies, to 
                                                          
187 Fischer does hint at who he means when using the term, when he mocks those not close to the ocean, along 
with their abstract efforts to effect positive change by distantly countering its degradation. He states: “How can 
we expect anybody other than the recreational fisherman to save the ocean? It’s not going to be some 
environmentalist in a building in New York or D.C., it’s going to be the people that love it the most; those are 
the families that are fishing together, diving together, [and] surfing together” (in Waters, 2016).  
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follow with a high degree of accuracy the movements of one of the earth’s most enigmatic 
predators in places that previously seemed beyond the human gaze. And it does raise the 
question of whether or not we have thereby extended the Foucauldian panoptical nightmare 
to the ‘other’-world that is the depths of the ocean. But while one could argue this point, 
context also needs to be taken into account. With oceanic ecosystems under dire threat 
because of human activity, and with sharks a vital part of that inter-connected system, the 
ability to monitor accurately the movements and behaviours of sharks should take precedence 
over the aforementioned concern.188 It must also be taken into account who precisely is doing 
the monitoring. As a first point, it would be overly cynical to assume anything other than 
good intention on the part of the scientists and conservationists who have dedicated their 
careers, and indeed lives, to trying to understand the behaviours of various types of marine 
life in the interests of preserving them. On a related second note, and as discussed in Chapter 
Two, Dave Toke’s advancement of the distinction between scientists operating in the field for 
decades who rely on intuition, and those whose technophilia has distanced them from such 
practices, should also be recalled, because the vessel Ocearch, by default due to its unique 
outfitting, attracts a variety of researchers extremely heterogeneous in their histories, 
experiences, and practices. And it is accordingly often operated by those with an intimate, 
non-scientific knowledge of the ocean. As Fischer claims: “What we’re trying to do is get 
great fishermen together with great scientists so we have great data sets so we can manage 
our oceans toward abundance as soon as possible” (Waters, 2016). Admittedly, Fischer’s use 
of the word ‘manage’ could be pounced on, and held up as glaring evidence of his unwitting 
assimilation of the imperatives of control society, insofar as the monitoring of nature enabled 
by technological advance is construed as an extension of Deleuze’s envisioned society of 
continuous digital surveillance. But if one considers the context – both in terms of dire 
environmental circumstance, and in terms of the aspirations of those doing the monitoring – 
then such criticism should be reconsidered. Instead, one could turn to the still guarded but 
more optimistic thought of Guattari in this regard; in particular, his claim – discussed in 
Chapter Four – that “machinic mutations…deterritorialize subjectivity” and that “the junction 
of informatics, telematics and the audio-visual will perhaps allow a decisive step to be made 
in the direction of interactivity, [or] towards a post-media era” (1995: 97). This is because, in 
                                                          
188 Waters notes that, according to the International Action Plan for Sharks, a programme “initiated by the 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), more than 100 out 
of 400 shark species are being commercially exploited,” and furthermore, “many of those species are so 
overexploited that even their long-term survival can no longer be guaranteed.” Shockingly, “an estimated 100 
million sharks are killed each year” (Waters, 2016).  
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addition to this schizophrenic mix, as it were, “the Universes of techno-science, biology, 
computer technology, telematics and the media [can] further destabilise our mental co-
ordinates on a daily basis” (1995: 119), and this is a good thing. Indeed,  if one considers that 
both Shark Net and Ocearch employ a wide range of technologies to facilitate the capture and 
distribution of time signals from sharks, in order to create a system of relations between 
sharks and human beings, then certainly we could see them as machinic mutations that can 
deterritorialize the subjectivities – albeit only incrementally – of some of those who 
encounter these programmes on the receiver’s end of the exchange. Of course, we must be 
cautious, because for Guattari the possibility of the deterritorialization of subjectivity – or 
becoming different – can only be achieved “provided that new social, political, aesthetic and 
analytical practices allow us to escape from the shackles of [the] empty speech which 
crush[es] us” (1995: 97). But in relation to this, it has been argued that the creators of both 
Shark Net and Ocearch certainly do approach their craft through new methods, enabled by 
utilizing digitized open sourcing, which promote collaboration and public access, and that 
most importantly exhibit a deep passion (or desire) for the environment. For the most part, 
the receiver’s end of the digital interface has captured more of the popular imagination, not 
least because of the interest in accounting for the power of the new configuration which 
entices certain people to devote their time to sending out messages on behalf of sharks, based 
on time stamps received from those sharks. And it is possible that via a durational connection 
enabled by the range of new digital technologies, those deeply affected by the related 
applications have in some way become different, even if this means only the slight 
approximation of becoming-animal. In sum, if we take on a more Guattarian sensibility when 
thinking of these two mobile applications – without forgetting the immense contribution of 
Deleuze in terms of his work on durational difference – then we can begin to employ a wider 
range of thoughts on the issue of becoming different in time. 
Conclusion 
In sum, we can look to the concepts generated in the highly productive collaboration between 
Deleuze and Guattari, examined in Chapter Three, on difference, desire, and becoming, as a 
theoretical lens through which to engage with Shark Net and Ocearch.  
With regard to the generation of difference, Ansell Pearson’s suggestion that Deleuze 
had an aversion to dogma, and that in this sense, he “was a monster,” is relevant here. That is, 
his work was characterized as  “a subversive, perilous attempt to map out a new becoming of 
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thought” that is “beyond good sense and common sense,” insofar as, through it, “thought 
becomes monstrous because it forsakes the desire for an image of thought” (2002: 3). 
Similarly, the evocative connections generated by the likes of Shark Net and Ocearch are an 
embodiment of this kind of radical thought on both sides of the spectrum – whether one 
encounters them as a researcher, conservationist or scientist on the one hand, or on the other 
hand, as a user who downloads the mobile application. For the former, technological advance 
allows for the academic/practitioner grouping to generate new knowledge on an animal 
whose movements and behaviours are still not fully understood, while furthermore, through 
the collaborative open-sourced nature of the research, the monopolization of new 
understanding by one party is negated. For the latter, namely the end user, they have the 
option of not simply encountering a shark in a purely informational sense, or through the 
memorial ambit of popular culture, but also in a new way – enabled by the capacity of new 
technology. And on this point, it is again important to note that children surface as a thematic 
concern; for instance, Grades K to 8 in Australia now participate through the Ocearch 
application, and it is being built into an extended school programme. This is because the way 
in which one acquires knowledge at such a formative stage potentially alters one’s world – or 
more precisely, one’s understanding of time – and in this instance one’s orientation toward 
nature. Indeed, we may even speculate that, as demonstrated in the language used by the 
various journalists writing on the applications, while many adults who encounter it still tend 
to see it in informational and generic environmental terms, the children who access it might 
be engaging with it on a different, far more intuitive level. After all, there is significant 
evidence that succeeding generations relate differently to the constantly proliferating and 
augmenting developments of information technology. 
In relation to desire, it must be remembered that in Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze and 
Guattari were critical of the tendency to characterize desire in terms of lack, and instead 
advanced it as a productive constellation of forces in interaction. Extended to the human-
animal relationship, on the one hand, such desire can result in animals being Oedipalized, 
insofar as they are construed as substitutes for human companionship, or have human aspects 
projected onto them, and so forth. And both Shark Net and Ocearch reflect such desire via the 
anthropomorphization of the sharks, through granting them names and projecting human 
personalities onto them via their imagined statements on Twitter, etc. On the other hand, in 
terms of Deleuze and Guattari’s taxonomy of animals, both Shark Net and Ocearch can also 
be utilized to channel desire for State animals, as it were, insofar as they are used as 
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mechanisms to protect against shark attacks on people, with the sharks being construed 
through the lens of popular mythology as dangerously powerful denizens of the deep, whose 
sole purpose is to swallow up unsuspecting swimmers. But while the above Oedipalization of 
sharks entails the explication of a Suicidal/Catatonic Body without Organs, and their 
characterization as State animals entails the explication of a Fascist/Cancerous Body without 
Organs, both Shark Net and Ocearch also make possible an encounter with sharks as demonic 
animals. That is, as animals whose difference is allowed to remain unmitigated, so that the 
human encounter with them can be transformative, insofar as it facilitates the emergence of a 
strange new human-shark hybrid durationality through digital means. Moreover, on account 
of their complex and multi-layered collaborative structures, both Shark Net and Ocearch 
comprise explications of a Full Body without Organs that are so large, that they can contain 
within them the explications of Suicidal/Catatonic and Fascist/Cancerous Bodies without 
Organs, indicated above, without overly jeopardizing their capacity to usher in difference.   
This issue of transformative becoming thus remains primary. As users, we can be 
deeply affected by the untimely messages sent to us from the netherworld by the most ‘other’ 
of animals, not least because we can never exercise dominion over it. As stated before, much 
like the work of Kafka and Melville, or indeed the picture book of Uexküll, Shark Net and 
Ocearch facilitate a contemporary amorphous and destabilizing encounter with the animal 
‘other,’ and correlatively with nature in general. A productive encounter enabled by the 
meshing of new technological developments and capacities, a different approach to research 
at both the levels of collection and distribution, and the emergence of a different kind of 
subject constantly in interaction with the digital and desirous of encountering the time of an 
‘other.’ As discussed in Chapter Five, for Deleuze, any potentially transformative practice 
occurs within time, and indeed creates new time, and the durational aspects of difference 
were examined through his various theoretical encounters with Nietzsche, Proust and 
Bergson. Yet at this point, Deleuze’s reservations over digitality notwithstanding, we should 
also consider how Shark Net and Ocearch can be understood through Deleuzo-Proustian, 
Deleuzo-Bergsonian and Deleuzo-Nietzschean terms.   
For Deleuze, it was the Signs of Art in Proust’s work which were the ultimate form of 
signs. For him, “these signs, as though dematerialized, find their meaning in an ideal 
essence,” and in turn have an effect on all the other signs, “most notably on the sensuous 
signs,” insofar as “the world revealed by art…integrates them, colours them with an aesthetic 
meaning, and imbues what was still opaque about them” (Deleuze 2000: 13-14). 
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Accordingly, if Sensuous Material Signs such as those in Botanicula encourage a move away 
from unthinking or self-defeating interactions with others – through Worldly Signs and 
deceptive Signs of Love, respectively – toward durational intuition and an accordingly 
affirmative regaining of time, Signs of Art would have to amplify this exponentially. And it 
can be argued that Shark Net and Ocearch constitute such signs, because they can lead us to 
an encounter with nature that prompts deep introspection and self-reflexivity on the part of 
the user in relation to duration. That is, what the mobile applications generate is neither a 
repetitive series of inputs in an enclosed system – as with the Tamagotchi – nor a series of 
encounters that break the virtual hegemony of the human subjective position, which occurs 
through Botanicula. Rather, they generate a sporadic series of temporal encounters with an 
open variable that can never be entirely determined. And the very fact that these apps can 
lead people to consider the movements within time of an animal that shares existence with 
them, arguably comprises a new development within popular discourse and public 
perceptions of the environment. 
  With regard to a Bergsonian reading of Shark Net and Ocearch, we can return to John 
Normark, who succinctly expressed this thinker’s philosophical project, when he pointed out 
that “both instinct and intelligence are “two solutions to the same problem of confronting and 
manipulating matter” (2009: 2). That is, as discussed, Bergson positioned instinct – or the 
compulsion to organize, put into structure, and establish orthodoxy – against intelligence, 
which by definition exceeds the boundaries of the past through memorial creativity, or 
through the recollection of a past that has never been present, with a view to embarking into 
the future in accordance with a related new trajectory. And in many ways, this is what 
applications such as Shark Net and Ocearch offer us; they do not exclusively classify and 
categorize, but rather generate the conditions through which a user of their mobile 
applications can imaginatively encounter a shark, and thereby reflect on both its existence in 
time as well as their own duration in relation to it, in a way that can give birth to a new hybrid 
form of time.  
And this, in turn, has a bearing on Deleuze’s argument in Difference and Repetition 
concerning Nietzsche’s third order of time, namely that time only passes through the creation 
of difference, which thus amounts to the creation of new time. An idea indissociable from the 
valorization of a creative and affirmative generation of difference as the only means of 
proceeding into the future, and correlatively, away from a past which has lost its momentum 
(1994: 94-95). Indeed, instead of repeating tired old environmental tropes we need to find 
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new ways with which to tackle an environmental crisis that is both immense, and which we 
all contribute to. And applications like Shark Net and Ocearch, with their ability to 
communicate the duration of an animal ‘other’ via digital means to a user, in a way that can 
precipitate the emergence of a new human-animal hybrid durational  experience on the part of 
such a user, is a step in the right direction.  
This is not to say that such applications are a solution to the environmental problem 
which is of overwhelming proportions. Rather, it is to say that they reflect a potential to 
inflect sensibilities in the direction of a more thoughtful orientation toward nature. Much like 
there is a fair chance that someone who spends much of their time in nature will develop a 
keener sense of its presence, and thus a different sense of self in relation to it, so too, via 
digital means, a similar sensibility may well be engendered through apps such as Shark Net 
and Ocearch. And that stands to be an affirmative development, even if at first the change 
thereby precipitated is only incremental. After all, an altered conception can become a very 
powerful thing in time. 
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Conclusion  
Inspired by my own digital exchange with a shark just over four years ago, this thesis has 
focussed on how certain digital artefacts have the potential to more powerfully inflect 
attitudes toward environmental care, not simply through providing more information on 
nature, but also, more importantly, through connecting human and animal time. And it was 
argued that through such a connection being forged, certain digital artefacts can make us 
aware, on an intuitive level, of how our lives are inextricably intertwined within the same 
great durational Whole.   
 In this regard, the first task was to determine what discursive dynamics are 
responsible for those current attitudes that are so powerfully, and so pervasively, inflected 
against nature. And this required as a starting point an exploration of the environmental crisis 
itself. Accordingly, it was determined that while human disregard for the natural environment 
is in no way exclusively the modus operandi of the contemporary era, the idea of an 
environmental crisis in itself began to gain traction with the popular success of Rachel 
Carson’s evocative 1962 book Silent Spring. And, as discussed, this was partly because its 
publication was coterminous with a number of catastrophic environmental events that were 
moreover coupled with unique cultural moments, which collectively altered long-held 
perceptions of our ‘dominant’ place in relation to the planet we inhabit. Indeed, one of the 
world’s great superpowers, the United States, was around this time beset by a series of 
terrifying environmental disasters – the Cuyahoga River on fire in the centre of populous 
Cleveland, the eutrophication of Lake Erie and the wretched accompanying smells, and 
masses of dead birds washing up on the shores of Santa Barbara. All of which were captured 
in visceral detail by the mass media of the time. And correlatively, when the famous 
Earthrise photo taken by the crew of Apollo 8 in 1968 began to be circulated in the press and 
via exposure through broadcast, our understanding of our place in the universe underwent 
transformation, insofar as the state of the environment gained legitimacy as a primary issue 
that could no longer be ignored. It seemed imperative to act, and global institutional players 
duly responded, holding the first global-level conference on the environment, namely the 
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, in Stockholm in 1972. However, as 
was demonstrated, this conference, and all the conferences that followed in subsequent 
decades, were beset by era-specific geopolitical squabbles, which rendered them ineffective. 
Beyond such era-specific deadlocks, great geopolitical developments and shifts – such as the 
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OPEC Oil Crisis of the 1970s and the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s – saw 
the economic discourse of neoliberalism rise to dominance and achieve hegemony, 
respectively. And it was argued that neoliberalism, with its constant call for growth, remains 
incompatible with responsible earth stewardship.  
 To be sure, criticism from the mass media, members of the public, theoreticians, and 
activist groups that seek to hold global institutions to account for their criminally negligent 
lack of environmental responsibility, remains a feature of our society. Indeed, even today, 
there is no shortage of critique that advances neoliberalism as an exploitative system, one that 
both disenfranchises people and destroys the environment. But at the same time, in many 
respects, such critique has neither profoundly altered this exploitative system of relations, nor 
halted its continued large-scale destruction of the planet. In fact, in many cases, it has not had 
much of an impact on many people, who simply continue to go about their lives as if the 
environmental crisis is an abstract idea, and not an actual crisis with real consequences for 
them.  
To account for the failure of oppositional voices in the media, public and academy to 
alter either the lacklustre response by those in power, or the lackadaisical attitude of the 
majority of people to the degradation of the natural environment, the focus turned to 
Kilbourne, Beckmann and Thelen’s conception of the Dominant Social Paradigm (or DSP) in 
operation today. As was argued, while its economic, political, technological, and 
cosmological dimensions all serve to relegate the natural world that sustains us to a secondary 
issue, its technological dimension continues to provide us with assurance against impending 
environmental catastrophe. Accordingly, the belief exists that if critical mass were ever to be 
reached, technological advance – or what Kilbourne et al. term the ‘technofix’ – can always 
be relied upon to save us from nature’s fury, or more accurately, from ourselves. And it was 
further demonstrated that the DSP, although not exclusively tied to a neoliberal framework of 
thought and operation, remains very well reflected in, and propagated by, neoliberal 
discourse, to the point where the two emerge as inextricably linked.  
As such, the argument that we should look to the digital artefacts of information 
technology as tools through which to inflect attitudes more positively toward the natural 
world, encountered two immediate and substantial problems. Firstly, information technology 
is inextricably linked with the spread of neoliberal economic discourse and practice, and 
secondly, it is intertwined with both environmental and social degradation on account of the 
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resources and infrastructure required to keep it operating. And not only were these two 
realities explored at length,  but it was also advanced that such exploration is very important 
because too often, in both popular discourse and even academic theory, it is easily forgotten 
that the possibilities of the virtual world are only facilitated through a vast, and immensely 
polluting actual material infrastructure that sustains the cyber world. However, while the 
above two issues remain problematic, it is also highly unlikely that contemporary society will 
abandon its reliance on information technology in the near future. Furthermore, as 
environmentally destructive as neoliberalism is, it is also immensely productive – indeed, it 
has produced the very digital tools that I accessed to study the environmental crisis.  That is, 
a large part of my research for this environmentally-orientated thesis entailed scouring the 
internet, particularly Google Scholar, via my Lenovo laptop and through my Samsung phone 
– all of which are generated by and/or produced through environmentally destructive 
practices. Moreover, all of these aforementioned virtual points and actual tools of access 
have, to a great extent, become accessible to me at an affordable price through the worst 
excesses of neoliberalism – the hyper-competition that demands, among other things, the 
extraction of materials such as coltan from the poorest regions on earth, without regard for 
safe and fair labour practice, and so forth.  
As such, because of the irony of the adoption of a thoroughly oppositional stance 
toward neoliberalism and technology for the sake of preserving the environment, and the 
communication of such a stance through the means made available by neoliberalism and 
technological advance, an alternative stance was chosen. That is, it was advanced that within 
the highly productive and amorphous technological dimension of the DSP, one should search 
instead for tools that may facilitate the positive inflection of sensibilities toward the natural 
environment. However, as was argued, in pursuing this trajectory, great care had to be taken 
to avoid falling into the trap of the technofix. And in this regard, a serious philosophical 
meditation on the capacity of information technology was crucial. As a first step, the works 
of a number of contemporary theorists who place into critical question some of the more 
entrenched ideas concerning information technology, were thematized. Following this, the 
focus shifted to those theorists who problematize the standard Western conception of 
technology as being separate from, and in opposition to, both culture and nature. And then, 
informed by such consideration, a related circumspect approach was adopted, which 
acknowledged the complexities involved in any exchange between agency, culture, 
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technology and nature, and which simultaneously avoided being either too pessimistic, or 
conversely, too optimistic, over technological development.  
However, if technology can be considered as an indeterminate tool that could be 
employed either to endorse the status quo or to transform it, then the next question that 
emerged concerned the direction in which to inflect the technological dimension of the DSP, 
so that it might precipitate a more positive orientation toward nature. To respond to this, a 
philosophical framework was required, both to guide any new interventions and to recognize 
resonant existing interventions. And in this regard, the writings of the post-structural 
philosopher Gilles Deleuze and his collaborative work with the radical psychoanalyst, Félix 
Guattari, were turned to because of how they promote difference, and the idea of desire 
outside of the ambit of that cornerstone of the DSP, namely capitalism. Beyond this, the work 
of Deleuze and Guattari was also chosen because of how, through their concept of 
desubjectivation via ‘becoming-animal,’ they provide an alternative perspective to the 
anthropocentrism propagated by the cosmological dimension of the DSP. And accordingly, 
these features of their work were explored and elaborated upon. However, employing the 
work of Deleuze in the above regard entailed a number of theoretical challenges that had to 
be engaged with and thought through.  
That is, while the immensely productive concepts mentioned above were forged in the 
1960s, 1970s and 1980s, and were imbued with an optimism that different, more affirmative 
modes of being – or rather becoming – in the world were possible, by the early 1990s, 
information technology had begun to emerge as the means through which the future of 
communication, trade and other exchange would occur. This development was viewed very 
dimly by Deleuze. As discussed, in his 1990 text “Postscript on Control Societies,” Deleuze 
expressed significant concern over the emergence of information technologies, because of 
their correlative negative impact on the generation of difference. Moreover, many of the 
charges laid against the emerging digital societies by Deleuze have been reflected in the 
works of a number of contemporary theorists, who are least partially correct in their 
identification of the many problematic dynamics associated with developments relating to 
information technology. At the same time, the counterweight to such concern, namely 
Deleuze’s concept of counter-information, was thematized. That is, although Deleuze never 
developed the idea significantly, when asked about how the hegemony of a digital society of 
control could be resisted, he responded by advancing the idea of counter-information. And he 
furthermore suggested that viral contamination and piracy constituted two forms of such 
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counter-information. With regard to the idea of virus, certain contemporary theorists have 
been quick to seize on related possibilities, equating Deleuze’s suggestion with their 
elaboration on the counter-information of error within digital code and in institutional 
response to new digital practices. But in addition to this, at this point the focus also shifted to 
the individual contribution of Guattari, and specifically his idea of post-media. This was, 
firstly, because it provided elaboration on Deleuze’s suggestion of piracy as a form of 
counter-information, and secondly, because it evinced optimism on Guattari’s part that if 
accessed thoughtfully, information technology could act as a potential conduit for the 
generation of difference. This position was then explored, both in terms of Guattari’s 
articulation of it, and in its reflection in contemporary theoretical consideration of 
information technology. What accordingly emerged was that, ironically, the many 
contemporary theorists who use Deleuzoguattarian concepts in their analysis of the potential 
of information technology to precipitate desubjectivation, actually access these concepts 
through a Guattarian sensibility. But beyond this, in their assertions that information 
technology has the capacity to engender affirmative change, they also tend to overlook a key 
aspect of Deleuze’s conceptions of difference, desire and becoming, namely his insistence 
that the generation of difference includes a durational component.  
With a view to engaging with the latter issue, the durational aspect of difference was 
then focused upon, which required specific consideration of Deleuze’s individual work on 
three thinkers who deeply informed his conception of durational difference, namely 
Nietzsche, Proust, and Bergson. What emerged from an overview of Deleuze’s work on these 
three thinkers was that the generation of affirmative, transformative experiences consistently 
included a deep awareness of, and engagement with, time. Next, the focus turned to 
Deleuze’s two mammoth works on analog cinema, because this constituted the first time in 
which he applied his conception of durational difference to a technological phylum. For 
Deleuze, such cinema could be deeply transformative because of its ability to reflect and 
reflect upon duration, and to precipitate analogous reflection on the part of the viewer. 
However, while this may have been applicable to analog cinema, the prominent Deleuzian 
scholar, David Rodowick, argued that because the digital involves a different informational 
ontology, digital cinema – and by extension, other digital artefacts from games to mobile 
applications – could not communicate duration. After thematizing his ideas in this regard, the 
counter-weight position of two equally prominent Deleuzian thinkers, Brian Massumi and 
Ronald Bogue, was explored. That is, while Massumi argued that the digital cannot be 
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extricated from its analog context, Bogue pointed out that the production of non-dogmatic 
thought and new connections is dependent on aesthetic dynamics, before any dependency on 
technological means through which the aesthetic is produced. 
Against the backdrop of the above, in the final chapter, three digital artefacts were 
examined in terms of the durational exchange they facilitate. Accordingly, while the iconic 
1990s Tamagotchi served as a testament to Deleuze’s deep concerns over the continuous 
control exerted by digitality, and was correlatively categorized as involving first-order hybrid 
durationality, the free-to-play multi-platform adventure game Botanicula proved to be far less 
nefarious in this regard. And for the creative possibility it entailed, it was deemed to be an 
example of second-order hybrid durationality. Yet, although it constituted a thoughtful 
engagement with nature – akin to the work of Uexküll – it nevertheless ultimately entailed 
the user being propelled forward in time within an enclosed digital system. This contrasted 
with the third-order hybrid durationality of the shark tracking applications, Shark Net and 
Ocearch. In this regard, it was argued that, Shark Net, in conjunction with the more recently 
launched Ocearch, through their utilization of a wide range of technologies, on account of 
their employment of an open unpredictable variable – namely the living shark – and in their 
related facilitation of a connection in time between shark and human via a digital platform, 
comprise something altogether different than either of the two above digital artefacts. 
Something which approximates a digital becoming-animal and which – on account of the 
scale of the project, its ‘nomadic’ dynamics, and its increasing imbrication with the formal 
education sector – stands to be immensely transformative. 
The newness of such an experience must be underscored. Who could have possibly 
imagined – even ten years ago – that one could receive a ping from a shark, unwittingly 
informing one of its continued duration, its continued movement-in-time, on a cell phone that 
would have the capacity to perform any number of additional functions, from producing 
digitized video clips that one can embed into a messaging service, to storing and searching 
through entire philosophical tomes. That is, information technology has produced – and 
continues to produce – new kinds of exchanges, and the effects of these exchanges, along 
with the exchanges that will become possible in the future, remain indeterminate.  
However, against the backdrop of the above exploration of both Shark Net and 
Ocearch through a Deleuzoguattarian lens, and the connections to the environment they 
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facilitate, there are some recommendations that can be made in order to improve the potential 
efficacy of such nomadic war machines. 
Firstly, the charge of anthropomorphism was only hesitantly levelled against the apps 
in the final chapter. This was because of how the tendency on the part of the two trackers to 
name their sharks – although comprising an explication of a Suicidal/Catatonic Body without 
Organs – could also constitute reflection of immaturity, which requires space and time to 
mature, not condemnation that might prevent such maturation from taking place. Yet one 
cannot help shake the thought that this domestication does indeed detract from the other-
worldly element of the encounter. And even if one concedes that it is not the naming of the 
sharks that is the crux of the problem, the extension of that now-named entity into the realm 
of social media – a secondary feature of both applications – remains a troubling aspect. This 
is because via the Facebook pages and Twitter accounts, the domestication – or 
Oedipalization – of what could have been a mysterious and personally transformative 
encounter with an animal ‘other,’ occurs. In effect, some person monopolizes the pings of 
one of the tagged animals through being the first to open up a Twitter account, or a Facebook 
page, for it, so that subsequently, instead of encountering the time of a shark, one encounters 
the appropriation of its time by one person. And through such means, what was a silent, 
unsettling, and potentially reflective exchange in time – via a digital platform – becomes 
replaced by the reflections of one person’s Oedipal desires, and the babble of, for instance, 
the Twittersphere, through which collectively any unsettling possibilities are settled in the 
most parochial terms. 
 Secondly, the technological limitations of the applications particularly as they relate 
to time, remain an issue. While the popular debate over the accuracy of time-signatures, and 
the implications of this, were thematized for what they communicated about the importance 
for people of the durational features of the digital connection, it must be noted that the 
applications even now do not provide a seamless exchange between animal and human, on 
account of an interface that is sluggish, and often plagued by error. In itself this is an 
interesting point. As advanced by the recent theorists who wrote on the breakdown of digital 
exchange in support of Deleuze’s assertion concerning counter-information, the breakdowns 
in both the Shark Net and Ocearch interfaces demonstrate adequately that there is as yet no 
such thing as an all-encompassing digital society of control. That is, while information 
technology has undoubtedly altered all sorts of relations profoundly, and while it does both 
enhance and impinge on our lives in a plethora of ways, to view it as a system of relations, 
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seamless and perfectly efficient in integration and operation, would be an error. But in terms 
of the tracker applications, ironically, only the efficient extension of control society dynamics 
to the ocean will be able to facilitate the durational counter-information currently desired by 
devotees of Shark Net and Ocearch.  
 Yet, if this is pursued, other related possibilities will conceivably emerge. As 
discussed, Stale Stenslie in Virtual Touch: A study of the use and experience of touch in 
artistic, multimodal and computer-based environments, details the possibilities of developing 
haptic (or kinaesthetic) technologies associated with the digital. And one should consider that 
the additional dynamic of simulating touch within a digital exchange in time between animal 
and human, stands to open up an entire new field of possibilities, the philosophical 
implications of which cannot even be imagined at present. After all, while haptic technology 
is something many of us are already used to – the feedback received from one’s hand 
movement on a smartphone operates via this technology of touch, vibration, motion, and 
force – to apply it to an application such as Shark Net or Ocearch in a far more sophisticated 
manner could facilitate a move beyond a mere signal from the other side of the oceanic 
mirror, as it were, toward an approximation of an actual brief, fleeting contact with the 
animal ‘other.’  
 One should also consider that the virtual reality headset moved very recently from 
popular imagination to tangible reality with the launch of the Oculus Rift earlier this year. 
And it is worth noting, before looking at the potential of such a three-dimensional device 
being employed in the service of enhancing connections between animal and human, that the 
device was initially developed around 2012 by an independent company through the crowd-
funding website, Kickstarter. Admittedly, this independent company was subsequently 
bought out by Facebook in 2014, but the monopolizing tendencies of tech-giants 
notwithstanding, it is important to note that the initial desire for such a product was from the 
public, who collaboratively funded the aforementioned independent company in their 
endeavour to develop the device.  Thus, while Facebook capitalized on the monetary 
potential of the device, its point of genesis was not this social media monolith. The device is, 
as its tag ‘virtual reality headset’ suggests, a contraption that one places over one’s head, 
which closes off one’s sight, and to a lesser extent, one’s hearing, from outside distraction, to 
facilitate a far more immersive experience, insofar as one enters into the virtual environment 
presented. Applied to something like Shark Net or Ocearch, again, the generation of new 
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connecting experiences in terms of the relation between animal and human, is certain, and the 
philosophical implications of this stand to be manifold.    
  On a closing note, any such coming-together of information technologies and the 
environment will yield new connections, but whether or not they will be affirmative remains 
to be seen. Yet in going forward, it is important to remember the idea generated by a 
Deleuzoguattarian theoretical approach to any development, namely that in time everything 
has the capacity for change. Similarly, to dismiss the idea that information technology has the 
potential to participate positively in addressing the environmental crisis – despite being 
compromised by its current material cost – is not only to disregard an immense domain of 
possibility, but also to construe the people who develop and access it as static beings devoid 
of the capacity for an affirmative engagement with the life around them. This is controverted 
every day by creative inventions on the part of creative people who seek connections not only 
with each other, but also more recently with the animal ‘other,’ in ways that poignantly 
evince their status as a people yet to come. 
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